Ryan Grant, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1908

Ryan Grant, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-22246

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth Scoggin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition t o vacate his
conviction for aiding- and-abetting second-degree unintentional murder under a recent
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legislative enactment, arguing that the district court erred by (1) failing to hold a hearing,
and (2) concluding that appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life. We
affirm.
FACTS
The following factual summary is drawn from the supreme court’s opinion
affirming the murder conviction of appellant Ryan Grant’s accomplice, Diamond Lee
Jamal Griffin. See State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 260 (Minn. 2016).
On July 8, 2013, Griffin and his childhood friend, Grant, drove to S outh
Minneapolis. About two weeks prior, Griffin and Grant had jointly purchased a .22-caliber
semiautomatic pistol. Griffin and Grant exited the car with the pistol, intending to commit
a robbery. Grant hit a man in the head with the pistol, but the man ran away.
After the unsuccessful robbery, Griffin and Grant walked down an alley. They saw
three men sitting at a table in a backyard. Griffin and Grant entered the backyard, and
Griffin aimed the pistol at one of the men and demanded money. The man said that he had
no money and Griffin hit him on the head with the pistol. A second man threw a bottle at
Griffin, causing Griffin to fall backward. Griffin caught himself and fired the pistol at the
man, striking his arm. The man who Griffin hit in the head with the pistol grabbed Griffin’s
leg and Griffin shot him in the chest, fatally wounding him. Griffin and Grant fled.
Grant testified at Griffin’s jury trial. The jury found Griffin guilty of first-degree
felony murder, attempted murder, and assault. The supreme court affirmed Griffin’s
convictions.
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In April 2014, Grant pleaded guilty to aiding-and-abetting second-degree felony
murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2012), aiding-and-abetting
attempted second-degree murder, and aiding -and-abetting first-degree robbery. Grant
provided the following factual basis to support his guilty plea.
Grant and Griffin intended to commit a robbery, and Grant gave the pistol to Griffin.
Grant noticed adults and children in a backyard, and Grant and Griffin decided to rob the
adults. Griffin instructed Grant to wait by the side of the house while Griffin committed
the robbery. While waiting, Grant heard three gunshots. Grant then asked Griffin what
happened, and Griffin replied: “[S]hut the f--k up; don’t say nothing.” Grant later learned
that Griffin had shot two people, and one person had died.
In November 2014, the district court sentenced Grant in accordance with the plea
agreement to concurrent prison sentences of 234 months for the felony-murder conviction,
203 months for the attempted- murder conviction, and 108 months for the robbery
conviction. At the sentencing hearing, the state noted that Grant was “a much lesser
participant” than Griffin, but that Griffin “most likely could not have accomplished what
he did without . . . Grant’s participation.” The district court stated that Grant received the
benefit of the plea agreement because he cooperated with police and testified against
Griffin, which “helped a lot in convicting” Griffin.
In December 2023, Grant filed a preliminary application to vacate the murder
conviction, pursuant to the Act of May 19, 2023 (the act). See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52,
art. 4, § 24, at 864-68 . In the preliminary application, Grant provided identifying
information, such as his name and date of birth. He also provided the district court case
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number under which he sought relief and the basic procedural history of the case. The
district court granted Grant’s preliminary application.
Grant then filed a petition to vacate his conviction pursuant to the act, arguing that
he was entitled to relief because he was not a major participant in the underlying felony
offense and he did not act with extreme indifference to human life. In his filing, Grant
provided a copy of the factual basis supporting his guilty plea and the facts found in Griffin.
Grant claimed that his filings showed that “Griffin . . . went to the backyard, on his own,
with the firearm. . . . [Therefore,] Grant’s conduct of standing by the side of the house . . .
cannot be considered as extreme indifference to human life.”
Respondent State of Minnesota opposed Grant’s petition. T he state argued that
Grant was a major participant under the plain language of the act because he “provided a
deadly weapon” to Griffin. The state also argued that Grant acted with extreme
indifference to human life “by consciously disregarding the substantial and unjustifiable
risks of giving the pistol to Griffin to commit a robbery, where it was reasonably
foreseeable that death or great bodily harm would result.”
The state provided a portion of the transcript of Grant’s testimony from Griffin’s
jury trial. The transcript shows that, when he testified, Grant admitted that, after he was
arrested, he did not tell the police everything he knew about the shooting because he “tried
to deny [his] involvement.” He also admitted that he originally lied to the police about
knowing that Griffin had a gun, and admitted that he gave the gun to Griffin and that he
and Griffin had purchased the gun together.
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Grant testified that he and Griffin chose to commit a robbery in South Minneapolis
because it is “a highly populated area of Hispanics.” They targeted Hispanics because they
assumed that Hispanics have “[n]o green card, [they] carry cash, and they won’t go to the
police.” Grant testified that he and Griffin saw “kids and a couple guys” in a backyard and
decided to rob them. Grant gave the gun to Griffin because, when he had the gun during
the earlier robbery attempt, the robbery was unsuccessful . While Griffin was in the
backyard, Grant saw Griffin hit a man over the head. Grant saw a second man throw a beer
bottle at Griffin and then the first man grab Griffin’s leg causing Griffin to fall. As Griffin
was getting up, Grant heard three gunshots. Grant stated that one of the men in the yard
ran toward him “screaming.” The next day, Grant sold the gun and split the money with
Griffin.
On October 8, 2024, the district court filed an order denying Grant’s petition for
relief. The district court determined that Grant was a major participant in the robbery
because he gave the pistol to Griffin knowing that Griffin was going to commit a robbery.
The district court also determined that Grant acted with extreme indifference to human life,
stating:
Grant handed . . . Griffin the pistol—a weapon that can, and in
this case did, cause death—moments before it was used in the
robbery. As the [s]tate argues, this act not only
demonstrates . . . Grant’s practical participation in the robbery,
but an extreme indifference to human life as it was reasonably
foreseeable death or great bodily harm would result. Simply
put, the [c]ourt agrees with this analysis based on the record
before it. Accordingly, the [c]ourt finds that . . . Grant acted
with an extreme indifference to human life.

