Troy Olds, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-2001

Troy Olds,
Appellant,

vs.

City of Moorhead,
Respondent.

Filed August 4, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CV-22-2656

Celeste E. Culberth, Leslie L. Lienemann, Culberth & Lienemann, LLP, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Jessica E. Schwie, Jana O’Leary Sullivan, Kennedy & Grave n, Chartered, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Brian T. Rochel, Frances E. Baillon, Phillip M. Kitzer, Kitzer Rochel, PLLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Samuel Kramer, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Claire Bruner-Wiltse, Schaefer Halleen, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus curiae
National Employment Lawyers Association-Minnesota Chapter)

Justin D. Cummins, Cummins & Cummins, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus
curiae Minnesota Association for Justice)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Troy Olds challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of his claim
against respondent City of Moorhead, his former employer, for an alleged violation of the
Minnesota whistleblower act (MWA), Minn. Stat. § 181.932 (2024).1 In its summary-
judgment order, the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework2 and
determined that dismissal was appropriate because Olds had not produced evidence
showing that the city’s proffered reason for terminating him was a pretext for retaliation.
Olds argues that the district court erred by applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to
an MWA claim. Olds also argues, in the alternative, that summary judgment was
inappropriate under McDonnell Douglas because the evidence was sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact that the city’s proffered reason for his termination was
pretextual and the discharge was actually motivated by retaliatory animus. We conclude
that McDonnell Douglas applies to Olds’s MWA claim and that, under that framework, the
record does not present a genuine issue of material fact for trial. We therefore affirm.

1 Section 181.932 was amended after Olds brought his MWA claim in 2022. See 2023
Minn. Laws ch. 53, art. 11, § 26, at 1290-91. The 2023 amendment expanded the types of
actions that an employer is prohibited from taking, but it did so in a manner that does not
affect Olds’s claim. Id. Accordingly, we cite to the most recently published version of the
statute.

2 As explained below, the McDonnell Douglas framework is a burden-shifting framework
for evaluating discrimination claims. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973).
3
FACTS3
In September 2012, Olds began working for the city as an engineering technician in
the city’s engineering department. As an engineering technician, Olds was responsible for
drafting construction plans and surveying and inspecting construction sites. He was also
expected to “communicate effectively” and “maintain effective working relationships”
with supervisors and vendors.
In 2015, Olds began experiencing issues with the city’s management. Olds asserts
that, between 2015 and 2019, he identified and made multiple reports to the city about
conduct that did not comply with construction contracts or plans and that he experienced
various forms of retaliation because of those reports, including the city removing him from
a project, reprimanding him, treating him with hostility, “papering” his personnel file, and
denying him a promotion.
The February 20, 2020 Incident
Olds asserts that he made his final report in February 2020 when he reported that
the computer-aided-design (CAD) lead of the engineering department, C.L., was trying to
eliminate a map that showed that a contractor was in breach of a contract with the city.
On February 18, 2020, C.L. sent an email to several employees in the engineering
department, including Olds, with instructions about CAD -related changes that he wanted
implemented. Two days later, on February 20, 2020, C.L. passed Olds at work and asked

3 In outlining the facts, because we are reviewing summary judgment, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to Olds. See STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644
N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002).
4
him how he was doing. Olds told C.L. that he was not doing very well and told C.L. that
he was upset that C.L. had sent the February 18 email about CAD-related changes. C.L.
asked Olds to come to C.L.’s office to finish the conversation there.
When Olds came to C.L.’s office, he took a seat in a chair across from C.L. and
explained why he was upset. Olds asserts that, during the conversation, he informed C.L.
that he did not want him to eliminate the city map and accused C.L. of lying about where
C.L. had obtained a list of bid items from. According to C.L., Olds was in his office for
over an hour, during which Olds raised various issues and concerns but was not receptive
to C.L. trying to problem solve those issues. C.L. recalled that, during the conversation,
Olds’s “voice was shaking” and “very loud,” his “face was red,” and he was “leaning
forward off the edge of [his] seat.” Olds does not dispute that he was upset when meeting
with C.L., that his voice was raised during the conversation, and that they met for over an
hour. C.L. believed that he ended the conversation by stating that they needed to take a
break or stop the discussion.
