In the Matter of the Application of Janet T. Lamkin, to Register the Title to Certain Land.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1892

In the Matter of the Application of Janet T. Lamkin,
to Register the Title to Certain Land.

Filed July 14, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Bentley, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CV-20-94

Patrick J. Neaton, Neaton & Puklich, PLLP, Chanhassen, Minnesota (for appellant Janet T.
Lamkin)

Susan M. Tindal, Andrew A. Wolf, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
respondent Waconia Township)

Brian T. Grogan, Kelly C. Engebretson, Aaron P. Minster, Moss & Barnett, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Jaguar Communications, LLC)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
Respondent Waconia Township established a public highway by dedication over
appellant Janet T. Lamkin’s private road, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 160.05,
subdivision 1(a) (2024).
1 The issue on appeal regards the width of that highway. Under the

1 We apply the most recent version of the statutes in this opinion because the statutes have
not been amended in relevant part. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of
2
belief that the width extends beyond the paved surface of the road, the township authorized
an internet service company, respondent Jaguar Communications, LLC, to bury a fiber line
alongside the highway . Lamkin then commenced a proceeding to register title to the
property and sought a determination terminating or modifying the township and Jaguar’s
interest in the property.
The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the township
and Jaguar after determining that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the
width of the dedicated public highway and that the township did not exceed its authority in
authorizing Jaguar to install a fiber line along the highway because the line is located within
the highway’s boundaries. We disagree that the grant of summary judgment was
appropriate because there exists a genuine issue of material fact. We therefore reverse and
remand.
FACTS
Lamkin owns and lives on a lakefront property (homestead) on North Shore Road
in Carver County. Lamkin and her late husband, Allan, purchased the first portion of the
homestead in 1965.2 Today, the homestead is about 70 acres and comprised of five parcels
of land that the Lamkins acquired over time. Lamkin’s son, James, also lives on the
homestead.

Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts
apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case”).

