In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1998

In the Marriage of:

Justin Benjamin Merritt, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Virginia Witherspoon Merritt,
Respondent.

Filed October 20, 2025
Affirmed; motion to dismiss issue granted and motion to supplement denied
Ede, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-FA-23-5645

Andrew J. Haugen, Courtney Latcham, Heimerl & Lammers, LLC, Minnetonka,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Jill I. Frieders, Frieders & Kuhn, L.L.P., Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Ede , Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this family law appeal from the district court’s supplemental findings of fact,
conclusions of law, order for judgment, and judgment and decree, appellant husband argues
that the district court abused its discretion by (A) using a valuation date for the parties’
homestead that differed from their agreed- upon date, (B) assigning negative equity to the
homestead, (C) considering home equity line of credit (HELOC) expenditures that were
made after the valuation date as marital debt, (D) relying on respondent wife’s testimony
in deeming credit card balances to be marital debt, (E) not awarding husband his claimed
nonmarital interest in his retirement account, (F) reserving spousal maintenance,
(G) imputing income to husband for child support while declining to impute income to
determine spousal maintenance, and (H) including non-work or education-related childcare
costs within husband’s childcare support obligation. Wife moves this court to dismiss one
issue raised in husband’s appeal—whether the district court abused its discretion by
awarding wife half of the sale proceeds from a rental property—asserting that it is now
moot. Husband moves this court to supplement the record. Because we conclude that the
district court did not prejudicially abuse its discretion, we affirm. We also grant wife’s
motion to dismiss the rental-property-proceeds issue, and we deny husband’s motion to
supplement the record.
FACTS
Appellant Justin Benjamin Merritt (husband) and respondent Virginia Witherspoon
Merritt (wife) were married in January 2010. The parties share two minor children. In
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August 2023, husband petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. The parties subsequently
negotiated a temporary agreement in which they stipulated to parenting time, the use of
their jointly owned homestead and rental property, and child support. Several months later,
the parties filed a document entitled “Binding Agreements Reached During Moderated
Settlement.” That document set forth the parties’ agreement that they would share legal
custody and that wife would have sole physical custody, and it described a parenting-time
schedule that the parties created.
The matter proceeded to trial on the remaining disputed issues, which included the
value and disposition of the homestead, the disposition of the rental property, the allocation
of the HELOC debt, husband’s nonmarital claim to his Roth IRA account, and childcare.
During the trial, the district court heard testimony from husband, wife, wife’s mother, two
property appraisers, and the children’s nanny. After the trial, the district court filed
supplemental findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order for judgment. We
summarize the district court’s factual findings and legal conclusions below. And because
husband challenges some of the district court’s findings of fact as clearly erroneous, we
also describe relevant portions of the trial evidence.
Homestead
The parties owned a homestead that they had renovated. According to husband, the
homestead was on the National Historic Register of Houses. The neighborhood includes
homes that are unique and mostly custom-built.
A.H., a certified residential appraiser, testified that she was hired to appraise the
parties’ homestead during and after the property renovation. During A.H.’s testimony, the
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district court admitted an appraisal report by A.H. that was dated December 30, 2022; in
the report, A.H. wrote that she valued the homestead at $1.4 million. A.H. testified that,
based on her professional experience, not much had changed in the relevant r eal estate
market between January 1, 2023 and the summer of 2023—it had remained consistent.
Another appraiser, T.P., was hired by wife and testified about his written appraisal
of the homestead, which was dated November 8, 2023. T.P. said that, based on his
evaluation of market data, the market was stable. He also provided the following median
home prices for properties within a one-mile radius of the parties’ homestead during certain
periods preceding the November 8 appraisal: $612,000 (seven to twelve months before the
appraisal); $697,000 (four to six months before the appraisal); and $469,000 (three months
before the appraisal). T.P. opined that houses on top of the hill in the neighborhood were
much larger and generally sold for more money than properties that were not. Noting that
the parties’ homestead was not on top of the hill, T.P. valued the property at $970,000. He
explained that part of the reason he valued the homestead differently than A.H. could be
the difference in square footage that each appraiser assigned to the home. But T.P.
ultimately attributed the difference in value to the homes that each appraiser picked as
comparators to the parties’ homestead. He testified, however, that his personal knowledge
did not support a determination that the market had decreased 30% in the seven-to-eight-
month period before his appraisal.
In her testimony, w ife’s mother told the district court that she would assume the
homestead mortgage and that wife would pay her back just as wife would remunerate “any
other mortgage company” for a loan with interest “of no less than 4 percent.” Wife’s mother
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was adamant that her assumption of the mortgage was not a gift and that wife would repay
her. Before assuming the mortgage, however, wife’s mother stated that she wanted to
confer with her financial consultants and that she would do what they advised. At the time
of trial, wife’s mother had yet to speak with an attorney about this potential assumption of
the mortgage.
HELOC
The parties had a HELOC on their rental property. Before July 2023, the HELOC
balance was zero. From July 1, 2023 to March 14, 2024, the parties borrowed $95,000
through the HELOC. In his testimony, husband maintained that there was a portion of the
HELOC debt that was marital and a nonmarital portion. He explained that the nonmarital
portion was directly related to wife’s HELOC expenditures and to his use of HELOC funds
to reimburse himself for wife’s spending on his personal accounts after the parties’ agreed-
upon valuation date of August 1, 2023. Husband requested that the district court attribute
five of nineteen HELOC transactions to wife. Wife, on the other hand, testified that all the
HELOC withdrawals were marital debt.