Immediately after that conversation, C.L. talked to the assistant city engineer about
his exchanges with Olds and the assistant city engineer encouraged C.L. to talk to human
resources (HR), which C.L. did. C.L. also typed up a summary of his interaction with Olds
and sent it to a manager, who forwarded the summary to the director of HR, the head of
the engineering department, and the assistant city engineer the next day. In the summary,
C.L. noted that Olds “seem[ed] incredibly stressed and anxious” and that “[h]is level of
anger and voiced frustration” was concerning to C.L.
5
Termination of Olds’s Employment
On February 21, 2020—the same day that the email with C.L.’s summary was sent
to HR—the head of engineering communicated C.L.’s concerns to the city manager, C.V.,
and the city placed Olds on paid administrative leave while it conducted an investigation.
The city hired a third- party investigator to perform the investigation. The investigator
immediately began conducting interviews and receiving records.
In May 2020, the investigator submitted a report to the city with the results of the
investigation. The report stated that, on February 20, Olds was in C.L.’s office for over an
hour having a “raised voice discussion.” The report summarized interviews with two other
city employees who heard Olds being loud and sounding angry in C.L.’s office. The report
also summarized previous concerns with Olds’s behavior from 2015 through the 2020
incident. Among other things, it referenced a documented oral reprimand that Olds
received in 2015 for “threatening and offensive behavior” toward a contractor’s employee,
a 2018 performance review indicating that Olds needed improvement in exercising
judgment because he could become “confrontational and argumentative” with parties
concerning projects, a 2019 performance review stating that Olds had shown “anger” to
coworkers in emails and texts, and a 2019 referral of Olds to employee assistance for
trainings due to his behavior. The report ultimately determined that “[t]he record
establishes that Olds’s continuing angry and volatile behavior adversely impacts the work
environment.”
6
Based on the report, the head of engineering’s summary of C.L.’s report, and HR’s
recommendation, C.V. decided to terminate Olds’s employment. C.V. was the sole
decision-maker.
On May 15, 2020, C.V. sent Olds a notice of intent to discharge him based on the
February 20 incident and the findings in the third-party investigator’s report. The 13-page
notice letter found that, on February 20, 2020, Olds had “engaged in two angry and raised
voice rants” toward C.L.—the first at Olds’s cubicle when C.L. asked how Olds was doing,
and the second when Olds spent over an hour in C.L.’s office and spoke angrily and in a
raised voice. The notice letter found that Olds’s conduct violated a city policy requiring a
respectful workplace. The notice letter also reviewed past behavioral concerns involving
Olds. It found that Olds’s conduct had resulted in or was reasonably expected to result in
adverse impacts on other employees, on the reputation of the city and the engineering
department, and on the work of the city’s engineering operations. The notice letter provided
Olds the opportunity to respond. Over the next two weeks, C.V. sent Olds two supplements
to the notice to discharge, which reiterated that Olds had an opportunity to respond if he
desired.
On June 1, 2020, Olds sent an email to his union representative, which was
forwarded to C.V. and considered by the city as Olds’s response to the notice letter. In the
email, Olds asserted that he had previously reported incidents of mistreatment to HR and
asked HR for help but that the city had “done absolutely nothing to protect [him] from
abuse and [he would] not subject [himself] to any face to face contact by any means.” Olds
stated: “If the City didn’t hear me before there’s no reason they need to hear me now.”
7
On June 4, 2020, C.V. sent Olds a letter terminating Olds’s employment, effective
June 6, 2020.
Olds’s MWA Claim
In February 2022 , Olds filed a summons and complai nt with the district court,
alleging that the city violated the MWA when it terminated his employment for reporting
a violation, suspected violation, or planned violation of regulations, statutes, or common
law.