This appeal followed.
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DECISION
Hearing
Grant argues that the district court erred by denying his petition without first holding
a hearing. An appellate court reviews de novo whether a petitioner is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. See Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012) (applying
de novo review to district court’s legal determination to hold postconviction evidentiary
hearing); State v. Griffin, 20 N.W.3d 57, 60-61 (Minn. 2025) (mem.) (applying
postconviction-statutory framework in analyzing provisions under the act).
To determine whether Grant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, we must first
review the legislation under which he claims entitlement to a hearing.1 See State v. Hayes,
826 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2013) (stating that appellate courts apply plain meaning of
statute that is unambiguous). Under the act, an individual first files a “preliminary
application” for relief. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4 § 24, subd. 4. The preliminary
application must contain: the applicant’s name, the applicant’s date of birth, the relevant
district court case number, whether the applicant was convicted following a trial or
pursuant to a plea, whether the applicant filed a direct appeal or a postconviction-relief
petition, a brief statement explaining why the applicant is entitled to relief, and the
applicant’s attorney’s information. Id. The preliminary application is then reviewed by a

1 The state asserts that Grant’s argument fails because he did not request a hearing. But we
conclude that Grant did not need to explicitly request an evidentiary hearing because the
possibility of a hearing is implied when the petition is filed. See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52,
art. 4 § 24, subd. 6(e)(3).

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district court judge or a special master appointed to review preliminary applications. Id.,
subd. 5(a)-(b). The reviewing judge or special master uses discretion to determine whether
“there is a reasonable probability that the application is entitled to relief.” Id., subd. 5(c).
A reviewing judge or special master may summarily deny an application under
certain circumstances. Id., subd. 5(e). A preliminary application may be summarily denied
when the application does not include all required information, the applicant is not in
custody, the applicant was not convicted of the requisite offense, the issues in the
application are not relevant to the relief available, or it is a successive preliminary
application and relief had previously been denied. Id., subd. 5(e)- (f). If the reviewing
judge determines that there is a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief,
the judge will notify the applicant, and the applicant may “file and serve a petition to vacate
the conviction,” id., subds. 5(g), 6(a), “which can result in a full hearing on the merits of
their petition, held in open court and conducted pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section
590.04.” Griffin, 20 N.W.3d at 58 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
In addition to the information required in the preliminary application, the petition
must include “a statement of why the petitioner is entitled to relief.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch.
52, art. 4 § 24, subd. 6(a). The petitioner may file other relevant information, such as police
reports and trial transcripts. Id. The state is then afforded an opportunity to object to the
petition and may provide documents supporting the objection. Id., subd. 6(c).
The district court must then:
(1) issue an order and schedule the matter for sentencing or
resentencing pursuant to subdivision 7 if the county attorney
indicates an intent to support the petition;
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(2) issue an order denying the petition if additional information
or submissions establish that there is not a reasonable
probability that the applicant is entitled to relief under this
section and include a memorandum identifying the additional
information or submissions and explaining the reasons why the
court concluded that there is not a reasonable probability that
the applicant is entitled to relief; or

(3) schedule the matter for a hearing and issue any appropriate
order regarding submission of evidence or identification of
witnesses.

