Teresa McDonald, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1939

Teresa McDonald,
Relator,

vs.

Monarch Bus Service,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed September 15, 2025
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 50866093-3

Teresa McDonald, Cottage Grove, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

Monarch Bus Service, Hastings, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Melannie M. Markham, Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Relator Teresa McDonald appeals from an unemployment-law judge’s (ULJ)
determination that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits. Broadly, McDonald
2
challenges the ULJ’s determinations that she was discharged for employment misconduct
and did not qualify for an exception to ineligibility. She also raises evidentiary and
credibility questions. We affirm.
FACTS
McDonald worked full time as a school-bus driver for respondent-employer
Monarch Bus Service from August 12, 2013 , to June 7, 2024. McDonald’s discharge
stemmed from three accidents—the first occurred in September 2023, the second occurred
in October 2023, and the third occurred in June 2024. On June 7, 2024, the day after the
third accident, Monarch notified McDonald that she had been placed on a three -day
suspension and that she would be contacted following the third day. McDonald did not
hear from Monarch until July 2, 2024, when she was officially discharged.
On July 7, 2024, McDonald applied for unemployment benefits. Respondent
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development issued a
determination of ineligibility for unemployment benefits on the basis that McDonald was
discharged for employment misconduct. McDonald appealed the ineligibility
determination.
In early August 2024, McDonald was diagnosed with “[m]ajor [d]epressive
[d]isorder, [r]ecurrent, [s]evere” and “ [g]eneralized [a]nxiety [d]isorder.” McDonald’s
medical provider advised that, despite these diagnoses, McDonald could “perform any
employment” and work eight-hour days.
3
A ULJ held an evidentiary hearing on August 28, 2024. McDonald’s former
manager appeared and testified on Monarch’s behalf. McDonald also appeared with
counsel and testified.
The manager testified first regarding the circumstances that led to McDonald’s
discharge. The manager explained that McDonald was discharged because she “had three
. . . accidents in a school year.” The manager testified generally regarding these accidents,
describing each as “preventable” and asserting that McDonald failed to report the first and
third accidents as soon as they occurred —a violation of Monarch’s policy requiring that
all accidents be reported immediately.
Regarding the first accident, the manager described McDonald rearending the
vehicle in front of her at a stop sign: “She thought the car was going to go, and the car
stopped, and she was too close to the vehicle in front of her, so she rearended them.” The
manager testified that McDonald did not report the accident until “probably about
30 minutes” after it occurred.
Regarding the second accident, the manager testified that McDonald “was
approaching a school and sideswiped a mirror of a vehicle . . . that was parked at the
school.” The manager explained that McDonald reported the accident as soon as she
learned that it had occurred. The manager also testified that McDonald blamed the accident
on a faulty steering wheel, but a mechanic who examined the bus after the accident did not
find any problems with the bus or its steering wheel.
Regarding the third accident, the manager testified that McDonald ran the bus into
a fence pole after “she got too close to” it while “trying to navigate through the lot” where
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the buses were kept. The manager claimed that McDonald hit the pole four times.
McDonald did not report this accident. When the manager asked McDonald why she did
not report the accident, McDonald explained that “she was feeling sick that day and under
stress.”
In response to questioning from McDonald’s attorney, the manager admitted that
she “d[id] not have firsthand knowledge of . . . the three accidents,” but clarified that she
reviewed video footage of them.1 The manager described that the video footage showed
both the bus’s exterior and interior, including the driver.
In response to questioning from the ULJ, the manager explained why she considered
the accidents preventable. For the first accident, she explained that Monarch drivers know
to have “a certain amount of space between” the bus and the vehicle in front of it to prevent
rearending accidents, and that McDonald did not maintain such space during the first
accident. Regarding the second accident, the manager explained that , although the space
where the second accident occurred was tight and very busy, “all of our drivers navigate in
small areas every single day without getting into an accident.” The ULJ then asked the
manager whether she noticed anything about McDonald’s demeanor when the third
accident occurred. The manager answered that McDonald did not appear to be “attentive
enough of the . . . surrounding area.” The manager further explained that Monarch drivers
receive training on “tail swings” and are told to always check their mirrors to ensure they

