In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C. R. E. and H. R. E., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1992

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
C. R. E. and H. R. E., Parents.

Filed June 9, 2025
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Houston County District Court
File No. 28-JV-24-412

Daniel B. McGuire, RAM Law PLLC, Roseville, Minnesota (for appellant-mother H.R.E.)

Suzanne M. Bublitz, Interim Houston County Attorney, Caledonia, Minnesota (for
respondent Houston County Department of Human Services)

Karen Haugerud, Caledonia, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Segal, Judge.*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant-mother appeals the district court’s order terminating her parental rights.
She challenges the district court’s (1) determination that statutory grounds exist for
terminating her parental rights, (2) determination that termination of her parental rights is
in the children’s best interests, (3) imposition of a presumption that she is palpably unfit to

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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parent, (4) alleged failure to conduct a meaningful and independent review of the evidence,
and (5) evidentiary rulings. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant H.R.E. (mother) and C.R.E (father) are the parents of M.G.E., S.C.E., and
T.S.E.—the children who are the subject of this appeal. Mother was also a primary
caretaker of father’s three children from a previous relationship, S.E., P.E., and C.E. On
July 30, 2024, law enforcement removed the children from the care of mother and father
and placed them on a 72-hour hold based on reports of abuse, neglect, and endangerment.
On August 8, respondent Houston County Department of Human Services (the county)
petitioned to terminate the parental rights of mother and father, alleging that both parents
were palpably unfit to parent and that the children had experienced egregious harm while
under their collective care. The county also argued that reasonable efforts at reunification
were not required. Following a hearing on the petition, the district court concluded that
the county had made a prima facie showing that mother and father had subjected the
children to egregious harm and that the children would be at risk of imminent physical
damage or harm if they were released to the care of mother and father. The district court
also determined that the county was not required to engage in reasonable reunification
efforts.
The matter proceeded to a five-day bench trial. On the first day of the proceedings,
father waived his right to trial and agreed to an involuntary termination of his parental
rights. The district court thereafter heard testimony from 18 witnesses and received
numerous exhibits into evidence.
3
On December 5, the district court issued a written order which included the
following findings of fact. The district court found that both father and mother had
subjected the children to numerous instances of abuse for several years. The district court
found that father had engaged in “excessive and unwarranted physical, psychological and
verbal punishment for the children.” The district court acknowledged that mother “was
also a target of emotional and physical abuse” by father. But the district court also found
that mother “was a perpetrator of abuse,” that she was “present for father’s abuse of the
children,” that she “excused, condone[d] and assisted” father’s abuse, and that she failed
to “take action to remove herself and the children from the situation or seek outside help.”
The district court determined that mother and father were palpably unfit to parent,
that mother had subjected her children to egregious harm, and that termination of parental
rights was in the best interests of the children. Based on these determinations, the district
court terminated mother and father’s parental rights.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s order terminating her parental rights to
M.G.E., S.C.E., and T. S.E. “[A]ll parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody,
and control of their children.” In re Welfare of Child. of G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d 222, 231
(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). An individual’s parental rights may be terminated “only
for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375
(Minn. 1990). A district court may terminate parental rights if it determines that “(1) at
least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence,
4
(2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, [if required,] and (3)
termination is in the child’s best interests. ” In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d
593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). Reasonable efforts to
reunite the family are not required if the district court determines that the termination
petition meets one of seven statutory exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2024).1 A
decision to terminate parental rights “must be based on evidence concerning the conditions
that exist at the time of the termination” and is appropriate when “it appears that the present
conditions of neglect will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re Welfare
of Child of F.F.N.M., 999 N.W.2d 525, 534 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted), rev.
denied (Minn. Jan. 5, 2024).
We review the district court’s ultimate decision to terminate parental rights for an
abuse of discretion. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600. “A district court abuses its discretion by
making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey ,
975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). We review the district court’s
underlying factual findings for clear error. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600. Factual findings “are
clearly erroneous when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).

1 The district court concluded that reasonable efforts to reunite the family were not required
because the county had made a prima facie showing that both mother and father had
subjected the children to egregious harm. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(1). Mother does not
challenge this conclusion on appeal.
5
Mother argues that the decision terminating her parental rights must be reversed,
challenging the district court’s (1) determination that statutory grounds for termination
exist, (2) determination that termination is in the children’s best interests, (3) imposition of
a presumption that mother was palpably unfit to parent, (4) alleged failure to conduct a
meaningful and independent review of the evidence, and (5) evidentiary decisions. We
address each argument in turn.
I. The district court acted within its discretion in determining that a statutory
ground exists for terminating mother’s parental rights.

