In the Matter of the Application of Arbor Creek Holdings, LLC, for a Conditional Use Permit.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1917

In the Matter of the Application of
Arbor Creek Holdings, LLC, for a Conditional Use Permit.

Filed September 2, 2025
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Wright County Planning Commission
File No. PR20240002335

Timothy J. Keane, Diane L. Peterson, Kutak Rock LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Colette Brashears (pro hac vice), Kutak Rock LLP, Fayetteville, Arkansas (for relator
Greater Lake Sylvia Association, Inc.)

Jay T. Squires, Michael J. Ervin, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent Wright County Planning Commission)

Tamara O’Neill Moreland, Inga K. Kingland, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren Ltd.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Arbor Creek Holdings, LLC)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A county planning commission granted a property owner a conditional use permit
to build a house on East Lake Sylvia below a natural bluff in a n area governed by a
comprehensive land-use plan that requires steep slopes to “be protected, as far as practical,
in their natural, stable state.” A lake association appeals by certiorari, arguing that the
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county’s decision to grant the permit was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious because
it failed to follow the comprehensive plan and applicable ordinance and because it lacks
factual findings supported by adequate evidence. Because we hold that the county’s permit
decision adequately addresses and complies with the ordinance and comprehensive plan
and because the finding challenged by the lake association has record support, we affirm.
FACTS
This case concerns a dispute over a proposal to build a house in an environmentally
sensitive area on the shore of East Lake Sylvia. East Lake Sylvia rests in Wright County
and is overlooked on its north side by a steeply sloped natural bluff. The county’s
applicable comprehensive land-use plan is its 2009 Northwest Quadrant Land Use Plan,
which governs the area around the lake. Among other environmental and developmental
concerns, the comprehensive plan declares that “[s]teep slopes in shoreland areas are
especially important to recognize, where intense development not only compromises the
integrity of these slopes, but once compromised, leads to decreased lake water quality
through erosion and siltation.” The comprehensive plan also recognizes that “shoreland
areas are very desirable for residential development due to the scenic vistas and recreational
opportunities” and provides that, during development, “[s]teep slopes . . . and other
sensitive environmental features will be protected, as far as practical, in their natural, stable
state.”
Part of the bluff area of East Lake Sylvia was rezoned to residential use in 2021,
and respondent Arbor Creek Holdings LLC owns at least one of the parcels in a platted,
six-lot subdivision in that area. Seeking to construct a house on that lot, Arbor Creek
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applied in June 2023 to amend an existing conditional use permit (CUP) and to build the
house below the bluff to alter 16,798 cubic yards of the soil by cutting 12,809 cubic yards
and filling 3,989 cubic yards. Arbor Creek’s proposal included a driveway down the bluff
to the lakeside house. Staff of respondent Wright County Planning Commission questioned
whether Arbor Creek’s proposal comported with the comprehensive plan given its land-
alteration component. Arbor Creek withdrew its application.
Arbor Creek reapplied in March 2024. This time it reduced its proposed land
alteration to a total of 7,731 cubic yards, based on 1,101 yards of cut and 6,630 yards of
fill. The change “significantly reduced” the previously proposed tree and land removal and
included other technical alterations advised by various experts. The new proposal included
a “ramp” over the bluff to access the lakeshore rather than cutting through the bluff. County
staff acknowledged the reduced, proposed land alteration but again believed that the
“proposal appears to conflict with the [comprehensive plan].” The planning commission,
despite signaling earlier it would grant the application, denied it, reasoning that the
proposal “still create[d] a significant disturbance to a natural and stable bluff,” raising
concerns about the quantity of fill.
Arbor Creek retained a new engineer to make changes from the previous plan and
in September 2024 re applied to the county. Its modified proposal reduced the land
alteration to 3,493 cubic yards, including 1,608 yards of cut and 1,885 yards of fill, and it
relocated the proposed driveway. Of the “in bluff” cut and fill, 57 cubic yards were to be
cut and 991 cubic yards were to be filled; the “below bluff” (or lakeside) fill was reduced
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from 5,242 to 894 cubic yards. The proposal included detailed plans for drainage, erosion
control, and stormwater management.
The planning commission received mostly favorable prehearing public comments,
but S outhside Township and relator Greater Lake Sylvia Association Inc. (GLSA)
advocated denying the permit. Neither the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources,
the Wright County Soil and Water District, nor the Minnesota Indian Affairs Council
expressed opposition, all of whom had expressed concerns about earlier versions of Arbor
Creek’s proposal. Planning-commission staff opined that, although the proposal had
significantly reduced the alteration necessary for the build, the proposal still “appear[ed]
to conflict” with the comprehensive plan.
The planning commission held a public hearing on Arbor Creek’s third request,
where one of Arbor Creek’s project planners testified about the new proposal. He explained
that the proposal had improved by no longer relying on a “land bridge” over the bluff but
would instead use an existing, previously overlooked road that was already clear of trees .
The new proposal increased the home’s shoreline setback from the previously planned 80
feet to 102 feet. He opined that a silt fence and the existence of an expansive flat area
between the bluff and the lakeshore would assist in preventing erosion into the lake.
The project’s newly retained engineer also testified, describing the modified
driveway design and explaining that it follows the existing grade and “hug[s] the bluff” so
as to reduce the need for fill and eliminated or greatly reduced the need for retaining walls.
He described the plan’s curb-and-gutter system, which would direct drainage to a catch-
basin to dissipate water-flow energy before stormwater could reach the lake, as well as the
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plan’s leaving intact an ice ridge, which would direct runoff into swales. The new design
also needed less fill to elevate the house. The engineer additionally discussed how the new
plan’s cut and fill amounts balanced, allowing most of the fill material to be moved from
elsewhere on the site, eliminating the need for large amounts of material to be trucked in.
And he added that areas on the slope would be graded and seeded, minimizing runoff.
A consultant specializing in wetlands and landfills testified, saying that the design
will “cause a lot less erosion to occur.” He said that vegetation in the swales would capture
silt, reducing erosion that was “likely presently occurring in there.” Arbor Creek’s general
construction contractor testified that he had constructed “nearly 40 new houses on Sylvia”
and that his process protects the lake by including silt fencing and mats and by monitoring
runoff. Other members of the public also testified favoring the project.
GLSA’s counsel testified against the proposal, arguing that it contravenes the
comprehensive plan. He conceded that it was not as “adverse and impactful as the original”
proposal but asserted that “large truckloads of trees [had been] removed.” Arbor Creek
confirmed it had removed some trees but countered by insisting that it had done so
consistent with the existing directives on the land. GLSA presented no expert testimony.
The planning commissioners conferred. The chairperson observed that Arbor Creek
had “dotted a lot of the I’s and crossed a lot of the T’s,” but he referenced “that elephant in
the room, the bluff,” and wondered, “[H]ow are we going to work through that[ ?]” The
commissioners debated the proposal’s merit, ultimately voting to approve Arbor Creek’s
permit request. The planning commission issued an order discussing the succession of
proposals, observing the improvements regarding land alteration, road alignment,
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stormwater protection, and erosion control. It found that the proposal comported with the
comprehensive plan and would not injure the lake or other parcels. And it wrote that it
could not find that the proposal’s land alteration and end use “conflict[ed] with the land
use plan.” It issued a CUP with stated conditions, including those required to control
erosion and water runoff.
GLSA appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
GLSA contests the CUP. GLSA faces an uphill battle to convince us to overturn the
planning commission’s decision to grant the CUP, given that counties are entitled to “wide
latitude” in making the quasi-judicial decision. See Schwardt v. County of Watonwan, 656
N.W.2d 383, 386, 388 (Minn. 2003). To prevail, GLSA must establish that the decision is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious because it was based on legally insufficient reasoning
or because its reasoning was not record-supported. RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington,
861 N.W.2d 71, 75–76 (Minn. 2015); see also White Bear Docking & Storage, Inc. v. City
of White Bear Lake, 324 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. 1982) (cautioning judicial restraint in
zoning appeals). GLSA argues that the planning commission’s reasons for granting the
CUP do not meet the legal or factual thresholds. The arguments fail. GLSA argues that the
planning commission’s reasons for granting the CUP were both legally insufficient and
lacked a factual basis. The arguments fail under the standard of review.
I