1 The video footage was not submitted into evidence.
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“clear[] objects on the rear of the bus,” but that McDonald “was not checking back and
forth between her mirrors.”
McDonald testified next. Regarding the first accident, McDonald testified that the
driver in front of her at a four-way stop pulled forward halfway into the intersection and
suddenly braked, causing “the front cross arm of the bus” to “bump[] ” the other vehicle’s
taillight. McDonald described reporting the accident once she “saw the [other driver] and
. . . knew everything was okay for us on the bus.”
Regarding the second accident, McDonald described pulling the bus into a school
loading zone and, after parking, being informed by a woman and a school representative
that she had scraped the woman’s vehicle’s sideview mirror. McDonald then reported the
accident.
Regarding the third accident, McDonald described pulling the bus into the lot,
failing to make a wide enough turn, and scraping the backend of the bus against a fence
pole. She denied hitting the pole more than once. McDonald admitted that she did not
report the accident, which occurred in the morning. Instead, McDonald left work, reported
back for her afternoon shift, and completed her afternoon shift. McDonald did not discuss
the accident with Monarch until that evening when they called to ask her about it.
McDonald testified that she felt “distraught” the day of the accident and described it as
“almost like . . . a breaking point.” McDonald explained that she did not report the accident
because she “was just trying to get [her] emotions settled, [and think] better thoughts.”
In response to questioning from her attorney, McDonald testified that she was not
experiencing any mental-health symptoms on the days of the first or second accidents.
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On the day of the third accident, however, McDonald described having a mental health
flare-up just before she struck the pole, making it “hard to concentrate.” She identified her
symptoms as “grie[f], anxiety, the [in]ability to handle stress, feeling uncomfortable and
just getting overwhelmed.”
The ULJ also questioned McDonald regarding her mental -health conditions .
Specifically, the ULJ asked McDonald how often she experienced mental-health symptoms
while driving. McDonald explained that it was only on the day of the third accident that
her “emotions just took over,” but she was usually able to focus.
On September 11, 2024, the ULJ issued their findings of fact and decision. The
ULJ determined that McDonald was ineligible for benefits because she was discharged for
employment misconduct, and that the mental-health exception to ineligibility did not apply.
The ULJ made detailed credibility findings, explaining that they credited the manager over
McDonald wherever the testimony conflicted. To support their determination, the ULJ
reasoned that the manager’s testimony was “clear,” “straightforward,” “detailed,”
“supported by notes,” and did not “suggest inaccuracy or deception.” The ULJ also
described the manager’s testimony as “presented in a logical sequence of events” and noted
her ability to answer questions “quickly” and “logically.” The ULJ explained why they
discredited McDonald’s testimony as well , pointing to evidence that McDonald falsely
claimed that the second accident was caused by a faulty steering wheel. Although
McDonald did not make the faulty-steering-wheel claim at the hearing, the ULJ reasoned
that this evidence nevertheless “suggest[ed] a willingness to say inaccurate things to deflect
responsibility.” The ULJ also noted other gaps in McDonald’s testimony, including that
7
she “could not explain” why her mental illness prevented her from checking her mirrors
before turning and “never provided any clear explanation for” her failure to report the third
accident.
McDonald requested reconsideration. The ULJ thereafter issued an order affirming
their original decision as “factually and legally correct.” In their order, the ULJ reasoned
“[t]he evidence did not support” that the events leading to McDonald’s “discharge were a
consequence of her mental health impairment.”
McDonald appeals.
DECISION
McDonald challenges the ULJ’s determination that she was ineligible for
unemployment benefits. As relevant here, when reviewing a ULJ’s eligibility
determination, we
may affirm the decision . . . or remand the case for further
proceedings; or [we] may reverse or modify the decision if the
substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced
because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are:
. . . .
(4) affected by other error of law; [or]
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
hearing record as submitted[.]

Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(4)-(5) (2024).
Broadly speaking, McDonald makes the following arguments: (1) the ULJ’s
decision that McDonald engaged in employment misconduct was not supported by
substantial evidence and, even if it was, her conduct falls into an exception to ineligibility;
(2) the ULJ made improper credibility determinations; (3) the ULJ abused their discretion
8
when they permitted the manager to testify regarding the video footage; (4) the ULJ legally
erred when they failed to assist the parties in developing the record; and (5) the ULJ legally
erred when they determined her discharge date. We address each argument in turn.
I.
McDonald argues the ULJ’s determination that she engaged in employment
misconduct was unsupported by substantial evidence. In the alternative, McDonald asserts
that—even if she did engage in employment misconduct —the ULJ’s determination that
she did not qualify for the mental-health exception was not supported by substantial
evidence.2 “Substantial evidence is (1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more
than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its
entirety.” Dourney v. CMAK Corp., 796 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation
omitted). We address each argument below.
A. Employment Misconduct
McDonald first argues the ULJ’s decision that she engaged in employment
misconduct was unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
“Whether an employee engaged in employment misconduct presents a mixed
question of law and fact.” Wichmann v. Travalia & U.S. Directives, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 23,

