Lydia Louise Monahan, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1907

Lydia Louise Monahan,
Appellant,

vs.

MN Department of Human Services, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed July 7, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Larson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-24-3557

Lydia Louise Monahan, Ardmore, Oklahoma (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ian Taylor, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Self-represented appellant Lydia Louise Monahan challenges the district court’s
dismissal of her complaint against respondent Minnesota Department of Human Services
2
(DHS).1 She raises three arguments on appeal: (1) the district court erred when it denied
her motion for default judgment; (2) the district court judge violated the Minnesota Code
of Judicial Conduct when they did not recuse themself based on the appearance of
impartiality; and (3) the district court erred when it dismissed her complaint for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we
do not discern that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion for
default judgment or the district court judge violated the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct, we affirm in part. But because Monahan’s complaint sets forth a claim upon
which relief may be granted, we reverse the district court’s decision to grant DHS’s motion
to dismiss and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On June 5, 2024, Monahan filed a complaint wherein she alleged that DHS violated
several statutes, including: (1) Minn. Stat. §§ 179.60, 609.322, .43, .505 (2024); (2) various
sections of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act (MLRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 179.01-.17 (2024);
and (3) the Minnesota whistleblower act (MWA), Minn. Stat. § 181.932 (2024).
2 In

1 Monahan also named in the complaint DHS’s former commissioner, Jodi Harpstead, in
her official capacity . Because Harpstead is no longer serving as commissioner, DHS’s
current temporary commissioner, Shireen Ghandi, is automatically substituted. See Minn.
Civ. App. P. 143.04. DHS makes various arguments that we should dismiss the claims
against Harpstead “as an individual.” But “[o]fficial-capacity suits generally represent
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. . . .
[O]fficial capacity suits are, in all respects other than the name, to be treated as a suit
against the entity.” Khalifa v. State, 397 N.W.2d 383, 389-90 (Minn. App. 1986).
Accordingly, we construe the complaint as alleging claims against DHS.
2 It is unclear from the complaint when the conduct underlying the pleadings occurred.
Accordingly, we assume without deciding that the current versions of these statutes apply.
3
reviewing a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss, “we accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true.” Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 64 n.2
(Minn. 2020). In her complaint, Monahan alleged the following. Monahan is a former
DHS employee who worked in the Child Support Division under Child Support Division
Director Shan een Moore (the director). The director “harass[ed], intimidate[d], [and]
retaliate[d]” against Monahan and “disparage[d]” Monahan’s “employment performance
record” while Monahan “represent[ed] a union member in filing a grievance against the
[d]irector for” violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Other union members
experienced similar retaliation after aiding employees in filing grievances. The director
would instruct supervisors to retaliate “by falsely finding fault in their performance.”
These union members did not have any negative performance reviews until they assisted
other employees in grievance processes. Monahan ultimately ended her employment with
DHS because of the “harassment, intimidation, and retaliation.”
On June 14, 2024, a Ramsey County Deputy Sheriff served the following documents
on DHS via personal service on an employee at the DHS office: a waiver of service of
summons form, a notice of lawsuit and request for waiver of service of summons (rule 4.05
waiver request), a summons, a civil cover sheet, and a complaint. On July 1, 2024,
Monahan received an email from DHS’s counsel. In the email, counsel indicated that his
client had signed the waiver and asked whether DHS could serve the signed waiver on
Monahan via email. Counsel also asked if Monahan was “open to service by email
4
generally.” Monahan responded that she “would prefer all documents be e-served.” On
July 2, 2024, DHS deposited a signed waiver and a declaration of service in the U.S. Mail.3
On July 6, 2024, Monahan filed a motion for default judgment, contending that DHS
had not served its answer within 21 days. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01 (providing that
“[d]efendant shall serve an answer within 21 days after service of summons upon that
defendant”). DHS opposed the motion, arguing in part that, because it returned a signed
waiver, it was not required to serve an answer until 60 days after the date the waiver request
was sent. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05(c) (providing that defendant who “timely returns a
signed waiver need not serve an answer . . . until 60 days after the request was sent”).
On August 9, 2024, the district court held a hearing on Monahan’s motion for default
judgment. There, Monahan asserted that she sent the rule 4.05 waiver request improperly
and that she was unsure whether she was supposed to send the rule 4.05 waiver request.
She argued that, even if there was a 60-day timeline because of the rule 4.05 waiver request,
DHS had still failed to file an answer by that deadline. Monahan also contended that
Rule 14 of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice required DHS to use e-Service.
DHS argued that rule 14 did not require e- Service. DHS noted that Monahan
indicated her preference to use e-Service, not email. DHS further explained that Monahan
was not listed as an e-Service contact, meaning that DHS could not serve Monahan via e-
Service. Accordingly, because Monahan did not agree to service via email and was not