During discovery, Olds moved for spoliation sanctions, alleging that the city failed
to preserve evidence despite receiving a preservation letter from Olds in June 2020. The
district court granted Olds’s motion, determining that the city had a duty to preserve
evidence related to this litigation when it received the preservation letter, that the city
breached its duty “by erasing [Olds’s] work computers, discarding work materials from
[Olds’s] office and not preserving work diaries,” and that Olds showed that he would be
prejudiced by the loss of such evidence. Although the district court noted that it believed
that the city acted negligently and did not have “a purposeful intention to delete evidence,”
it still determined that Olds would “be afforded an adverse jury instruction regarding the
destruction of evidence” explaining that the jury “may infer that the evidence, if produced,
would have been favorable to [Olds] and unfavorable to the City.” The district court noted
that the final instruction would be crafted when the case was being prepared for trial.
The city thereafter moved for summary judgment, asserting that Olds could not
show that “he engaged in protected activity or that any protected activity caused his
termination” and that, “[e]ven assuming [Olds] [could] establish a prima facie case, he
8
[could not] show the City’s reason for termination—the compelling reason of addressing
workplace violence concerns following his angry and threatening tirade—is a pretext for
retaliation.” Olds opposed summary judgment, arguing that the McDonnell Douglas
framework for evaluating evidence in discrimination claims should not apply to his claim
under the MWA and that genuine disputes of fact precluded summary judgment.
Following a hearing, the district court filed its order and judgment granting the city’s
motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the district court determined that Olds had not
produced direct evidence of retaliation and, as a result, the McDonnell Douglas framework
applied. Applying McDonnell Douglas, the district court first concluded that Olds had met
his burden to establish a prima facie case under the MWA. It then concluded that the city
had offered a legitimate reason for Olds’s termination—namely, that his termination “was
the result of [Olds’s] angry tirade with [C.L.] on February 20, 2020”—and that Olds
therefore needed to present evidence that could show that the city’s proffered reason was
pretextual. The district court lastly concluded that “Olds ha[d] not provided any evidence
that his reporting of the suspected contract and/or specification violations in any way
motivated the City’s decision to terminate him or that the City’s stated reasons were
pretextual.” The district court therefore granted summary judgment for the city.
Olds appeals.
DECISION
Olds makes two principal arguments. First, he argues that the district court erred by
applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to his MWA claim. Second, he argues that,
even if McDonnell Douglas applies, the district court erred by granting the city’s motion
9
for summary judgment because the record presents genuine issues of material fact . We
address each argument in turn.
I. The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to Olds’s MWA claim.
The McDonnell Douglas framework is often employed by Minnesota courts when
employment-discrimination claims are challenged on motions for summary judgment.
Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 372 (Minn. 2022). It is a three-step, burden-
shifting framework that was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the Title VII
employment-discrimination case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green to be used when
there is no direct evidence of the alleged violation of law. Id. at 372-73; see McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-04.
At the first step under McDonnell Douglas, an employee challenging an employer’s
action must establish a prima facie case of the alleged violation of law, the elements of
which will vary depending on the case. Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 373. If the employee does
so, there is a rebuttable presumption that the employer discriminated. Id. At the second
step, if the employee has met their initial burden, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged action. Id. “If
the employer does so, the presumption of discrimination no longer applies.” Id. At the third
step, if the employer has met its burden of production, the burden shifts back to the
employee to show that the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual because the
employer’s proffered reason is untrue or the challenged action was motivated by an
unlawful reason. Id. “The employee retains the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Id.
10
Olds makes three arguments why McDonnell Douglas does not apply to his claim.
First, he contends that it is error to apply McDonnell Douglas to claims under the MWA.
Second, he contends that applying McDonnell Douglas to MWA claims violates the
Minnesota Constitution. Last, he contends that, even if McDonnell Douglas does apply to
MWA claims and such application is constitutional, McDonnell Douglas was improperly
applied in this case because he presented direct evidence to support his MWA claim.