Roth IRA
Husband testified that he has a Roth IRA account, which he first opened in 2009 or
2010. He explained that, when he and wife married, he maintained the Roth IRA through
a financial services company. After he transferred or “rolled it over” from one company to
another, husband eventually had his financial planner manage the Roth IRA. This account
“was also consolidated with other funds from other IRAs.”
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Husband’s Employment
Husband testified that, before he was terminated on April 10, 2024, he was
employed by a company called Planful and had a total annual compensation target of
$300,000. At the time of trial, husband was seeking new employment and working with
recruiters to assist him in the process. He had been directly recruited by a large public
company but had not received an offer. According to husband, it could take eight to twelve
months for him to secure an executive position. In the meantime, husband was receiving
weekly unemployment and worked as an adjunct professor at a university, where he was
scheduled to teach one class in the next semester.
Childcare
The parties’ minor children were enrolled in daycare. Through a school-age
childcare (SACC) program administered by the public school system, both children had
upcoming daycare contracts. SACC is available during the school year and the summer
months, from 6:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on most days.
After the parties’ separation, wife continued to use the services of the family’s
nanny. The nanny testified about the care she provided the children. She picked the children
up from SACC between 4:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m. Wife asked the nanny to do so to provide
the children more time after school to decompress from their day and to start their
homework. If the children were picked up later, they had a harder time completing their
assigned tasks. In addition to providing transportation and childcare, the nanny prepared
dinner. The nanny also testified that, after the parties’ separation, she had seen a change in
the children.
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District Court’s Orders
On November 5, 2024, the district court filed supplemental findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order for judgment. A judgment and decree was also entered.
The district court awarded the homestead and the negative equity it carried to wife.
Although the district court awarded the rental property to husband, it ordered husband to
refinance any encumbrance on the property within 90 days so that the debt was solely in
his name. The district court also ordered husband to sell the rental property if he could not
refinance the existing mortgage on that property within 90 days after the court’s entry of
the judgment and decree. And the district court ordered that the parties equally split any
proceeds generated from the rental-property sale.
The district court determined that a $95,000 balance on the HELOC for post-
valuation-debt expenses was marital property, reasoning that it could not determine with
certainty “that one party or the other [had] rashly [spent] HELOC funds for personal,
nonmarital needs.” The district court also allocated certain portions of the parties’ credit
card balances to husband.
As to husband’s Roth IRA, the district court deemed the full amount of the account
to be a marital asset. Although husband claimed a nonmarital interest in the Roth IRA, the
district court determined that husband had failed to provide “sufficient evidence to trace
the asset after it began appreciating during the marriage and was then additionally co-
mingled with marital retirement accounts in 2015.” The district court reasoned that, while
an account statement that had been admitted as an exhibit “implie[d] the existence of an
IRA account prior to the parties’ marriage, it d[id] not provide the value of the asset at the
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time the parties were married in January of 2010.” Because it found that the value of the
Roth IRA at the start of the parties’ marriage was unknown, the district court determined
that it could not trace that marital asset.
For purposes of child support, the district court imputed income to husband. The
district court determined that husband had not provided the court with sufficient
documentation to establish his efforts to find comparable employment and his claimed
eight-to-twelve-month unemployment timeframe. And the district court found that husband
had not provided evidence of his efforts to seek interim employment while working with
recruiters. The district court imputed a monthly income to husband based on his education,
employment history, range of skills, abilities, and his average earnings over the past three
years from Planful. And the district court added an amount based on husband’s average
income from his work as an adjunct professor.
Wife sought spousal maintenance for three to five years based on her assertion that
her monthly income would not cover her monthly budget. But the district court reserved
the issue of spousal maintenance because it determined that husband had not secured
employment and that his ability to contribute was unknown. The district court ordered that,
as soon as husband notified wife that he found employment, wife could renew her spousal
maintenance request.
As for childcare, the district court determined that it was in the best interest of the
children to continue receiving nanny services so that they could leave SACC prior to
5:30 p.m. The district court ordered that husband’s childcare obligation would include the
costs of SACC, plus $300 per month for additional care.
9
On November 12, 2024, the district court filed the marital termination agreement,
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for bifurcated judgment. A bifurcated
judgment and decree was also entered. The November 12, 2024 judgment outlines the
parties’ stipulated agreement, including that the parties agreed to a valuation date of August
1, 2023.
Husband appeals.
DECISION
In challenging the district court’s November 5, 2024 judgment, husband argues that
the court abused its discretion by (A) using a valuation date for the parties’ homestead that
differed from their agreed-upon date, (B) assigning negative equity to the homestead,
(C) considering HELOC expenditures after the valuation date as marital debt, (D) relying
on wife’s testimony in deeming credit card balances to be marital debt, (E) denying
husband’s claim that a portion of his Roth IRA account was nonmarital, (F) reserving
spousal maintenance, (G) imputing income to husband for child support while declining to
impute income to determine spousal maintenance, and (H) including non-work or non-
education-related childcare costs within his childcare support obligation. Wife moves this
court to dismiss the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by awarding
her half of the sale proceeds from the rental property, asserting that it is now moot. Husband
moves this court to supplement the record with a letter that he recently filed in district
court.