3 The signed waiver was dated June 5, 2024. But DHS did not receive the complaint and
rule 4.05 waiver request until June 14, 2024. It is unclear why the signed waiver indicates
that it was signed on June 5, 2024.
5
listed as an e-Service contact, DHS served the signed waiver via U.S. Mail on July 2, 2024.
This, DHS argued, was “well within” 30 days of June 14, 2024 —the day the rule 4.05
waiver request was served. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05(a)(5) (providing that defendant has
30 days after waiver request is sent to return waiver if defendant is within the United
States).
The judge requested permission from Monahan to verify whether Monahan was
listed as an e-Service contact and therefore capable of receiving documents via e-Service;
Monahan gave her consent. The judge’s staff then pulled up a screenshot of the Minnesota
Court Information System (MNCIS) showing that Monahan was not “signed up for
service” when the relevant documents were served. Although Monahan was registered to
use the e-Service system, she had not “ticked the box to receive and accept service.”
On August 12, 2024, the district court issued an order denying Monahan’s motion
for default judgment. The district court concluded that DHS timely returned the signed
waiver to Monahan and, therefore, had 60 days to file an answer. The district court noted
Monahan’s contention that she sent the rule 4.05 waiver request erroneously. But the
district court reasoned that, even if DHS missed the 21-day deadline to file an answer, there
is a preference for deciding cases on the merits and Monahan had not experienced
“substantial prejudice” from the delay. The district court also reasoned that “[e]ven if
6
[DHS] believed in error that [Monahan] had agreed to extend[] the time to answer her
Complaint, . . . such a belief was reasonable.”4
The same day, DHS filed a motion to dismiss Monahan’s complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). In response,
Monahan filed another motion for default judgment and requested that the district court
deny DHS’s motion to dismiss. As part of the motion practice surrounding the motion to
dismiss, Monahan referenced various exhibits.5
Following a hearing, the district court filed an order granting DHS’s motion and
dismissing Monahan’s complaint with prejudice. The district court reasoned that the:
(1) “claims related to criminal activity . . . should be dismissed” because “[n]one of the[]
[cited] statutes create a direct, civil cause of action”; (2) MLRA claim “should be dismissed
because Minn. Stat. §§ 179.06 and 179.60 . . . do not create a private cause of action for
damages”; and (3) MWA claim must be dismissed because Monahan “failed to plead any
facts demonstrating the causation or link between her conduct and termination.”
Monahan appeals from the resulting judgment, challenging both the order denying
her motion for default judgment and the order granting DHS’s motion to dismiss.

4 Monahan initially filed an appeal from the district court’s denial of her motion for default
judgment. We dismissed Monahan’s appeal as premature and indicated that she could seek
review of the August 12, 2024 order in an appeal from a final judgment.
5 Monahan references these exhibits in her brief. But the record reflects that the district
court did not consider these exhibits when it decided the motion to dismiss and, therefore,
they are not part of our record on appeal.
7
DECISION
In response to the district court’s decision to dismiss her claims, Monahan makes
three arguments. First, Monahan contends the district court erred when it denied her
motion for default judgment. Second, Monahan asserts the district court judge violated the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct when they did not recuse from the matter because of
the appearance of impartiality. Last, Monahan argues the district court erred when it
dismissed her complaint. We address each argument in turn.
I.
Monahan first argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
motion for default judgment. “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend within the time allowed therefor by
these rules or by statute, and that fact is made to appear by affidavit, judgment by default
shall be entered against that party . . . .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. A party seeking default
judgment “generally need do no more than aver that the defendant has failed to timely
answer the complaint.” Laymon v. Minn. Premier Props., LLC, 903 N.W.2d 6, 17-18
(Minn. App. 2017), aff’d, 913 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. 2018). We review a decision to deny a
motion for default judgment for an abuse of discretion. Black v. Rimmer, 700 N.W.2d 521,
525 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. dismissed (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005). “A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is inconsistent
with the facts in the record.” In re Otto Bremer Tr., 2 N.W.2d 308, 319 (Minn. 2024)
(quotation omitted).
8
Monahan argues the district court abused its discretion when it determined that DHS
had timely returned a signed waiver and, therefore, had 60 days to file an answer. “A
plaintiff may request that the defendant waive service of a summons.” Minn. R. Civ.
P. 4.05(a). “A defendant who, before being served with process, timely returns a signed
waiver need not serve an answer to the complaint until 60 days after the request was sent
to that defendant . . . .” Id. (c). A defendant has 30 days from the time the waiver request
was sent to return it. See id. (a)(5). Among other requirements, a waiver request must state
the date it was sent and be accompanied by two copies of the waiver document and a
prepaid means for returning one of those copies. See id. (a).
Here, Monahan avers that because she failed to comply with the rule 4.05 procedural
requirements when she sent the rule 4.05 waiver request, DHS could not return the signed
waiver and extend its time to serve an answer to 60 days. We disagree. While rule 4.05
“requires strict compliance,” see Hughes v. Lund, 603 N.W.2d 674, 677 (Minn. App. 1999),
strict compliance is enforced against the party attempting to avoid waiving service of
process. Here, despite the deficiencies in the rule 4.05 waiver request, DHS signed the
waiver and returned it within the requisite time period. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05(a), (c).
Thus, because Monahan received the signed waiver from DHS despite her failure to strictly
comply with rule 4.05, she cannot attack DHS’s reliance on the signed waiver to defend
the motion for default judgment.
6

