State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-2024

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stephani Marie Boyum,
Appellant.

Filed February 2, 2026
Affirmed
Segal, Judge*

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-23-391

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dawn R. Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges her conviction for felony fifth-degree
controlled-substance crime. Appellant argues that the state’s evidence was insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she (1) knowingly possessed a controlled substance,
and (2) possessed 0.25 grams or more of a controlled substance, the amount required to
support a felony-level conviction. Appellant also asserts that misconduct by the prosecutor
deprived her of a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS1
In the early morning hours of March 26, 2023, a sergeant with the Sherburne County
Sheriff’s Office stopped appellant Stephani Marie Boyum on Highway 169 outside
Zimmerman, on suspicion that the windows of her car were illegally tinted. Boyum was
in the driver’s seat, with an adult passenger seated next to her. During the stop, the sergeant
noticed a cloth pouch hanging on the exterior of the car, attached to the rear driver-side
door. The pouch was attached to the exterior of the door by a magnet located in the strap
of the pouch. The sergeant opened the pouch and found two glass pipes, a metal pipe-
cleaning tool, and two pieces of a crystal substance that was later determined to contain
methamphetamine.
The sergeant testified that he first noticed Boyum’s car at a gas station near the
highway. The sergeant drove by the car, while it was at the station, at “[p]arking lot speeds,

1 The facts are summarized from the trial testimony and evidence.
3
very slow.” The sergeant agreed he had a “clear view of the driver’s side” and noticed the
dark window tint but did not see anything attached to the outside of the car at that time.
Surveillance video from the gas station captured the sergeant driving by Boyum’s car, but
the driver-side of Boyum’s car is not visible in the video.2
After driving by Boyum’s car at the gas station, the sergeant watched the car from
“right across the street” for approximately ten minutes. He then followed Boyum as she
left the gas station and headed north on Highway 169. He followed Boyum for about eight
miles before pulling her over on the highway. While following her, the sergeant drove
behind and in the same lane as Boyum “[w]ithin a couple car lengths . . . . [m]ost of the
time,” but also pulled alongside her car at least once “to verify the tint.” When he drove
alongside Boyum’s car, he saw “something kind of dangling from the driver’s area” of the
car, but “didn’t confirm or take too much look at it at that time,” believing it was “damage
to the vehicle.”
The sergeant testified that, because of his position relative to Boyum’s car and how
dark it was, he “just wouldn’t have seen” if something had been discarded out the car’s
window. The video from the sergeant’s dash camera, which began recording about 90
seconds before he pulled Boyum over, does not show any items being thrown from
Boyum’s car, and no other vehicles can be seen traveling north on Highway 169.3

2 The gas-station surveillance video was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
The video shows a view of Highway 169 in the background. During the six-and -a-half
minutes of the video, only eight vehicles can be seen driving north on the highway.

3 The dash-camera video was also admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
4
During the stop, the sergeant questioned Boyum about the pouch. Boyum insisted
she had never seen it before and denied tossing it out of her car. When the sergeant pat-
searched Boyum, he found a “torch-style lighter” in her pants pocket. The sergeant
testified that torch-style lighters are commonly used to provide a “more intense direct clean
flame” to glass methamphetamine pipes. During his search of the car, the sergeant found
a butane refill can. He testified that people who use “butane torch-style lighters for
controlled substances” typically “go through a lot of butane” and “need refills.” In
addition, the sergeant observed that the car was “messy” and testified that he did not “think
somebody could have sat in the back seat without removing items.”
The sergeant sent the crystal substance to a lab for drug-chemistry testing. The test
results showed that the crystal substance contained methamphetamine and weighed 0.479
grams, accurate to within 0.004 grams. The sergeant did not request, and the lab did not
perform, any tests to determine drug purity.
The state charged Boyum with felony-level fifth-degree controlled substance crime
under Minnesota Statutes section 152.025, subdivision 2(1) (2022).4 A jury found Boyum
guilty of the offense and the district court convicted Boyum but stayed imposition of
sentence and placed her on probation for up to five years. Boyum appeals.

