Paul A. Kruger, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1945

Paul A. Kruger, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Jackie Eversman Passe,
Respondent,

Paul Priefert, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed July 14, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Wabasha County District Court
File No. 79-CV-22-862

Gregory M. Erickson, Benjamin P. Lanari, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Sally M. Silk, Moersch, Dorsey & Hahn, P.A., Northfield, Minnesota (for respondent
Jackie Eversman Passe)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it denied their claim to reform a
warranty deed to exclude an easement. Because the district court did not abuse its
2
discretion when it concluded that appellants did not prove the elements necessary to reform
the deed by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
Around 1982, Vincent and Isabelle Eversman (the Eversmans) 1 owned
approximately 718 acres of farmland in Wabasha. Over the years, the Eversmans sold
portions of their farmland in separate sales. Due to financial difficulties, the Eversmans
signed a contingent interest term loan agreement (workout agreement) with a bank in 1987.
The agreement allowed the Eversmans to set aside a significant portion of their original
loan for the farm, which would become due at some point in the future. Either their loan
needed to be paid off or the parties needed to reach another agreement prior to May 1,
1995. If that did not happen, the Eversmans’ loan could exceed $400,000 after the debt
became due.
Because of the workout agreement and financial difficulties, the Eversmans entered
into a contract for deed to sell 310 acres of their farm to appellants Paul A. Kruger and
Mary Jane Kruger (the Krugers), their daughter and son-in- law, in April 1995. A Loan
specialist, P.H., worked on the transaction on behalf of the bank and had to approve any
negotiations regarding the loan. Therefore, the Eversmans were not in full control of the
terms by which their property would be liquidated.
In the original contract for deed, the Eversmans reserved an easement (E1) for
themselves. The contract for deed was recorded on May 22, 1995. After the property was

1 While we generally refer to individuals by their last names in our opinions, at times we
refer to individuals by their first names to avoid confusion.
3
appraised, the parties realized that an additional easement (E2) was needed so that the
Krugers could access a part of the land they acquired. An amended contract for deed
containing E1 and E2 was recorded on August 8, 1995.
About two weeks later, on August 21, 1995, the Eversmans executed a warranty
deed conveying the land to the Krugers. The warranty deed, drafted by the Eversmans’
attorney, reserved three easements —E1, E2, and E3. E3 gave the Eversmans and their
heirs the right to use a dirt road to cross the Kruger property to access a tillable portion of
land the Eversmans owned adjacent to the Kruger property.
Paul Kruger remembers signing the closing documents on the back of P.H.’s car.
He testified that his review of the closing documents was limited and that he did not get a
copy. The Krugers and P.H. did not understand the legal description of the easements in
the closing documents. On September 12, 1995, the Krugers executed a deed titled
“Easement” in favor of the Eversmans. This deed, which included E3, was recorded on
October 16, 1995.
The Krugers claim that the Eversmans fraudulently inserted E3 in the 1995 warranty
deed. In 2022, the Krugers sued respondents Jackie Eversman Passe, Paula Priefert,
2
Nicole Eversman Radatz, Melissa Eversman Beach, and Robert Eversman, 3 alleging that

2 The district court caption incorrectly identifies respondent Paula Priefert as Paul Priefert.
“The title of the action shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 143.01.

3 Respondents are the Estate of Raymond A. Eversman, Vincent and Isabelle’s son, and the
beneficiaries of his estate. Jackie Eversman Passe filed a brief as an individual and as the
personal representative of the Estate of Raymond A. Eversman. The other respondents did