6 Monahan alternatively asserts that DHS did not validly return a signed waiver because,
under rule 14, it could only return the signed waiver via e-Service—not U.S. Mail. We
disagree. Rule 14 does not require e-Service when the party to be served has not
“designated an email address for receiving electronic service in the E-Filing system.”
9
But even if the signed waiver was defective and, assuming without deciding that
DHS was properly served in this case, the district court still did not abuse its discretion
when it denied the motion for default judgment. A district court may deny a motion for
default judgment when four requirements are met: (1) the defendant had “a reasonable
defense on the merits”; (2) the defendant had “a reasonable excuse for” failing to answer;
(3) the “defendant acted with due diligence after” becoming aware of the failure; and
(4) denial of the motion would not cause “substantial prejudice” to the opposing party.
Coller v. Guardian Angels Roman Cath. Church of Chaska, 294 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn.
1980); see also Finden v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964) (providing that court
should relieve defendant of judgment under Rule 60.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure when these four requirements are met).
Here, the record demonstrates that DHS met its burden to satisfy all four factors.
First, as discussed in detail below, DHS had reasonable defenses on the merits of
Monahan’s claims. Second, because DHS sent the signed waiver, the district court fairly
determined that DHS had a reasonable excuse for failing to answer within 21 days. Third,
the record demonstrates that DHS acted promptly in responding to Monahan’s motion for

Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 14.03(d)(2). In such a situation, rule 14 provides that “another method
of service authorized under applicable rules or law must be used.” Id. Here, Monahan was
not properly registered to receive and accept service through the e-Service system. Thus,
DHS used another acceptable method of service—U.S. Mail—to serve the signed waiver
on Monahan. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.02(a), (c) (providing that, where rule 14 does not
require service by electronic means, “service upon the attorney or a party shall be made by
. . . mailing a copy to the attorney or party at the attorney’s or party’s last known address”).
10
default judgment and filing its own motion to dismiss. 7 Fourth, the record supports the
district court’s determination that any prejudice to Monahan was not substantial.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Monahan’s motion for default judgment.
II.
Monahan argues the district court judge violated the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct when they did not recuse from the case. “Whether a judge is disqualified from
presiding over a case is a question of law, which we review de novo.” In re Jacobs, 802
N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 2011). We presume that a judge properly discharged their duties.
Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). Under the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct, “[a] judge shall disqualify [themself] in any proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Minn. Code Jud. Conduct
Rule 2.11(A). “Whether a judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned is
determined by an objective examination into the circumstances surrounding the removal
request.” Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d at 752 (quotation omitted). This inquiry considers “whether
an objective examination of the facts and circumstances would cause a reasonable

7 Monahan argues DHS has not acted promptly because it “still has not provided an answer
to the claims.” But Monahan misunderstands the rule. Where a defendant serves a motion
to dismiss under rule 12.01, as DHS did here, the time to file an answer is extended.
11
examiner to question the judge’s impartiality.” State v. Burrell, 743 N.W.2d 596, 601
(Minn. 2008).
Here, Monahan argues the judge exhibited bias against her in several ways,
including
claiming the merits of the case needed to be reviewed,
accepting the missed timeline, arguing and even presenting
evidence on behalf of [DHS] . . . [,] claiming [Monahan] had
not consented to receiving documents served through email, or
was somehow not able to receive service through [e-Service]
. . . , [and] not requiring [DHS’s counsel] to adhere to MN
Rules 12, 14, 55, etc.