2 Because Janet Lamkin and Allan Lamkin share a surname, this opinion refers to Janet
Lamkin as Lamkin and Allan Lamkin as Allan.
3
In January 2020, Lamkin initiated a proceeding under Minnesota Statutes
section 508.11 (2024), or “the Torrens system,” to register title to the homestead. Hebert
v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Minn. 2008); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 508.11,
.12 (2024). The township and Jaguar were named as defendants in connection with
Lamkin’s application because they appeared to hold interests that might affect Lamkin’s
registration for title to the homestead. Specifically, the application stated that the township
“purports to have a 66-foot roadway easement for North Shore Road,” which Lamkin
disputed. In turn, Jaguar had “installed underground cable on [the homestead] and it
purports to have the right to do so pursuant to the [township’s] roadway easement for North
Shore Road. [Lamkin] contests the validity of that easement.”
The issue on appeal is narrow. Lamkin acknowledges “that North Shore Road is a
Township road that has been established.” The dispute is over the width of the township’s
right-of-way. That is because, as discussed later, the township is entitled to a right-of-way
for only the width of actual use. In turn, it could have authorized Jaguar to install a fiber
line alongside the highway only if that area falls within the right-of-way, as determined by
the width of actual use.
The relevant facts, presented in the light most favorable to Lamkin, the nonmoving
party, and additional procedural history follow. See STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson,
L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002) (noting that appellate courts “ view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
granted”).
4
North Shore Road
Running along the north shore of Lake Waconia, North Shore Road crosses many
lakefront properties, including Lamkin’s. The road has been there since around the 1880s.
The stretch of the road that cuts through the homestead is about 500-feet long, and its
pavement is 20-feet wide. The road has a centerline but does not have lines delineating its
outer edges.
In 1985, the township sought to adopt a town road map that established North Shore
Road as a public road. See Minn. Stat. § 164.35 (2024) (describing process for recording a
“town road map”). After the township notified all residents with properties abutting the
road of its intent to do so, Allan sent the township two letters opposing its proposal for
North Shore Road to “be deemed 66.00 feet in width pursuant to and in accordance with
[Minn. Stat. § 160.04], 33.00 feet on each side of the . . . described center lines.” Allan
noted that the township had “maintained the traveled surface of the road only along the
northwest shore,” the road “had no shoulders,” and the township was entitled to only the
width of the road that is “needed and ha[s] actually been used to support and maintain the
traveled portion.” Despite Allan’s assertion that the township’s filing “should be limited to
the traveled (gravel) portion of the road” and that the township “go[es] beyond that line at
[its] peril,” the town road map was recorded on October 14, 1985.
Since then, the township has maintained the road without objection by the Lamkin
family. The township “generally completes larger maintenance projects on a five or ten
year schedule,” including a crack sealing project in 1999 and a chip sealing project in 2009.
The township’s “routine practice with respect to maintenance of [t]own roads” entails
5
“regular periodic grading and dust guard application (where requested by area residents),
certain activities specific to paved roads, such as pothole, joint, and asphalt milling,
patching, and sealing, [and] other activities applicable to all roads, such as snow plowing
and aggregate shouldering repairs.” It also includes tree trimming and removal, grass
mowing, and maintaining culverts, which are necessary for proper drainage on the road
and nearby properties.
In the winter months, the township plows snow from North Shore Road. The
snowplow operator for the township affirmed that snow removal involves “plow[ing] it a
few feet off of . . . the outer edge of the paved portion” of the road. He explained that he
“can catch the whole width of the road with [the snowplow],” which causes snow to “fl[y]
past the [snowplow].” The equipment and methods that the snowplow operator uses to
plow snow depends on “[t]he conditions of how much snow [they have] had,” and in his
estimation, the distance that the snow flies “can vary . . . but 20 feet is not out of the
question.” He was also “sure it can throw 20, 30 feet.” In some areas, however, the trees
on the homestead “prevent[] the [t]ownship plows from pushing or throwing snow further
onto the [homestead].” The snowplow operator recalled asking Allan on one occasion
whether he could plow the snow on the homestead, to which Allan responded, “[Y]eah, it’s
fine. That’s what . . . the shoulders are for, to get the snow off.”
The Lamkins have also maintained both sides of the traveled, or paved, portion of
North Shore Road by “leveling those areas, filling holes, planting grass, and creating
attractive lawn areas right up to the outer edges of the traveled portions of [the road].” They
have “plant[ed] numerous trees on both sides of the traveled portions of North Shore
6
Road,” which form a loose fence-like boundary along the areas past the edges of the paved
road. They have also “mow[ed] the grass right up to the outer edge of the traveled
pavement, remove[d] branches and other debris, and repair[ed] the lawn.”
Jaguar’s Installation of Fiber Line
In April and May 2018, Jaguar applied for two permits from the township, seeking
to install a 3,000-foot fiber line under North Shore Road. As a “telecommunications right-
of-way user” and an authorized competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC), Jaguar has a
statutory right to “construct, maintain, and operate small wireless facilities, conduit, cable,
switches, and related appurtenances and facilities along, across, upon, above, and under
any public right-of- way,” Minn. Stat. § 237.163, subd. 2 (2024), subject to certain
regulations and statutory requirements.
Around that time, Jaguar contacted the Lamkin family to inform them that part of
the fiber line would be installed under the stretch of North Shore Road running through the
homestead. The Lamkins “told Jaguar . . . that Waconia Township’s right-of-way for North
Shore Road did not extend past the outer portions of the paved and traveled segments of
North Shore Road, and that [Jaguar] would need an easement . . . to install or maintain [the
fiber line].” Jaguar “seemed to ignore the . . . objections,” and the Lamkins did not take
any further action.
Eventually, the township approved Jaguar’s permit applications, and Jaguar
installed the fiber line within the public right-of-way easement that the township believes
it has. The subterranean fiber line runs no more than 25 feet from the road’s centerline and
enables Jaguar to provide internet service to about 30 customers living on North Shore
7
Road, including the Lamkins. In March 2023, Jaguar learned about Lamkin’s Torrens
application contesting the validity of Jaguar’s easement to install and maintain its fiber line
adjacent to the portion of North Shore Road on the homestead.
The township and Jaguar filed answers to Lamkin’s Torrens application, and then
both the township and Jaguar moved for summary judgment in January 2024. The township
argued that the undisputed facts showed the township had acquired a 66-foot right-of-way
over North Shore Road on two independent grounds—common- law dedication, whereby a
landowner can expressly or impliedly dedicate private property for use as a public road,
and statutory dedication under Minnesota Statutes section 160.05 (2024). Jaguar argued
that it has a statutory right to construct and operate its fiber line along public roads and, as
long as the township had a right-of-way over North Shore Road, Jaguar acted within that
right by installing the fiber line beneath the portion of the road on the homestead. Jaguar
also raised laches as a separate, independent basis for summary judgment.
On May 13, 2024, the district court filed an order granting respondents’ motions for
summary judgment. Relevant here, the district court determined that there was no genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether the township had established actual use of a 62-
foot-wide right-of-way for a continuous period of six years, as required by Minnesota
Statutes section 160.05. The district court relied on deposition testimony that the township
at times throws snow 20 feet from the edge of the pavement and determined that the