After addressing each argument below, we conclude that the district court did not
prejudicially abuse its discretion in rendering the November 5, 2024 judgment.
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A. Homestead Valuation Date
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by departing from the
agreed-upon valuation date for the homestead without making specific findings that a
different date would be fair and equitable.
Upon dissolution of a marriage, the district court “shall make a just and equitable
division of the marital property of the parties without regard to marital misconduct, after
making findings regarding the division of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1
(2024). And the district court “shall value marital assets for purposes of division between
the parties as of the day of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement conference, unless
a different date is agreed upon by the parties, or unless the court makes specific findings
that another date of valuation is fair and equitable.” Id. “The district court has broad
discretion in setting the marital property valuation date.” Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d
716, 720 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2002). “A district court abuses its
discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court made detailed findings supporting its determination that
November 8, 2023—rather than the parties’ agreed-upon valuation date of August 1,
2023—was a fair and equitable date of valuation. Before deciding that T.P.’s appraisal of
the homestead was “overall, a more accurate valuation of the property,” the district court
carefully compared the appraisals presented at trial.
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The district court found that A.H. had performed two appraisals of the home and
that she had testified to her familiarity with the neighborhood. And the district court
considered that A.H.’s report set forth detailed floorplans and measurements of the home,
including the assertion that the square footage of the residence was 3,514. The district court
also discussed T.P.’s stated familiarity with the neighborhood and his testimony that “the
median house value in the neighborhood over the 12 months prior to his appraisal was
$612,000.00, $697,000.00 and $469,000.00.”
As to the comparator homes that the appraisers used to estimate the homestead’s
value, the district court found that two of the homes that the appraisers included were the
same; those two homes had sale prices of $1 .6 million and $1.175 million, respectively.
The district court noted that A.H. chose two other comparator homes—one valued at nearly
$2 million and one at more than $2 million—but found that those homes “were much larger
than the parties’ home and included a sport court and inground pool, respectively.” And
the district court contrasted A.H.’s appraisal with T.P.’s decision to choose comparator
homes closer in size to the homestead and had prices between $875,000 and $990,000. The
district court cited T.P. ’s testimony that he had also appraised a more-than-two-million-
dollar home that A.H. had chosen as a comparator but had determined that the property
“was not an apples-to-apples comparison” with the homestead. Moreover, the district court
discussed T.P.’s testimony that the homestead faced two a partment buildings, which T.P.
said diminishes property values.
Although it also considered the homestead’s history, the district court found that
“those aspects d[id] not appear to have influenced the appraisers’ opinions with regards to
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market value of the homestead.” The district court determined that T.P. “was not aware of
the historic registry, and neither appraiser testified that these items influenced the
valuation.” After reviewing witness testimony, the appraiser reports, and comparable
property sales, the district court found that T.P.’s November 8 appraisal was “a more
accurate valuation of the property,” despite noting that A.H. had correctly measured the
homestead’s square footage. 1 The district court decided that it was “appropriate to add
$87,000 to [T.P.]’s valuation to correct for the inaccurate calculation of square footage” in
the November 8 appraisal. Ultimately, the district court determined that the market value
of the homestead was $1,057,000.
In short, the district court’s November 5, 2024 judgment included specific findings
of fact “that explained its rationale for using” November 8, 2023 as the valuation date. See
Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d at 720. These findings of fact are supported by the evidence. Because
the district court made detailed findings and those findings are reasonably supported by the
record, we conclude that the court acted within its discretion when it selected a valuation
date for the homestead that differed from the parties’ agreed-upon date. See id. ; see also
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506.
B. Negative Homestead Equity
Husband challenges the district court’s assignment of negative equity to the
homestead, contending that the court’s decision was against the logic and facts in the

1 The district court observed that the November 8 appraisal measured the homestead’s
square footage as 3,225 square feet and that the appraisal included diagrams and square
footage that were identical to those used by the county, which the court found to be
undisputedly inaccurate.
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record. In particular, husband asserts that the district court abused its discretion in relying
on the November 8, 2023 appraisal and that he would be the only party harmed by the
assignment because wife’s mother planned to pay off the mortgage and all plans for wife’s
repayment of that loan were speculative.2
A district court “has broad discretion in evaluating and dividing property in a marital
dissolution and will not be overturned except for abuse of discretion.” Antone v. Antone,
645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). An appellate court “must affirm the trial court’s division
of property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though this court may
have taken a different approach.” Servin v. Servin, 345 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Minn. 1984).
“Determining the specific value of an asset is a finding of fact.” Maurer v. Maurer,
623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001). The district court need not be exact in its valuation of
assets. Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979). “[V]aluation is necessarily

2 Husband also maintains that the district court abused its discretion by awarding wife half
of the sale proceeds from the rental property because the court treated the rental property
differently than the homestead. In an appellate motion seeking dismissal of this issue as
moot, wife asserts that husband has refinanced the rental property and thus the district
court’s November 5, 2024 judgment no longer alternatively requires that he sell it and pay
wife any proceeds. We “must dismiss an issue on appeal as moot when a decision on the
merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible.” In re
Welfare of Child of K.O., 4 N.W.3d 359, 364 (Minn. App. 2024) (quotation omitted).