2 McDonald also argues that the “inadverten[ce]” exception and the “single incident
exception” apply. But McDonald did not raise these exceptions before the ULJ. Therefore,
to the extent that McDonald now argues that her conduct falls under Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 6(b)(2), (d) (2024), the arguments were not preserved for appellate review. See
Peterson v. Ne. Bank-Minneapolis, 805 N.W.2d 878, 883 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[B]ecause
this issue was not raised before the ULJ, it is not properly before this court on review.”).
9
27 (Minn. App. 2007). “We view the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to
the decision, giving deference to the credibility determinations made by the ULJ.” Skarhus
v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006) (citations omitted). “In doing
so, we will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence substantially sustains
them.” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2005)). But we review de novo
whether an employee engaged in employment misconduct. See id.
“Employment misconduct means any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct,
on the job or off the job, that is a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer
has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a)
(2024). “An employer has a right to expect that its employees will abide by reasonable
instructions and directions.” Vargas v. Nw. Area Found., 673 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Minn.
App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004). “As a general rule, refusing to abide by an
employer’s reasonable policies and requests amounts to disqualifying misconduct.”
Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002). An employee’s
knowing violation of an employer’s directives constitutes employment misconduct because
such actions evince willful disregard of the employer’s interests. Id. at 806. “This is
particularly true when there are multiple violations of the same rule involving warnings or
progressive discipline.” Id. at 806-07.
Here, the ULJ determined that Monarch discharged McDonald due to employment
misconduct; specifically, three accidents involving negligent driving and two failures to
report an accident immediately.
10
Beginning with their decision that McDonald’s negligent driving constituted
employment misconduct, the ULJ made the following findings. For the first accident,
McDonald rearended the car in front of her, and McDonald “could have avoided [the
accident] if she had used proper spacing and paid greater attention.” F or the second
accident, McDonald hit another vehicle’s sideview mirror because she “began a turn
without verifying that she had cleared the vehicle to her side” and “was not being careful
and did not check her mirrors,” despite Monarch training its drivers to “check their mirrors
when making turns.” And for the third accident, “McDonald hit the post because she was
not being careful when making her turn and did not check her mirrors.”
The ULJ also made the following findings with respect to McDonald’s failures to
report accidents. F or the first accident, McDonald waited to report the accident for
“approximately 30 minutes after it occurred,” in violation of Monarch’s policy requiring
immediate reporting, which “McDonald was aware of.” A nd for the third accident,
McDonald failed to report the accident.
The ULJ’s findings are well supported by the evidence presented at the hearing and
the manager’s testimony.
3 Accordingly, we conclude that the ULJ’s decision that
McDonald engaged in employment misconduct was supported by substantial evidence in
the record.

