In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1922

In the Marriage of:

Kimberly Ann Young, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Charles Wayne Young, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed November 17, 2025
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-22-6120

Jill M. Johnson Bigelbach, Katelyn M. Wehlage, Johnson Bigelbach Law, PLLC, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles Wayne Young, Jr., St. Cloud, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from a district court’s order modifying parenting time, appellant
Charles Wayne Young Jr. (Father) argues that the district court misapplied the law, made
improper findings, and exhibited bias. Because the district court properly applied the law
2
and made adequate findings to support its decision, and Father did not make a requisite
showing that the district court displayed bias, we affirm.
FACTS
Father and respondent Kimberly Ann Young (Mother) married in 2012. They have
two minor children.
On March 9, 2023, the parties’ marriage was dissolved pursuant to a stipulated
judgment and decree of dissolution (J&D). The J&D awarded the parties joint legal and
joint physical custody of their children and equal parenting time. The J&D also awarded
Father the marital home, located in Minneapolis. The J&D additionally provided that the
children would attend school in the Minneapolis Public School District unless the parties
mutually agreed to a change or the district court ordered otherwise. Following the
dissolution, Mother purchased a home located less than one mile from Father’s home.
After the parties separated, Father began a romantic relationship with another
woman. In March 2024, Father purchased a home in St. Cloud, where he moved in with
the woman. The distance between Father’s new home and Mother ’s home is 72 miles,
resulting in a one-way travel time of approximately one hour and twenty minutes,
excluding traffic and weather-induced delays.
In late May 2024, Mother filed a motion to modify parenting time. Mother’s
proposed schedule sought equal parenting time during the summer and primary placement
with her during the school year. More specifically, Mother requested that the parties
exercise parenting time on a week-on and week-off basis during the summer months.
Mother asked that the children primarily reside with her during the school year and that
3
Father have parenting time during alternating weekends, Wednesday evenings in the Twin
Cities metropolitan area, and nonholiday weekdays during which the children do not have
school (e.g., most spring breaks). She also proposed a holiday schedule that alternated
placement between most holidays.
Father filed a responsive motion in which he requested denial of Mother’s motion
and entry of his proposed parenting schedule. He proposed an eight-week school-year
schedule that awarded himself full parenting time on five of every eight weekends and
Mother primary weekday parenting time. This schedule also included travel from St. Cloud
to Minneapolis on one-half of the Monday mornings during the school year.
Father also requested parenting time for the entire summer, excluding two weeks.
He proposed a similar alternating holiday schedule to Mother. At a June 2024 hearing on
the motions, the parties agreed to waive an evidentiary hearing and asked the district court
to rely upon the parties’ affidavits in reaching its decision.
The district court filed an order in October 2024 modifying parenting time. The
order noted that the parties reached an agreement on summer parenting time, which the
court ordered and which provided that the parties would have a week-on and week-off
schedule during the summer months. In deciding the school-year parenting time, the
district court applied the statutory best-interests factors in finding that a schedule with
limited weekday travel between St. Cloud and Minneapolis was in the children’s best
interests. The district court’s order awarded Father overnight school-year parenting time
every other weekend and evening parenting time every Wednesday and Thursday in the
Twin Cities metropolitan area until 7:00 p.m. The parties agree that the new parenting-time
4
schedule results in Father having 36% of overnights, a reduction from the equal overnight
schedule in the J&D.
The order additionally allowed Mother to “enroll the children in extracurricular
activities but should take care not to schedule activities on [Father ’s] weeknight parenting
time.” The order concluded with several communication-related prohibitions, including
that the parties “must not discuss Court proceedings with [the] children” and cannot “use
the children as spies, messengers, or conduits of information about the other parent.”
Father appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court acted within its discretion to modify parenting time.

Father raises several arguments in challenging the district court’s application of the
law and findings. We address each in turn.
We review a district court’s order modifying parenting time for an abuse of
discretion. Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. App. 2017). An abuse of
discretion occurs when a district court misapplies the law or relies on findings of fact that
the record fails to support. Id. Appellate courts uphold the factual findings upon which a
district court bases its parenting-time decision unless those findings are clearly erroneous.
Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. 1978). But “[d]etermining the legal
standard applicable to a change in parenting time is a question of law and is subject to de
novo review.” Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009).
Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (2024), governs modification of parenting time.
Subdivision 5(b) provides:
5
If modification would serve the best interests of the child, the
court shall modify the decision-making provisions of a
parenting plan or an order granting or denying parenting time,
if the modification would not change the child’s primary
residence. Consideration of a child’s best interest includes a
child’s changing developmental needs.