She also contends the judge exhibited bias because they ignored evidence and were
formerly employed at the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office.
To the extent Monahan’s argument is based on the judge’s determinations in this
case, “[p]rior adverse rulings . . . , without more, do not constitute judicial bias.” State v.
Mems, 708 N.W.2d 526, 533 (Minn. 2006). And the remaining arguments are similarly
unavailing. First, Monahan’s challenge to the district court “presenting evidence”
references the judge reviewing MNCIS to assess whether Monahan could receive
documents via e-Service —an act the judge did after receiving consent from Monahan.
Second, Monahan does not provide any evidence to support her bare assertion that the
judge is biased toward DHS because the judge used to work at the Minnesota Attorney
General’s Office. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133,
135 (Minn. 1971) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by
any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived . . . .”). Finally, the record reflects
that the judge did not ignore evidence. A district court must look at the complaint, not
12
extraneous evidence, when deciding a motion to dismiss. In re Hennepin Cnty. 1986
Recycling Bond Litig., 540 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. 1995). Thus, the district court
appropriately did not rely on Monahan’s exhibits.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court judge did not violate the Minnesota
Code of Judicial Conduct when they did not recuse from the case because the record does
not demonstrate any appearance of impartiality.
III.
Finally, Monahan argues the district court erred when it dismissed her complaint for
failure to state a claim under rule 12.02(e). When reviewing a district court’s decision to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, “we review the legal sufficiency of the
claim de novo to determine whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for
relief.” Graphic Commc’ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund “A” v. CVS Caremark Corp.,
850 N.W.2d 682, 692 (Minn. 2014). In doing so, “[w]e accept the facts alleged in the
complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”
Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014).
“A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for
judgment for the relief sought . . . .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. “Minnesota is a notice-pleading
state and does not require absolute specificity in pleading, but rather requires only
information sufficient to fairly notify the opposing party of the claim against it.” DeRosa
v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff may
plead their case using “broad general statements that may be conclusory.” Id. (quotation
13
omitted). The district court may, upon motion, dismiss a complaint that “fail[s] to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). But a claim survives
“a motion to dismiss . . . if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced,
consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at
603.
In her complaint, Monahan alleged claims under: (1) criminal statutes, including
Minn. Stat. §§ 179.60, 609.322, .43, .505; (2) the MLRA; and (3) the MWA. We address
the district court’s dismissal of Monahan’s claims in these respective categories.
A. Criminal Statutes
Monahan challenges the district court’s decision to dismiss her claims under
criminal statutes on the basis that “[n]one of the[] [cited] statutes create a direct, civil cause
of action.” “[A] criminal statute does not automatically give rise to a civil cause of action
unless the statute expressly or by clear implication so provides.” Larson v. Dunn, 460
N.W.2d 39, 47 n.4 (Minn. 1990). “[T]he general rule [is] that criminal statutes do not give
rise to a civil cause of action absent from manifestation of legisla tive intent to do so.”
Summers v. R & D Agency, Inc., 593 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. App. 1999). Here, none of
the statutes Monahan relies on expressly or by clear implication give rise to a civil cause
of action. We, therefore, agree with the district court that Monahan failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under Minn. Stat. §§ 179.60, 609.322, .43, .505.
8

8 We note that the district court did not explicitly address Monahan’s claim under Minn.
Stat. § 609.322, but it was properly dismissed.
14
B. The MLRA
Monahan argues that the district court erroneously dismissed her MLRA claim. 9
Under Minn. Stat. § § 179.06, .12 , an “[e]mployer” “does not include the state, or any
political or governmental subdivision.” Minn. Stat. § 179.01, subd. 3. But Monahan’s
MLRA allegations in her complaint were specifically targeted at the state. Monahan
alleged that “the [state] allowed [its employees] to allegedly access information reported
to an anonymous tip-line . . . in an attempt to permanently blacklist her from employment”
and requested that the state be “[p]ermanent[ly] barr[ed] . . . from ever having access to
anonymous tip-lines.” Because the state is not an “employer” under the MLRA statutes
Monahan relied on, the district court properly dismissed her claims.10
C. The MWA
Monahan challenges the district court’s decision to dismiss her claims under the
MWA.11 The MWA “makes it illegal for an employer to punish an employee for reporting