Mother challenges the district court’s determination that at least one statutory
ground exists to support termination of her parental rights. The county bears the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists.
F.F.N.M., 999 N.W.2d at 534. We review the district court’s determination of whether a
statutory ground for termination exists for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600.
And “we need only conclude that one ground is supported in order to affirm.” Id. at 602.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that two separate
grounds for termination existed, that she had subjected her children to egregious harm, and
that she was palpably unfit to parent pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(3), (5)
(2024).2 We disagree.

2 At times, the district court’s order erroneously cites Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4), (6), as the relevant provisions. We note that the district court’s citations are
consistent with a previous iteration of the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4), (6) (2022). In 2024, the legislature twice amended Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1, ultimately removing subdivision 1(b)(3) and renumbering subdivision 1(b)(3)-(9).
See 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 80, art. 8, § 27, at 333-34; 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 115, art. 18,
§ 38, at 1742-44.
6
We focus our analysis on the district court’s determination that a statutory ground
for termination exists based on egregious harm, as we may affirm a termination order if
one ground for termination exists. See J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 602. A district court may
terminate parental rights if it finds “that a child has experienced egregious harm in the
parent’s care,” and that the harm “is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that indicates a lack
of regard for the child’s well-being, such that a reasonable person would believe it contrary
to the best interest of the child or of any child to be in the parent’s care .” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). Egregious harm is defined as “the infliction of bodily harm to
a child or neglect of a child which demonstrates a grossly inadequate ability to provide
minimally adequate parental care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 14 (2024).
The district court based its egregious-harm determination on its findings that mother
had perpetrated, assisted in, and failed to protect the children from numerous instances of
abuse. The district court found that mother spanked her children “almost every day.”
Mother spanked T.S. E. as part of his potty-training routine using her hand, spoons, or
spatulas, and sometimes “whack[ed]” T.S.E. on the head. On one occasion, T.S.E. received
spankings from both father and mother, resulting in “six or seven purple and blue marks
on his bottom.” The district court found that in one instance, mother struck S.C.E. with a
spoon, leaving “a red mark on his leg that was swollen the next day.” On another occasion,
mother “spanked [S.C.E.] so bad that he had a little round circle of black on his bottom.”
The district court found that M.G.E. was the “primary child of the abuse.” On
several occasions, father threw M.G. E. into a pond even though M. G.E. could not swim.
On one occasion, father took a piece of broken rod and hit M. G.E. on his bare skin
7
approximately 20 times, leaving “red and blue rod-like marks” and causing him to bleed.
On another occasion, father “severely beat” M.G.E. while mother was in the house and
then “dragged [M.G.E.] around by the ear while he was screaming, ‘help me mommy.’”
But mother did not intervene until father “grabbed a fruit knife from the kitchen and nicked
[M.G.E.’s] ear.” The district court found credible testimony from Dr. Cree Kachelski who
opined that the abuse could have resulted in M.G.E.’s death and that M.G.E. had been
subjected to “child torture.”
We emphasize that mother does not contest the factual bases underlying the district
court’s determination that the children experienced egregious harm under mother’s care .
The district court found that a reasonable person would place their child’s safety above
their own safety and “not participate in or allow another parent . . . to abuse a child for
several years physically, psychologically or emotionally.” The district court further found
that mother had “demonstrated that she is not a reasonable person by her own actions, and
also by her failure to act over the years. ” Given these uncontested findings, which are
well-supported by the record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in its egregious-harm determination.
Although mother does not contest the district court’s underlying findings of fact,
mother contends that the district court’s egregious-harm determination was nevertheless
an abuse of discretion because it was father—not mother— who “severely beat the
children” and that mother “did her best to intervene in [father’s] punishment of the
children.” We acknowledge the difficult circumstances mother faced in trying to provide
appropriate care and protection for her children. Dr. Sharon McNamara—a psychologist
8
retained by mother—testified that mother “was parenting in an atmosphere of coercion and
control” and that father dictated “what was the right way or the right way to punish.” The
district court addressed this dynamic in its findings, acknowledging that mother was also a
target of father’s physical and emotional abuse. But this dynamic notwithstanding, the
district court found mother had “excused, condone[d] and assisted” father’s abuse and
repeatedly perpetrated her own abuse over the course of several years. The district court
also found that mother “had the means to leave [father] and bring her children with her,”
but she failed to contact human services, law enforcement, family, or friends to “ask for
help so that she and the children could leave [father] and be safe.” Mother does not argue
that these findings are unsupported by the record. And the district court’s egregious-harm
determination is amply supported by witness testimony and other record evidence detailing
numerous episodes of abuse experienced by mother’s children.
We are also unpersuaded by mother’s argument that father perpetrated the worst of
the abuse and that mother’s actions did not, on their own, amount to egregious harm. Under
the statute, egregious harm is not limited to harm that a parent inflicts directly upon a child.
Such harm need only occur while the child is “in the parent’s care,” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), and encompasses circumstances in which “the parent either
knew or should have known that the child had experienced egregious harm,” In re Welfare
of Child of T.P., 747 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Minn. 2008). Here, both the district court’s findings
and the record reflect that mother—in addition to perpetrating abuse— knew that father was
repeatedly subjecting the children to egregious harm over the course of several years, failed
9
to protect the children from such harm, and “excused, condone[d], and assisted” father’s
abuse.3
We therefore conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in
determining that a statutory ground for termination based on egregious harm exists. And
because “we need only conclude that one ground is supported in order to affirm,” we do
not address the district court’s palpable-fitness determination. 4 See J.H., 968 N.W.2d at
602.

