Laurissa Wredberg v. Canvas Health, Inc.
Also decided on this docket: Minn. Ct. App., June 23, 2025
Opinion text
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A24-1897
Court of Appeals Procaccini, J.
Laurissa Wredberg,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: August 12, 2026
Office of Appellate Courts
Canvas Health, Inc.,
Respondent.
________________________
Pamela Spera, Eden Prairie, Minnesota, for appellant.
James Sherman, Wessels Sherman P.C., Bloomington, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________
SYLLABUS
1. The district court did not err in dismissing appellant’s whistleblower claim
under Minnesota Statutes section 181.932, subdivision 1(3), because the sexual-assault-
counselor privilege in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(k)—which
appellant alleges her employer ordered her to violate—applies only in an “action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive
evidence,” and appellant did not allege facts sufficient to show that she was ordered to
disclose information under such circumstances.
1
2. The district court did not err in dismissing appellant’s common-law claim
for wrongful discharge, because appellant premised her claim on a violation of the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(k),
and appellant’s amended complaint did not allege facts sufficient to show that disclosing
information to her employer would have violated that privilege.
Affirmed.
OPINION
PROCACCINI, Justice.
We are asked to determine whether a sexual assault counselor violates the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(k),
by disclosing information about a victim to the counselor’s employer without the victim’s
consent.1 Appellant Laurissa Wredberg, a sexual assault counselor, alleges that her former
employer, respondent Canvas Health, Inc. (Canvas), terminated her employment because
she refused orders to disclose information about a victim to her supervisors. Wredberg
sued Canvas, asserting a claim based on the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, Minnesota
Statutes section 181.932, subdivision 1(3), and a claim for wrongful discharge under the
common law. Wredberg grounds both claims on the premise that the disclosure of
information about the victim to her supervisors would have violated the sexual-assault-
counselor privilege. Canvas moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
1
We use the term “victim” throughout this opinion because that is the term used in
the statute containing the sexual-assault-counselor privilege.
2
relief can be granted. The district court granted Canvas’s motion, and the court of appeals
affirmed.
As presented by Wredberg on appeal, both of her claims rely on the premise that
disclosure of the information to her supervisors would have constituted an actual
violation of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Wredberg advocates for an
interpretation of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege that would prohibit all disclosures
of information related to a victim without the victim’s consent, regardless of the context
of such disclosures. But the plain language of the statute containing the sexual-assault-
counselor privilege—along with decades of our case law interpreting that statute—
demonstrates that the privilege is confined to disclosures in an “action or proceeding,
civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.”
Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1. Because Wredberg has not alleged that she was ordered to
disclose information “in court or before any person who has authority to receive
evidence,” she has not sufficiently alleged that a disclosure to her supervisors would have
violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. As a result, the district court did not err
when it dismissed Wredberg’s claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act or her claim
for common-law wrongful discharge. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
Because we are reviewing the district court’s decision to grant Canvas’s motion to
dismiss, we accept the allegations in Wredberg’s amended complaint as true and construe
all reasonable inferences in favor of Wredberg, the nonmoving party. See Halva v. Minn.
3
State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021). We therefore recite the facts as
they are alleged in Wredberg’s amended complaint.
Wredberg was employed as an Abuse Response Services Advocate at Canvas
Health, a nonprofit organization that provides mental healthcare services in Washington
County. She qualified as a “sexual assault counselor” for purposes of the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege under Minnesota Statutes section 595.02,
subdivision 1(k).2
Wredberg’s supervisors asked her to provide them with information regarding the
whereabouts of “a particular minor client/victim.” Her supervisors told her that the
information would be provided to “other members of the County” and was needed to
“ultimately jail the victim.” Wredberg’s supervisors also told her about calls that they had
received from a family member of the victim, law enforcement officers, the county
attorney’s office, and the county probation office, all of whom sought the victim’s
location and other information about the victim. Knowing that an arrest warrant had been
issued for the victim related to “a probation violation as a runaway,” Wredberg refused to
provide the information without her client’s consent. “Due to the information that [she]
2
We refer to the privilege afforded by Minnesota Statutes section 595.02,
subdivision 1(k), as the “sexual-assault-counselor privilege.” See generally In re Hope
Coalition, 977 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 2022) (using the same nomenclature). And we refer to
Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1, in general as “the privilege statute.”
For purposes of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege, a “[s]exual assault counselor” is
“a person who has undergone at least 40 hours of crisis counseling training and works
under the direction of a supervisor in a crisis center, whose primary purpose is to render
advice, counseling, or assistance to victims of sexual assault.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02,
subd. 1(k).
4
had received in her professional role about a criminal court having issued an arrest
warrant for the runaway victim/survivor,” Wredberg was concerned that the information
her supervisors were ordering her to disclose “would be used in criminal court
proceedings against the victim/survivor and that records [Wredberg] produced would also
be used in such proceedings against the victim/survivor.” Wredberg cited the statutory
sexual-assault-counselor privilege as the basis for her refusal to disclose the victim’s
information. According to Wredberg’s amended complaint, one of her supervisors
acknowledged that Canvas was “trying to get [Wredberg] to violate her legal and ethical
obligations to [her] client,” but the supervisor maintained that Wredberg “should [violate
those obligations] anyway.”
The day after they made their initial request, Wredberg’s supervisors called her to
a meeting where they again pressured her to disclose information about the victim. The
supervisors continued to make clear that Canvas was “working with other people who
were also not sexual assault counselors, including law enforcement, the county attorney’s
office, and the county probation office.” As a result, Wredberg grew more concerned that
any information she shared with her supervisors “would be used as evidence in criminal
proceedings against the victim/survivor without their consent.” She again refused to
disclose information about the victim, again citing the sexual-assault-counselor privilege.