A. Caselaw supports application of McDonnell Douglas to MWA claims.
The MWA prohibits employers from discharging an employee because the
employee “in good faith, report[ed] a violation, suspected violation, or planned violation
of any federal or state law or common law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer
or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.” Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1.
Olds argues that it is error to apply McDonnell Douglas to an MWA claim and that, instead,
to survive summary judgment an employee need only submit sufficient evidence to
establish the elements of an MWA violation as outlined in the model jury instructions. See
4 Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG 55.65 (2021). He asserts that whether McDonnell Douglas
applies to an MWA claim is an “open question,” which we should answer in the negative.4
He cites for support the concurring opinion in the supreme court’s Hanson case. 972
N.W.2d at 378-81 (Chutich, J., concurring).
In Hanson, the employee likewise argued that McDonnell Douglas should not be
applied to claims under the MWA. Id. at 377. The concurrence in Hanson stated that,

4 Olds’s argument is supported by an amicus brief jointly filed by the National Employment
Lawyers Association-Minnesota Chapter and the Minnesota Association for Justice.
11
although the supreme court had applied McDonnell Douglas to whistleblower claims in
previous decisions, it had never been asked to address whether that practice is correct and
urged the court to conclude that McDonnell Douglas does not apply to MWA claims. Id.
at 378-80 (Chutich, J., concurring). The Hanson court acknowledged that “there is debate
about the continuing viability of the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Id. at 377. But it
also stated that the supreme court has “recognized McDonnell Douglas as the appropriate
framework to use in whistleblower cases since the MWA was enacted,” id. at 372 n.16,
and it expressly declined to reach the issue whether the court “should abandon the
McDonnell Douglas framework in whistleblower cases,” id. at 378. We, too, have applied
McDonnell Douglas to MWA claims. E.g., Moore v. City of New Brighton, 932 N.W.2d
317, 323-24 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2019). We therefore conclude
that McDonnell Douglas applies to MWA claims.
B. Applying McDonnell Douglas to MWA claims is not unconstitutional.
Next, Olds argues that applying McDonnell Douglas to an MWA claim violates the
right to a jury trial under the Minnesota Constitution because it (1) transfers the jury’s fact-
finding role to the district court by imposing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff at
summary judgment and (2) requires the plaintiff to meet a higher burden of proof at
summary judgment than they would have to meet at trial.
Appellate courts review the interpretation and application of the Minnesota
Constitution de novo. Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 895 N.W.2d 623, 633-
34 (Minn. 2017). The Minnesota Constitution establishes a categorical right to a jury trial
for actions at law, stating that the “right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate[] and shall
12
extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy.” Minn. Const. art.
I, § 4; Leiendecker, 895 N.W.2d at 634. A law violates this right “if it renders the jury-trial
right so burdened with conditions that it is not a jury trial” as guaranteed by the constitution.
Leiendecker, 895 N.W.2d at 634 (quotation omitted).
In arguing that the application of McDonnell Douglas violates his right to a jury
trial, Olds compares his case to Leiendecker . In that case, the supreme court determined
that an anti-SLAPP 5 statute violated the right to a jury trial under the Minnesota
Constitution because the statute instructed district courts to make pretrial factual findings,
usurping the role of the jury. Id. at 635. Specifically, the statute instructed that “the
responding party has the burden of proof, of going forward with the evidence, and of
persuasion on the motion” and that “the court shall grant the motion and dismiss the judicial
claim unless the court finds that the responding party has produced clear and convincing
evidence that the acts of the moving party are not immunized from liability under [another
statutory section].” Id. (quotation omitted). The supreme court found that this language
violated the responding party’s right to a jury trial because (1) it “transfer[red] the jury’s
fact-finding role to the district court” and (2) it “require[d] the responding party to meet a
higher burden of proof before trial (clear and convincing evidence) than it would have to
meet at trial (preponderance of the evidence).” Id. at 636.
Olds argues that the McDonnell Douglas framework unconstitutionally burdens his
right to a jury trial because it requires the district court to act as the fact-finder. We disagree.