9 Monahan also raises an argument under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2018). But the district court did not decide a claim under the NLRA.
Accordingly, Monahan’s argument is not properly before us. See Hoyt Inv. Co. v.
Bloomington Commerce & Trade Ctr. Assocs., 418 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1988) (“[A]n
undecided question is not usually amenable to appellate review.”); Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts generally address only those
questions previously presented to and considered by the district court).
10 We note that the district court did not explicitly address Monahan’s claim under Minn.
Stat. § 179.12, but it was properly dismissed.
11 Monahan also asserts that she is entitled to “punitive relief” under Minn. Stat. §§ 3.736,
subd. 2, 549.20 (2024). But because the district court did not decide the issue, Monahan’s
argument is not properly before us. See Hoyt, 418 N.W.2d at 175; Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at
582.
15
violations of law in good faith.” Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 372 (Minn.
2022). In relevant part, the MWA provides:
An employer shall not discharge, discipline, penalize, interfere
with, threaten, restrain, coerce, or otherwise retaliate or
discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s
compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of
employment because:
(1) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an
employee, in good faith, reports a violation, suspected
violation, or planned violation of any federal or state law or
common law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or
to any government body or law enforcement official[.]

Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1). “‘Employer’ . . . includes the state and any political
subdivision of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 181.931, subd. 3 (2024). If there is no direct
evidence of retaliation, MWA claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. See Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 374. The employee must make a prima
facie case that (1) the employee engaged in “statutorily protected conduct”; (2) the
employer took “an adverse employment action”; and (3) there was “a causal connection
between the two.” Coursolle v. EMC Ins. Grp., Inc., 794 N.W.2d 652, 657 (Minn. App.
2011) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2011). To make a prima facie case,
“the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s protected activity along with close temporal
proximity to the adverse action suffices to establish a causal connection.” Hanson, 972
N.W.2d at 374.

We conclude that, under our liberal notice-pleading standard, Monahan alleged an
MWA claim upon which relief could be granted for her allegations regarding her
representation of a union member in a grievance process. First, Monahan alleged a
16
protected activity—that she “represent[ed] a union member in filing a grievance against
the [d]irector.” See Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1) (identifying good-faith reports of
violations, suspected violations, or planned violations of state law, common law, or rules
as protected activities). Second, Monahan alleged adverse employment actions, including
harassment, intimidation, and retaliation in the form of false, negative performance
reviews. See id., subd. 1 (providing that an employer “shall not discharge, discipline,
penalize, interfere with, threaten, restrain, coerce, or otherwise retaliate or discriminate
against an employee” because the employee engaged in a protected activity). 12 Finally,
Monahan alleged a causal connection between the two:
[The director’s] violence escalated into retaliation against the
union members who were attempting to support the employees
experiencing the discrimination at her hands, by directing their
supervisors to do her dirty work discriminating against them
by falsely finding fault in their performance, when no fault was
ever found UNTIL they were representing members in lawful
and peaceful grievance processes . . . .

(Emphasis added.) Taking this allegation as true and construing it in the light most
favorable to Monahan, the complaint sufficiently alleges a temporal proximity between the
time Monahan assisted a union member in the grievance process and when she received
the “false[] finding [of ] fault” with her performance.
13 See Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 374

12 We note that Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1, was recently amended . See 2023 Minn.
Laws ch. 53, art. 11, § 26, at 1290-91. The earlier version of the operative language read:
“An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate against, or
penalize an employee.” Minn. Stat. § 181.932 (2022). These amendments do not affect
our conclusion that Monahan sufficiently pleaded a claim under the MWA.
13 To the extent that Monahan attempted to allege that the director took other adverse
employment actions against her or that she engaged in other protected activities, we agree
with the district court that she failed to sufficiently allege a causal connection.
17
(providing that “the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s protected activity along with
close temporal proximity to the adverse action suffices to establish a causal connection”
for purposes of making a prima facie case).
For this reason, we narrowly reverse the district court’s decision to dismiss
Monahan’s MWA claim as it relates to her assisting a union member in a filing grievance.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the MWA claim as to these
other factual scenarios.