GLSA first contends that the planning commission’s decision was unreasonable,
arbitrary, and capricious because it failed to apply its own ordinances when it granted the
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CUP, pointing to the county’s CUP ordinance and comprehensive plan. A planning
commission must apply the relevant provisions of a county ordinance. See In re Stadsvold,
754 N.W.2d 323, 332 (Minn. 2008). One criterion for granting a CUP under a Wright
County ordinance is that “[t]he use is not in conflict with the Policies Plan of the county.”
Wright County, Minn., Code of Ordinances (WCO) § 155.029(A)(5) (2022); see Minn.
Stat. § 394.22, subd. 9 (2024) (defining “comprehensive plan”). The county’s relevant
comprehensive plan again is the Wright County Northwest Quadrant Land Use Plan, which
dictates, “Proposals that conflict with the adopted Plan will only be approved in
extraordinary circumstances, when unique reasons justify the departure, and the basic
policies and intent of the Land Use Plan are not compromised.” The plan outlines major
goals that “serve as the framework within which [the] Plan must be reviewed and used as
a decision making tool.” Its fourth major goal regards environmental protection, and its
relevant provisions mentioned above are more fully presented here:
Steep slopes, wetlands, unstable soils and other
sensitive environmental features will be protected, as far as
practical, in their natural, stable state. Development on or near
such areas may be required to provide larger lot sizes,
enhanced setbacks or other conditions to protect the sensitive
features.
. . . .
Lakeshore and shoreland areas are very desirable for
residential development due to the scenic vistas and
recreational opportunities. . . .