5 “SLAPP” stands for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.” Id. at 628.
13
Unlike the anti-SLAPP statute at issue in Leiendecker, applying McDonnell Douglas to
summary-judgment challenges to an MWA claim does not require district courts to make
factual findings. At summary judgment, courts do not find facts; they instead determine
whether genuine disputes of fact exist. Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d
623, 628 (Minn. 2017). We have specifically cautioned that, when courts analyze pretext
under McDonnell Douglas, “fact issues requiring credibility determinations” should not be
resolved on summary judgment and should go before the fact-finder. See Moore, 932
N.W.2d at 329.
Olds also argues that the pretext analysis under McDonnell Douglas creates a higher
burden for a plaintiff asserting an MWA claim. Again, we disagree. The pretext analysis
goes directly to determining whether the evidence presented could satisfy the element of
an MWA violation that the adverse action was because of the employee’s report. See Minn.
Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981) (explaining that, when applying McDonnell Douglas to employment-discrimination
claim, employee’s burden to show pretext “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading
the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination”).
Accordingly, we conclude that the McDonnell Douglas framework does not require
a higher burden at summary judgment than that placed on a plaintiff asserting an MWA
claim before a fact-finder and thus does not violate the Minnesota Constitution.
14
C. Application of McDonnell Douglas is appropriate because Olds did not
provide direct evidence that the city acted with retaliatory animus.
Last, Olds contends that the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to his
MWA claim because he provided direct evidence of retaliation.
As explained by the supreme court in Hanson, “[w]ithout direct evidence of
retaliation,” analysis of whether summary judgment is appropriate on an MWA claim
“proceeds according to the three-step framework of McDonnell Douglas.” Hanson, 972
N.W.2d at 374; cf. Hansen v. Robert Half Int ’l, Inc., 813 N.W.2d 906, 918 (Minn. 2012)
(stating that discrimination claims “not involving direct evidence of discriminatory
animus” are subject to the McDonnell Douglas framework).6 The Hanson court explained,
“Direct evidence establishes that the employer’s discrimination was purposeful, intentional
or overt, such as where an employer announces he will not consider females for positions.”
972 N.W.2d at 373 (quotations and citations omitted).

6 Olds also argues that he, as the employee, has the choice to present his evidence for
evaluation under the “direct method” rather than under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. He cites this court’s decision in Friend v. Gopher Co., in which we
determined that the district court, acting as fact-finder, could evaluate a claim of disparate
treatment using either of two evidentiary frameworks: (1) the “direct method,” which
evaluates the strength of the affirmative evidence of discriminatory motive—whether or
not the evidence is direct or circumstantial; or (2) the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. 771 N.W.2d 33, 38-40 (Minn. App. 2009). We are not persuaded by Olds’s
argument that Friend dictates that it is his choice whether McDonnell Douglas applies here.
Friend involved review of a district court’s determination of employment discrimination
following a trial. Id. at 35. This case, on the other hand, is before us on review of the district
court’s summary-judgment dismissal of Olds’s MWA claim. The procedural posture is
identical to that in Hanson, and we therefore follow Hanson. See Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at
370-71.
15
With that explanation in mind, we turn to the record here. Olds presented no
evidence of retaliatory statements by C.V., the city manager who terminated his
employment, to show purposeful, intentional, or overt discrimination. Instead, he argues
that the following constituted direct evidence of retaliation: the city’s knowledge of his
reports, the adverse inference against the city for spoliating evidence, and the temporal
proximity between the reports and Olds’s discharge.
We disagree that this evidence constitutes direct evidence of retaliation. The fact
that the city knew of the reports is not direct evidence that the decision-maker terminated
Olds’s employment because of the reports— an inference would have to be drawn to find
that causation. Similarly, an adverse inference against the city for spoliating evidence does
not constitute direct evidence that the city intentionally retaliated against Olds, especially
because the district court determined that the city’s spoliation of evidence was the result of
negligence “and not a purposeful intention to delete evidence.” Finally, temporal proximity
is not direct evidence of discrimination. The supreme court in Hanson determined that
temporal proximity was present, yet it rejected Hanson’s argument that she had presented
direct evidence of retaliation. Id. at 373-74.