Canvas never contended that Wredberg was incorrect in her assertion that she could not
legally share the information without the victim’s consent. When Wredberg’s supervisors
paused the meeting for a lunch break, a law enforcement officer called Wredberg directly,
asking her to disclose the whereabouts of the victim and threatening her with arrest if she
5
did not comply. Wredberg alleges that her supervisors “did nothing to help.” She refused
the officer’s request but was not arrested.
A few weeks later, Wredberg’s supervisors asked her to disclose information about
the victim for a third time. Again, Wredberg refused. Canvas then discharged Wredberg
from employment.
Wredberg sued Canvas, asserting two claims.
First, she alleged that Canvas violated the Minnesota Whistleblower Act,
Minnesota Statutes section 181.932. Although Wredberg’s amended complaint did not
cite a specific subdivision within section 181.932, there is no dispute that her claim is
based on subdivision 1(3),3 which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee
who refuses an employer’s order to perform an action when the employee has “an
objective basis in fact to believe” that the action “violates any state or federal law or rule
or regulation.” Wredberg alleged that disclosing information about the victim to Canvas
would have violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege set forth in Minnesota Statutes
section 595.02, subdivision 1(k). Wredberg did not identify any alternative “state or
federal law or rule or regulation” that would have been violated by the disclosure. See
Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(3).
3
In her amended complaint, Wredberg recites subdivision 1(3) nearly verbatim:
[The Whistleblower Act] prohibits an employer from discharging an
employee on the basis of the employee’s refusal of an employer’s order to
commit an illegal act when said employee informs the employer that the
order is being refused because he/she has an objective basis in fact to believe
that the ordered action violates state or federal laws or regulations.
6
Second, Wredberg asserted a common-law claim for wrongful discharge, citing
our opinion in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987). In
Phipps, we recognized a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge when an
employee is terminated from employment “for refusing to participate in an activity that
the employee, in good faith, believes violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation
adopted pursuant to law.” Id. at 571. In addition to citing Phipps, Wredberg’s amended
complaint also cited In re Hope Coalition, 977 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 2022), a case in which
we considered a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and emphasized the importance
of confidentiality between a victim and a sexual assault counselor. Wredberg’s amended
complaint alleged that Canvas’s decision to terminate her employment for refusing to
disclose information about a victim “contravene[d] a clear mandate of public policy to
protect the rights and safety of victims of sexual assault, including protection of victims’
privacy and confidential, sensitive information.”
Canvas moved to dismiss Wredberg’s amended complaint for failure to state a
claim under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e). The district court granted that
motion, dismissing both of Wredberg’s claims against Canvas, and the court of appeals
affirmed. Wredberg v. Canvas Health, Inc., No. A24-1897, 2025 WL 1733487, at *1
(Minn. App. June 23, 2025). Wredberg petitioned for further review as to the dismissal of
both of her claims, and we granted her petition.
ANALYSIS
The question before us is whether either of Wredberg’s claims should have
survived Canvas’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Minnesota Rule of
7
Civil Procedure 12.02(e). We review the grant of such a motion de novo and must
“determine whether the pleadings set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Abel v.
Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Minn. 2020). A claim survives a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12.02(e) “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced,
consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank,
N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014). When determining whether dismissal was
appropriate, we “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 500
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, we first
review Wredberg’s whistleblower claim before turning to her common-law claim for
wrongful discharge.
I.
As relevant to Wredberg’s whistleblower claim, the Minnesota Whistleblower Act
prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because “the employee refuses an
employer’s order to perform an action that the employee has an objective basis in fact to
believe violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law, and
the employee informs the employer that the order is being refused for that reason.” Minn.
Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(3).
Although we have never interpreted what it means for an employee to have “an
objective basis in fact to believe” under subdivision 1(3),4 the parties agree that
4
We have cited the phrase “objective basis in fact to believe” in Minnesota Statutes
section 181.932, subdivision 1(3), only twice, and we did not analyze its meaning in
8
Wredberg’s whistleblower claim depends on whether Wredberg’s disclosure of
information about the victim to her supervisors would have actually violated the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Wredberg does not contend that “an objective basis in
fact to believe” may require something less than being ordered to actually violate a law.5
Given the parties’ agreement and the lack of any briefing on the meaning of “an objective
basis in fact to believe,” we assume for the purposes of this case only—but do not
decide—that Wredberg’s whistleblower claim is contingent on her alleging that her
employer ordered her to actually violate the law.
We further note that Wredberg relies exclusively on the sexual-assault-counselor
privilege to support her claim that Canvas ordered her to violate the law. She does not
point to any other law, rule, or regulation governing the conduct of sexual assault
either instance. See Ford v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 874 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 2016);
Nelson v. Productive Alts., Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 455 n.2 (Minn. 2006).