Development of lakeshore property shall abide by State
Shoreland Management Rules to maintain, as far as practical,
a natural shoreline and natural views of shoreland areas from
the lake’s surface.
. . . .
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In general, development activity should take place in
harmony with the existing, stable, natural environment.
Development proposals should be adapted to suit the natural
landscape, rather than altering the land to suit the development.

It is impossible for any development to occur without
some alteration of the land. However, it is often possible,
through innovative or alternative design considerations, to suit
the development to the existing natural conditions.
Unnecessary alteration is expensive, and can lead to a variety
of unforeseen problems through the disturbance of natural soil,
drainage or other systems.

(Emphasis in original.) GLSA’s argument requires us to consider whether the planning
commission’s decision granting the CUP satisfies these provisions.
GLSA couches its argument in terms of alleged deficiencies in the planning
commission’s specific findings regarding elements in the plan’s provisions: “the
[commission] did not find that . . .”; “[n]or did the [commission] articulate whether . . .”;
“[t]he [commission] did not conclude whether . . .”; “the [commission] failed to articulate
any finding as to . . .”; “[n]or did it state . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The argument is not
convincing.
The first flaw in GLSA’s insufficient- findings argument is that, although the
county’s CUP ordinance identifies specifically required findings “where applicable” for
CUP approval, the commission made the findings that the ordinance requires:
Among other things, the County Planning Commission shall
make the following findings where applicable.

(1) The conditional use will not be injurious to the use
and enjoyment of other property in the immediate vicinity for
the purposes already permitted, nor substantially diminish and
impair property values within the immediate vicinity.

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(2) The establishment of the conditional use will not
impede the normal and orderly development and improvement
of surrounding vacant property for uses predominant in the
area.

(3) Adequate utilities, access roads, drainage and other
necessary facilities have been or are being provided.

(4) Adequate measures have been or will be taken to
provide sufficient off-street parking and loading space to serve
the proposed use.

(5) The use is not in conflict with the Policies Plan of
the county.

(6) Adequate measures have been taken or will be taken
to prevent or control offensive odor, fumes, dust, noise and
vibration, so that none of these will constitute a nuisance, and
to control lighted signs and other lights in such a manner that
no disturbance to neighboring properties will result.