3 In support of her argument, mother points to language from T.P. in which the supreme
court stated that whether a parent “knew or should have known that a child experienced
egregious harm is necessary, but not sufficient, to satisfy that statutory requirement,” and
that “[o]ther factors will be relevant to whether that requirement is met in a given case.”
T.P., 747 N.W.2d at 362 n.4. But this language refers to scenarios involving a parent “who
has not personally inflicted egregious harm on a child.” Id. at 362. Here, however, the
district court’s order does not rely solely on mother’s knowledge of abuse perpetrated by
father as the basis for its egregious-harm determination. As previously explained, the
district court relied on abuse perpetrated by both mother and father as well as abuse
perpetrated by father in the presence of mother to support its conclusion that the county
had met its statutory burden under the egregious-harm provision.

4 Mother also argues that the district court erred in imposing a presumption that she is
palpably unfit to parent. A statutory presumption of palpable unfitness to parent arises
upon a showing that a parent’s parental rights were previously involuntarily terminated or
that their custodial rights were involuntarily transferred to a relative. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(3). The district court’s order states that mother “failed to rebut the
presumption of palpable unfitness.” But there is no evidence in the record that mother
previously had her parental rights involuntarily terminated or had custodial rights to
another child involuntarily transferred to a relative, and therefore no statutory basis to
impose a presumption of palpable unfitness to parent. Still, we question whether the
district court actually imposed such a burden on mother since the district court’s order
otherwise analyzes the palpable-fitness determination in accordance with the proper burden
of proof. The district court’s order contains only one brief reference to the presumption of
palpable fitness. And even assuming the district court erred, because we affirm the
termination of parental rights based on the district court’s egregious-harm determination,
any such error was harmless. See In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn.
App. 1997) (applying harmless-error analysis to affirm termination of parental rights).
10
II. The district court acted within its discretion in determining that termination is
in the children’s best interests.

Mother challenges the district court’s determination that termination of her parental
rights is in the best interests of the children. We review the district court’s best-interests
determination for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600. “Because the
best-interests analysis involves credibility determinations and is generally not susceptible
to an appellate court’s global review of a record, we give considerable deference to the
district court’s findings.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App.
2012) (quotation omitted).
A district court must weigh three factors when conducting a best-interests analysis:
“(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In
re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 65 7 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation
omitted). “Competing interests include such things as a stable environment, health
considerations and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of Child. of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d
656, 668 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). If there is a conflict between the interests
of the child and the parent, the interests of the child predominate. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 7 (2024).
Although the district court did not conduct an explicit, factor-by-factor analysis to
determine whether termination was in the best interests of the children, the district court’s
findings reflect consideration of the relevant factors. The district court found that the
children had not expressed an interest in returning to mother’s home. The district court
11
credited the testimony of the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL), who testified that “none
of the children have ever inquired about how their parents are” or asked about going home.
The GAL further testified that the children wanted to “remain where they are” and that
being removed from the home had given them “a sense of security.” The district court also
credited the testimony of psychologist Dr. Mollie Brady, who recommended that the
children have no contact with mother and father because there would be no therapeutic
value in such contact and because “it would likely be damaging to their mental health.”
Dr. Brady testified that the children could be “triggered” by exposure to a parent who acted
as both a perpetrator and a witness to severe abuse. The district court acknowledged that
mother “loves her children,” but found that “[t]he children’s best interests in growing up
in a safe environment outweigh[ed] [mother’s] interest in maintaining the parent-child
relationship.” For these reasons, we conclu de that the district court acted within its
discretion in determining that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interests.
III. The district court did not err by failing to conduct a meaningful and
independent review of the evidence.

