In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. E. S., aka C. E. S., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1902

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. E. S., aka C. E. S., Parent.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-24-131

Lucas J.M. Dawson, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant
father D.J.N.)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Alyssa Lund, Britta Nicholson, Assistant
County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human
Services)

Eric Anderson, Anderson Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent mother
C.E.S.)

Destiny Thomas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant father D.J.N. argues that the district court abused its discretion by
(1) adjudicating the child in need of protection or services (CHIPS); and (2) determining
that respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department
(department) made reasonable efforts to reunite father and the child. We affirm.
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FACTS
The department filed a petition to adjudicate the child of respondent mother and
appellant father as CHIPS. The department alleged the child was CHIPS because
father: (1) physically abused the child; (2) was unwilling or unable to provide for the
child’s physical or mental health; (3) deprived the child of proper parental care due to
father’s emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity; and (4) had a
behavior, condition, or environment that is injurious or dangerous to the child.
In January 2024, at an emergency protective care hearing, the district court ordered
the child to remain with mother under the supervision of the department. The district court
also ordered a voluntary case plan that included requirements that father: complete
parenting education, a mental health evaluation, and anger management classes and follow
all recommendations from each; not use physical discipline with the child; and cooperate
with the department, including maintaining consistent contact with the guardian ad litem
and the department, signing necessary releases, and allowing home visits.
The district court held a trial on the CHIPS petition. Mother testified about the
allegations in the petition, the child’s behavior and reports of abuse, and the child’s
interactions with father. Father testified about his programming, medical diagnoses,
treatment, and his interactions with mother, the department, and the child.
Several witnesses for the department testified. A forensic interview er and trainer
testified about interviewing the child and her observations of the child during the forensic
CornerHouse interview of the child. A child protection social work supervisor and a child
protection investigator both testified about their work with the child and this case. A
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licensed independent clinical social worker with the Domestic Abuse Project testified about
working as the child’s therapist over the previous eight months. An investigator with
Hennepin County testified about observing a second interview with the child. A child
protection social worker testified about father’s case plan and his engagement with the plan
as well as father’s communication with the department. Finally, the child’s guardian ad
litem testified that a CHIPS adjudication was in the child’s best interests.
The district court filed a 50-page order adjudicating the child as CHIPS on each of
the four statutory grounds alleged by the department. In the order, the district court found
mother to be “credible and persuasive in view of the evidence.” The court also found all
of the department’s witnesses and the guardian ad litem to be “credible and persuasive.”
The district court found father’s testimony about his desire to have a relationship
with his child to be credible. But the court found father’s testimony about his mental health
diagnosis and treatment to be not “entirely reliable.” The district court also found
unreliable father’s testimony about the history between father and mother, and his behavior
and how it affects mother, service providers, and the child. The court further found that
father’s testimony was not credible or was unsupported by the record as it related
to: father’s opinion of the child’s mental health diagnosis; father’s testimony that he had
not physically abused the child; father’s testimony that his mental health does not impact
the child ; father’s engagement in services; and father’s interactions with the child, the
department, and service providers. The district court did not find father’s testimony
“persuasive in view of the evidence.”
Father appeals.
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DECISION
On appeal from a district court order adjudicating a child as CHIPS, we review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D.,
865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). “A finding
is clearly erroneous only if there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or when
an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” In
re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). “When the record
reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might
also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). When
applying the clear -error standard of review, appellate courts (1) “view the evidence in a
light favorable to the findings”; (2) do not reweigh the evidence; (3) do not make our own
findings of fact; and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22. We defer to
the district court in its assessment of the credibility of witnesses. In re Welfare of L.A.F.,
554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
We review a district courts determination that the petitioner established a statutory
basis for the order for abuse of discretion. See D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321. “A district
court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
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I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating the child as
CHIPS.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in adjudicating the child as
CHIPS by: basing its decision on father’s disabilities in violation of father’s due process
rights, inappropriately shifting the burden of proof onto father, and determining that the
department established by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the alleged
statutory bases for a CHIPS adjudication. We address each argument in turn.
A. The district court did not base its decision on father’s disabilities.