In sum, the evidence presented by Olds is not direct evidence of retaliation, and the
McDonnell Douglas framework therefore applies. See id. at 374.
II. Summary judgment was appropriate under the McDonnell Douglas
framework.
Olds argues that, even if McDonnell Douglas applies, summary judgment was
inappropriate because the district court concluded that he had established a prima facie case
16
under the MWA and because the evidence was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of
material fact about pretext.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. Appellate courts “review the grant of summary judgment de novo
to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court
erred in its application of the law.” Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 628 (quotation omitted).
In doing so, appellate courts “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
against whom summary judgment was granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc., 644 N.W.2d at 76-77.
To create a genuine issue of material fact, a nonmoving party must submit evidence that is
“sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566
N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). “[G]eneral assertions . . . are not sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact.” Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848
(Minn. 1995). “In order to successfully oppose summary judgment, appellant must extract
specific, admissible facts from the voluminous record and particularize them for the
[district court].” Kletschka v. Abbott- Northwestern Hosp., Inc., 417 N.W.2d 752, 754
(Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 1988).
Olds argues first that, because the district court determined that he had established
a prima facie case of retaliation under the MWA—a determination that the city does not
challenge on appeal—there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to a jury trial. We
disagree.
17
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case. Moore, 932 N.W.2d at 323. An employee presents
a prima facie case under the MWA if they submit evidence showing that (1) the y engaged
in statutorily protected conduct, (2) they suffered adverse action by their employer, and
(3) a causal connection exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Id.
But the fact that Olds established a prima facie case of retaliation under the first step of
McDonnell Douglas was not enough for his claim to survive summary judgment because,
at the second step, the city offered a legitimate reason for his termination—specifically,
that Olds was discharged based on his angry behavior toward C.L. on February 20, 2020.
Therefore, to survive summary judgment, Olds needed to meet his burden at the third step
to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact that the city’s reason was
pretextual and his termination was motivated by retaliatory animus. See Hanson, 972
N.W.2d at 373.
Here, as in Hanson, there was temporal proximity at least between Olds’s
February 2020 report and his discharge. In Hanson, the supreme court explained that “a
causal connection based on temporal proximity, while enough to satisfy [a] prima facie
case, is not sufficient to satisfy [the employee’s] burden to provide evidence that [the
employer’s] stated reasons are pretextual or that [the employee’s] reporting motivated the
termination decision.” Id. at 376. To argue that he met his burden, Olds asserts that he
presented the following “evidence of causation that went beyond temporal proximity.”
First, he asserts that, in the fall of 2019, one of his managers yelled at Olds that he
(the manager) “hate[d] his f-cking job ” because of Olds. But Olds did not report this
18
asserted conduct by his manager until February 14, 2020, and, by the time the city received
Olds’s report about that manager’s conduct, the city had already opened its investigation
into Olds’s conduct toward C.L. Because the investigation into the February 20, 2020,
incident was already initiated by the time the city learned about the 2019 incident, the 2019
incident does not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether C.V. acted with retaliatory
animus in discharging him following the 2020 investigation.
Second, Olds asserts that the same manager who yelled at him in 2019 planned to
have Olds fired because the manager “paper[ed] [his] file” by keeping notes on his
interactions with Olds and because the manager spoke to other employees to find out what
C.L. and Olds had discussed on February 20, 2020. But Olds has presented no evidence
that any of this alleged conduct by that manager affected HR’s investigation into the
February 20 incident or influenced C.V.’s decision to terminate Olds’s employment
following the investigation.
