In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Brad Stevens.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1879

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Brad Stevens.

Filed June 2, 2025
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Commitment Appeal Panel
File No. AP23-9079

Daniel S. Kufus, Steinhagen, Crist, Wehrly, & Kufus, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant Brad Stevens)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Aaron Winter, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Human Services)

Stephen O’Keefe, Goodhue County Attorney, Red Wing, Minnesota (for respondent
Goodhue County)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the judicial appeal panel’s first-phase denial of his petition for
discharge, provisional discharge or transfer, from his indeterminate civil commitment to
the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person. Because

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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appellant failed to present prima facie evidence entitling him to provisional discharge, or
discharge, and because he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is
entitled to a transfer, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Brad Ronald Stevens was indeterminately civilly committed to the MSOP
as a sexually dangerous person in 2005. This is Stevens’s fifth appeal involving his civil
commitment. In his first two appeals, we affirmed the district court’s denial of his motions
for dismissal. See In re Commitment of Stevens, No. A10-1554, 2011 WL 691855 (Minn.
App. Mar. 1, 2011) (affirming the denial of a motion to vacate commitment), rev. granted
(Minn. May 17, 2011) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Aug. 18, 2011); In re Commitment of
Stevens, No. A15-2054, 2016 WL 3376062 (Minn. App. June 20, 2016) (affirming the
denial of a motion for injunctive relief). In his third and fourth appeals, we affirmed the
appeal panel’s denials of Stevens’ petitions for discharge. See In re Civ. Commitment of
Stevens, No. A17-0716 (Minn. App. Sept. 5, 2017) (affirming dismissal of a petition for a
full discharge); In re Commitment of Stevens, No. A21-0270, 2021 WL 3852781 (Minn.
App. Aug. 30, 2021) (affirming the dismissal of a petition for provisional or full discharge).
In February 2022, Stevens petitioned the Special Review Board ( SRB) for a full
discharge, a provisional discharge, or a transfer to community preparation services (CPS).
The Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services and Goodhue County opposed the
petition. The SRB recommended that the appeal panel deny Stevens’s petition. Stevens
petitioned the appeal panel for rehearing and reconsideration of his petition.
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Stevens presented testimony from four witnesses: the director of the MSOP
forensic-evaluation department, the MSOP forensic evaluator, the MSOP clinical
supervisor, and himself. The parties stipulated to all 20 exhibits, which included 11 from
Stevens and nine from the commissioner. Stevens’s exhibits consisted of letters from
clergy in the Church of Scientology as well as the results of assignments he completed for
the church. The commissioner’s exhibits included the appeal -panel-appointed doctor’s
“Focused Review Report” that recommended denial of Stevens’ petition, along with other
medical reports from his treatment team.
At the close of Stevens’s case, the commissioner and county move d for dismissal
pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b). In its order, the appeal panel concluded that, as to
discharge, Stevens failed to allege a prima facie case that he is entitled to a full or
provisional discharge. The appeal panel also concluded that, as to his transfer request,
Stevens failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that transfer is appropriate.
Stevens appeals.1
DECISION
A person who is committed as a sexually dangerous person may petition the SRB
for a reduction in custody. Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 2 (202 4). In the event of an
adverse ruling from the SRB , the committed person may seek a rehearing and
reconsideration from the appeal panel. Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1(a) (2024). Once
the committed person completes presentation of evidence in support of the petition, the