3 We address McDonald’s challenges to the ULJ’s credibility determinations in part II.
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B. Mental-Health Exception
McDonald argues in the alternative that, even if she engaged in employment
misconduct, the ULJ’s decision that she did not qualify for the mental-health exception
was unsupported by substantial evidence. Whether McDonald’s conduct was a
consequence of mental illness or impairment is a question of fact, and we view factual
findings in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision. Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 344;
see also White v. Univ. of Minn. Physician Corp., 875 N.W.2d 351, 356-57 (Minn. App.
2016) (stating claimant’s “mental illness could be a relevant fact”).
When an employer discharges an employee for employment misconduct, the
employee is ineligible for unemployment benefits, unless the employee’s actions fall under
an exception. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subds. 4(1), 6(b) (2024); see also Wichmann, 729
N.W.2d at 27. One exception is “conduct that was a consequence of the applicant’s mental
illness or impairment .” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b) (1). A “consequence” is “[ a]
result that follows as an effect of something that came before.” Black’s Law Dictionary
383 (12th ed. 2024). We have previously concluded that, where an employee’s conduct
was “indisputably caused by” symptoms of their mental impairment, “the conduct [was] a
‘consequence of’ a mental illness or impairment” under Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 6(b)(1). Cunningham v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 809 N.W.2d 231, 232 (Minn. App.
2011).
Here, the ULJ determined that the mental-health exception did not apply because
“[t]he events that led to McDonald’s discharge were not a consequence of her mental health
impairments.” Specifically, the ULJ found that McDonald’s mental-health conditions did
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not prevent her from “driv[ing] carefully,” “check[ing] her mirrors when she made turns,”
and “call[ing] in and report[ing] her accidents when they happened.” Substantial evidence
supports these findings. The record contains an August 2024 note from McDo nald’s
medical provider, indicating that she had been diagnosed with “ [m]ajor [d]epressive
[d]isorder, [r]ecurrent, [s]evere” and “ [g]eneralized [a]nxiety [d]isorder.” The medical
provider advised that, despite these conditions, McDonald could “perform any
employment” and work eight-hour days.4
McDonald disagrees, arguing this case is analogous to Skottegaard v. Comcast
Cablevision Corp., No. A11-2130, 2012 WL 3792297 (Minn. App. Sept. 4, 2012). 5 In
Skottegaard, the relator was discharged following “a cash -shortage error and” attendance
violations, including a final incident wherein she did not appear at work and did not call to
inform her employer of the absence. 2012 WL 3792297, at *1. We reversed the ULJ’s
determination that the relator’s misconduct was not a consequence of mental illness or
impairment as unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at *3. In doing so, we largely
relied on the relator’s psychiatrist’s opinion, as relayed through letters submitted into the
record. Id. at *2-3. The psychiatrist indicated that the relator’s medications affected her
ability to function at work, that the relator’s anxiety caused her to exhibit “avoidance