4 The state also charged Boyum with possession of drug paraphernalia, a petty-
misdemeanor offense. But the district court dismissed the charge prior to trial after the
legislature decriminalized the offense. See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 15, § 17, at .1052.
(repealing Minn. Stat. § 152.092 (2022) which made it “unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally to use or to possess drug paraphernalia”).

5
DECISION
Boyum asserts three arguments on appeal. First, Boyum argues that the state failed
to prove that she possessed methamphetamine because there are alternate reasonable
hypotheses demonstrating that persons other than Boyum may have been in exclusive
possession of the pouch prior to the sergeant’s stop of her car. Second, Boyum argues that,
even if she knowingly possessed the methamphetamine, the state proved only that she
possessed 0.25 grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine—not that she
possessed a felony-level amount of methamphetamine— because the state presented no
evidence of the purity of the drug. Finally, Boyum argues that the state committed
prosecutorial misconduct during the closing argument and that she is therefore entitled to
a new trial. We address each argument in turn.
I. The evidence is sufficient to prove that Boyum knowingly possessed a
controlled substance.

Boyum argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that she knowingly
possessed a controlled substance because the circumstances proved are consistent with at
least three rational hypotheses other than guilt: (1) her passenger had exclusive possession
of the pouch that contained the controlled substance; (2) the pouch was thrown by someone
in a passing car; and (3) the pouch was “dusted up” off the roadbed. Because the jury had
to infer that the methamphetamine was in Boyum’s possession before the sergeant found
the pouch hanging on the outside of Boyum’s car door, 5 we must apply the standard of

5 When a defendant does not have actual physical possession of the item at the time of the
arrest, the state can prove possession through constructive possession “where the inference
6
review for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. See State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,
601-03 (Minn. 2017) (applying the circumstantial-evidence standard of review in a
constructive possession case).
Appellate courts review sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in two steps. “The
first step is to identify the circumstances proved. In identifying the circumstances proved,
we defer to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of
evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.”
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013) (quotations and citation
omitted). And appellate courts “consider only those circumstances that are consistent with
the verdict.” Id. at 599.
“The second step is to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
(quotations omitted). In doing so, appellate courts “review the circumstantial evidence not
as isolated facts, but as a whole” and “examine independently the reasonableness of all
inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Appellate courts “ give no deference to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable
inferences.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The following summarizes the circumstances proved:
• Boyum was in the driver’s seat when the sergeant pulled her
over and a passenger was seated in the front seat next to her.

• The rear seat was too cluttered for someone to sit in.

is strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed” the contraband.
State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975).
7
• When the sergeant stopped Boyum’s car, a pouch was attached
by a magnet to the exterior of the rear driver-side door, slightly
behind and below the driver’s window. The pouch was very
light.

• The pouch contained a crystal substance in two pieces, two
glass pipes, and a pipe -cleaning tool. The pipes and the two
pieces of the crystal substance were intact.

• The crystal substance found in the pouch contained
methamphetamine and weighed 0.479 grams (plus or minus
0.004 grams).

• The pouch was not attached to the exterior of Boyum’s car
when the sergeant observed her car at the gas station.

• In the roughly six-and-a-half minutes that Boyum was parked
at the gas station, eight cars passed by on north Highway 169,
the road Boyum was travelling on when she was pulled over.
The sergeant followed Boyum for about eight miles before
pulling her over. During the 90 seconds that the sergeant’s
dash camera recorded before Boyum was pulled over, there are
no other vehicles visible on north Highway 169.

• The sergeant found a torch-style lighter in Boyum’s pants
pocket, and a butane refill can in her car. Both are associated
with the use of glass pipes to smoke methamphetamine.