1 Goodhue County did not participate in this appeal.
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commissioner may move to dismiss the petition pursuant to rule 41.02(b) of the rules of
civil procedure. See Coker v. Jesson, 831 N.W.2d 483, 489-91 (Minn. 2013) (addressing
motions to dismiss in the context of petitions for discharge).
The statutory burdens placed on committed persons petitioning for a discharge or a
provisional discharge are different from those put on committed persons petitioning for
transfer. Thus, different standards apply when a commitment appeal panel evaluates
whether the petitioner made a prima facie case for the relief sought. See Foster v. Jesson,
857 N.W.2d 545, 548-49 (Minn. App. 2014) (addressing these differences). On a petition
for discharge or provisional discharge, the committed person “bears the burden of going
forward with the evidence, which means presenting a prima facie case with competent
evidence to show that the person is entitled to the requested relief.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.28,
subd. 2(d) (2024). The burden on the committed person is a “burden of production,” not
persuasion. Coker, 831 N.W.2d at 486. On a motion to dismiss a discharge petition at the
close of the petitioner’s case, the appeal panel must “view the evidence . . . in a light most
favorable to the committed person.” Id. at 491.
By contrast, on a petition for transfer, the person seeking the transfer has the burden
of establishing “by a preponderance of the evidence that transfer is appropriate.” Minn.
Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(e) (2024). The committed person’s burden on a petition for
transfer is thus one of both production and persuasion. Foster, 857 N.W.2d at 548. As a
result of these two different types of burdens in proceedings before the appeal panel, we
review the grant of a commissioner’s motion to dismiss a discharge petition de novo, while
we review the findings of fact relating to a transfer petition for clear error. Id.
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Petition for Discharge and Provisional Discharge
Because our de novo review leads us to conclude that Stevens’s petition does not
meet the burden of production of evidence sufficient to support a provisional discharge,
and he therefore cannot meet his burden of production supporting a full discharge, we begin
and end with our consideration of his provisional-discharge petition.
A provisional discharge requires that the committed person be “capable of making
an acceptable adjustment to open society.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 1(a) (2024).
Additionally, the following factors must be considered when evaluating a petition for
provisional discharge:
(1) whether the committed person’s course of treatment
and present mental status indicate there is no longer a need for
treatment and supervision in the committed person’s current
treatment setting; and
(2) whether the conditions of the provisional discharge
plan will provide a reasonable degree of protection to the
public and will enable the committed person to adjust
successfully to the community.

Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 1(b) (2024).
As we noted, the committed person “bears the burden of going forward with the
evidence, which means presenting a prima facie case with competent evidence to show that
the person is entitled to the requested relief.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(d). To satisfy
this burden, the committed person must produce evidence that, if unopposed, would satisfy
the criteria for provisional discharge. Larson v. Jesson, 847 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App.
2014). During the first-phase hearing, the appeal panel must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the committed person. Coker, 831 N.W.2d at 491. And the appeal panel
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may consider only the evidence produced by the committed person. In re Civ. Commitment
of Poole, 921 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2019). Failure
to assert a prima facie case may warrant dismissal of the petition under Minn. R. Civ. P.
41.02(b). Coker, 831 N.W.2d at 489.
Based upon evidence stipulated to by the parties, the appeal panel received evidence
from the MSOP treatment team that Stevens has refused to take part in any recommended
sex-offender treatment.2 As a result, Stevens’s treatment team cannot determine whether
Stevens understands the circumstances surrounding his sexual misconduct which led to his
commitment. For example, Stevens refuses to discuss his criminal offenses and instead
talks generally about how his alcohol use may have contributed to his criminal acts.
Therefore, his treatment team maintains that he remains in need of such treatment.
The only evidence Stevens presented was his own testimony in which he suggests
that, because he completed assignments through the Church of Scientology, he has
successfully taken part in appropriate treatment. But, by itself, this self-serving testimony
does not demonstrate that Stevens is “capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open
society.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 1(a). A person requesting provisional discharge
must offer something beyond their own self- serving testimony to demonstrate that their
treatment needs and risk meet the statutory criteria. See Poole, 921 N.W.2d at 68 (holding

2 For purposes of this appeal, we assume evidence a petitioner stipulates to be admissible
can be considered by an appeal panel when addressing whether the petitioner made a prima
facie case for discharge or provisional discharge.
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that uncorroborated conclusory assertions by a client are insufficient to avoid a motion to
dismiss). Therefore, Stevens has not satisfied his burden of production.
The appeal panel concluded that, viewing the evidence submitted by Stevens and
the evidence to which the parties stipulated in a light most favorable to Stevens, he failed
to present a prima facia case showing that he is entitled to a provisional discharge. Our de
novo review of the record leads us to conclude that the appeal panel correctly denied
Stevens’s petition for provisional discharge.
Because Stevens does not make a prima facie case for provisional discharge, he
cannot meet a prima facie case for a full discharge. See Larson, 847 N.W.2d at 535-36
(holding that the provisional discharge criteria is more lenient than that for a full discharge).
Transfer to CPS
Under the clear-error standard of review, it is not proper for appellate courts to
reweigh the evidence; rather, the appellate court’s role is to review “the record to confirm
that evidence exists to support the decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021). This court defers to the appeal panel’s evaluation of expert
testimony. See In re Civ. Commitment of Fugelseth, 907 N.W.2d 248, 256 (Minn. App.
2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018).
“In evaluating whether a petitioner has demonstrated the appropriateness of transfer
by a preponderance of the evidence, the panel must address the statutory factors.” Foster,
857 N.W.2d at 549 (quotation omitted). The factors are:
(1) the person’s clinical progress and present treatment needs;
(2) the need for security to accomplish continuing treatment;
(3) the need for continued institutionalization;
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(4) which other treatment program can best meet the person’s
needs; and
(5) whether transfer can be accomplished with a reasonable
degree of safety for the public.

Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b)(1)-(5) (2024).
The appeal panel considered the statutory factors and determined that Stevens did
not “demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that transfer to CPS is appropriate
according to the statutory factors.” The appeal panel noted that Stevens’ “current clinical
progress and present treatment needs are best met in his current setting,” and that he
“continues to require the level of security and institutionalization with the MSOP.” The
record supports the appeal panel’s findings and determination.
As to our review of the statutory factors and the record, we summarize the factors
in two categories. The first category comprises evidence relating to clinical progress,
present need for treatment, and the treatment program best suiting Stevens’s needs. See
Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b)(1), (4). The second category comprises evidence relating
to Stevens’s need for security to accomplish continuing treatment, need for continued
institutionalization, and whether transfer can be accomplished with a reasonable degree of
safety. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b)(2), (3), (5).
Clinical Progress and Treatment Needs
The record supports the appeal panel’s finding that Stevens is a nonparticipant in
the MSOP treatment program. According to t he treatment team’s report, Stevens has not
participated in treatment since 2005 except for a brief six-month period in 2021.
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The treatment team expressed concerns that, because Stevens has not completed
treatment, he currently does not understand the impact his criminal acts have had on his
victims, which is necessary for a successful rehabilitation. Therefore, the treatment team
concluded that Stevens continues to need treatment as recommended by the MSOP
program.
Security, Need for Institutionalization, and Public Safety
As part of its determination that Stevens continues to need treatment in a secured
facility to satisfy concerns for public safety, the appeal panel relied, in part, on the forensic
examination of Stevens by one of his treating doctors. The doctor opined that Stevens does
not meet the criteria for a transfer to CPS, presents a risk for sexual recidivism, and needs
to remain in a secure facility for purposes of public safety. This opinion is consistent with
the opinion provided by the court-appointed examiner who opined that Stevens does not
meet the statutory criteria for transfer, has had no meaningful participation in the
evidence-based treatment program at MSOP, and therefore must remain in a secure setting.
Stevens testified that he disagrees with the treatment team’s findings and
recommendations, but summarily disagreeing with the findings and recommendations is
insufficient evidence to support a transfer. See Poole, 921 N.W.2d at 68 (holding that
uncorroborated conclusory assertions by a client are insufficient to avoid a motion to
dismiss).
In sum, the appeal panel evaluated the evidence relevant to transfer with the
statutory factors listed in Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b). Because the record supports
the appeal panel’s findings and determination that the preponderance of the evidence does
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not support a transfer to CPS, the appeal panel did not clearly err in denying Stevens’ s
petition for transfer.
Finally, we address Stevens’s main argument regarding the appeal panel’s denial of
his petition for a reduction in custody. Stevens claims that the appeal panel did not properly
consider that he is a member of the Church of Scientology which, as suggested by the
Scientology clergy letters, does not believe it is appropriate to participate in any form of
group therapy as recommended by the MSOP.
Stevens does not claim that the commitment statute is unconstitutional. Instead, he
argues that the appeal panel did not recognize his right to refuse the recommended
sex-offender treatment when it violates his religious beliefs and when considering his
requested relief. We are not persuaded.
The record demonstrates that the appeal panel explicitly considered Stevens’s
religious practice. Stevens testified at length about his membership with the Church of
Scientology and his beliefs. And the appeal panel received several exhibits detailing the
Church of Scientology and its beliefs as it relates to sex-offender treatment. However, the
appeal panel also heard from Stevens’s treatment team that they have attempted to find
commonalities between his religious beliefs and the treatment goals of MSOP and that
those attempts have been resisted by Stevens. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 (“We have
repeatedly stated that clear-error review does not permit an appellate court to ‘weigh the
evidence as if trying the matter de novo .’”). Therefore, the appeal panel considered
Stevens’s concerns as it relates to his religious beliefs but, as noted, carefully considered
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the evidence which supports its determination that Stevens failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that he is entitled to a transfer.
Affirmed.