Father argues that the district court violated his due process rights by inappropriately
basing its decision on father’s disabilities instead of father’s actions. Under Minnesota
law, a CHIPS petitioner “shall not file a petition alleging that a child is in need of protection
or services on the basis of a parent’s disability.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.141, subd. 1a(a)
(2024).1 Further, the petitioner “must demonstrate in the petition that the child is in need
of protection or services due to specific behaviors” of the parent.2 Id. (emphasis added).

1 The legislature added subdivision 1a in the 2024 legislative section, and it applied to the
pleadings and motions pending on August 1, 2024. 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 115, art. 18, § 32,
at 1733-34. Because the department’s petition was pending until the district court
adjudicated the child in November 2024, it applies to the petition here.

2 Father claims that the department bears the burden “to prove with clear and convincing
evidence that its petition was not based on the disability of the parent.” But father cites to
section 260C.141, subdivision 1a(a), which does not contain any language describing the
quantum of proof and father does not identify any authority for his claim that the standard
is “clear and convincing evidence.” We need not determine the quantum of evidence,
however, because even assuming the standard is clear and convincing evidence, father’s
argument fails.
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The record shows that neither the CHIPS petition nor the district court’s decision
were based on father’s disabilities. In the order, the district court stated three different
times that its decision was based on father’s actions and not on his disabilities. First, the
district court stated that “father’s mental disabilities are not a reason to hold [the child] out
as a child in need of protection or services.” Second, the order noted that in adjudicating
the child CHIPS the district court “focuse[d] on father’s actions, not his diagnosis and not
his disabilities.” Third, the district court described father’s actions that supported its
decision and then reiterated that “the court’s focus is, again, not on father’s disability.” We
also note that, as will be addressed in this opinion, the facts presented support the district
court’s conclusion. The district court did not abuse its discretion or violate father’s due
process rights because the district court did not base its decision on father’s disabilities.
B. The district court did not shift the burden of proof to father.

Father argues that the district court erroneously shifted the burden of proof from the
department to father. As support for this argument, father cites the district court’s
statement that “petitions filed with the district court are part of the case record before the
court and therefore allegations can be considered in making a disposition on the petition.”
Father asserts that the supreme court has held that allegations in a CHIPS petition are
merely allegations, In re Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 872 (Minn. 2021),
and, thus, the district court erred by “accepting the allegations as evidence.”
Father’s argument misconstrues the district court’s decision. The district court did
not state that allegations in a petition are evidence. Rather, the district court properly noted
that the burden of proof is on the department, identified evidence that corroborated the
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allegations in the petition, credited witnesses whose testimony corroborated the allegations
in the petition, and found father’s testimony that contradicted the allegations in the petition
to be unpersuasive and not credible. The district court compared the allegations in the
petition with the evidence the department presented at trial and then concluded that the
allegations were reliable. This is exactly what the supreme court directed district courts to
do in H.G.D.: “We hold that the district court can consider the allegations of [a CHIPS]
petition if evidence establishes the reliability of those allegations.” Id. Because the district
court appropriately placed the burden of proof on the department, and because the district
court did not incorrectly apply H.G.D., the district court did not incorrectly place the
burden of proof and so did not abuse its discretion.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the child
has been a victim of physical abuse.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the
department had established that the child has been a victim of physical abuse. A child may
be adjudicated as CHIPS if the child has been a victim of “physical abuse” as defined in
Minnesota Statutes section 260E.03, subdivision 18 (2024).3 Minn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 6(2)(i) (2024). The legislature defined “physical abuse” as “any physical injury,
mental injury under subdivision 13, or threatened injury under subdivision 23, inflicted by
a person responsible for the child’s care on a child other than by accidental means, or any