Id., subd. 6(e).
Here, Grant argues that he was entitled to a hearing under subdivision 6(e)(3). He
claims that a district court may issue an order denying the petition, under subdivision
6(e)(2), only when the additional information submitted shows that the preliminary
application should have been denied. We disagree and conclude that a district court may
summarily deny a petition for relief after deciding that the additional submissions show
that there is not a reasonable probability that the individual is entitled to the relief requested
in the petition. See Bobo, 820 N.W.2d at 516 (stating district court need not hold
evidentiary hearing when postconviction petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally
insufficient to entitle him to relief requested). In other words, the district court’s decision
on whether to hold a hearing on the petition is not a second look at whether the individual
met the threshold preliminary-application requirements of eligibility to file a petition.
The preliminary application, discussed in subdivisions 4 and 5, is treated differently
from the petition for relief discussed in subdivision 6. Specifically, subdivision 6(e)(2)
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states that a district court may deny “the petition” without reference to the preliminary
application.2
Additionally, subdivision 6(f) directs that a hearing be conducted pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 590.04 (2024), which is under the postconviction-relief chapter. In Griffin, in
deciding that a district court’s denial of a preliminary application under the act is a final
order, the supreme court again applied the framework of the postconviction-relief chapter.
20 N.W.3d at 60-61 (concluding that denial of preliminary application under the act is final
order for purposes of appellate review o f order denying postconviction relief). The
reference to and reliance upon the postconviction-relief chapter leads us to also find
guidance in the postconviction-relief chapter, which permits summary denial of a petition.
An evidentiary hearing is required only when “material facts are in dispute which
have not been resolved in the proceedings resulting in conviction and which must be
resolved in order to determine the issues raised on the merits.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d
162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quoting State ex rel. Roy v. Tahash, 152 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn.
1967)). An evidentiary hearing is not required unless facts are alleged which, if proven,
would entitle a petitioner to the requested relief. Fratzke v. State , 450 N.W.2d 101, 102
(Minn. 1990).
Here, the record was sufficient for the district court to determine whether Grant was
entitled to relief, including the trial transcript of Grant’s testimony at Griffin’s trial, Grant’s

2 We note that the identification of the petitioner in subdivision 6(e)(2) as the “applicant”
is inartful but does not alter the language permitting the district court to “issue an order
denying the petition.” (Emphasis added.)
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guilty-plea transcript, and the facts from Griffin’s direct appeal. Therefore, we conclude
that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary because, as discussed below, Grant’s alleged
entitlement to relief is refuted by the record. See Williams v. State , 760 N.W.2d 8, 14
(Minn. App. 2009) (stating that postconviction petitioner not entitled to hearing if
allegations lack factual support and are refuted by the record), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21,
2009); Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (stating that postconviction court must hold
evidentiary hearing on issues raised in petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and
records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief”).
Relief under the act
Under subdivision 6(e)(2), a district court may deny a petition if additional
information establishes that “there is not a reasonable probability” entitling the individual
to the requested relief. Appellate courts review de novo whether a reasonable probability
exists. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 694-98 (1984) (treating “reasonable
probability” in reviewing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as mixed question of law
and fact); State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017) (stating that appellate courts
review district court’s application of Strickland’s reasonable-probability test de novo
because it involves mixed question of law and fact). “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Here, the district court determined that Grant was not entitled to have his felony-
murder conviction vacated because he failed to show that he was not a major participant in
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the underlying felony or that he did not act with extreme indifference to human life. We
agree.
Grant pleaded guilty to aiding-and-abetting second-degree felony murder. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1). Under section 609.19, subdivision 2(1), a person is guilty
of second-degree unintentional murder if he causes the death of another while committing
a felony offense. Under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2012), a person is criminally liable
for a crime committed by another if he intentionally aided in the commission of the crime.
Here, Grant intentionally aided Griffin in the robbery that resulted in a death.
Recent legislation provides an exception to accomplice liability for second-degree
murder. The amendment to the aiding-and-abetting statute provides that “[a] person may
not be held criminally liable for [second -degree felony murder] for a death caused by
another unless the person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
extreme difference to human life.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 3, subd. 2a(b).3
Grant focuses solely on the argument that he did not act with extreme indifference
to human life. He argues that the district court erred because it denied relief based on the
sole fact that Grant provided the firearm to Griffin to conclude that Grant was both a major
participant and acted with extreme indifference to human life.
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. State v. Boss, 959 N.W.2d
198, 203 (Minn. 2021) . This court interprets a statute to determine the legislative intent,