Here, the state argues that the circumstances “point unerringly towards Boyum’s
actual possession of the pouch” prior to the stop. The state notes in support of its argument
that the pouch was attached to the outside of her car in the position it would have landed if
dropped by Boyum from the driver’s window, and “only Boyum possessed other items that
[the sergeant] could tie to smoking methamphetamine.” We agree that the facts proved are
consistent with Boyum’s constructive possession of the drugs. And Boyum, herself,
acknowledges that the “state’s theory that Boyum threw the pouch from the vehicle in an
8
effort to abandon known contraband represents one inference from the circumstances
proved.” But she argues that there are at least three other rational hypotheses that can be
drawn from the circumstances proved.
First, Boyum argues that it is reasonable to infer that her passenger had exclusive
possession of the pouch and that he either “flung the item from the [front] passenger side
window in such a way that it landed on the rear driver’s-side door panel or that [he] reached
across the interior of the vehicle and tossed the item out of the rear driver’s-side window,
where it stuck to the door panel just below” the window. We are not persuaded.
If the pouch was thrown out the front passenger-side window, the pouch would have
to have traveled in an arc over the top of Boyum’s moving car, landing on the other side of
the car immediately behind and below the driver-side window. This hypothesis stretches
common sense and is not reasonable . Similarly, it is not reasonable to infer that the
passenger reached from the front seat, across the back seat, to toss the pouch out the
driver’s-side rear window. Such an act would seem to defeat the purpose of tossing the
pouch out the window—to dispose of the methamphetamine without being observed by the
sergeant in the squad car.
Boyum next suggests that the pouch may have been thrown by someone in a passing
car, because “[i]t is reasonable to infer that . . . a driver or occupant in another vehicle may
have noted a law enforcement presence and deemed it prudent to discard contraband, just
as the state argued Boyum might have done.” We reject this suggestion as pure speculation.
See State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 480 (Minn. 2010) (noting that, in challenging a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, a defendant may point “to evidence in the
9
record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt” but appellate courts “do not
set aside verdicts based on speculation” (quotation omitted)). In addition, the evidence in
the record reflects that there were few other cars on north Highway 169 at that time and
that the sergeant did not notice the pouch being thrown from another vehicle. The pouch
was also “very light,” making it less believable that it would have attached to Boyum’s car
after being tossed from another moving vehicle.
Finally, Boyum argues that “it is reasonable to believe that the pouch may
have . . . been dusted up onto” Boyum’s car from the roadbed. But this would require
numerous coincidences: (1) that the pouch was lying discarded along the highway in a
place where Boyum’s car would have run over it while being followed by the squad car;
(2) that Boyum drove her car over or near the pouch in such a way that the pouch jumped
up from the road and attached to the driver-side of the car right behind the driver’s door;
and (3) th at despite being dusted up from the roadbed, the glass pipes and
methamphetamine crystals were unbroken and intact. Boyum argues that, because the
“crystal substance was found ‘rolled up’ in a plastic bag and ‘tucked inside’ a ‘sleeve’ in a
‘soft fabric pouch,’ and the pipes were located inside the same pouch, further encased in
additional fabric sleeves,” it is not unreasonable that they would be undamaged. But even
if this was possible, the “dusted -up-from-the-roadbed” hypothesis requires too many
coincidences to amount to a rational hypothesis.
Because the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
the alternative hypotheses that the pouch was discarded by the passenger, thrown by
10
someone from another car, or dusted up from the roadbed onto Boyum’s car, the evidence
is sufficient to establish Boyum’s knowing possession of a controlled substance.
II. The evidence is sufficient to prove that the amount of the controlled substance
was 0.25 grams or more.