WCO § 155.029(A) (2022). While we reject Arbor Creek’s argument that the planning
commission did not need to make any express findings, and the commission’s suggestion
that it did not have to expressly address the comprehensive plan, none of the allegedly
missing findings are expressly required by the county’s ordinance. More importantly, the
commission’s CUP-approval decision in fact expressly listed the six ordinance factors and
immediately included detailed, non-conclusory findings explaining why the approved CUP
met each of them. GLSA cites no authority that requires the county to make the additional
findings that GLSA says are missing.
We are not persuaded otherwise by GLSA’s contention that the commission failed
to adequately consider and explain whether Arbor Creek’s final CUP proposal comported
with the comprehensive plan. A county’s CUP decision must adequately explain its
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reasoning to allow for judicial review. See White Bear Rod & Gun Club v. City of Hugo,
388 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Minn. 1986). Our review of the record and findings informs us that,
while reviewing the series of successively improved applications, the commission grappled
with and explained its reasoning, addressing the same competing policy concerns that are
outlined in the challenged portions of the comprehensive plan— the right of property
owners to develop property and the objective to maintain preferred types of land in their
natural state. The comprehensive plan provides for steep-slope protection “as far as
practical, in [a] natural, stable state” while also contemplating “[d]evelopment on or near
such areas” with “conditions to protect sensitive features.” (Emphasis added .) The
commissioners clearly considered these concerns and explained their reasoning for finding
no conflict with the plan.
For example, one commissioner reflected, “I don’t think our [comprehensive] Plan
says, ‘thou shall not touch a bluff.’ When they wrote it, if they wanted to do that, they could
have said that. They didn’t.” He added, “I just think we’re here with a better more adapted
plan that does more to protect the natural environment than it did even at that second stage.”
And he observed, “It seems like they’re trying to adapt their plan to be consistent with the
natural environment. And we can have a reading of that major policy goal and the
points . . . about trying to adapt development to what’s there and not vice versa. It seems
like they’re doing that.” Commissioners frequently discussed or engaged with the abundant
testimony about protecting the bluff and controlling runoff and erosion. They praised Arbor
Creek’s “pretty heroic efforts” in improving the plan.
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The decision granting the CUP implicitly addresses the comprehensive plan’s
challenged objectives, which are themselves tempered by practical considerations. A
challenged provision in the plan states, “Development proposals should be adapted to suit
the natural landscape, rather than altering the land to suit the development.” This language
is followed by the recognition that “[i]t is impossible for any development to occur without
some alteration of the land” and that “it is often possible, through innovative or alternative
design considerations, to suit the development to the existing natural conditions.” And the
challenged provision that development of lakeshore property “maintain, as far as practical,
a natural shoreline and natural views of shoreland areas from the lake’s surface” similarly
follows language that “[l]akeshore and shoreland areas are very desirable for residential
development.” (Emphasis added.) The granted CUP order considers these balanced goals.
It recognizes that Arbor Creek’s “consultants have stated the cut and fill along [the] bluff
will not degrade the bluff and make it unstable.” It recognizes the significant reduction of
cut and fill from the previously denied applications, incorporation of a new road alignment
down the bluff, and provisions for stormwater protection and pollution and erosion
controls. It emphasizes that the land-alteration plans were created by a licensed
professional engineer and reviewed by an environmental consultant. And it states the
proposal will not injure the lake or adjacent land. It found that “increase in drainage from
the land alteration has been engineered to either be contained or controlled on the
property.” Its conditions likewise reflect adherence to the comprehensive plan, including
requiring that construction be consistent with engineered plans and that Arbor Creek
comply with its state and federal water-quality permits, maintain stormwater basins, and
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institute best practices for runoff control. And it obligates Arbor Creek to accept future
directives for controlling erosion. GLSA does not convince us that the commission failed
to make the required findings or to adequately consider the comprehensive plan.
We are also not persuaded by GLSA’s reference to the commission’s decision to
reject Arbor Creek’s earlier applications. Findings on one application do not necessarily
bind the commission’s decision on a different application. See Sunrise Lake Ass’n, Inc. v.
Chisago Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 633 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Minn. App. 2001); cf. In re Rev. of
2005 Ann. Automatic Adjustment of Charges for All Elec. & Gas Util s., 768 N.W.2d 112,
120 (Minn. 2009) (“[A]n agency must generally conform to its prior norms and decisions
or, to the extent that it departs from its prior norms and decisions, the agency must set forth
a reasoned analysis for the departure that is not arbitrary and capricious.”). The planning
commission’s CUP decision recognized that it was working with a substantively different
application here by detailing the impactful changes to the proposal. And although
Southside Township opposed the proposal, and some planning-commission staff observed
that the proposal appeared to conflict with the comprehensive plan, it is the commission
itself, not the staff or the township, who ultimately controls the decision whether to grant
the proposal. WCO § 155.027(A) (2023); see Bd. of Supervisors v. Carver Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 225 N.W.2d 815, 819–20 (Minn. 1975). GLSA’s reliance on the prior
application rejections and staff disagreement about the approval provide no basis for
reversal.
In sum, the planning commission articulated legally sufficient reasons why Arbor
Creek’s proposed project met the objectives of the comprehensive plan and why the
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commission changed course. GLSA’s contention that the findings and consideration by the
commission fail to comport with the comprehensive plan does not lead us to conclude that
granting the CUP was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
II
GLSA argues also that the planning commission’s findings lack record support. A
county’s decision to approve a CUP is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious if it is justified
by reasons that have no factual basis in the record. See RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 75–76. We
consider the argument without reweighing evidence, reviewing the record only to
determine whether the evidence supports the decision. Id. at 76. GLSA specifically
challenges as unsupported the commission’s finding that “the cut and fill along [the] bluff
will not degrade the bluff and make it unstable” and implies that the commission errantly
relied on the testimony of Arbor Creek’s consultant to make this finding. GLSA maintains
that Arbor Creek had cleared “truckloads of trees” below the bluff for a build site, even
though clear cutting was prohibited under a pre-existing CUP to prevent erosion, and that
Arbor Creek’s final application was therefore simply proposing a solution to a problem
Arbor Creek had created. But the consultant did not connect the trees cut below the bluff
to the “siltation that’s likely presently occurring in there.” And we see nothing in the record
describing how clear-cutting trees below the bluff would impact the stability of the bluff
itself. GLSA also tries to undercut the finding by pointing to the consultant’s testimony
that “[t] hey did what they could with the existing conditions there. There’s still
sedimentation that can go wash into the lake.” But the same consultant testified that “this
engineered design will make a lot less erosion or cause a lot less erosion to occur.” We are
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in no position to weigh the evidence. And the challenged finding has further support in the
record. Another consultant testified that the plan follows an existing bluff roadway that had
already mostly been cleared of trees and that planned fill on the bluff wouldn’t “degrade
the slope.” He stated that he could not see how “anything” could “get into the lake.” It is
clear from the record that the commission might have interpreted the evidence differently
and reached a different conclusion. But our deferential review standard prevents us from
reversing.
Affirmed.