In evaluating whether modification of parenting time is in the best interests of the children,
a district court “must consider and evaluate all relevant factors.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a) (2024) (emphasis added). A list of 12 best-interests factors appears in Minn.
Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1)-(12). The mandate to consider relevant best-interests factors
when considering requests to modify parenting time does not require that a district court
make specific findings on all best-interests factors. Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592,
597 (Minn. 2018).
Restriction of Parenting Time
Father, citing a reduction in parenting time from 50% to 36%, argues that this
reduction constitutes an impermissible restriction of parenting time and operates as a de
facto modification of joint custody. In support of this argument, Father maintains that the
reduction resulted in a restriction of parenting time which the district court failed to justify
with statutory findings and the district court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing left it
without a sufficient basis to restrict parenting time. Father also claims that the new
parenting-time schedule “functions as a de facto sole custody arrangement.” We are
unpersuaded.
Apart from certain statutory exceptions not applicable to this case, a district court
may only restrict parenting time if it finds that “(1) parenting time is likely to endanger the
6
child’s physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional development; or (2) the
parent has chronically and unreasonably failed to comply with court-ordered parenting
time.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(c)(1)-(2). A district court may not restrict parenting
time without an evidentiary hearing. See Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 336 (Minn.
App. 2014) (considering whether a reduction in parenting time constituted a restriction
such that an evidentiary hearing was required).
The Minnesota Legislature has not defined when a restriction of parenting time
occurs. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518.003, .175 (2024). “To determine whether a reduction in
parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification, the court should consider the
reasons for the changes as well as the amount of the reduction.” Suleski, 855 N.W.2d at
336 (quoting Dahl, 765 N.W.2d at 124). A restriction of one parent’s parenting time does
not occur when a modification of parenting time “increases [the other] parent’s percentage
of parenting time to an amount that is between 45.1 to 54.9 percent.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 5(c).
1 In considering the first prong—the reasons for the change—we have explained
that when the reason for the reduction in parenting time stems solely from the distance
between the parties’ homes and not a defect in a party’s care of the children, only the second
prong—the amount of the reduction—is at issue. Suleski, 855 N.W.2d at 336. In this

