State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-2018

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Juan Jose Sanchez Andrade,
Appellant.

Filed January 12, 2026
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-12654

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Worke, Judge; and Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his first-degree criminal -sexual-conduct conviction, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony and denying him
2
an opportunity for surrebuttal. Appellant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction, the prosecutor committed misconduct, and the district court erred
in sentencing. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2021, J.B. notified law enforcement that, when he was around six years
old, his then 15-year-old cousin, appellant Juan Jose Sanchez Andrade, sexually assaulted
him multiple times within a period of six months. Respondent State of Minnesota charged
Andrade with first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
At trial, J.B. testified that he started having flashbacks of the sexual assaults after
he started working with children. These flashbacks would sometimes cause panic attacks.
J.B. testified about his recollection of the sexual assaults.
Over objection, a CornerHouse forensic interviewer testified as an expert in
interviewing sexually abused children. The interviewer explained script and episodic
memories:
A script memory would be driving home from work every
single day and getting to your driveway and not remembering
how you got there. Your brain allowed you to perform that
action, but you do it with such regularity that it doesn’t
necessarily retain the data of every single trip home you make.

. . . .

An episodic memory refers to a single incident,
something that has context . . . . So, on that way home, if you
hit a deer, the chances are pretty high that you’re going to
remember that drive home that day.

3
The interviewer testified about “narrative practice,” a technique employed at the
beginning of an interview in which the interviewer asks the child to recall a “neutral
event”—such as going to a park—to assess how well the child can “organically pull
forward” specific and detailed information from their script memory. This assessment
helps the interviewer structure subsequent questions to isolate details of the multiple
incidents of abuse. The interviewer further testified that individuals who suppress
traumatic memories may recall only “pieces of . . . of that event,” and that it is common for
sexual-abuse victims to disclose different information to different people.
In closing arguments, Andrade asserted that the allegations were not believable
because no family member noticed any physical signs of sexual abuse or heard J.B. yell in
pain when he was being abused, and there was no evidence that J.B. “pulled away” from
Andrade when Andrade led J.B. to the bathroom where he assaulted him. The prosecutor
stated in rebuttal that Andrade’s assertion that there should have been noticeable injuries
and actions should be ignored as speculation leading to “fanciful or capricious doubt” and
“victim blaming.” The prosecutor asserted that, instead, the jury should rely on the
evidence. The district court overruled Andrade’s objection that the prosecutor’s statement
was inappropriate and belittling. The district court denied Andrade’s request for surrebuttal
to respond to the prosecutor’s statements.
The jury found Andrade guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district
court sentenced Andrade to 86 months in prison. This appeal followed.
4
DECISION
Expert Testimony
Andrade argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the
interviewer to testify about script and episodic memories because she was not qualified to
testify about such and the testimony was not helpful to the jury. Appellate courts review
admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802,
810 (Minn. 1999). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Garland,
942 N.W.2d 732, 742 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). District courts should be cautious
when admitting expert testimony, especially in criminal cases, because expert testimony
may unduly influence the jury. State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. 1997).
Expert Qualification
Andrade argues that the interviewer was not qualified to testify about script and
episodic memories. For expert testimony to be admissible at trial, the witness must be
“qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Minn. R.
Evid. 702.
Here, the district court determined that the interviewer was qualified to testify about
script and episodic memories “based on her formal education, work experience, review of
the research, [and] training that she has both given and received.” In reviewing the record,
nothing in the interviewer’s education, experience, or training
1 conflicts—logically,

1 The interviewer has associate’s and bachelor’s degrees in law enforcement and a master’s
degree in criminal justice, has conducted approximately 500 forensic interviews, and her
5
factually, or legally— with her qualification to testify. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that the interviewer was qualified to testify about script and
episodic memories.
Helpful to the Jury
Andrade argues that, even if the interviewer was qualified to testify about script and
episodic memories, the district court abused its discretion by allowing her to testify about
such because her testimony did not help the jury. Andrade claims that, rather than being
helpful, the interviewer’s testimony about script and episodic memories was confusing and
misled the jury regarding the reliability of J.B.’s memory.
For expert testimony to be admissible, it must “assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Minn. R. Evid. 702. “An expert witness may
not testify as to the credibility of a specific witness, [but they] may be able to testify
generally as to certain psychological or physiological conditions that may affect credibility,
if such testimony is beyond the knowledge and experience of an average jury.” State v.
Reese, 692 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 2005). In State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610
(Minn. 1984), the supreme court identified the importance of expert testimony in child
sexual-abuse cases:
The nature . . . of the sexual abuse of children places lay jurors
at a disadvantage. . . . [T]he common experience of the jury
may represent a less than adequate foundation for assessing the
credibility of a young child who complains of sexual abuse. . . .