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E3 was invalid and the product of fraud or forgery, and that respondents created a nuisance
and trespassed on the Krugers property. The Krugers sought reformation of the warranty
deed to exclude E3 and a declaratory judgment enjoining respondents from using,
interfering, or trespassing on the Krugers land and ordering respondents to bear any costs.
Respondents brought counterclaims seeking a permanent injunction preventing appellants
from interfering with and obstructing the use of E3 and awarding damages for costs
necessary to repair E3. The parties agreed that the issues of fraud/forgery, trespass,
nuisance, and respondents’ counterclaim for damages would be tried by an advisory jury.
4
Then, the district court resolved the Krugers’ reformation and declaratory judgment claims,
and respondents’ counterclaim for a permanent injunction following trial.
At trial, P.H. and the Krugers testified that they did not recall any negotiations
discussing E3, and they first learned about it three years ago, in 2021. Evidence from
previous lawsuits involving the parties suggested that the Krugers had notice of the
inclusion of E1 and E3 in the warranty deed no later than October 21, 1997, when they
were served with a complaint in a separate lawsuit. A declaration from Paul Kruger signed
during another lawsuit in January 2022, states: “Prior to the fi nal payment of the contract
for deed, I agreed to grant Vincent Eversman an easement to property contiguous over the

not file briefs. For ease of reference, we refer to all respondents collectively throughout
this opinion.

4 “In all actions not triable of right by a jury, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, may try an issue with an advisory jury.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 39.02.
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benefited parcel in exchange for an easement to the benefited parcel, so that I could access
the benefited property.”
Paul Kruger testified that he never talked about E3 with Mary Kruger, and that he
is “not a hundred percent,” and would have “given [purchasing the farm] another thought”
had he known about E3. Passe agreed that there was no evidence of discussions between
the Eversmans and the Krugers about the existence of E3 between June and September
1995.
The jury found that E3 was not included in the original contract for deed, and that
E3 was not included in the 1995 warranty deed by any fraud, forgery, or inequitable
conduct on behalf of the Eversmans. The district court adopted these findings and
concluded that “it [ was] reasonable that Paul Kruger and Vincent Eversman agreed to
exchange easements, and thus E3 was granted to the Eversmans.” The district court also
concluded:
The Warranty Deed is a written agreement that appears to
express the intentions of the parties. There is not enough
evidence to clearly show that the Warranty Deed was not an
accurate expression of the parties’ intentions in 1995, or that
any such mistake was due to mistake or inequitable conduct.

The district court denied the Krugers’ claim to reform the warranty deed to exclude
E3 because the Krugers did not prove the three elements necessary to reform the deed by
clear and convincing evidence.
This appeal follows.

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DECISION
The Krugers challenge the district court’s denial of their claim to reform the
warranty deed to exclude E3. “Reformation is an equitable remedy that is available when
a party seeks to alter or amend language in a [deed] so that the [deed] reflects the parties’
true intent when they entered into the contract.” SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v.
Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011). The district court
may use its equitable powers to reform a deed if the party seeking reformation proves:
(1) that a valid agreement existed between the parties that
expressed their real intentions, (2) that the written instrument
failed to express the parties’ real intentions, and (3) that this
failure resulted from the parties’ mutual mistake, or a unilateral
mistake accompanied by the other parties’ fraud or inequitable
conduct.

Slindee v. Fritch Invs., LLC, 760 N.W.2d 903, 911 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing Manderfeld
v. Krovitz, 539 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 25. 1996)).
“The evidence supporting reformation of a written instrument, including a deed,
must be consistent, clear, unequivocal, and convincing.” Theros v. Phillips, 256 N.W.2d
852, 857 (Minn. 1977). “[The supreme court] characterized this level of proof as a high
burden.” SCI, 795 N.W.2d at 865 (quotation omitted).
“We review the district court’s ultimate decision to grant equitable relief for [ an]
abuse of discretion.”5 Herlache, 990 N.W.2d at 449-450. Under the abuse-of-discretion

5 The Krugers argue that the de novo standard of review applies because the district court
erred as a matter of law. The de novo standard of review “applies to the district court’s
equitable determinations if those determinations were made as a matter of law on summary
judgment.” Herlache v. Rucks, 990 N.W.2d 443, 450 n.4 (Minn. 2023). Here, the abuse-