1 Father seems to interpret this language as indicating that a reduction in parenting time
below 45.1% is necessarily a restriction. However, the statute merely states that a reduction
in parenting time to an “amount that is between 45.1 to 54.9 percent” is not a restriction
without stating that a further reduction is a restriction. Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(c).
Moreover, father’s interpretation is inconsistent with Suleski, 855 N.W.2d at 336-37, which
does not set a floor as to what constitutes a restriction.
7
context, a substantial reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction requiring an
evidentiary hearing. See id.
In considering whether a reduction is substantial, we compare the modification
order with the most recent ruling that set parenting time. Id. at 337. In Suleski, we reasoned
that a 7% reduction in parenting time was, given the circumstances of the case, not
substantial. Id. Although the reduction in the present appeal is 14% rather than the 7% in
Suleski, in that case we only considered the amount of the reduction rather than considering
the reasons for the change because the reason for the requested reduction stemmed solely
from the distance between the parties’ residences. Id. at 336. Here, although the primary
basis for Mother ’s modification motion appears to be Father’s relocation, Mother cited
additional reasons, including concerns with the impact of the move on the children’s mental
health, inappropriate messages from Father , and his involving the children in parenting
conflicts.
Given the notable impact of Father’s relocation and, as will be further explained
below, the district court’s careful analysis of the reasons supporting modification, the
reduction in parenting time does not constitute a restriction. For that reason, Father’s
arguments regarding a lack of an evidentiary hearing (which, as we noted, he waived) and
a lack of statutory findings justifying a restriction or a de facto physical-custody
modification do not present a basis for relief.
Characterization of the Proposals Related to Parenting Time
Father argues that the district court mischaracterized the parties’ parenting-time
proposals, pointing to a portion of the district court’s order which states that “[b]oth parties
8
seek an unequal schedule where Mom has more overnights.” Father points out that his
proposed schedule sought 47% of overnights, which he argues “constitutes equal parenting
time as a matter of law” pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g), and that the district
court failed to apply a presumption in favor of equal parenting time. However, Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 1(g), merely provides that “there is a rebuttable presumption that a child
must receive a minimum of at least 25 percent of parenting time with each parent.” Further,
this provision does not include a presumption in favor of equal parenting time, nor does
Father cite other authority indicating that there is a presumption of equal parenting time.
Indeed, Father does not dispute, and the record supports, that both parties proposed a
schedule in which Mother has more overnights. The district court’s finding is therefore
not clearly erroneous, and it did not improperly apply the law in making this finding.
Characterization of the Summer Parenting-Time Agreement
Father contends that the district court mischaracterized the parties’ summer
parenting-time agreement as a permanent, rather than temporary, agreement. In support of
this claim, Father cites the transcript from a June 2024 hearing during which counsel for
Mother stated that, “[f]or right now, pending an order from the court [that] may change
summer parenting time, the parties have agreed that they’re going to exercise time on a
week-on-week-off basis.” Assuming without deciding that the district court
mischaracterized the agreement, we address Father’s argument that this
mischaracterization resulted in the district court “distort[ing] the impact of his parenting
time and incorrectly conclud[ing] that he was proposing less than equal time.” We are
unpersuaded. Father does not dispute that the language cited by the district court accurately
9
describes the agreement for summer parenting time. And though it may not be clear what
is meant by “[f]or right now,” Father did not clarify to the district court that this is not his
agreement and, given the ambiguity, the district court did not clearly err by interpreting
this agreement as a permanent one.
Information Regarding the Children’s Preferences
Father next argues that the district court had insufficient evidence to support a
modification because it lacked information regarding the children’s “true preferences.”
The district court found the best-interests factor regarding the children’s preferences to be
neutral because, although it found that “[t]he children enjoy spending time with both
parents,” it “had insufficient information as to the children’s true preferences” given the
lack of formal assessments due to the parties’ waiver of an evidentia ry hearing. Because
the record supports the district court’s finding and because a district court only needs to
make findings on the relevant factors in making a best-interests determination, Hanse n,
908 N.W.2d at 597, Father’s claim of error is unpersuasive.
2
Credibility Determinations and Weight of Evidence
Father additionally posits that the district court made erroneous credibility
determinations and improperly weighed the parties’ evidence. He first asserts that the
district court “repeatedly credited [Mother’s] representations about the children’s

2 In a related argument, Father contends that the district court erred by indicating that it
would refuse to visit with the children to obtain their preferences per Minn. Stat. § 518.166
(2024). We need not address this argument because, as noted, Father waived an evidentiary
hearing. Additionally, the record does not indicate that Father requested that the district
court interview the children.
10
preferences and their adjustment their struggles while dismissing [his] claims that the
children ‘barely notice’ the commute,” adding that a lack of a custody evaluation or neutral
assessment made the district court’s “credibility findings arbitrary.” Because the record
does not indicate that Father requested a custody evaluation or neutral assessment, Father
forfeits this argument on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)
(“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented [to] and considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it.”
(quotation omitted)). Moreover, “appellate courts defer to [district] court credibility
determinations,” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000),
meaning that we will not disturb the district court’s implicit finding that Mother ’s
submissions were more persuasive than Father ’s. Our review of the record confirms that
Mother’s affidavit supports the district court’s finding.
He additionally asserts that the district court failed to objectively weigh the parties’
competing proposals and did not explain why Mother’s schedule was better for the
children. However, the district court made detailed findings on each of the 12 best-interests
factors and explained that “the best interests of the children are served when they are not
required to travel in a vehicle for over an hour on school day mornings and school day
evenings (when there is school the next day).” Indeed, the nature of the parties’ school-year
proposals, although not significantly dissimilar, support s the district court’s finding.
Father’s proposal includes morning travel from Minneapolis to St. Cloud on four of every
eight Monday mornings. On the contrary, Mother’s proposal does not include travel
11
between Minneapolis and St. Cloud on school mornings. Father’s argument that the district
court failed to objectively weigh the proposals is therefore unpersuasive.
De Facto Modification of Legal Custody
Father appears to claim that a provision allowing Mother to enroll the children in
extracurricular activities, as well as restrictions imposed by the district court on both parties
regarding communications with the children, are inconsistent with the J&D’s grant of joint
legal custody. We interpret Father’s claim to be that the district court improperly granted
a de facto modification of legal custody without requiring that Mother satisfy the
requirements under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2024). Significant modifications to orders
governing legal custody can operate as de facto modifications of custody and thus require
application of modification standards under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). Cf. Christensen v.
Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 442-43 (Minn. 2018) (explaining that modification of parenting
time can constitute modification of physical custody so as to require application of section
518.18(d)). We are not persuaded that the district court’s order functions as an improper
de facto modification of legal custody.
We first address Father’s argument that the district court’s order, which states that
“Mom shall be permitted to enroll the children in extracurricular activities but should take
care not to schedule activities on Dad’s weeknight parenting time,” is somehow
inconsistent with, or modifies, his right to joint legal custody. Father correctly notes that
a joint-legal -custody designation gives each parent equal rights and responsibilities
regarding “major decisions determining the child’s upbringing, including education, health
care, and religious training.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b). However, he does not
12
provide any explanation or authority for the assertion that this provision in the district
court’s order conflicts with his rights as a joint legal custodian.
Father next points to the following communication limitations as being inconsistent
with joint legal custody: “[t]he parties must not discuss Court proceedings with [the]
children,” and “[n]either party may use the children as spies, messengers, or conduits of
information about the other parent.” Again, Father does not provide any explanation or
authority for the assertion that this provision in the district court’s order conflicts with his
rights as a joint legal custodian. Moreover, rather than being inconsistent with joint legal
custody, these limits are consistent with the obligations of parents with joint legal custody.
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(12) (addressing “the willingness and ability of parents to
cooperate in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing information and minimize
exposure of the child to parental conflict”).
3
II. The district court did not exhibit judicial bias.
Father last argues that the district court demonstrated bias and that this bias requires
reversal of the district court’s order and reassignment to a new judge on remand. In support