“Appellate courts decide de novo whether” an issue is moot. Id. The district court
alternatively ordered that husband refinance the rental property within 90 days of the
court’s entry of the judgment and decree or, if he could not do so, that he sell the property
and share the proceeds with wife. It is undisputed that husband refinanced the property.
And during oral argument before this court, husband’s counsel conceded that an award of
relief is no longer possible. Based on the record, we agree and therefore grant wife’s
motion. We nonetheless consider this argument to the extent that it is relevant to our review
of the district court’s assignment of negative equity to the homestead.
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an approximation in many cases, and it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within
a reasonable range of figures.” Hertz v. Hertz, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1975).
The district court found that, as of the November 8, 2023 valuation date that the
court used, the homestead’s mortgage balance was $1,336,966. Based on additional
principal payments that the parties made after that valuation date, the district court
determined that the mortgage balance had been reduced by $15,959.64. The district court
found that this left the homestead with negative equity in the amount of $264,036.36, which
the court awarded to wife, conditioned on payment by wife’s mother of the mortgage to
satisfy the parties’ obligation to their existing lender. And the district court alternatively
ordered that, if wife’s mother could not satisfy the mortgage, the parties had to notify the
court so that the court could order a different disposition of the homestead. In the meantime,
the district court ordered that wife was solely responsible for the ongoing mortgage
payments to the parties’ existing lender.
In arguing that the negative equity assigned to the homestead would not affect wife
in light of the anticipated satisfaction of the mortgage by wife’s mother, husband cites our
decision in Nolan v. Nolan, 354 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. App. 1984), rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
20, 1984). In Nolan, the main subject of the parties’ dispute in their dissolution proceeding
was a $500,000 personal obligation claimed by the husband, which he owed to the First
Bank of St. Paul as a guarantee on a construction loan made to Shepard Park Development
Corporation (SPDC). Nolan, 354 N.W.2d at 511. The husband had a 25% shareholder
interest in SPDC and the loan was “part of a financing arrangement which was intended to
reduce the indebtedness of SPDC.” Id. During the dissolution trial, the husband testified
15
that he considered the loan to be a personal obligation and that it was due on demand, but
he also acknowledged that he did not know when payment would be required. Id. In
declining to consider the $500,000 personal obligation in dividing the marital property, the
district court “indicated that the personal liability of [the husband] on the note was
‘speculative at best.’” Id. at 513. We affirmed, concluding that the district court’s
“responsibility to equitably divide the marital assets did not allow it to mathematically
factor the $500,000 liability into the distribution.” Id. In reaching that conclusion, we
reasoned that the liability “was inextricably tied to the speculative, and income-generating,
character, of the assets awarded to [the husband].” Id.
Unlike Nolan, the value of the parties’ homestead and the amount left to pay on their
mortgage were not speculative. Both parties testified that they bought the homestead for
$500,000. Wife stated that they secured a loan of about $1.3 million dollars—more than
what the homestead was worth—to cover the costs of upgrades and furniture. After
considering the trial evidence, the district court found that the homestead’s value was
$1,057,000 and that, even with the parties’ additional payments toward the mortgage, the
value did not exceed the mortgage balance. And the district court awarded the homestead
and its negative equity to wife, thereby making her solely responsible for the mortgage
payments. Even if wife’s mother paid the mortgage, as she testified was her intention,
wife’s mother also consistently stated that she considered this a loan that wife would pay
off, plus interest, rather than the amount the homestead was worth. In addition, applicable
law required that the district court value the homestead at the time of the valuation date
that the court determined was fair and equitable. See Aaron v. Aaron, 281 N.W.2d 150, 153
16
(Minn. 1979) (“Generally, courts base the distribution of property on the value of the
property at the time of distribution . . . .”). In this case, the homestead had negative equity
as of the November 8, 2023 valuation date. As explained above, the district court’s
homestead valuation date is reasonably supported by the record.
Husband nonetheless maintains that the district court’s disparate treatment of the
homestead and rental property resulted in an arbitrary decision. The record defeats this
claim. The district court awarded the homestead to wife and the rental property to husband.
The November 5, 2024 judgment required that wife execute a quitclaim deed conveying
her interest in the rental property to husband and that husband likewise convey his interest
in the homestead to wife. And both parties were solely responsible for any costs on their
awarded property, including the mortgage on the homestead.
We therefore conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in assigning
negative equity to the homestead.
C. Post-Valuation Date HELOC Expenditures

Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering HELOC
expenditures that were made after the parties’ agreed-upon valuation date as marital debt.
He claims that the district court failed to analyze whether the expenditures were attributable
to a particular party, despite evidence supporting allocation of the debt between the parties.
“In dissolution proceedings, debts are apportioned as part of the property settlement
and are treated in the same manner as the division of assets.” Korf v. Korf, 553 N.W.2d
706, 712 (Minn. App. 1996). In general, marital property is what was acquired during the
17
marriage and before the valuation date. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2024).
Nonmarital property includes what was acquired after the valuation date. Id.
As to the HELOC expenditures, the district court found as follows:
Both parties provided testimony that debt from the HELOC
was mainly generated by the other party, and that at least some
portion of HELOC spending must be treated as nonmarital and
assigned to the other party. Both parties have accused the other
of imprudent personal spending out of the HELOC. From the
information and testimony provided, the court cannot
determine with any certainty that one party or the other was
rashly spending HELOC funds for personal, nonmarital needs.