township’s “actual use” therefore extends to that range—31 feet from the road’s centerline,
for a total width of 62 feet. And because it was undisputed that Jaguar’s fiber line fell
within 25 feet of the centerline, the district court also concluded that Jaguar was entitled to
8
maintain its fiber line along the recognized public right- of-way on North Shore Road.
Accordingly, the district court denied and dismissed the portion of Lamkin’s application
challenging the validity of the township and Jaguar’s easement on the homestead.
The district court filed an order and decree of registration, subject to the township’s
62-foot-wide right-of-way over the portion of North Shore Road running through the
homestead and Jaguar’s resulting easement.
Lamkin appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts “review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo.”
Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010).
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R.
Civ. P. 56.01. Our review requires us to determine “ whether the district court properly
applied the law and whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary
judgment.” Riverview, 790 N.W.2d at 170. In doing so, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, Lamkin). STAR Ctrs., Inc., 644 N.W.2d at
76-77. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence regarding
an essential element to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” St. Paul
Park Refining Co. v. Domeier, 950 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 2022) (quotations omitted). A
fact is “material” if “its resolution will affect the outcome of the case.” Sayer v. Minn .
Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.W.2d 151, 162 (Minn. 2010).
9
Lamkin argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of the township and Jaguar because there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
the width of the dedicated highway based on the township’s actual use. The township and
Jaguar maintain that summary judgment was appropriate because there is no genuine
dispute that the width of the highway is 62 feet and includes the fiber line. We first address
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the township and then turn to the issues
on summary judgment as they pertain to Jaguar.
I
Under Minnesota law, “[w]hen any road or portion of a road has been used and kept
in repair and worked for at least six years continuously as a public highway by a road
authority, it shall be deemed dedicated to the public to the width of the actual use.” Minn.
Stat. § 160.05, subd. 1(a). In such cases, the road will “be and remain, until lawfully
vacated, a public highway whether it has ever been established as a public highway or not.”
Id. The dedication of a road by public use is limited “to the extent of actual use over the
statutory period.” Barfnecht v. Town Bd. of Hollywood Twp., 232 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Minn.
1975) (emphasis added). But that does not necessarily limit “[t]he width of the prescriptive
easement . . . to that portion of the road actually traveled.” Id. The width may include areas
such as “the shoulders and ditches that are needed and [that] have actually been used to
support and maintain the traveled portion.” Id. “The boundary of a public highway acquired
by public use is a question of fact.” Id.
The township and Jaguar argue, and the district court agreed, that there is no genuine
dispute among the parties that the township, at times, throw s snow 20 feet from the edge
10
of the pavement. They maintain that such intermittent use of the land where the snow is
stored constitutes “actual use” of that land for purposes of establishing the width of the
public highway under section 160.05, subdivision 1(a). It follows, in their view, that there
is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the width of the public highway, so they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There are several problems with this argument.
First, Lamkin does dispute that the township regularly throws snow 20 feet from the
edge of the pavement during the winter months. Viewing the record in the light most
favorable to Lamkin, as we must, STAR Ctrs., Inc., 644 N.W.2d at 76-77, the snowplow
operator’s testimony establishes only that, in his estimation, snow being thrown or pushed
20 feet from the outer portion of the paved area of the North Shore Road is “not out of the
question.” But, according to the snowplow operator, that distance “can vary on the snow.”
His testimony illustrates that variability. On the one hand, he was “sure [the snowplow]
can throw [the snow] 20, 30 feet.” But he also estimated, based on photographs from a
certain year, that snow and ice was plowed only “three feet.” Another township employee
testified in his deposition that the snowplow operator told him the 20-foot estimate was
based on a “visual observation,” not an actual measurement, and that 20 feet was a
“maximum” distance that “varie[d] from one place to the other” and from year to year.
Lamkin maintains that the 20-foot estimate is not representative of typical snow
storage along the road and references evidence in the record from January 2024 when there
was less snowfall. Lamkin also points to record evidence that, in some areas along the road,
trees block the snow from flying as far as other places. And even the township
acknowledges that the 20-foot distance, which established the total width of 62-feet, is not
11
“an exact figure under all circumstances.” Considering the record as a whole in the light
most favorable to Lamkin, there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the
amount of land that the township actually uses to store plowed snow.
Second, even if there was no dispute that snow is intermittently thrown 20 feet from
the edge of the pavement, Lamkin disputes that the use of land in that way constitutes
“actual use” for purposes of establishing a public highway by dedication. Again, “[t] he
boundary of a public highway acquired by public use is a question of fact.” Barfnecht, 232
N.W.2d at 423. The township’s use of the land for snow storage may be relevant to a factual
determination as to what portion of the homestead was actually used for the public, but
neither the township nor Jaguar offer any support that intermittently storing snow on land
establishes actual use of that land as a matter of law. The township cites nonprecedential
opinions that suggest snowplowing can be relevant to fact-finding on actual use, but none
conclude that, as a matter of law, it is sufficient to establish actual use. See In re Twp.
Resol. 01-03 , No. A03 -1522, 2004 WL 1327280, at *2-3 (Minn. App. June 15, 2004)
(considering intermittent snowplowing for determination of actual use); Johnson v. City of
Shorewood, No. A06- 2353, 2008 WL 434680, at *13 (Minn. App. Feb. 19, 2008)
(concluding that township’s paving shoulder of a curb to temporarily store snow did not
constitute a taking); Theusch v. Berg, No. A07-848, 2008 WL 1972487, at *3 (Minn. App.
May 6, 2008) (affirming dedication of public road and supporting slopes based on
12
combination of regular road work and maintenance that included snowplowing), rev.
denied (Minn. July 15, 2008).3
The township also relies on Rivers v. Hennepin County, but that decision does not
support the premise that the storage of plowed snow is sufficient to establish actual use as
a matter of law. No. C4-90-21, 1990 WL 105926, at *2 (Minn. App. July 31, 1990). There,
we reversed a district court’s finding that the county established actual use by plowing
snow because “no witness for the county testified to the actual use for snowplowing,” so
the testimony amounted at most to “variable” and “speculative” evidence about “the actual
distance that snow may be thrown during snowplowing operations.” Id. Here, the
snowplow operator’s testimony provides some evidence about the actual distance that snow
travels. But Rivers does not suggest that the snowplow operator’s testimony is enough, in
itself, to resolve the factual question regarding the width of the dedicated highway.
Third, as our caselaw indicates, a fact-finder determining the width of the roadway
based on actual use must consider the totality of the circumstances. That includes an
assessment of the nature of the use and how often it is maintained. Norfolk Township v.
Joffer, 353 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Minn. App. 1984) (explaining that public use can be
established through “seasonal,” “sporadic[]” use established by “ a small number of
persons,” as well as maintenance that is “performed when necessary ” and does not cover
all parts of the road). Here, the fact-finder might consider the extent of land used to store
snow, the frequency of plowing to that extent, as well as other maintenance activity, such