5
The parties’ position on this point is consistent with the analyses of the district
court and court of appeals. Quoting Abraham v. Hennepin County, 639 N.W.2d 342, 355
(Minn. 2002), the district court explained that “to state a claim under [the Whistleblower
Act], ‘the alleged facts, if proven, would constitute a violation of the law or rule adopted
pursuant to law.’ ” And the court of appeals likewise held that “[t]o state a valid claim for
relief under the act, ‘the alleged facts, if proven, [must] constitute a violation of [a] law or
rule adopted pursuant to law.’ ” Wredberg, 2025 WL 1733487, at *2 (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 355). Although both courts
relied on Abraham, that opinion considered a different provision of the Whistleblower
Act. See 639 N.W.2d at 355 (interpreting subdivision 1(a) of the Whistleblower Act,
which is now labeled as subdivision 1(1)). Subdivisions 1(1) and 1(3) contain different
language. Compare Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1) (protecting an employee who in
“good faith, reports a violation, suspected violation, or planned violation”), with Minn.
Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(3) (protecting an employee who “refuses an employer’s order to
perform an action that the employee has an objective basis in fact to believe violates any
state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law”).
9
counselors.6 Accordingly, to assess Wredberg’s whistleblower claim, we consider whether
she has alleged that the disclosure of information about the victim to her supervisors
would have actually violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege.7
The privilege statute, in relevant part, provides:
Subdivision 1. Competency of witnesses. Every person of sufficient
understanding, including a party, may testify in any action or proceeding,
civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive
evidence, except as provided in this subdivision:
….
(k) Sexual assault counselors may not be allowed to disclose any opinion or
information received from or about the victim without the consent of the
victim. However, a counselor may be compelled to identify or disclose
information in investigations or proceedings related to neglect or termination
of parental rights if the court determines good cause exists. In determining
whether to compel disclosure, the court shall weigh the public interest and
6
It is unclear from the record whether a sexual assault counselor may owe other
duties to a victim aside from the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. And because we
confine ourselves to the allegations in the amended complaint, we do not consider
whether a sexual assault counselor may owe other legal duties to a victim aside from the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege pleaded in the amended complaint.
7
We note that the unique circumstances presented in this case require us to analyze
the privilege statute from an unusual perspective. Typically, we construe the privilege
statute in the context of parties seeking to suppress or obtain third-party discovery in an
ongoing action or proceeding. See Hope Coalition, 977 N.W.2d at 657–59 (considering
whether the sexual-assault-counselor privilege prohibited the defendant’s motion for the
victim’s therapist to produce records for in camera review without the victim’s consent);
State v. Expose (Expose I), 872 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Minn. 2015) (holding that the district
court abused its discretion when it allowed the defendant’s therapist to testify about the
defendant’s allegedly threatening statements without his consent at trial); State v.
Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 130–31 (Minn. 1984) (considering whether the physician-
patient privilege prohibited the State’s motion for discovery of defendant’s statements
made during group therapy sessions). This case is different because it involves the
application of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, which prompts us to determine whether
a disclosure by Wredberg to Canvas would have violated the sexual-assault-counselor
privilege.
10
need for disclosure against the effect on the victim, the treatment
relationship, and the treatment services if disclosure occurs.
Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k) (emphasis added). The statute also defines “sexual
assault counselor.” Id. There is no dispute that Wredberg is a sexual assault counselor.
We first consider Wredberg’s argument that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege
prohibits the disclosure of victim information in all contexts. After clarifying the scope of
the privilege, we then examine whether Wredberg sufficiently alleged that her disclosure
to Canvas would have violated the privilege.8
A.
In her briefing to our court, Wredberg contends that “[t]he sexual-assault-
counselor privilege prohibits the counselor’s disclosure of privileged victim information,
without the victim’s consent, beyond the context of testimony in a court action or
proceeding.” Under her interpretation, the sexual-assault-counselor privilege protects
more than oral testimony and also extends beyond the context of an “action or
proceeding.” For the reasons set out below, we agree with Wredberg that the privilege
encompasses disclosures apart from oral testimony, but we disagree that it extends
beyond the context of actions and proceedings.
The scope of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege is a matter of statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo. In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d 260, 264
(Minn. 2013). “The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the
8
Because the parties agree that this issue is dispositive as to Wredberg’s
whistleblower claim, we need not address the sufficiency of other allegations bearing on
that claim.
11
intention of the Legislature.” Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016).
When we interpret a statute, we generally begin by “examin[ing] the statutory language
to determine whether the words of the law are clear and free from all ambiguity.” Staab v.
Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012). If “the language of a statute is
clear, we apply the plain language of the statute.” Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624.
To the extent the court of appeals indicated that the sexual-assault-counselor
privilege protects only oral testimony,9 such an interpretation is foreclosed by the plain
language of the statute itself, which refers to the “disclos[ure of] any opinion or
information.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k). Such an interpretation is also foreclosed
by our case law. In Hope Coalition, we held that the statutory sexual-assault-counselor
privilege prohibits sexual assault counselors from disclosing privileged records in
response to a subpoena from a criminal defendant, even for in camera review, “unless the
victim consents or the court finds good cause in matters involving neglect or termination
of parental rights.” 977 N.W.2d at 659. Likewise, in State v. Andring, we held that the
statutory physician-patient privilege—which contains language similar to the sexual-
assault-counselor privilege—prevented a physician from disclosing, in response to the
State’s discovery request, a criminal defendant’s statements made during group therapy.
342 N.W.2d 128, 134 (Minn. 1984). Based on the statutory text and our case law, we
9
Wredberg notes that the court of appeals stated that the sexual-assault-counselor
privilege “unambiguously applies only to testimony in a court action or proceeding.”
Wredberg, 2025 WL 1733487, at *5 (emphasis added). But we acknowledge that in
another section of its opinion, the court of appeals appeared to more broadly interpret the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege as precluding the “disclos[ure of] victim information
during a court action or proceeding.” Id. at *4.