Consequently, the court finds that the entirety of the $95,000
HELOC shall be allocated as marital debt. Neither party shall
reimburse the other for nonmarital spending from the HELOC.

We are mindful that, under subdivision 3b of section 518.003, debt incurred after
the valuation date is generally considered nonmarital. See id. But here, each party
essentially argued to the district court that part or all of the HELOC debt resulted from the
other party’s nonmarital spending. When parties to a dissolution disagree about whether
property is marital property or is the nonmarital property of one of them, the burden is on
the party asserting the existence of a nonmarital interest to prove the existence of that
nonmarital interest. See Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d at 723. And the record reasonably supports
the district court’s decision that neither party adequately proved the relevant HELOC
expenditures were attributable to the other. Thus, we conclude that the district court acted
within its discretion in treating the post-valuation date HELOC expenditures as generating
marital debt.
Prior to the valuation date, the balance of the HELOC was zero. From July 1, 2023
to March 14, 2024, the parties incurred $95,000 in debt through HELOC expenditures.
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Both parties testified that there was a portion of the HELOC that was marital,
notwithstanding that the debt was incurred after the valuation date and that the expenditures
might otherwise qualify as nonmarital personal spending by either of the individual parties.
The parties disputed five specific HELOC expenditures. Husband sought allocation of the
debt associated with those expenditures to wife.
According to husband, the first HELOC expenditure arose from five $1,000
withdrawals that wife made from the parties’ joint checking account, which left that
account with insufficient funds to cover the homestead mortgage. Husband transferred
$5,000 from the HELOC to the checking account to “replenish the balance.” But wife
testified that she made the five $1,000 withdrawals to pay a contractor who was doing work
on the homestead.
Husband testified that the second HELOC expenditure was for costs that wife
charged on his personal American Express credit card. He explained that, although his
name was on the American Express account, wife was an authorized user with her own
card. Although she agreed in her testimony that she did not have her own credit card and
that she was a joint user of husband’s card, wife also stated that she had not engaged in
overspending and that there was a “dramatic increase in [husband’s] credit card spending
as soon as [the parties] separated.”
The third HELOC expenditure, per husband’s testimony, went into the parties’ joint
checking account. Husband said that he used those funds to make payments toward the
HELOC and toward the parties’ joint loan on wife’s car. But wife disputed this claim. She
19
testified that, while the parties had used marital funds to make payments on the car loan
before November 2023, she had since made the payments with her own money.
Husband stated that the fourth HELOC expenditure was to replenish the parties’
joint checking account so that they had sufficient funds to make mortgage payments. Wife,
however, testified that husband had stopped contributing to the joint checking account in
October 2023. She also reported that, aside from paying some utility bills, husband was
neither contributing to the marital home nor making childcare payments. And wife claimed
that she was still contributing to the parties’ joint checking account and was using those
funds.
The last expenditure husband discussed in his testimony was one that “essentially
max[ed] out the . . . account, removing all remaining balance from the HELOC.”
Nevertheless, wife testified that she used this money to make mortgage payments on the
homestead because she could not afford that expense on her own.
Because this record reasonably supports the district court’s decision that it could not
determine whether the parties had made nonmarital, post-valuation date HELOC
expenditures, we conclude that the court acted within its discretion by assigning the
challenged HELOC expenditures as marital debt.
D. Credit Card Debt
Husband asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allocating the debt
associated with his Chase and Apple credit cards. He contends that the district court should
have disregarded wife’s testimony about this debt in favor of other evidence about the
credit card balances.
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As mentioned above, “debts are apportioned as part of the property settlement and
are treated in the same manner as the division of assets.” Korf, 553 N.W.2d at 712. And
the district court has broad discretion in dividing property in a marital dissolution. Antone,
645 N.W.2d at 100. We conclude that the district court acted within its broad discretion in
allocating the credit card debt because its findings are reasonably supported by the record.
As to the Chase credit card debt, the district court found as follows:
The total charges between July 4, 2023 and August 2,
2023 . . . [were] $5,194.65. [Wife] testified that she reviewed
the charges and the reimbursements from Planful . . . and
found that charges totaling $3,981.37 were not reimbursed and
therefore were personal travel and other expenses of [husband].
The court finds that [husband] shall be solely responsible for
this charge. The remaining amount of $1,213.28 is marital
debt.

The relevant Chase credit card statement was admitted at trial and establishes that
the card balance was $5,194.65. Wife testified that, shortly after the parties’ separation, she
believed husband was traveling for work because that was what he had told her. But she
also said that these purported business travel expenses were not reimbursed by husband’s
employer. In connection with this testimony, wife introduced into evidence an exhibit
showing, for each of husband’s credit cards, the amount that husband spent on travel versus
the amount that Planful reimbursed him. Wife expressed her belief “that, if [husband’s]
company didn’t reimburse him for the travel, . . . it was personal.” She also described her
efforts to review husband’s credit card statements and to examine “what was reimbursed
and what was personal.” Thus, in wife’s estimation, the $3,981.37 expenditure on the
Chase credit card that was not reimbursed by Planful was husband’s personal spending.