Third, Olds asserts that the head of the engineering department said that Olds
“should be concerned about meeting with him.” It appears that Olds is referring to a
statement that was made in October 2018 after Olds sent an email to individuals in the
engineering department expressing frustration that individuals were not replying to his
emails. The other individuals on the email, including the head of the engineering
department, started a separate email chain, in which they expressed how they believed that
Olds’s email was an “unprofessional communication.” The head of engineering then
emailed HR, stating that he was willing to meet with Olds about the email but wanted HR’s
input. The director of HR recommended that only two individuals meet with Olds, and not
19
all the individuals on the original email, because having so many people in the room might
make Olds “feel defensive.” The head of engineering then replied to HR, “He probably
should, but OK.” Considering that the department head’s statement was not related to any
report made by Olds and that Olds does not connect that 2018 statement to C.V.’s decision
to discharge him in 2020, it cannot demonstrate retaliatory animus for that decision.
Fourth, Olds asserts that HR did not treat him and the manager who yelled at him
similarly—namely, HR did not investigate the manager after Olds reported that the
manager had retaliated against him but instead sent Olds, and not the manager, to an anger-
management program. But, as explained above, Olds did not immediately provide HR with
a report of what the manager had said. And, although the manager was not sent to any
trainings, Olds was sent to training for conduct that preceded the February 2020 report that
he alleges led to his discharge. This evidence is not probative of a retaliatory animus by
C.V. in discharging Olds in 2020.
Fifth, Olds contends that his reports highlighted other employees’ wrongdoing and
that the city had a history of retaliating against him each time he made a report. But Olds’s
generalized assertion of a history of retaliation (during which he was not terminated) is
insufficient to show that C.V. was motivated by retaliatory animus when she terminated
his employment following the February 20, 2020 incident. See Kletschka, 417 N.W.2d at
754 (explaining that, to avoid summary judgment when employer has offered legitimate
reason for its action, employee must extract specific facts from record showing pretext).
Sixth, Olds argues that there are credibility issues in the record sufficient to create
a dispute about retaliatory animus. Olds claims that the city’s concern that Olds might
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engage in “workplace violence” was contradicted by the fact that the city did not call law
enforcement or immediately remove him from the office on February 20, 2020. But, even
if a jury could reasonably perceive such a contradiction under the circumstances of this
case, the contradiction would not be sufficient to demonstrate that the reason for C.V.’s
termination decision following investigation of the incident was pretextual. Olds also
asserts that C.V. contradicted her statement that she had read the entire investigator’s report
when, during her deposition, she could not recall previously reading Olds’s February 14
email that was included in the report. Even if C.V.’s statement during her deposition that
she did not recall reading an email that was included as part of the report could be
reasonably considered to contradict her statement that she read the report, it could not
support a determination that her termination decision was motivated by retaliatory animus.
Olds also points to alleged inconsistent statements regarding whether C.V. instructed the
HR director to preserve documents, but Olds does not explain how the inconsistency
creates a genuine dispute of fact as to pretext.
Seventh, Olds asserts that the city’s failure to keep his belongings safe after he was
discharged demonstrates retaliatory animus. But Olds presents no evidence to counter the
record evidence showing that, while unfortunate, the loss of personal items was the result
of miscommunication in which a third-party cleaning company mistook the box containing
Olds’s personal items as trash. Olds’s mere assertion does not create a genuine dispute of
fact as to whether the city intentionally tried to destroy Olds’s items because of his reports.
Finally, Olds cites the adverse inference that the district court, in its spoliation order,
intended to instruct the jury that it could draw. Even assuming that an adverse inference
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applies at the summary -judgment stage, it is not sufficient to create a genuine dispute of
fact regarding pretext. In its spoliation order, the district court found that the city acted
negligently, not intentionally, when it failed to preserve certain documents. Accordingly,
an asserted inference based on the spoliation order does not provide evidence that C.V. had
a retaliatory animus against Olds.
In sum, Olds has not produced evidence that C.V., as the sole decision-maker for
the city, had a retaliatory animus toward Olds. Because Olds has not provided evidence
that could establish tha t the city’s reason for discharging him was pretextual and that the
decision was in fact motivated by retaliatory animus resulting from Olds’s reports of
alleged violations, there is no genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment
and the district court properly dismissed Olds’s MWA claim.
Affirmed.