3 Father is correct that the district court cited the wrong statutory provision. However,
because the language that the district court quoted is the substantively correct statutory
language, we conclude that the error was merely clerical and, therefore, harmless. See
State v. Kessler, 470 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. App. 1991) (“[A] clerical error, resulting in
no prejudice, is not reversible error.”).
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physical or mental injury that cannot reasonably be explained by the child’s history of
injuries.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.03, subd. 18(a). In subdivision 13, the legislature defined
“mental injury” as “an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of a child
as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in the child’s ability to function
within a normal range of performance and behavior.” Id., subd. 13 (2024). “Physical abuse
may result in significant mental injury, even if it results in no observable physical injury.”
In re Welfare of Child. of N.F., 749 N.W.2d 802, 809 (Minn. 2008).
Father maintains that the record does not establish that he caused the child’s injury
through nonaccidental, impermissible physical contact. The record does not support
father’s argument. The district court credited the child’s statement to the CornerHouse
interviewer that father hit the child in the face with his hand. The district court also credited
the testimony of the child’s therapist related to abuse the child suffered, which is
confidential and not summarized in this opinion. The district court further found that
father’s testimony that he did not physically abuse the child was unpersuasive and not
credible. Because we defer to the district court’s assessment of witness credibility, see
L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d at 396, view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district
court’s findings, see Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221, and do not reweigh the evidence or
reconcile conflicting evidence, see id. at 221-22, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence clearly and convincingly showed that
the father inflicted mental injury that constitutes physical abuse on the child.
Father also argues that the district court’s determination violates the supreme court’s
decision in N.F. We disagree. In N.F., the supreme court held that the district court must
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assess whether any alleged physical conduct was “reasonable discipline.” 749 N.W.2d at
810 (quotation omitted). The supreme court also noted that “for there to be a mental
injury . . . [t]here must be a showing that the injury resulted in an impairment in [the
child’s] ability to function within a normal range of performance and behavior.” Id.
(quotation omitted). In N.F. the supreme court determined that there was no record that
the child had a mental injury or had suffered physical injury from being paddled by father
36 times. Id. The supreme court concluded that the petitioner had failed to meet its burden
by presenting evidence that connected the paddling with the child suffering physical or
mental injury as defined by the statute. Id. at 811.
Unlike N.F., the department met its burden to prove that the child suffered a mental
injury due to father’s actions. Several witnesses—all of whom the district court found to
be credible—testified that the child suffered a mental injury. The district court found
father’s testimony to the contrary to be unpersuasive and not credible based on the other
evidence presented. Given the different records, N.F. is distinguishable from this case.
Because we conclude that there was physical abuse that meets the definition
provided in Minnesota Statutes section 260C.007, subdivision 6(2), we need not—and do
not—address father’s arguments challenging the other statutory bases that the district court
determined the department had established.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
department made reasonable efforts to reunite father and the child.

Father challenges the district court’s determination that the department made
“reasonable efforts” to reunite father with his child. Under Minnesota law, and with
exceptions not relevant here, once a district court has jurisdiction over a child alleged as
CHIPS, the district court “shall ensure that reasonable efforts . . . by the social services
agency are made . . . to reunite the child with the child’s family.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)
(2024). In determining whether the department made reasonable efforts, “the child’s best
interests, health, and safety must be of paramount concern.” Id.
In advocating for reversal, father highlights evidence that he contends shows the
department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child and father. But the record
does not support father’s argument.
The district court considered the evidence that father identifies on appeal. In
addition, the district court found father’s testimony related to the impact of his behavior on
others and his interactions with the department not credible. Across six pages of extensive
findings, the district court described father’s awareness of, and refusal to engage with, the
case plan. A witness, whom the district court found credible, testified that the case plan
was specifically developed to facilitate father’s reunification with his child while ensuring
the health and safety of a child suffering from injury due to traumatic experiences father
inflicted on the child. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concludin g that the
department made reasonable efforts to reunite father with his child.
Affirmed.