21
Husband introduced into evidence an exhibit listing all his expenses that Planful
reimbursed. But not all the travel expenses reported in the relevant Chase credit card
statement appear on husband’s list. The district court also found credible wife’s testimony
about the lack of reimbursement for husband’s travel expenses, and we defer to those
credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
The district court also relied on wife’s testimony about the Apple credit card, finding
that this
was a credit card held only by [husband] . The statement
balance on July 31, 2023 was $11,201.51. [Wife] testified that
$10,205.40 was spending by [husband] on personal (non-
reimbursed) travel and other personal expenses for trips to
Toronto and Germany, which did not benefit the marital estate,
and that these amounts should be [husband]’s sole
responsibility. The [district] court [found] that $996.11 of this
statement is marital debt and $10,205.40 [was husband]’s
nonmarital debt.

These findings are likewise reasonably supported by the record.
The relevant Apple credit card statement was admitted into evidence and shows that
the balance was $11,201.51. Wife testified that about $10,200 of this was either husband’s
personal spending, furnishings for another property, or travel that was not reimbursed by
Planful. There were also charges reflected in the Apple credit card statement that did not
appear on the reimbursement list that husband introduced into evidence. And wife testified
that one of husband’s trips on the Apple credit card was not reimbursed by Planful.
Because the district court’s findings of fact about the allocation of the challenged
credit card balances are reasonably supported by the record, and because we defer to the
22
court’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the court acted within its discretion in
distributing this debt to husband.
E. Roth IRA
Husband maintains that the district court abused its discretion by classifying his
entire Roth IRA as marital despite evidence that a portion of the account was accumulated
before the parties’ marriage in January 2010. He argues that one of his exhibits provides
reliable evidence that no marital funds were contributed to the account since the date of
marriage. Wife counters that husband failed to prove his nonmarital claim.
Appellate courts “independently review the issue of whether property is marital or
nonmarital, giving deference to the district court’s findings of fact.” Baker v. Baker, 753
N.W.2d 644, 649 (Minn. 2008). “A spouse claiming that property is nonmarital must prove
the necessary underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence.” Wiegers v. Wiegers ,
467 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn. App. 1991). “When nonmarital property and marital property
are commingled, the nonmarital investment may lose that character unless it can be readily
traced.” Id.
Because the district court found that husband had not proved that the Roth IRA was
traceable after the parties were married in 2010, the court determined that the full balance
of the account was a marital asset. And although husband’s exhibit implied that the Roth
IRA existed before the parties’ marriage, the exhibit did not set forth the value of the
account at the time the parties were married. The district court determined that attempting
to trace any nonmarital property invested in the Roth IRA was impossible because the value
of the account at the time the parties were married was unknown.
23
Because the district court did not clearly err in finding that husband failed to trace a
nonmarital interest in the Roth IRA account, we discern no error in the district court’s
determination that the Roth IRA was a marital asset. Husband introduced into evidence a
Roth IRA account statement for the period of November 1, 2011 to November 30, 2011.
The statement established the starting value of the account as of October 31, 2011, and the
account’s value as of November 30, 2011. A graph included in the statement appears to
show that, in November 2010, the account was valued at or just above $8,000. While we
can infer from this statement that husband had the Roth IRA in November 2010, there is
no evidence in the record establishing the value of the account before the parties were
married in January 2010. Husband asserts that the statement shows he made no contribution
in 2010, which he claims is reliable evidence that no marital funds were deposited in the
account. Despite this assertion, the statement fails to show the value of the Roth IRA before
the parties were married. Husband also testified that the Roth IRA had been consolidated
with other accounts. Again, however, because of the lack of evidence reflecting the Roth
IRA’s starting balance and growth over time, the district court could not trace nonmarital
funds.
Because husband did not meet his burden of proving that funds in the account were
nonmarital, the district court acted within its discretion by deeming the Roth IRA to be a
marital asset. See Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 705–06 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding
that, because the documentary evidence did not support respondent’s contention that
nonmarital funds were applied to the homestead mortgage, respondent “failed to prove, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that she had a nonmarital interest in the homestead”).
24
F. Spousal Maintenance
Husband asserts that the district court abused its discretion by reserving spousal
maintenance without analyzing wife’s maintenance claim. He contends that Minnesota
Statutes section 518.552, subdivision 2 (2024), required the district court to make findings
on the statutory factors before reserving the issue of spousal maintenance. Wife maintains
that the district court properly reserved this issue.
“A district court generally has broad discretion in its decisions regarding spousal
maintenance[,]” Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App. 2009), including
whether to reserve maintenance, Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 766 (Minn. App.
2001), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001). “The standard of review in spousal-maintenance
determinations is whether the district court abused its discretion by improperly applying
the law or making findings unsupported by the evidence.” Melius, 765 N.W.2d at 414.
In the November 5, 2024 judgment, the district court found that wife was seeking
spousal maintenance and noted her testimony that, “even with the reduced mortgage
amount to pay to [wife’s mother] for the homestead, . . . [wife would] need assistance for
a period of time.” And the district court cited husband’s opposition to wife’s spousal-
maintenance request, acknowledging his claim that wife was capable of self-support and
that he did not have the means to provide temporary spousal maintenance. The district court
ultimately reserved the issue of spousal maintenance based on its findings that husband had
not secured employment and that his ability to contribute to wife was unknown.