12
agree with Wredberg that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege protects more than oral
testimony, as it can also apply to the disclosure of records and other information.
But Wredberg’s broad reading of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege—that all
disclosures without the victim’s consent are prohibited—goes too far. Adopting her
interpretation would require us to deviate from decades of precedent related to the
privilege statute. And it would also be contrary to the plain language of the statute, which
limits the privilege to the context of an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court
or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02,
subd. 1.
In assessing whether the privilege extends beyond actions and proceedings,10 we
note that “[o]ur previous interpretation of a statute guides us in determining its meaning.”
Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N.W.2d 400, 404–05 (Minn. 2011). Although we have interpreted
the various privileges in the privilege statute on numerous occasions, we have never
construed any of them to apply outside the context of an “action or proceeding, civil or
criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.”11 Instead,
10
In our analysis, we use the terms “action” and “proceeding” as shorthand for the
phrase “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has
authority to receive evidence.” See Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1.
11
Although Wredberg contends that we held that the privilege statute prohibited
disclosure outside the context of an action or proceeding in Expose v. Thad Wilderson &
Associates P.A. (Expose II), 889 N.W.2d 279 (Minn. 2016), as discussed below, we made
no such pronouncement in that case. Aside from Expose II, the parties do not point to any
cases in which we have applied the statutory privileges in section 595.02, subdivision 1,
outside the context of actions and proceedings, and we appear to have applied those
privileges only in that context. See, e.g., State v. Martens, 18 N.W.3d 752, 753 (Minn.
2025) (concluding that the therapist-client privilege in subdivision 1(g) did not prohibit a
13
we have consistently treated those privileges as evidentiary in nature and emphasized that
we construe such privileges narrowly. See State v. Expose (Expose I), 872 N.W.2d
252, 257–59 (Minn. 2015) (construing the therapist-client privilege as an “evidentiary
privilege” and noting that “[w]e have long construed evidentiary privileges narrowly”);
Expose v. Thad Wilderson & Assocs., P.A. (Expose II), 889 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn.
2016) (explaining that “[t]he therapist-client privilege … is a statutory evidentiary
privilege”); Larson v. Montpetit, 147 N.W.2d 580, 586 (Minn. 1966) (“[E]videntiary
privileges constitute barriers to the ascertainment of truth and are therefore to be
disfavored and narrowly limited to their purposes.”).
And we have consistently distinguished the obligations arising under the privilege
statute from professional duties, such as duties of confidentiality, which may apply
outside the context of an action or proceeding. For example, in Expose I, we held that the
therapist-client privilege “does not create any affirmative duties for a psychologist or
other mental-health professional, but rather simply creates an exception to the general
rule that every witness is presumed to be competent to testify in court.” 872 N.W.2d
therapist from testifying at trial about the defendant’s statements to the therapist because
the mandated-reporter exception to the privilege applied); Hope Coalition, 977 N.W.2d
at 659 (holding that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in subdivision 1(k) prevented
disclosure of records for in camera review in the context of a criminal proceeding); State
v. Atwood, 925 N.W.2d 626, 635 (Minn. 2019) (holding that the physician-patient
privilege under subdivision 1(d) did not apply to the defendant’s blood sample and test
results and, consequently, the district court erred in suppressing such evidence at a
pretrial hearing); Expose I, 872 N.W.2d at 259 (concluding that the district court abused
its discretion in allowing the defendant’s therapist to testify at trial because such
testimony was prohibited by the therapist-client privilege in subdivision 1(g)); State v.
Zais, 805 N.W.2d 32, 41 (Minn. 2011) (holding that the marital privilege in
subdivision 1(a) did not prohibit the defendant’s wife from testifying against him at trial).
14
at 258 (emphasis added).12 And in Expose I we also rejected the argument that the
therapist-client privilege was “dilute[d]” when it was not applied to prohibit a third
party’s testimony regarding privileged communications that a therapist had shared with
the third party. 872 N.W.2d at 260. We noted that such an argument “confuses the
[therapist-client] privilege with a therapist’s professional duty of confidence.” Id.; see
also State v. Martens, 18 N.W.3d 752, 765 (Minn. 2025) (Thissen, J., concurring) (“[The
therapist-client privilege] should not be conflated with a therapist’s professional duty of
confidentiality and the rules governing those obligations.”).13 Wredberg appears to be
similarly conflating the privilege statute with professional duties of confidence. To accept
Wredberg’s view that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege extends beyond actions and
proceedings, we would need to accept an interpretation that we have never before
adopted.
We decline to adopt a new interpretation because we are convinced that our past
view of the privilege statute’s limited application to actions and proceedings is consistent
12
Wredberg’s asserted duty here—a broad duty not to disclose—differs from the
affirmative duty to warn at issue in Expose I. That said, our reasoning in Expose I
nonetheless applies here because it speaks to the narrow scope of the privilege statute.
13
The distinction between a professional’s ethical duties and their obligations under
the privilege statute is important. For example, take the attorney-client context. Under the
statutory attorney-client privilege, “[a]n attorney cannot, without the consent of the
attorney’s client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to the attorney
or the attorney’s advice given thereon in the course of professional duty.” Minn. Stat.
§ 595.02, subd. 1(b). But an attorney is also bound by the ethical duties contained in the
Rules of Professional Responsibility, which more generally require an attorney to
“preserve the confidences and secrets of [the attorney’s] clients.” O’Connor v. Johnson,
287 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Minn. 1979). “This ethical obligation is broader than the attorney-
client privilege [in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02].” Id.