3 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may be cited for their persuasive
value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
13
as any work performed on the culvert located in the disputed portion of North Shore Road.
See Leeper v. Hampton Hills, Inc., 187 N.W.2d 765, 768 (Minn. 1971) (considering totality
of similar record evidence). Weighing all relevant information, the fact-finder is tasked
with determining the boundary of the public road.
In sum, there exists a genuine dispute over the width of the township’s right-of-way
over North Shore Road such that the evidence, including the extent and frequency of the
township’s storage of plowed snow , “permit[s] reasonable persons to draw different
conclusions.” St. Paul Park Refining Co., 950 N.W.2d at 549 (quotation omitted). We
therefore conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
the township.
II
Next, we turn to the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Jaguar. Lamkin
concedes that, if the fiber line was installed within the boundary of the township’s right-
of-way, Jaguar has a valid interest in the property. We agree. There is no dispute that Jaguar
is a state-approved public utility service provider that is entitled to “construct, maintain,
and operate small wireless facilities, conduit, cable, switches, and related appurtenances
and facilities along, across, upon, above, and under any public right- of-way.” Minn. Stat.
§ 237.163, subd. 2. Thus, for the width of North Shore Road that the township can establish
actual use, the township has an easement for that public right -of-way, and it had the
authority to grant Jaguar’s permit to install the fiber line.
Lamkin also does not dispute Jaguar’s assertion that its fiber line is buried within
25 feet from the road’s centerline. That means, if the township establishes a right-of-way
14
that is at least 50 feet wide, then Jaguar’s fiber line would fall within that right-of-way. If,
on the other hand, the township’s right-of-way is less than 50 feet wide, Jaguar’s fiber line
may not fall within the right-of-way. As we explained above, the precise boundary of North
Shore Road acquired by public use presents a genuine issue of material fact. Rixmann, 723
N.W.2d at 495. Because the extent of Jaguar’s right turns on that same issue, the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Jaguar for the same reasons that
summary judgment in favor of the township was not appropriate.4
Reversed and remanded.

4 We note that Jaguar alternatively argues that it is entitled to summary judgment under the
doctrine of laches because Lamkin waited nearly three years after Jaguar applied for
permits to challenge Jaguar’s right to do so. Although we “may affirm a grant of summary
judgment if it can be sustained on any grounds,” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817
N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012), we may decline to consider alternative grounds for
summary judgment that the district court did not address, see Monson v. Suck, 855 N.W.2d
323, 329-30 (Minn. App. 2014) (declining to address on appeal alternative arguments that
the district court did not address in the first instance), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 30, 2014).
On remand, the district court should determine in the first instance whether Jaguar is
entitled to summary judgment on this alternative ground.