3 The retroactivity provision was amended by replacing “and” with “or” so that the
provision requires the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
not a major participant in the underlying felony “or” did not act with extreme indifference
to human life. 2024 Minn. Laws, ch. 123, art. 4, § 20.
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which is derived from the statute’s language if it is unambiguous. State v. Wiltgen, 737
N.W.2d 561, 570-71 (Minn. 2007).
Grant does not contest the district court’s determination that he was a major
participant in the underlying robbery. A “major participant” is defined by statute and
includes a person who “provided a deadly weapon to another participant where it was
reasonably foreseeable that the weapon would be used in the underlying felony.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2a(c)(1) (2024).
The record shows that Grant and Griffin acquired the gun together two weeks before
the robbery and murder. Grant and Griffin attempted a robbery at which Grant hit a man
in the head with the gun, but the man ran away. After the unsuccessful robbery attempt,
Grant gave Griffin the gun to use in the second robbery. The record therefore shows that
Grant was a major participant because he “provided a deadly weapon [(gun)] to [Griffin]
where it was reasonably foreseeable that the [gun] would be used in the [robbery].” See id.
Grant claims that he is entitled to relief because he did not act with “extreme
indifference to human life.” He argues that, while providing the gun to Griffin could
establish that he was a major participant, it does not also establish that he acted with
extreme indifference to human life. He claims that the district court erroneously used the
providing-the-gun fact to conclude both that he was a major participant and a person who
acted with extreme indifference to human life.
Here, the district court understood that it was required to resolve both issues —
whether Grant “was a major participant in the commission of the robbery or acted with an
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extreme indifference to the lives of [the victims].” (Emphasis added.) The district court
stated:
Grant handed . . . Griffin the pistol—a weapon that can, and in
this case did, cause death—moments before it was used in the
robbery. . . . [T] his act not only demonstrates . . . Grant’s
practical participation in the robbery, but an extreme
indifference to human life as it was reasonably foreseeable
death or great bodily harm would result.

While the statut e defines “major participant,” it does not define “extreme
indifference to human life.” The parties agree that the definition used by the district court
is the correct definition of “extreme indifference to human life.” Extreme indifference to
human life involves “recklessness or at minimum, gross negligence .” State v. Bird, 734
N.W.2d 664, 677 (Minn. 2007). “[O]ne acts recklessly by creating a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that one is aware of and disregards.” State v. Engle, 743 N.W.2d 592,
595 (Minn. 2008) (defining reckless for the purpose of statute criminalizing reckless
discharge of firearm within municipality).
Grant argues that he did not exhibit “recklessness” or “gross negligence” because
he stood next to the house and did not go into the backyard during the shooting. The state
counters that several facts show that Grant acted recklessly—he targeted a marginalized
group, he saw that children were present, he gave Griffin the gun because he had been
unsuccessful in using it during the first robbery attempt, he ran way, he sold the gun, and
he lied to the police. We agree.
Grant gave Griffin the gun knowing that the gun would be used to commit a crime,
and he should have known that committing a robbery with a loaded gun could lead to injury
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or death. The record, also, does not show any facts mitigating Grant’s conduct of providing
Griffin a loaded firearm to use in the commission of a robbery. Therefore, the district court
did not err by denying relief relying on the fact that Grant provided the gun to Griffin to
commit the robbery.
As the state suggests, there are several additional facts in the record that show that
Grant exhibited indifference. See State v. Schmitz, 559 N.W.2d 701, 704 (Minn. App.
1997) (stating that “indifference suggests a lack of concern and is related to negligence or
recklessness”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1997). He targeted a marginalized group
because he believed that he would not be reported and would not be prosecuted. He saw
children in the backyard and still gave Griffin the gun to use during the robbery. See State
v. Profit, 323 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Minn. 1982) (stating that committing offense in front of
children is “particularly outrageous,” and that, even if children who are present are not
“technically victims of the crime, they [are] victims in another sense”). He lied to the
police to distance himself from the robbery. He immediately fled even after he heard the
gunshots and saw a victim running toward him screaming. See State v. Caine, 746 N.W.2d
339, 356 (Minn. 2008) (stating that fleeing crime scene evidences “consciousness of
guilt”); Tucker v. State, 799 N.W.2d 583, 587 (Minn. 2011) (stating that failure to aid may
be relevant in determining whether person convicted of a crime acted with particular
cruelty). And he sold the gun and shared the profits with Griffin after he knew that Griffin
shot two men with it, killing one. We conclude that the record shows that Grant lacked
concern for human life and displayed extreme indifference to human life.
Affirmed.