Daniel Hatlevig, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1966

Daniel Hatlevig,
Appellant,

vs.

Jason Schott, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed August 4, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Winona County District Court
File No. 85-CV-23-2076

William L. French, French Law Office, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Morgan B. Muenster, Grinde & Dicke Law Firm P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Segal, Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
The issue in this appeal is whether the terms “mobile home” and “manufactured
home” are legally synonymous such that referring to a mobile home as a manufactured

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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home in a contract for deed cannot constitute a false statement. The district court granted
summary judgment for respondent-sellers Jason and Carrie Schott after concluding that the
terms are interchangeable under Minnesota law. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Daniel Hatlevig purchased real property from the Schotts by a contract
for deed in May 2018. On the property was a 1973 Wick Home, which the contract for
deed referred to as a “manufactured home” that was affixed to the real property.1
Hatlevig commenced a lawsuit in November 2023, alleging that the Schotts
committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation by “represent[ing] that the habitable
trailer on the premises was a manufactured home when, in reality, it was a mobile home
without an adequate foundation.” 2 The Schotts filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
“there was no mobile home sold as part of [the parties’] real estate transaction” because the
home was affixed to the real property. Alternatively, the Schotts argued that there is no
legally significant distinction between the terms “manufactured home” and “mobile

1 Minnesota Statutes section 168A.1412 (2024), details the process for affixing a
manufactured home to real property. Once affixed, the manufactured home “may be made
an improvement to real property, and no longer titled as personal property.” Minn. Stat.
§ 168A.1412, subd. 1.

2 To prevail on a negligent misrepresentation claim, the plaintiff must establish, among
other elements, that “the defendant supplie[d] false information to the plaintiff.” Williams
v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Minn. 2012). For fraud, the plaintiff must establish, among
other elements, that “there was a false representation by a party of a past or existing
material fact susceptible of knowledge.” Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d
520, 532 (Minn. 1986).
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home.” Hatlevig opposed the motion to dismiss and argued that discovery was necessary
to resolve the claim.
In a hearing on the motion to dismiss , the district court asked about the “legal
distinction” between a manufactured home and a mobile home and “where [those terms
are] defined in the law .” Hatlevig’s attorney pointed to a magazine article discussing the
difference between mobile and manufactured homes, alluded to federal statutes that
purportedly illuminated the difference, and maintained that there was a genuine issue of
material fact “based solely on the affidavit of [Hatlevig] ,” who, according to Hatlevig’s
attorney, had “done the research” and found that the research “clearly says it’s not a
manufactured home.”
The district court construed the Schotts’ motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56 and granted it.3 The district court concluded that, under
Minnesota law, “[t]he terms ‘mobile home’ and ‘manufactured home’ are synonymous”
because “[m]anufactured homes do not need to be anchored to a foundation.” Therefore,
the Schotts “could not have committed fraud or negligent misrepresentation” because
“there were no false statements made.”
Hatlevig appeals.