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standard, “the district court’s decision will be overturned only if it is manifestly contrary
to the evidence.” In re Estate of Savich, 671 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2003). In cases
involving reformation of a deed, the findings of fact underlying the district court’s decision
are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous. 6 Theros, 256 N.W.2d at 857. A district
court’s findings are clearly erroneous if “they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Nunnelee v. Schuna,
431 N.W.2d 144, 146 (Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 30, 1988).
We need only consider whether the district court abused its discretion regarding the
third element—whether the deed’s failure to express the parties’ real intentions “was due
to a mutual mistake of the parties, or a unilateral mistake accompanied by fraud or
inequitable conduct by the other party.” Theros, 256 N.W.2d 857.
When focusing on this third element, the district court concluded that there was no
mistake because “[t]here is not enough evidence to clearly show that the Warranty Deed
was not an accurate expression of the parties’ intentions in 1995,” and further concluded

of-discretion standard applies because the district court “weighed the equities and made its
decision based on disputed factual findings after a court trial.” Id.

6 Respondents argue that the entire appeal should be reviewed for clear error because
appellants only challenge the district court’s findings of fact. Respondents also argue that
our scope of review is limited to “whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and
whether such findings sustain the conclusion of law and the judgment” because the Krugers
did not file any posttrial motions. Gruenhagen v. Larson, 246 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn.
1976). We disagree because, while the Krugers challenge some of the district court’s
factual findings, they ultimately challenge its decision not to grant equitable relief. And a
motion for a new trial is “not a prerequisite for appellate review of substantive questions
of law when a genuine issue of law is properly raised and considered at the district court
level.” Alpha Real Est. Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 664 N.W.2d 303,
311 (Minn. 2003).
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that the Krugers did not prove “that any such mistake was due to mistake or inequitable
conduct.” The district court also considered the Krugers’ forgery argument regarding the
typeface discrepancies, but concluded that the “difference was not explained in any depth
by [appellants].” It also concluded that “[t]here was no testimony as to how common
different typefaces may be used in such documents or whether this alone is somehow
suggestive of fraud, forgery, or inequitable conduct.” These findings are supported by the
record and are not clearly erroneous.
The Krugers argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying their claim
to reform the warranty deed because they proved everything required to reform the deed
by clear and convincing evidence. They contend that the record shows “fraud or
inequitable conduct occurred” because of the sudden appearance of E3 in the closing
documents in conjunction with the ongoing history of dissention between the Krugers and
the Eversmans. The Krugers point to evidence in the record that the Eversmans did not
want to sell their farm, Paul Kruger’s belief that the Eversmans poisoned his milk tanks
with penicillin, and the parties’ dislike for one another. The Krugers also rely on P.H.’s
testimony that the Eversmans were the only ones to benefit from E3, that the Eversmans’
attorney drafted the warranty deed, and Paul Kruger’s testimony that E3 was the result of
fraud.
However, the Krugers also concede that they “were not able to show exactly what
kind of fraud or inequitable conduct occurred.” On appeal, “[a] party cannot complain
about a district court’s failure to rule in [the party’s] favor when one of the reasons it did
not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that
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would allow the district court to fully address the question.” Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk,
668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003). In any event,
there is other record evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion that there was no
fraud or other inequitable conduct on behalf of the Eversmans. For example, the
Eversmans had limited bargaining power because of the workout agreement, the only
individuals involved in the negotiations were P.H. and Paul Kruger, and no one involved
in the transaction understood the legal descriptions of the easements in the documents. The
Krugers argue that the district court erred by weighing the evidence because the evidence
does not support the district courts determination, but it was the Krugers’ burden to prove
all elements by clear and convincing evidence and “[w]e cannot reweigh the evidence
presented to the [district] court.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 475 (Minn.
App. 2000) (quotation omitted).
In sum, the district court’s factual findings are supported by the record. And the
district court did not abuse its discretion because its ultimate decision to deny the Krugers’
claim to reform the deed was not manifestly contrary to the evidence.7 Savich, 671 N.W.2d
at 751 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reform
deed when “there [was] no evidence that respondents intended, but mistakenly failed, to
deed [the] property to the estate”).
Affirmed.

7 Because the Krugers had the burden to prove all three elements by clear and convincing
evidence, we need not consider the first two elements.