15
with the Legislature’s intent as shown through the statute’s plain text. See Engquist,
803 N.W.2d at 404–05 (“Our previous interpretation of a statute guides us in determining
its meaning.”). Wredberg treats the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in subdivision 1(k)
as a standalone prohibition on disclosure that operates outside the context of
subdivision 1. But we do not examine a statutory provision in isolation. State v. Gaiovnik,
794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011). We “construe a statute as a whole and interpret its
language to give effect to all of its provisions.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683
(Minn. 2015). Subdivision 1 of the privilege statute begins with the general rule that
“[e]very person of sufficient understanding, including a party, may testify in any action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive
evidence, except as provided in this subdivision:” and then lists various statutory
privileges, including the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the sexual-assault-counselor privilege and the other
privileges listed in the subdivision plainly function as exceptions to the general rule stated
in subdivision 1. See id., subd. 1(a–o); Expose I, 872 N.W.2d at 258 (noting that the
therapist-client privilege “creates an exception to the general rule that every witness is
presumed to be competent to testify in court”).
As we have repeatedly explained, “ ‘[a]n exception in a statute exempts from its
operation something that would otherwise be within it.’ ” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Second
Chance Invs., LLC, 827 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Minn. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting
City of St. Louis Park v. King, 75 N.W.2d 487, 493 (Minn. 1956)); accord State v.
Goodman, 288 N.W. 157, 159 (Minn. 1939). This means that an exception operates
16
within the scope of the rule it qualifies. See McDonnall v. Drawz, 3 N.W.2d 419, 422
(Minn. 1942) (“An exception comprehends only subject matter from which the exception
is made.”); Swedish-Am. Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 105 N.W.
69, 70 (Minn. 1905) (“The exception … must be construed with reference to the rule
adopted and the reason upon which it is based.”).
Because subdivision 1 makes clear that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in
subdivision 1(k) is an exception to the general rule stated in subdivision 1, the sexual-
assault-counselor privilege operates within the scope of an “action or proceeding, civil or
criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” The
sexual-assault-counselor privilege does not act as an independent prohibition on
disclosure in other contexts.
For all of these reasons, interpreting the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in
subdivision 1(k) to broadly prohibit disclosures to third parties in all contexts would be
inconsistent with our existing case law and with the plain language of the privilege
statute.
And, as we explain below, we are not persuaded by Wredberg’s other arguments in
favor of a different interpretation.
First, Wredberg focuses on the Legislature’s use of the word “disclose” in the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege as opposed to its use of the term “be examined” in
some of the other privileges. Compare Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k) (“Sexual assault
counselors may not be allowed to disclose ….”) (emphasis added), with, e.g., Minn. Stat.
§ 595.02, subd. 1(b) (“An attorney cannot, without the consent of the attorney’s client, be
17
examined ….”) (emphasis added). But the use of the word “disclose” in subdivision 1(k),
instead of the term “be examined,” does not support Wredberg’s broad interpretation of
the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Even if we assume that “disclose” is broader than
“examine,” the sexual-assault-counselor privilege is nonetheless still an exception to the
general rule in subdivision 1, and it therefore operates within the scope of an “action or
proceeding.” The Legislature’s choice to prohibit disclosures in the sexual-assault-
counselor privilege, rather than examinations, does not change our analysis here.14
Second, the statutory language explaining that a sexual assault counselor “may be
compelled to identify or disclose information in investigations or proceedings related to
neglect or termination of parental rights” does not lend support to the privilege’s
application outside the context of an action or proceeding. See Minn. Stat. § 595.02,
subd. 1(k) (emphasis added). This is because the “investigations” language plainly
contemplates a court action or proceeding, specifying that a sexual assault counselor may
14
Similarly, Wredberg also argues that the Legislature’s 2007 change to the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege demonstrates that the privilege extends beyond actions
and proceedings. The Legislature amended subdivision 1(k) as follows: “Sexual assault
counselors may not be compelled to testify about allowed to disclose any opinion or
information received from or about the victim without the consent of the victim.” Act of
May 7, 2007, ch. 54, art. 4, § 4, 2007 Minn. Laws 206, 256 (codified as amended at
Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k)). We generally address statutory history only if we
conclude that the statute is ambiguous. See State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 924
(Minn. 2019) (“When a statute is ambiguous, we may rely on the canons of statutory
construction to resolve the ambiguity …. We may ascertain the intention of the
Legislature by considering, for example, past versions of the law at issue.” (citation
omitted)). In any event, as discussed above, the 2007 change in focus from testimony to
disclosure does not undermine the conclusion that the plain language of the privilege
statute nonetheless limits operation of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege to the
context of an “action or proceeding.”
18
be compelled to make disclosures in “investigations … related to neglect or termination
of parental rights if the court determines good cause exists.” Id. (emphasis added).
Further placing such investigations within the context of an action or proceeding, the
statute goes on to describe factors that “the court” must consider when determining
whether to compel disclosure. Id.
Third, we are also unpersuaded by Wredberg’s reliance on four of our previous
opinions. As explained below, each of these opinions is consistent with our conclusion
that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege is limited to the context of an “action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive
evidence.” We address each opinion in turn.
1.