3 Father appears to raise three constitutional arguments involving the underlying
proceedings or regarding the district court’s order: a due-process challenge, a challenge to
the order as vague and overbroad, and a First Amendment challenge. Father’s due-process
argument consists almost entirely of challenges to the district court’s discretionary
weighing of competing evidence or support for its factual findings. For the reasons
explained above, this argument fails. And because the authority that F ather provides for
his remaining constitutional arguments fail to show that the district court erred or violated
his rights, those arguments fail. See White v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 567 N.W.2d 724,
734 (Minn. App. 1997) (“[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear
affirmatively before there can be reversal.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct.
31, 1997).
13
of his argument, Father contends that the district court showed bias by improperly framing
his purpose in relocating, accepting Mother’s framing of the facts and disregarding his
framing of the facts without justification, consistently resolving credibility issues in favor
of Mother, and making rulings that are based on speculation or factually unsupported
assertions.
Appellate courts presume that a district court judge “has discharged her duties
properly.” Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). Further, “[p]revious
adverse rulings by themselves do not demonstrate judicial bias”; rather, “the record as a
whole” must exhibit judicial bias. Id. Minnesota caselaw has established a high bar for
showing bias. In McClelland v. McClelland, for example, the supreme court concluded
that allegations that the district court judge “inappropriately interjected herself into the
questioning of one of the witnesses, interrupted the testimony of appellant’s expert,
prematurely stopped further inquiry into the wife’s marital and nonmarital assets, and
refused to make a record of her comments made in chambers” failed to demonstrate judicial
bias. 359 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Minn. 1984).4
Father relies on State v. Dorsey , 701 N.W.2d 238, 248 (Minn. 2005), to argue that
“a judge must not appear biased by resolving all disputes in favor of one party without
addressing conflicting evidence.” The portion of Dorsey to which Father cites does not
support this argument. Rather, it discusses whether a judge’s knowledge of a disputed

4 Following McClelland, the legislature amended a statutory provision underlying an aspect
of the court’s decision unrelated to the judicial-bias analysis in response to the court’s
decision. See Gales v. Gales, 553 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Minn. 1996).
14
evidentiary fact “could create a reasonable question regarding the judge’s impartiality.”
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Father’s bias claim rests almost entirely on disagreement with the district court’s
rulings. These adverse rulings fall short of the showing for bias, see Hannon, 752 N.W.2d
at 522, particularly when these challenged findings have record support.
Affirmed.