4 We acknowledge that McDonald testified that she experienced mental-health symptoms
immediately before and during the third accident . But the ULJ specifically found this
testimony not credible, and we defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. See Bangtson
v. Allina Med. Grp., 766 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. App. 2009); Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless
Servs., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. App. 2007).
5 This case is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite nonprecedential cases
as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
13
behaviors,” and that the post-traumatic stress disorder the relator suffered after being
robbed at gunpoint in the workplace exacerbated her other mental-health symptoms. Id.
Unlike in Skottegaard, the only evidence of McDonald’s medical-health conditions
aside from her own testimony is a two-page document from her medical provider stating
her diagnoses and indicating that these diagnoses did not prevent McDonald from
“perform[ing] any employment” and working eight-hour days. And while McDonald
emphasizes in her brief that, like the relator in Skottegaard , she experiences “avoidance
behaviors” that caused her not to report the third accident, she did not identify this symptom
at the hearing.
McDonald makes the related argument that, under Skottegaard, we must broadly
interpret the “consequence of” language in Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(1), to include
her conduct surrounding the third accident. McDonald is correct that, in Skottegaard, we
described the language in Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(1), as “broad.” Id. at *4. But,
even so, the ULJ’s findings in this case regarding McDonald’s conduct during the third
accident are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
For these reasons, we conclude the ULJ’s decision that McDonald was discharged
for employment misconduct and did not qualify for the mental- health exception to
ineligibility is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
II.
McDonald next raises a series of issues regarding the ULJ’s credibility
determinations. Specifically, McDonald argues the ULJ: (1) failed to make the credibility
findings required by statute; (2) erred when they credited the manager’s testimony; and
14
(3) exhibited bias when they found the manager’s testimony credible. These arguments
are unpersuasive.
First, we conclude the ULJ made the statutorily required credibility findings. Under
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2024), “When the credibility of a witness testifying in
a hearing has a significant effect on the outcome of a decision, the [ULJ] must set out the
reason for crediting or discrediting that testimony.” Here, the ULJ made detailed findings
spanning more than a page explaining the reasons they credited the manager’s testimony
and discredited McDonald’s testimony.
Second, throughout her briefing, McDonald argues that the ULJ made improper
credibility findings regarding the manager. But “[c]redibility determinations are the
exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed on appeal.” Bangtson, 766 N.W.2d
at 332 (quotation omitted). “When the parties have presented conflicting evidence on the
record, [we] must defer to the [ULJ’s] ability to weigh the evidence; we may not weigh
that evidence on review.” Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350,
352 (Minn. App. 1995). Accordingly, we will not disturb the ULJ’s credibility
determinations.
Last, McDonald argues the ULJ’s decision to credit the manager’s testimony
reflected “a bias on the [ULJ’s] part toward a particular pattern of speech.” McDonald
asserts that the ULJ credited the manager’s testimony based solely “on the manner of [the
manager’s] presentation.” We are not persuaded. McDonald does not point to any
authority supporting that the manner of someone’s testimony is an improper basis for
finding the witness credible. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187
15
N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not
supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be
considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”). Moreover,
the ULJ cited other reasons for their credibility findings, including that the manager’s
testimony was “detailed,” “supported by notes,” and “presented a logical sequence of
events,” and that the manager “answer[ed] questions quickly and in a manner that flowed
logically.” These are all proper reasons for crediting the manager’s testimony. See Ywswf,
726 N.W.2d at 532-33 (stating ULJ may consider how a witness “remember[ed] and [told]
the facts” and “any other factors that bear on believability” when evaluating witness
credibility).
For these reasons, we conclude the ULJ complied with the law when making their
credibility determinations, and we, accordingly, defer to those credibility determinations
on appeal.
III.
McDonald next argues that the ULJ improperly allowed unreliable evidence into the
record. Specifically, McDonald challenges the ULJ’s decision to allow the manager to
testify about what she saw on the video footage even though the video footage was not part
of the record.
We review a ULJ’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. CUP Foods, Inc.
v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 566 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
13, 2001). Under Minn. R. 3310.2922 (2023), a ULJ “may receive any evidence that
possesses probative value, including hearsay, if it is the type of evidence on which
16
reasonable, prudent persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of their serious affairs.”
Further, a ULJ “is not bound by statutory and common law rules of evidence.” Minn.
R. 3310.2922.
McDonald correctly observes that Monarch did not offer the video footage of the
three accidents into evidence. We further acknowledge that the manager was not present
when the accidents occurred. But “[a] witness at an evidentiary hearing is not required to
have firsthand knowledge because a ULJ ‘may receive any evidence which possess[es]
probative value, including hearsay.’” Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 345 (quoting Minn. R.
3310.2922 (2005)). Here, the manager testified regarding her direct knowledge of the
video footage. There is nothing in the record to suggest that her testimony was unreliable.
Rather, the manager testified that she always reviews video footage when an accident
occurs and explained that the video footage shows “different angles” of the bus, including
“the rear,” “the sides,” and “the driver.” The ULJ therefore did not abuse their discretion
when they allowed the manager to testify regarding the video footage, as this “is the type
of evidence on which reasonable, prudent persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of
their serious affairs.” Minn. R. 3310.2922.
IV.
McDonald next argues the ULJ failed to comply with Minn. R. 3310.2921 (2023).
Under that rule, a ULJ “must assist all parties in the presentation of evidence” and “ensure
that all relevant facts are clearly and fully developed.” Minn. R. 3310.2921. We review
legal questions de novo. Thao v. Command Ctr., Inc., 824 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 2012).
17
Specifically, McDonald argues the ULJ did not comply with rule 3310.2921 because
they declined to ask the manager clarifying questions about the accidents. We are not
persuaded. The record reflects that the ULJ asked the manager clarifying questions,
including questions about the accidents and why the manager considered the accidents
preventable. Moreover, this is not a circumstance where McDonald was disadvantaged
because she represented herself. See Ntamere v. Decisionone Corp., 673 N.W.2d 179, 180
(Minn. App. 2003) (“When a party is pro se, the ULJ must help the party to recognize and
interpret the parties’ claims.” (quotation omitted)). McDonald had counsel at the hearing,
who also asked the manager many questions about the accidents.
For these reasons, we conclude the ULJ complied with rule 3310.2921, and
appropriately assisted the parties in presenting the evidence to ensure the facts were clearly
and fully developed.
V.
Finally, McDonald contends that the ULJ legally erred when they determined she
was discharged as of June 7, 2024. “A suspension from employment without pay that is
of an indefinite duration . . . is considered a discharge at the time the suspension begins.”
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 5(b) (2024). Again, we review this issue de novo. See Thao,
824 N.W.2d at 4.
Here, the record shows that Monarch placed McDonald on a three-day suspension
on June 7, 2024, informing her that she would be contacted in three days. Monarch did not
contact McDonald until July 2, 2024, when she was officially discharged. Accordingly,
18
because McDonald’s suspension began on June 7, 2024, and was ultimately of indefinite
duration, the ULJ correctly determined that June 7, 2024, was McDonald’s discharge date.
Affirmed.