Wredberg relies primarily on Hope Coalition, a case that concerned the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege and how it “interacts with a criminal defendant’s
interests in a fair trial.” 977 N.W.2d at 653. Wredberg correctly notes that Hope Coalition
rejected a “permissive” reading of the phrase “may not be allowed to disclose” in the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege that would have allowed courts to require disclosure in
some circumstances. Id. at 658 (emphasis added). But we find little support for
Wredberg’s assertion that our holding in Hope Coalition means that the sexual-assault-
counselor privilege operates outside the context of actions and proceedings. In Hope
Coalition we explained that “[s]exual assault counselors … are statutorily prohibited
from disclosing privileged records in a criminal proceeding without the victim’s
consent.” Id. at 659 (emphasis added). Our analysis was limited to the scope of the
19
sexual-assault-counselor privilege within a court proceeding. Hope Coalition does not
stand for the broad proposition that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege prohibits a
sexual assault counselor from disclosing victim information outside the context of an
action or proceeding.
Likewise, our recognition of the State’s “compelling interest in protecting a
victim’s privacy through the sexual-assault-counselor privilege” in Hope Coalition does
not conflict with our conclusion that the privilege is limited to the context of an action or
proceeding. See id. at 662. Our recognition of the State’s compelling interest must be
understood within the context of our analysis in Hope Coalition. There, we considered
whether the application of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege would violate the
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and due process. Id. at 661–62.
To answer that question, we conducted a constitutional balancing test, weighing the
State’s interest in protecting victim privacy against the defendant’s constitutional rights.
Id. (explaining that “[w]hen the defendant’s constitutional right does not outweigh a
compelling interest of the [S]tate, the privilege remains unpierced”). In recognizing the
State’s compelling interest in prohibiting disclosure for in camera review in a court
proceeding, we emphasized the importance of confidentiality to the counseling
relationship. Id. at 661–62. Our recognition of the State’s “compelling interest” was in the
context of a balancing test applicable to a defendant’s constitutional rights in a criminal
proceeding. And our holding in Hope Coalition did not abrogate or conflict with the plain
language of the privilege statute, which remains limited to the context of an action or
proceeding.
20
2.
Our recognition in State v. Heaney that privileges have a “substantive component”
also does not support Wredberg’s interpretation that the sexual-assault-counselor
privilege broadly prohibits disclosure. See 689 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Minn. 2004)
(considering the physician-patient privilege). It is true that we observed in Heaney that
evidentiary privileges are not like other rules of evidence and hold a unique place in the
law. Id. In Heaney, we explained that “[u]nlike other rules of evidence that are concerned
solely with the reliability of evidence and its ability to guide the court to the truth,
privileges are an impediment to truth-finding.” Id. Privileges are different from other
evidentiary rules because they are “created to substantively protect a particular type of
relationship deemed valuable to society in general.” Id. In other words, statutory
privileges exist because the Legislature has determined that protecting certain
relationships is, in some circumstances, more important than obtaining complete
information in court proceedings. See id.
But our recognition of an evidentiary privilege’s “substantive component” does
not expand its legal effect beyond its evidentiary function in actions and proceedings.
Wredberg has not provided authority for the proposition that the substantive interests
underlying an evidentiary privilege can serve to convert that privilege into a regulation of
conduct outside of actions and proceedings. And nothing in Heaney itself suggests that
evidentiary privileges impose freestanding confidentiality obligations detached from
actions and proceedings. Rather, Heaney situates its discussion of privileges within the
law of evidence. See id. at 171–74 (considering, in a conflict of laws context, whether
21
blood-alcohol evidence should be suppressed in a criminal proceeding due to Minnesota’s
physician-patient privilege statute).
3.
Wredberg’s reliance on Expose I is similarly unpersuasive because the
propositions upon which she relies do not apply here. In Expose I, we considered whether
the therapist-client privilege in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(g),
contains a “threats exception” in light of a therapist’s statutory duty to warn about serious
physical threats.15 872 N.W.2d at 257–59. We declined to recognize such an exception.
Id. at 258. Relying on Expose I for the proposition that courts cannot make exceptions to
privileges, Wredberg argues that the court of appeals created an improper “workplace
communications exception” to the sexual-assault-counselor privilege by holding that her
allegations did not amount to a violation of the privilege. But concluding that Wredberg’s
allegations simply fall outside the scope of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege is not
equivalent to creating an exception to that privilege.
4.
Finally, we disagree with Wredberg’s assertion that we prohibited the disclosure of
privileged information in an out-of-court context in Expose II. In that case, we held that
the judicial proceedings privilege16 did not shield a therapist from liability for her
15
The therapist-client privilege in subdivision 1(g), like the sexual-assault-counselor
privilege in subdivision 1(k), is an exception to the general operative language in
subdivision 1.
16
The judicial proceedings privilege shields judges, judicial officers, attorneys, and
witnesses from liability for statements made in judicial proceedings. See Mahoney &
22
out-of-court statements—specifically, statements made to law enforcement during an
investigation and to prosecutors when preparing for her testimony at trial. 889 N.W.2d at
286–87. Here, Wredberg relies on our statement expressing our agreement with the court
of appeals that “the purpose of the therapist-client privilege (to keep information
concealed) and the purpose of the [judicial proceedings] privilege (to reveal information)
are ‘so contrary and inconsistent that applying the [judicial proceedings] privilege
effectively would defeat the [therapist-client] privilege.’ ” Id. at 287 (quoting Expose v.
Thad Wilderson & Assocs., P.A., 863 N.W.2d 95, 107 (Minn. App. 2015)).