job requires her to keep abreast of literature and research in the area of child abuse and
attend meetings to “discuss th[e] [peer-reviewed research], [and] determine whether . . .
[to] incorporate it into any of [the] trainings to make sure that [the field is] staying within
the limits of best practice.”
6
By explaining the emotional antecedents of the victim’s
conduct . . . an expert can assist the jury in evaluating the
credibility of the complainant.

The interviewer’s testimony falls squarely within the principle stated in Myers. She
stated that children subjected to repeated sexual abuse often recall the abuse through script
memory—that is, the typical sequence of events that occurred when being abused —and
the forensic interviewer will utilize techniques to isolate individual experiences of those
incidents. Contrary to Andrade’s assertion, the interviewer did not testify as to J.B.’s
credibility; instead, she provided context to J.B.’s disclosure. See Myers, 359 N.W.2d at
610 (“Background data providing a relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of the child’s
conduct and demeanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to its evaluation of [the
child’s] credibility is helpful and appropriate in cases of sexual abuse of children . . . .”).
And the interviewer testified that forensic interviewing does not determine whether the
interviewee is lying. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
interviewer’s expert testimony on script and episodic memories.
Surrebuttal
Andrade argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying him
surrebuttal during closing arguments. Appellate courts review limitations on closing
arguments for an abuse of discretion. State v. Morrow, 834 N.W.2d 715, 729 (Minn. 2013).
A district court may allow surrebuttal if it finds that “the prosecution has made a
misstatement of law or fact or an inflammatory or prejudicial statement in rebuttal.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 12(k). A p rosecutor “has a right to vigorously argue its case,”
with colorful arguments, including “that the evidence does not support particular
7
defenses”; however, they may not belittle the defendant, or their attorney, abstractly or by
suggesting that the defense raised was the only one that may be successful. State v.
Graham, 764 N.W.2d 340, 356 (Minn. 2009). Reviewing courts look at “the closing
argument as a whole, rather than to selected phrases and remarks.” Id. Whether a
prosecutor’s statements were belittling or inflammatory rests on whether the closing
argument was “couched in arguments about the evidence, including evidence about the
witnesses and forensics.” Id.; see also State v. Davis, 982 N.W.2d 716, 727 (Minn. 2022)
(concluding prosecutor’s statement that defendant’s “only hope” was for jury to ignore the
“facts” was proper within “context of an argument about the evidence”).
Andrade argues that he and his attorney were belittled, and the jury’s passions were
inflamed, when the prosecutor stated that Andrade’s arguments were “speculation” and
“victim blaming.” We disagree. The prosecutor’s statement that the jury should disregard
the speculations asserted by Andrade, within context, was addressing the evidence and
merits of his defense. See Davis, 982 N.W.2d at 727 (“Calling the defense’s possible
theory a ‘fantasy’ was a reference to the evidence.”). Similarly, the prosecutor’s statement
that “the suggestions that [J.B.] should have done something else, would have done
something else, . . . is victim blaming” was a response to the evidence and merits of the
defense asserted. See Graham, 764 N.W.2d at 356-57 (recognizing that prosecutor asking
for “justice” for victims was not to “inflame the jury’s passions and prejudices against the
defendant” but was “based on the evidence and did not pursue an improper purpose”).
Moreover, the district court found that these arguments were proper, “and this conclusion
8
is entitled to deference.” See Nunn v. State, 753 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. 2008). The
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying surrebuttal.
Pro se Supplemental Brief
In his pro se supplemental brief, Andrade argues that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction, the prosecutor committed misconduct, 2 and the district court
erred in sentencing. However, Andrade fails to provide legal support, argument, or
authority for these claims; thus, these claims are forfeited. See State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d
148, 165-66 (Minn. 2020).
Affirmed.

2 Andrade’s prosecutorial-misconduct argument also overlaps with his surrebuttal
argument. Because the prosecutor’s challenged statements were appropriate, this claim
fails.