Boyum also asserts a statutory-interpretation challenge to the sufficiency of the
state’s proof that she possessed a felony-level amount of the methamphetamine. Boyum’s
argument focuses on the fact that a fifth-degree controlled substance crime involves
possession of “one or mixtures containing a controlled substance,”
Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subds. 2(1), but the word “mixture” is absent from the subdivision
of the statute that differentiates a felony offense from a gross misdemeanor. This latter
subdivision references only “the amount of the controlled substance possessed.”
Id., subd. (4)(a) (2022).
When “a sufficiency- of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of a statute,
[appellate courts] review the question of statutory interpretation de novo.”
State v. Loveless, 987 N.W.2d 224, 247 (Minn. 2023). “The object of all interpretation and
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Every
law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.”
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). Our first step in statutory interpretation is to determine
“whether the statute’s language is ambiguous.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682
11
(Minn. 2015). If the statutory language is unambiguous, appellate courts apply the statute’s
plain meaning. State v. Powers, 962 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 2021).
As relevant here, subdivision 2(a)(1) of section 152.025 defines fifth-degree
controlled substance crime as “possess[ing] one or more mixtures containing a controlled
substance classified in Schedule I, II, III, or IV.” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1). The
level of the offense — felony or gross misdemeanor—is set out in subdivision 4 of the
section. The offense is a gross misdemeanor if the defendant “has not been previously
convicted of a violation of [Minnesota Statutes, chapter 152],” and “the amount of the
controlled substance possessed . . . is less than 0.25 grams.” Id., subd. 4(a). Possession of
0.25 grams or more is a felony-level offense.6 Id., subd. 4(b) (2022).
Boyum argues that, while the offense as set out in subdivision 2(a)(1) of the statute
criminalizes possession of “mixture s containing a controlled substance,” the word
“mixture” is absent from subdivision 4(a). That subdivision reference s only “the amount
of the controlled substance possessed”— that it be 0.25 grams or more to constitute a
felony. She contends that the absence of the word “mixture” in subdivision 4 means that
the state had to prove that Boyum possessed 0.25 grams or more of pure methamphetamine
for her to be convicted of a felony. Because the state presented no evidence concerning
the purity of the methamphetamine, Boyum argues that the state failed to prove that she
possessed a felony-level amount of the drug. Instead, she maintains that all the state proved

6 It is undisputed that Boyum had no prior conviction for a violation of chapter 152.
12
is that she may have possessed a substance weighing 0.479 grams that contained an
unknown amount of methamphetamine.
The state argues that Boyum’s interpretation—that felony fifth- degree controlled
substance crime requires proof that the defendant possessed 0.25 grams or more of the
controlled substance in its pure form—is unreasonable. The state maintains that the phrase
“controlled substance” in subdivision 4 of the statute incorporates mixtures because
subdivision 4 merely sets the level of offense for the crime of possessing “mixtures
containing a controlled substance” and that the phrase “controlled substance” in
subdivision 4 thus necessarily includes “mixtures.”
We need not, however, resolve the broader question of whether subdivision 4 of
section 152.025 requires proof that the defendant possessed 0.25 grams or more of a pure
controlled substance, because methamphetamine is defined as a mixture in sections 152.01
and 152.02 of the statute. In reaching this conclusion, we look first to the definitions
section of chapter 152 that defines the phrase “controlled substance” as “a drug, substance,
or immediate precursor in Schedules I through V of section 152.02.” Minn. Stat. § 152.01,
subd. 4 (2022). Schedule II of section 152.02, in subdivision 3(d)(2), provides: “Unless
specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture,
or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant
effect on the central nervous system: . . . (2) methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts
of its isomers.” Minn. Stat. § 152.02 subd. 3(d)(2) (2022) (emphasis added). Thus, the
phrase “controlled substance” when referring to methamphetamine is, unambiguously,
defined to include mixtures that contain the drug.
13
Boyum asserted at oral argument that the word “substance” in the definition of
“controlled substance” narrows the meaning of controlled substance to the chemicals listed
in subdivision 3(d)(1)-(5) of section 152.02, thereby excluding the reference to mixtures at
the outset of the list . But the word “substance” in section 152.02 is not used just to refer
to the listed chemicals in the schedules but is used in a multitude of different ways.
For example, subdivision 1 of section 152.02, which notes that there are five
controlled-substance schedules in the section, states generally that the “schedules consist
of the substances listed in this section.” Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 1 (2022) (emphasis
added). S ubdivision 3 of section 152.02 —which lists Schedule II drugs, including
methamphetamine—states at the outset that “ Schedule II consists of the substances listed
in this subdivision.” Id., subd. 3(a) (2022). And, as quoted above, the subsection that
includes methamphetamine, then references “any material, compound, mixture, or
preparation” that contains any quantity of the listed “substances.” Id., subd. 3(d).
Methamphetamine is thus defined as a substance that is a mixture containing a
substance. We therefore reject Boyum’s narrow reading of the word “substance” in the
statute.
Because the state presented evidence that the crystal substance in the pouch
contained methamphetamine and weighed in excess of 0.25 grams, the evidence was
sufficient to convict Boyum of felony fifth-degree controlled substance crime.
III. Any prosecutorial misconduct did not rise to the level of reversible plain error.