Husband argues that, “[e]ven where the [district] court elects to reserve
maintenance, it must base that reservation on a proper record and analysis of the statutory
25
factors.” He relies on Maiers v. Maiers, which concerned spousal maintenance. 775
N.W.2d 666, 667–68 (Minn. App. 2009).
In Maiers, the husband was the primary income earner and the wife was mainly a
homemaker. Id. at 667. Although the wife worked part-time during most of the parties’
marriage, she was laid off shortly after the dissolution proceedings began. Id. Before trial,
the wife started working as a flight attendant, but it remained undisputed that she was “not
self-supporting.” Id. At trial, the only issue for determination was spousal maintenance. Id.
The wife sought permanent spousal maintenance of $3,500 per month, while the husband
proposed a 5-year temporary maintenance obligation of $1,600 per month, with the issue
of future maintenance reserved. 3 Maiers, 775 N.W.2d at 667. The district court ordered
temporary maintenance for five years in the amount of $1,956 and “reserved the issue of
maintenance for further determination at the expiration of the five-year period.” Id. at 667–
68. On appeal, we reviewed whether the district court had abused its discretion by awarding
temporary spousal maintenance rather than permanent maintenance. Id. at 668. And we
affirmed the district court’s award of temporary maintenance because the court had “found
that [the wife would] become self-supporting at some point in the future” and had noted
uncertainty only about “when [the wife would] become self-supporting, not whether she
[would] become self-supporting.” Id. at 669.

3 “An award of temporary maintenance issued before August 1, 2024, is deemed
transitional maintenance.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3 (2024). “An award of permanent
maintenance issued before August 1, 2024, is deemed indefinite maintenance.” Id.
26
Husband contends that our decision in Maiers upheld the “award of temporary
maintenance and reservation of the issue of maintenance for further consideration in five
years’ time when appropriate findings and analysis [were] made.” But our analysis in
Maiers discusses the district court’s findings in support of its decision to award temporary
maintenance, and the issue on appeal was whether the court abused its discretion in making
that award—not whether the court needed to make certain findings before reserving the
maintenance for later determination. Id. at 668–69.
We have also explained that, “[w]hen reserved in the decree, the maintenance issue
is governed by standards for an initial award based upon the facts and circumstances
existing at the time the application is made, as if the entire action had been brought at the
later date.” Magnussen v. Magnussen, 387 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Minn. App. 1986) (quotation
omitted). And Minnesota Statutes section 518A.27, subdivision 1 (2024), provides that, in
a dissolution judgment, a district “court may determine, as one of the issues of the case,
whether or not either spouse is entitled to an award of maintenance notwithstanding that
no award is then made, or it may reserve jurisdiction of the issue of maintenance for
determination at a later date.” Taken together, Magnussen and section 518A.27 undermine
husband’s contention that the district court needed to make findings of fact on the statutory
factors set forth in subdivision 2 of section 518.552 before reserving spousal maintenance.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reserving
spousal maintenance.

27
G. Imputed Income
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by imputing income to
him for purposes of determining child support but not for purposes of determining spousal
maintenance, which the court instead reserved based on its finding that husband’s ability
to contribute was unknown, as just discussed. Wife responds that the district court’s
decisions in determining child support and reserving spousal maintenance were proper.
Under Minnesota Statutes section 518A.34(a) and (b) (2024), the district court is
required to “determine the gross income of each parent” in order “[t]o determine the
presumptive child support obligation of a parent.” Gross income includes “potential
income under section 518A.32.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2024). If a parent is voluntarily
underemployed, “child support must be calculated based on a determination of potential
income.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1 (2024). A determination of potential income can
be grounded in “the parent’s probable earnings level based on employment potential, recent
work history, and occupational qualifications in light of prevailing job opportunities and
earning levels in the community.” Id., subd. (2) (2024).
A district court’s determination of income for child support purposes “must be based
in fact and will stand unless clearly erroneous.” Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 685
(Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015). Whether a
parent is voluntarily underemployed is a finding of fact, which appellate courts review for
clear error. Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. And, as noted earlier, we review a
district court’s exercise of its broad discretion in determining spousal maintenance by
28
examining whether the court improperly applied the law or made findings of fact
unsupported by the evidence. See Melius, 765 N.W.2d at 414.
In determining child support, the district court found that husband was voluntarily
underemployed and imputed monthly income to him based on his education, employment
history, range of skills and abilities, and his average earnings over the preceding three years
of his employment with Planful. The district court also imputed an additional amount based
on husband’s average teaching income. And the district court reserved the issue of spousal
maintenance until husband secured employment.
Husband does not challenge the district court’s imputation of income for child-
support purposes. Instead, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion in failing
to apply the same imputed income to determine spousal maintenance rather than reserve it.
But “errors require reversal only if they resulted in prejudice.” Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d
170, 176 (Minn. App. 2020); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring a reviewing court to
disregard harmless error); Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987) (stating that a
district court will not be reversed if it reached a correct result for the wrong reason). As the
appellant, husband bears the “burden to demonstrate prejudice.” Sinda, 949 N.W.2d at 176;
see also Melius, 765 N.W.2d at 418 (requiring appellant to demonstrate both abuse of
discretion and prejudice to warrant reversal). Husband has not carried that burden here.