Wredberg contends that this language “prohibits” the disclosure of privileged
information “to law enforcement … outside the context of testimony in court.” But we
had no occasion to reach such a holding in Expose II. Rather, in Expose II, we were
assessing only the applicability of the judicial proceedings privilege. In doing so, we
explained that before deciding whether to apply that privilege, “we determine whether
there are competing policy interests that would counsel against [its] application.” Id.
at 286 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is within that context—
evaluating competing policy interests—that we discussed the substantive component of
the therapist-client privilege. Id. at 287. Specifically, in the language highlighted by
Wredberg, we were describing how the court of appeals “balanced the competing policy
interest of the therapist-client privilege against the purpose of the [judicial proceedings]
Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2007). Although Expose II used the
term “absolute privilege” instead of “judicial proceedings privilege,” e.g., 889 N.W.2d at
286–87, we use the term “judicial proceedings privilege” here for clarity.
23
privilege.” Id. In doing so, we and the court of appeals may have used imprecise language
in characterizing statements made to prosecutors or law enforcement in the absence of a
subpoena or court order as implicating the therapist-client privilege, when it is therapist-
client confidentiality that is more precisely implicated. But even so, this language does
not amount to a holding that the therapist-client privilege prohibits disclosures in contexts
outside of actions and proceedings.
* * *
For these reasons, we reject Wredberg’s contention that the sexual-assault-
counselor privilege statute broadly prohibits the disclosure of victim information outside
the context of actions and proceedings. The sexual-assault-counselor privilege is an
exception to the general rule in subdivision 1, which by its plain terms limits the privilege
to the context of an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person
who has authority to receive evidence,” and we have never held otherwise. The
sexual-assault-counselor privilege does not function as an independent prohibition on
disclosure in all contexts. Wredberg does not point to any other source of such a
prohibition. To be clear, there may well be policy reasons for providing statutory
protection to communications between sexual assault counselors and victims even
beyond the context of actions and proceedings. If a broader duty of confidentiality for
sexual assault counselors is desirable as a matter of policy, it is for the Legislature to
provide such a duty. “[W]e must read this state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they
should be.” Expose II, 889 N.W.2d at 286.
24
B.
Having concluded that, consistent with the language in the privilege statute, the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege applies only in an “action or proceeding, civil or
criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence,” we next
consider whether Wredberg sufficiently pleaded that Canvas’s demand for disclosure of
information occurred in that context.17 In her amended complaint, Wredberg does not
assert that she was ordered to make a disclosure in court or that any of her supervisors
had “authority to receive evidence.” Instead, she alleges only that her supervisors
demanded that she disclose information to them about the victim.18 Because Wredberg
17
Answering this question falls within the first issue presented in Wredberg’s
petition for review: “[D]oes a sexual-assault counselor terminated for refusing to disclose
victim information, ‘without the victim’s consent,’ upon her employer’s demand for the
information to provide to non-counselors in and outside the workplace, have a claim
under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act?” The court of appeals determined that Wredberg
had forfeited her alternative argument that “there was a court action or proceeding under
Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1.” Wredberg, 2025 WL 1733487, at *4 n.4. Given our
conclusion that this argument fails on the merits, we need not decide whether it was
forfeited.
18
To the extent Wredberg argues that she was terminated from employment due to
her refusal to honor a law enforcement officer’s request for the information, this
argument is forfeited. In her petition for review, consistent with her amended complaint,
Wredberg framed the alleged unlawful order that resulted in her termination as being
from Canvas to disclose information to Canvas.
We limit our review to issues raised in the petition for review. See In re Petition of
MCEA for Commencement of an Env’t Assessment Worksheet, 980 N.W.2d 175, 188
(Minn. 2022) (“[W]e generally do not address issues that are not raised in the petition for
review….”). Because Wredberg premised her whistleblower claim on her refusal to
comply with Canvas’s order to disclose the victim information, she forfeited an
alternative argument that her claim was based on her refusal to comply with the law
enforcement officer. For these reasons, we do not address whether law enforcement
25
has not alleged that she was ordered to disclose the information “in court or before any
person who has authority to receive evidence,” she has not sufficiently alleged that her
disclosure to Canvas would have violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege.19
Likewise, Wredberg’s concern that the information could be used against the victim in a
future criminal proceeding is not sufficient to allege that Canvas was ordering her to
disclose information “in court or before any person who has authority to receive
evidence.”
* * *
Wredberg has not alleged that Canvas ordered her to commit an actual violation of
the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Based on the parties’ agreement that a successful
claim under Minnesota Statutes section 181.932, subdivision 1(3), requires an allegation
that Canvas ordered Wredberg to actually violate the law, we affirm the decision of the
court of appeals. The district court did not err in dismissing Wredberg’s whistleblower
claim under Rule 12.02(e).
II.
We next turn to Wredberg’s common-law claim for wrongful discharge. As above,
we review de novo whether Wredberg’s amended complaint asserts a claim upon which
officers generally have “authority to receive evidence” as contemplated in the privilege
statute.
19
Given our determination that Wredberg has not alleged that she was ordered to
disclose the information “in court or before any person who has authority to receive
evidence,” we need not consider Wredberg’s argument that she was a “witness” in an
“action” or “proceeding.”
26
relief can be granted, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Wredberg. See
Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 68.
In Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., we recognized a narrow common-law
cause of action for wrongful discharge based on public policy, even in cases involving
at-will employment.20 See 408 N.W.2d at 571. We held that “an employee may bring an
action for wrongful discharge if that employee is discharged for refusing to participate in
an activity that the employee, in good faith, believes violates any state or federal law or
rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law.” Id. We have not recognized “a broader cause
of action that arises every time an employee’s termination results from an employer’s
violation of a clear mandate of public policy.” Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs.,
841 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn. 2014). Rather, we have made clear that the Phipps cause of
action is limited “to discharges resulting from an employee’s good-faith refusal to violate
the law.” Id. at 150. Accordingly, a common-law claim for wrongful discharge that is not
within the limited scope set forth in Phipps is cognizable only if we recognize a new
cause of action. Id. at 151.