3 The district court construed the motion as one for summary judgment because the parties
“submitted affidavits and additional documents not referenced in the pleadings.” On
appeal, Hatlevig does not challenge the district court’s decision to do so.
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DECISION
Hatlevig argues that summary judgment was improper because there is a genuine
dispute regarding whether the home identified in the contract for deed was a mobile home
or a manufactured home. He characterizes this dispute as a fact issue and maintains that he
should have been allowed to proceed with discovery on his claim.
Appellate courts “review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine
whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its
application of the law.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). In doing so, appellate courts “view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party,” id. at 625, and review legal questions de novo,
Visser v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 938 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn. 2020).
“The construction and effect of a contract is . . . a question of law unless the contract
is ambiguous.” Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Minn. 2003). And
whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of law. Id. “A contract is ambiguous if,
based upon its language alone, it is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation.”
Art Goebel, Inc. v. N. Suburban Agencies, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. 1997). For
unambiguous contracts, the “contract language must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning.” Denelsbeck, 666 N.W.2d at 347 (quotation omitted). A term’s plain and ordinary
meaning can be gleaned from various sources, including dictionaries, statutes, and caselaw.
See Bank Midwest, Minn., Iowa, N.A. v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 179-80 (Minn. 2004)
(considering such sources to discern plain meaning of a term in a contract for deed). Our
consultation of these sources leads us to conclude that the terms “manufactured home” and
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“mobile home” are interchangeable under Minnesota law and that a manufactured home
does not necessarily have a permanent foundation. In turn, we conclude that the term
“manufactured home” in the contract for deed is unambiguous and has the same meaning
as “mobile home.”
We turn first to the definition of “manufactured home” under the dictionary and the
Minnesota Statutes. These sources agree that a “manufactured home” must be “designed
to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation.” Minn. Stat. § 327.31,
subd. 6 (2024) (emphasis added); see also Minn. Stat. § 273.125, subd. 8 (2024) (same);
Black’s Law Dictionary 874 (12th ed. 2024) (same). And although the Minnesota Statutes
do not contain a separate definition of “mobile home,” some provisions reference the term
in a way that suggest it is synonymous with “manufactured home.” See, e.g., Minn. Stat.
§ 570.025, subd. 6 (2024) (including, in a sample notice of hearing, the phrase
“manufactured mobile home” and “manufactured (mobile) home”); Minn. Stat. § 570.026,
subd. 2 (2024) (same); Minn. Stat. § 571.932, subd. 2 (2024) (same).
Minnesota caselaw also supports a conclusion that “mobile home” and
“manufactured home” are interchangeable. We have held in various contexts that statutes
exclusively using the term “manufactured home” apply to situations involving mobile
homes. See, e.g., Lea v. Pieper, 345 N.W.2d 267, 270-72 (Minn. App. 1984) (describing
law that uses the term “manufactured home” as one “govern[ing] Manufactured Home
(Mobile Home) Park Lot Rentals” and applying it to “residents of a mobile home”);
Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 286- 87 (Minn. App. 1996)
(stating that statutes governing “manufactured home[s]” serve to “protect[] mobile home
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park residents”); McKraut Holdings, LLC v. Tomenes, 2019 WL 1890596, at *5 (Minn.
App. Apr. 29, 2019) (applying a statute referring to a “manufactured home” to “a resident
of a mobile home park”), rev. denied (Minn. Jul. 16, 2019).4 And, in at least one case, we
have used the two terms interchangeably. See Boquist v. Zierman, 2024 WL 1364778, at
*1 (Minn. App. Apr. 1, 2024) (referring to the same set of homes as “eleven manufactured
homes” and “eleven mobile homes”).
To persuade us otherwise, Hatlevig cites the Manufactured Home Construction and
Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (2018 & Supp. 2022), a federal law
that established quality and safety standards for manufactured homes, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 5401(b). He maintains that a transportable home built in 1973, prior to the act, would not
comply with those standards and thus could not be a “manufactured home” as defined by
the act. But state administrative rules implementing the act provide that the term “mobile
home” is “synonymous with manufactured home whenever it appears in [the chapter of the
administrative rules governing manufactured homes] and in other documents or on
construction or installation seals.” Minn. R. 1350.0100, subp. 43 (2023). The rules also
refer to transportable homes manufactured in 1973 as “manufactured homes.” Id., subp. 40
(2023) (referring to homes “manufactured after July 1, 1972, and prior to June 15, 1976”
as manufactured homes). These administrative rules offer support for the premise that
manufactured homes and mobile homes are the same under the act. Cf. Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16(8) (2024) (stating that “[w]hen the words of a law are not explicit, the intention

4 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may be cited for their persuasive
value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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of the legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other
matters[,] . . . administrative interpretations of the statute”). Federal law, as interpreted by
Minnesota’s administrative rules, does not advance Hatlevig’s claim.
In sum, the weight of authority establishes that the terms manufactured home and
mobile home are interchangeable under Minnesota law. As a result, the district court did
not err in granting summary judgment after determining that Hatlevig could not establish
material facts to support his claims —i.e., that the Schotts supplied false information or
made a false representation in the contract for deed. See Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d
807, 815 (Minn. 2012) (noting that negligent misrepresentation requires the defendant to
supply false information to the plaintiff); Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d
520, 532 (Minn. 1986) (noting that fraud requires a “false representation by a party of a
past or existing material fact”).
Before concluding, we briefly address Hatlevig’s argument that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his request for discovery. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.04
(providing that the district court considering a motion for summary judgment may allow
time for discovery “[i] f a nonmovant shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it
cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition”) ; see also 1300 Nicollet, LLC v.
County of Hennepin, 990 N.W.2d 422, 431 (Minn. 2023) (noting that appellate c ourts
review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a discovery request for an abuse of
discretion). District courts have “wide discretion to issue discovery orders.” In re Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Shetka v. Kueppers, 454
N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. 1990). Such requests “should be liberally granted,” but a district
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court does not abuse its discretion by denying a discovery request “if the discovery would
not assist the district court or change the result of the summary judgment motion .” QBE
Ins. Corp. v. Twin Homes of French Ridge Homeowners Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d 393, 400
(Minn. App. 2010).
Here, the result of the summary-judgment motion turned entirely on whether the
terms “manufactured home” and “mobile home” are interchangeable as a matter of law.
See id. (affirming denial of more discovery because the dispositive facts were “determined
by reference to the insurance contract”). It follows that t here are no essential facts left to
discover that would have “assist[ed] the district court or change[d] the result of the
summary judgment motion.” Id. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Hatlevig’s request for discovery.
Affirmed.