Boyum next argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor
misstated the burden of proof and argued facts not in evidence. Boyum’s trial counsel did
14
not object to the asserted errors. Appellate courts review u nobjected-to prosecutorial
misconduct under a modified plain error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294,
299-300 (Minn. 2006). The defendant has the burden of proving that an error was made,
and that it was plain, by showing that the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard
of conduct. Id. at 302. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the burden then shifts to the
state to demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. An
error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of
the jury.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If these three prongs are satisfied, the court then
assesses whether the error should be addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of the
judicial proceedings.” Id.
In analyzing whether prosecutorial misconduct affected a defendant’s substantial
rights, appellate courts consider three factors: “(1) the strength of the evidence against [the
defendant]; (2) the pervasiveness of the erroneous conduct; and (3) whether [the defendant]
had an opportunity to rebut any improper remarks.” State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 805-
06 (Minn. 2016).
Appellate courts “view the prosecutor’s statements as a whole, rather than just
selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence
to determine whether reversible error has occurred.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895,
901 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Prosecutorial misconduct will result in a new trial
only when, viewed in light of the whole record, it “appears to be inexcusable and so serious
15
and prejudicial that [the] defendant’s right to a fair trial was denied.” State v. Wahlberg,
296 N.W.2d 408, 420 (Minn. 1980).
Alleged misstatement of the burden of proof
Boyum argues that the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof in the closing
argument by “repeatedly invoking and injecting into the state’s burden the principle of
Occam’s Razor —that is, that the ‘easiest’ or ‘simplest’ explanation is the best
explanation.” The state contends that the reference to Occam’s Razor merely described to
jurors “how to draw an inference from circumstantial evidence.” (Quotation omitted).
“In the context of a criminal trial, misstatements of the burden of proof are highly
improper.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 690 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted).
But “[p]rosecutors are allowed to argue that there is no merit to the specific defense raised
by the defendant.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 552 (Minn. 2010). And “a remark
by a prosecutor on the lack of evidence regarding the defense’s theory does not shift the
burden of proof.” State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Minn. 1993).
Here, the prosecutor introduced the concept of Occam’s Razor at the beginning of
trial in the state’s opening statement:
But again, when I was prepping this case, I couldn't help but
think of the often-quoted problem-solving principle known as
Occam’s Razor which is the idea that sometimes the easiest
explanation is the best explanation for why something
happened. In this case the easiest explanation is that when [the
sergeant] was following Stephani Boyum’s car, at some point
she rolled down the window, dropped that pouch that had the
magnet on it, and while it was falling down it attached to the
rear passenger door.