Because it is somewhat unclear whether Wredberg’s common-law claim is
asserted as a Phipps claim or a new common-law claim for wrongful discharge based on
public policy, we address each possibility in turn. See Lykins ex rel. Duranske v. Anderson
Contracting, Inc., 20 N.W.3d 880, 890 n.7 (Minn. 2025) (noting that we have “inherent
20
In Minnesota, the employer-employee relationship is generally at-will, which
means that an employer can discharge an employee for “any reason or no reason” and
that an employee “is under no obligation to remain on the job.” Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983).
27
authority to consider issues raised below but not articulated in precisely the manner
necessary to clearly present the issues for appellate review” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
To the extent Wredberg asserts a Phipps claim, she frames it identically to her
whistleblower claim—asserting that she would have actually violated the sexual-assault-
counselor privilege if she had disclosed the information to Canvas as ordered.21 But such
a claim fails for the same reason Wredberg’s whistleblower claim fails; she has not
alleged facts sufficient to show that she was ordered to actually violate the sexual-assault-
counselor privilege.22
Because Wredberg has not alleged facts sufficient to support a Phipps claim, her
common-law claim survives only if we recognize a new cause of action for wrongful
discharge due to a sexual assault counselor’s refusal of an order from her employer to
disclose victim information without the victim’s consent. We have repeatedly emphasized
our reluctance to recognize new public-policy based causes of action, noting that “the
task of determining public policy … is usually better performed by the legislature.” See
Nelson v. Productive Alts., 715 N.W.2d 452, 457 n.5 (Minn. 2006); Dukowitz,
21
In the portion of her brief addressing her common-law claim, Wredberg argues
that she “precisely followed the law; Canvas did not.” She further asserts that her
“termination for her refusal to unlawfully disclose a sexual-assault victim’s privileged
information and whereabouts violated Minnesota’s common-law protection of ‘those
fired for their refusal to violate the law.’ ”
22
Wredberg does not argue that the phrase “in good faith, believes [that a law has
been violated],” from Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571, allows an employee to allege
something less than an order to commit an actual violation of law. Accordingly, we do not
consider that interpretation of Phipps here.
28
841 N.W.2d at 151. This reluctance “to extend the legislatively declared public policy of
the State applies with equal, if not greater, force” when the proposed cause of action
would require the court to “depart from the traditional American common-law,
employment-at-will rule.” Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 152.
In Nelson, we described the “difficult” process by which we recognize new
common-law causes of action, noting that courts that have undertaken that task have
“required that the public policy at issue be clear in order to justify a common-law cause
of action.” 715 N.W.2d at 456 (citing Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992)
(explaining that the identified public policy “must be fundamental, substantial and well
established at the time of the discharge”)). In holding that the employee in Nelson had not
identified an adequately clear public policy, we emphasized that the employee had failed
to identify any “statute that expressly prohibit[ed]” the circumstances that led to his
termination. Id.
Here, Wredberg asks us to recognize a common-law claim for wrongful discharge
grounded on a public policy that she locates solely in the sexual-assault-counselor
privilege. But because we hold that Wredberg’s disclosure to Canvas would not have
violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege, the sexual-assault-counselor privilege
cannot be the sole source of the “clear public policy” required to support a new
common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge. See id.
As Wredberg emphasizes, our decision in Hope Coalition recognized that the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege demonstrates the State’s “compelling interest in
protecting the privacy of sexual assault victims.” 977 N.W.2d at 662. Wredberg argues
29
that this compelling interest amounts to a clear public policy supporting a new
wrongful-discharge cause of action here. But as discussed above, Hope Coalition
addressed the scope of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in a judicial proceeding,
and we made clear that the Legislature implemented this compelling interest “through the
sexual-assault-counselor privilege.” Id. By placing the sexual-assault-counselor privilege
within the privilege statute, the Legislature chose to protect the privacy of victims by
prohibiting disclosures only in “an action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or
before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” Without more, our recognition
of the State’s compelling interest in protecting the victim’s privacy in Hope Coalition
does not justify establishment of a new wrongful-discharge cause of action here, where
the alleged order for disclosure occurred in a context different from that contemplated in
the privilege statute or in Hope Coalition.23
Whether it is viewed as a Phipps claim or as an assertion of a new cause of action,
Wredberg’s common-law claim for wrongful discharge is rooted in her allegation that
Canvas ordered her to violate the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Given our holding
23
To be clear, there may well be other policy justifications supporting the
recognition of a common-law wrongful-discharge claim in circumstances where a sexual
assault counselor is ordered to disclose communications that they deem to be
confidential. We hold only that Wredberg’s proffered justifications—the sexual-assault-
counselor privilege statute itself and our analysis of that privilege in Hope Coalition—are
insufficient.
And, as noted above, there may also be policy reasons for providing statutory
protection to communications between sexual assault counselors and victims even
beyond the context of “any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any
person who has authority to receive evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1. But it is for
the Legislature to provide such a statutory protection. See Expose II, 889 N.W.2d at 286.
30
that Wredberg failed to allege facts sufficient to show that her disclosure of information
to Canvas would have violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege, we also affirm the
decision of the court of appeals to uphold the district court’s dismissal of Wredberg’s
common-law claim under Rule 12.02(e).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
31