Mother argues that the district court failed to conduct meaningful and independent
review of the evidence because it (1) adopted the county’s proposed findings “nearly
verbatim,” and (2) failed to make sufficient credibility determinations to enable appellate
review.
12
A. Adoption of Proposed Findings
“[V]erbatim adoption of a party ’s proposed findings and conclusions of law is not
reversible error per se.” Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 12, 1993). Although we “continue to recognize the acceptability of this
practice,” we have cautioned that “wholesale adoption of one party’s findings and
conclusions raises the question of whether the trial court independently evaluated each
party’s testimony and evidence.” Id.; see also In re Child. of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703,
707 n.2 (Minn. 2005) (“While we have declined to adopt a blanket prohibition on [the
district court’s verbatim adoption of proposed findings], . . . our preference is for a court
to independently develop its own findings.” (quotation omitted)).
Mother argues that the district court adopted the county’s proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law “nearly verbatim, with minimal usage of its own skill and
judgment.” The substance of the district court’s order belies this contention. Most notably,
the district court’s order includes a section entitled “Mitigating Considerations for Mother”
that was not set forth in the county’s proposed order. That section of the district court’s
order consists of 11 paragraphs and includes findings based on evidence submitted by
mother regarding, among other things, mother’s love for her children, her attempts to
“defuse father’s anger and stop his punishment of the children,” and her own experience
of father’s physical and emotional abuse. This section also includes discussion of
testimony provided by defense witnesses—such as Dr. McNamara—that is not included in
the county’s proposed findings. Additionally, while both the district court’s order and the
13
county’s proposed findings included a section entitled “Best Interests,” the district court’s
order includes an additional paragraph of analysis not set forth in the county’s submission.
Mother correctly notes—and the county acknowledges—that the district court
adopted significant portions of the county’s proposed order. But, as previously noted, even
a district court’s wholesale adoption of a petitioner’s proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law does not constitute per se reversible error. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d at 590.
And here, the district court’s order differed in significant ways from the county’s proposed
order, indicating that the district court independently evaluated the testimony and evidence
presented by both parties. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion by the district court.
B. Credibility Determinations
“The district court must make sufficient findings to enable appellate review.”
Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 597 n.2 (Minn. 2018). Mother argues that the district
court failed to make sufficient findings to enable review because it did not make credibility
determinations for three important witnesses: the children’s maternal grandmother C.K.,
Dr. McNamara, and a social worker who testified for the county. We disagree.
Regarding C.K., while the district court did not explicitly assess her credibility in
its order, it lauded C.K.’s credibility on the record commenting that she was “doing an
excellent job of being genuine and credible.” The district court also referred to C.K.’s
testimony in its finding related to the abuse experienced by the children. The record
therefore indicates that the district court assessed the credibility of C.K.’s testimony. See
Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (deferring to the district
court’s implicit credibility determination).
14
As to Dr. McNamara, i n a section of the order entitled “Credibility of Witnesses,”
the district court noted that Dr. McNamara interviewed both mother and father, but the
district court did not make an explicit credibility finding regarding Dr. McNamara’s
testimony. We read the totality of the district court’s order to include an implicit credibility
determination regarding Dr. McNamara’s testimony in light of the discussion of that
testimony in the context of mother’s experience of abuse, recognizing her admission “that
being a victim does not take away from a parental duty to protect one’s children.”
As to the social worker, the district court did not make an explicit credibility
determination regarding her testimony or otherwise refer to her testimony in its order. But
mother cites to no authority compelling reversal of the district court’s termination order
where the district court failed to make a credibility determination as to one witness. And
here, the district court made explicit credibility determinations regarding the testimony of
17 other witnesses and implicit credibility determinations as to two other witnesses. These
credibility determinations, along with the district court’s other findings, are sufficient to
enable appellate review and we therefore discern no abuse of discretion.
IV. The challenged evidentiary rulings do not warrant reversal.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting prejudicial
evidence. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 93. Even if the district court erroneously admitted evidence, a new
trial is warranted “only if the complaining party demonstrates prejudicial error.” In re
Child of Simon, 662 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Minn. App. 2003). Mother contends that the district
court abused its discretion by admitting over her objection (1) exhibits 23 through 27,
15
(2) hearsay evidence elicited from a social worker, and (3) information protected by
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. We address each evidentiary
challenge in turn.
A. Exhibits 23-27
Exhibits 23 through 27 contain psychological evaluation reports of the children