Because the district court reserved the issue of spousal maintenance until husband
secured employment, the November 5, 2024 judgment does not require that husband pay
spousal maintenance to wife. Husband has failed to show how he is prejudiced by not
having a spousal maintenance obligation, and we cannot discern such prejudice from the
29
record. Thus, even assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion
in deciding to reserve the issue of spousal maintenance until husband secured employment,
we conclude that such assumed error is harmless and disregard it. Cf. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d
at 176–77.
H. Childcare
Husband challenges the district court’s inclusion of certain expenses— i.e., costs that
were unrelated to wife’s employment, education, or job search activities—in its calculation
of husband’s childcare support obligation. In particular, husband disputes the district
court’s award of $300 per month to wife for childcare expenses during non-work hours.
He asserts that, under Minnesota Statutes section 518A.40 (2024), the district court could
not award wife non-work-related childcare costs.
“Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties and approved by the court, the court must
order that work-related child care costs of joint children be divided between the obligor
and obligee based on their proportionate share of the parties’ combined monthly P ICS.”4
Minn. Stat. § 518A.40, subd. 1 (2024). The district court has broad discretion in ordering
support for the parties’ children. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).
In the November 5, 2024 judgment, the district court explained its determination
that it was in the best interest of the children “to continue utilizing nanny care so that [they
were] able to leave SACC prior to 5:30 p.m.” In addition, the district court found that the
parties’ nanny was hired to pick the children up from SACC, to “bring them home to begin

4 PICS is an acronym for “Parental income for determining child support.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.26, subd. 15 (2024).
30
homework and reading, and to get dinner in the oven so that these tasks [were] mostly
completed by the time [wife] arrive[d] at home around 5:30 p.m.” And the district court
discussed the children’s difficulty adjusting and noted that an earlier pick up time relieved
stress for the children and wife.
Husband contends that there is no authority for the district court to have considered
non-work or non-education related childcare costs. But “[c]hild care support must be based
on the actual child care expenses.” Minnesota Statutes section 518A.39, subd. 7 (2024).
“The statute’s use of the term ‘must’ creates a mandate that child-care support be based on
actual child-care expenses.” Jones v. Jarvinen, 814 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Minn. App. 2012). The
district court’s inclusion of the $300 for additional childcare reflects the actual childcare
expenses that wife was incurring and would continue to incur for the benefit of the children.
Wife testified that she would use the nanny about ten days a month and that each day would
cost $30.
Because the district court’s findings are reasonably supported by the record, w e
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding these childcare costs to
wife.
I. Husband’s Motion to Supplement
In July 2025, husband moved this court to supplement the record with a letter that
his counsel had recently filed with the district court. In his motion to supplement, husband
contends that the letter concerns “a significant undisclosed conflict of interest in the case”
relating to the district court judge who presided over the underlying proceedings. Husband
31
cites Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 110.05 in arguing that the letter contains
materially important information and should therefore be part of the record.
“The documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the
proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01. “An appellate court ordinarily may not consider matters outside the record.”
Thomas A. Foster & Assocs., Ltd. v. Paulson, 699 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582– 83 (Minn. 1988)). But “[i]f the record on appeal is
inaccurate or incomplete, a party may move to correct or modify the record.” K.S.A. v.
Alyea, 983 N.W.2d 455, 465 (Minn. App. 2022) (citing Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.05).
“Rule 110.05 is limited to correction of the record so that it accurately reflects anything of
material value that was omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated in it.”
W. World Ins. v. Anothen, Inc., 391 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Minn. App. 1986).
Because husband filed the letter with the district court after the court issued the
November 5, 2024 judgment, it is not part of the record that we are reviewing, unless we
grant his motion to supplement. See In re Nelson, 495 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Minn. 1993)
(concluding this court erred in considering a letter part of the record on review because the
letter was filed with the district court one month after the case was decided). Husband fails
to assert how this information is of material value in this appeal and has not carried his
burden of showing that the information establishes error by the district court. See W. World
Ins., 391 N.W.2d at 7 2; see also Potter v. Potter, 27 N.W.2d 784, 786 (Minn. 1947)
(explaining that “on appeal[,] error is never presumed,” that “[i]t must be made to appear
affirmatively before there can be reversal[,]” and that “the burden of showing error rests
32
upon the one who relies upon it” (quotation omitted)). Indeed, husband does not connect
the alleged conflict of interest to any of his arguments on appeal. And he does not allege—
nor do we discern —that the information set forth in the letter relates to an abuse of
discretion by the district court as to the determinations that he is challenging.
Thus, we deny husband’s motion to supplement under rule 110.05 because the letter
was not part of the record before the district court when it issued the November 5, 2024
judgment and because husband has failed to establish that the letter provides something of
material value to our analysis of the issues he raises in this appeal.5 See W. World Ins., 391
N.W.2d at 72; Potter, 27 N.W.2d at 786.
Affirmed; motion to dismiss issue granted and motion to supplement denied.

5 We reject wife’s argument that husband has forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in the
district court. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582 (“A reviewing court must generally consider
only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the [district]
court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation omitted)). In his motion to supplement,
husband maintains that he did not learn of the information until after his notice of appeal
was filed and therefore could not have raised the issue in the underlying proceedings.