Eric Dow Johnson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1987

Eric Dow Johnson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 28, 2025
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-26368

Eric Johnson, Lino Lakes, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that
the district court abused its discretion by concluding that his claim is Knaffla-barred. We
affirm.
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FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Eric Dow Johnson in Hennepin
County District Court with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. After the
charges were filed, two additional individuals reported that Johnson had sexually assaulted
them in Meeker County between 2003 and 2006. Johnson was not charged in those cases.
Johnson pleaded guilty to the Hennepin County charges. The plea agreement called
for concurrent prison sentences of 57 and 70 months, along with conditional release. The
agreement also included a promise that the state would not charge Johnson in one of the
Meeker County cases. In addition, the state offered not to charge Johnson in the remaining
Meeker County case as well, but Johnson would have to agree to the 70-month sentence
being increased to 90 months.
Johnson pleaded guilty, and the district court accepted his plea. Prior to sentencing,
Johnson moved to withdraw his plea, arguing, among other things, that the terms related to
the Meeker County cases constituted an improper inducement that rendered the plea
involuntary. The district court denied the motion, sentenced Johnson to concurrent prison
terms of 57 months and 70 months, and imposed a lifetime conditional-release period. The
90-month provision in the agreement was not exercised. Johnson appealed both
convictions. We consolidated the appeals and granted his motion to stay the appeal while
he pursued postconviction relief.
In his first postconviction petition, Johnson argued that the district court’s
imposition of a lifetime conditional-release period was improper and that he was entitled
to resentencing. The district court denied the petition and we reinstated his direct appeal.
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On direct appeal, Johnson challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to
withdraw his plea, arguing that the state’s promise in the plea agreement not to charge him
in one of the Meeker County cases was illusory and rendered his plea involuntary. State v.
Johnson, No. A23- 0025, 2024 WL 227998, at *2-4 (Minn. App. Jan. 22, 2024). We
affirmed the district court. Id.
After the conclusion of his direct appeal, Johnson filed a second postconviction
petition, arguing that the district court sentenced him for uncharged conduct and that his
plea was coerced. Regarding his coercion claim, Johnson alleged that his attorney was not
prepared for trial and that, when advising Johnson on the plea agreement, his attorney
“insisted” that if he did not take the agreement, he would be sentenced to 24 years in prison.
The district court denied postconviction relief, concluding that Johnson’s claims were
meritless and procedurally barred by State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976).
Johnson filed a third postconviction petition, again seeking to withdraw his plea.
He reasserted his claim that his attorney coerced his plea and argued that his attorney’s
coercion and unpreparedness for trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).
To support his claim, Johnson alleged that, in a recorded phone call with his attorney, his
attorney admitted that he coerced Johnson and was unprepared for trial. Johnson provided
no evidence of the phone call. The district court denied the petition, again concluding that
Johnson’s claims were meritless and Knaffla-barred. This appeal followed.
DECISION
“We review a [district] court’s summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief
for an abuse of discretion.” Andersen v. State , 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). “A
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[district] court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly
erroneous factual findings.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted). We review legal issues de novo and factual findings for clear error.
Id.
“[A] [district] court may summarily deny a claim that is procedurally barred by the
Knaffla rule.” Id. at 597. “Under the Knaffla rule, once a direct appeal has been taken, all
claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims that were known or should have been
known but were not raised in the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Additionally, “claims asserted in a second or subsequent postconviction petition
are procedurally barred if they could have been raised on direct appeal or in the first
postconviction petition.” Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2006).
Here, Johnson bases his coercion and IAC claims on statements that he alleges his
attorney made when advising him on his plea. But because Johnson received his attorney’s
statements personally, he knew or should have known of both claims at the time he filed
his direct appeal and first postconviction petition. His claims are therefore Knaffla-barred
unless he can demonstrate that an exception to the Knaffla rule applies.
The Knaffla bar is subject to two exceptions. Courts may consider a claim if (1) the
claim “is so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the time of the direct
appeal,” or (2) “hearing the claim is in the interest of justice because fairness so requires
and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct
appeal.” Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 9-10 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted).
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Johnson argues that his claims satisfy both exceptions. First, he contends that his
claims satisfy the novel-legal-theory exception because he presented “new evidence” in the
form of the phone call in which his attorney allegedly admitted to coercing him and to
being unprepared for trial. He argues that, because this evidence was not available when
he filed his direct appeal and prior petitions, “the legal basis [for his claims] was not
available.” Johnson misunderstands the exception. His “new evidence” adds to the factual
basis of his claims, not the legal basis. Therefore, his argument under the novel-legal-
theory exception fails.
Next, Johnson argues that his claims fall under the interest -of-justice exception
because his new evidence is outside the district court’s record and his claim therefore
cannot be resolved without an evidentiary hearing.
Johnson’s coercion claim does not satisfy the interest-of-justice exception because
he knew or should have known of the claim at the time he filed his direct appeal, and he
“offers no argument as to why his failure to raise this issue . . . on direct appeal was not
deliberate and inexcusable.” Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 216 (Minn. 2016).
“[A]n ineffective assistance of counsel claim fits within the [interest-of-justice]
exception to Knaffla if it cannot be determined from the district court record and requires
additional evidence, such as that involving attorney-client communications.” McKenzie v.
State, 754 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). Such a claim “need not be
brought on direct appeal and may be brought in a postconviction petition.” Pearson,
891 N.W.2d at 597. “But if such a claim could have been raised in a previous
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postconviction petition, the Knaffla rule bars consideration of the claim in a subsequent
petition for postconviction relief.” Id. (emphasis added).
Johnson’s IAC claim does not satisfy the interest-of-justice exception. Though his
attorney’s alleged statements in the phone call are outside the district court’s record, the
alleged statements are merely additional evidence of an IAC claim that arose before
Johnson entered his plea, and that he therefore knew or should have known about but failed
to raise in his direct appeal and prior postconviction petitions.
Because Johnson’s coercion and IAC claims are Knaffla-barred, and he cannot
demonstrate that an exception to Knaffla applies, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Johnson’s petition.
Affirmed.