prepared by Dr. Brady. Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting these exhibits for two reasons: (1) the exhibits are not relevant because they
repeat large portions of the petition to terminate parental rights and supporting probable-
cause statement, and (2) the exhibits contain inadmissible hearsay.
Unless displaced by a statute or the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection
Procedure, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply in juvenile-protection matters. Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 3.02, subd. 1. Under the rules of evidence, “[a] ll relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by” law. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is
relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. The parties cite no authority displacing these rules in the
juvenile-protection context. While it is true that the challenged exhibits contain portions
of the pleadings in this matter, they also contain clinical summaries; Dr. Brady’s
observations, recommendations, and diagnoses; extensive social- history information; and
assessment data drawn from tests conducted by Dr. Brady. Mother does not contest the
relevance of this information. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting this evidence as relevant.
16
Mother also argues that the exhibits contained inadmissible hearsay in the form of
“numerous out of court statements made by many individuals.” Hearsay is an out-of-court
statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible unless they fall under a
recognized exception. Minn. R. Evid. 802. Again, the parties cite no authority displacing
these rules in the juvenile-protection context. Assuming without deciding that the district
court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay contained in the challenged exhibits, we
conclude that any such error was harmless. The district court heard testimony directly from
Dr. Brady as well as many of the collateral sources she relied upon in her reports. Had the
district court excluded the exhibits, the evidence at trial would still have been sufficient to
support the district court’s findings. In sum, because admission of the exhibits did not
prejudice mother, reversal on that basis in not warranted.
B. Social Worker Hearsay Testimony
Mother argues that the district court improperly admitted hearsay evidence when it
allowed a social worker to testify that one of mother’s stepchildren wanted to be adopted
by his current caregivers. At trial, the social worker was asked on direct examination about
the best-interests factor regarding relationships to current caretakers, parents, siblings, and
relatives, as it related this stepchild.
Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this
testimony, any error was harmless for two reasons. First, the district court’s order does not
explicitly rely upon or otherwise reference the challenged testimony. Second, as discussed
above, there is substantial evidence in the record apart from this testimony that adequately
17
supports the district court’s best-interests determination, including testimony from the
GAL that “none of the children have ever inquired about how their parents are” or asked
about going home. The GAL also testified that two of mother’s stepchildren reported that
“their interest is in remaining outside of the home and not returning to the home.” That
testimony was received without objection. For these reasons, we conclude that mother was
not prejudiced by the admission of the social worker’s testimony regarding the stepchild’s
statement that he wanted to be adopted by his current caregivers.
C. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting information
protected by attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The attorney-client
privilege functions “to promote open and honest discussion between clients and their
attorneys” by protecting from disclosure “communication[s] in which legal advice is
sought or rendered.” Thompson v. Polaris, Inc. (In re Polaris, Inc.), 967 N.W.2d 397, 406
(Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted). “The work-product doctrine protects from disclosure
an attorney’s opinions, conclusions, mental impressions, trial strategy, and legal theories
in materials prepared in anticipation of litigation.” Cook v. Trimble (In re Cragg),
998 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 20,
2024).
During the county’s cross-examination of Dr. McNamara, the county attorney asked
Dr. McNamara about a conversation she had with a social worker.
5 The county attorney

5 Mother and father signed releases allowing Dr. McNamara and the social worker to
exchange information.
18
asked: “Didn’t you tell [the social worker] that it was both parents’ attorneys’ strategies
. . . to say that [mother] was afraid of being harmed so she—when she tries to get along
with [father]?” Mother objected and the district court overruled the objection. The county
attorney repeated the question and Dr. McNamara replied that she did not recall the
conversation. But when the social worker testified later that day, the county attorney made
a similar inquiry about her conversation with Dr. McNamara regarding mother and father’s
trial strategy. Mother again objected, and the district court took a recess to consider its
ruling on the objection. The district court ultimately sustained mother’s objection.
Again, assuming without deciding that the district court’s initial evidentiary ruling
impermissibly allowed for the admission of protected information, we conclude that any
such error was harmless for two reasons. First, the county attorney’s question to
Dr. McNamara did not elicit any substantive or prejudicial information. Dr. McNamara
simply responded that she did not recall having such a conversation. Second, in sustaining
mother’s second objection to this line of questioning, the district court effectively
reconsidered its prior ruling. For these reasons, we conclude that mother was not
prejudiced by the district court’s initial decision to overrule mother’s objection to the
county attorney’s line of questioning regarding her trial strategy.
Affirmed.