16
The prosecutor repeated this theme in closing arguments but did not return to Occam’s
Razor in rebuttal.
This court has addressed prosecutors’ use of Occam’s Razor in non-precedential
opinions, see, e.g., State v. Monyak, 14 N.W.3d 210, 215 (Minn. 2024) (following rule
136.01(c) and citing a nonprecedential decision as persuasive authority in the criminal
context).7 In State v. Tabaka, this court held that invoking Occam’s Razor was not plain
error because “the prosecutor employed a crude but accurate description of how to draw
an inference from circumstantial evidence.” No. A05-1899, 2007 WL 1120523 at *8
(Minn. App. Apr. 17, 2007), rev. denied (Minn. June 27, 2007). In State v. Tykwinski, this
court determined it was improper for the prosecutor to invoke Occam’s Razor “to illustrate
to the jury that, when presented with competing theories, the simplest, most logical
explanation is the best choice.” No. C3-99-1 608, 2000 WL 1051919 at *4 (Minn. App.
Aug. 1, 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Sep. 17, 2000). This court determined, however, that
any error was harmless because the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the district court
correctly articulated the state’s burden of proof. Id.
Because Occam’s Razor is typically presented as a guiding “principle” or “rule,”
albeit a philosophical one, the use of the phrase creates an unnecessary risk of confusing
the jury regarding the state’s burden of proof and should not be used. But we conclude that
the use of the phrase in this case is not a plain error and we are not persuaded that the
argument affected Boyum’s substantial rights. See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302.

7 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may be cited for their persuasive
value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd.1(c).
17
Here, immediately after referencing Occam’s Razor in closing argument, the
prosecutor advised the jury to use the “definition that the Judge just gave you about proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.” The prosecutor then went on to explain what constitutes a
reasonable doubt and stated: “So when I say the simplest explanation is the only doubt is
(sic) proof beyond a reasonable doubt is because there’s no other explanation that could
possibly create a reasonable doubt for how this magnetic pouch got to the side of the car.”
The prosecutor thereby reinforced the correct burden-of-proof standard in conjunction with
the use of the phrase. And the district court also instructed jurors three times— once at the
start of trial and twice before closing arguments—on the state’s burden to prove Boyum’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Arguing facts not in evidence
Boyum contends that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence in two instances:
(1) stating that the pouch containing methamphetamine was “perfectly” or “exactly” where
it would be if someone dropped it out their window or from the driver’s seat; and (2) stating
that the sergeant “told [jurors] he didn’t recall any other cars being nearby while he was
following [Boyum’s] vehicle.”
In closing argument, the “State may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence
and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.” Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at
804 (quotation omitted). A prosecutor, however, “may not speculate without a factual basis
18
or “intentionally . . . misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may
draw.” Id. at 804-05 (quotations and citations omitted).
As to the prosecutor’s statements that the magnetic pouch was found “exactly where
it would land” and “perfectly right where it would have landed if you had dropped it out
the window,” we construe those statements to be properly argued inferences based on the
evidence. See Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d at 419-20 (“Counsel have the right to present to the
jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to
present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.”).
Turning to the second statement, Boyum is correct that the prosecutor misstated the
evidence in saying that the sergeant testified that “he didn’t recall any other cars being
nearby.” The sergeant did not testify to this fact. The state acknowledges that this
misstatement constitutes an error but maintains that it was an innocent misstatement, and
that the prosecutor intended to reference the “squad video that showed that there were no
other vehicles in sight when [the sergeant] stopped Boyum’s car.”
We conclude that the misstatement does not rise to the level of reversible plain error.
Even if this was plain error, we are not persuaded that it affected Boyum’s substantial
rights. While the prosecutor erred in representing the sergeant’s testimony, there is support
in the record for the proposition that there were not a lot of other cars driving on the
highway at the time. In addition to the squad video that shows no other cars in the vicinity
immediately before the sergeant pulled Boyum over, the gas station surveillance video
shows that there were only eight cars heading north on highway 169 during the six-and- a-
half-minute clip played for the jury.
19
The state also presented strong evidence that the pouch was not on the side of
Boyum’s car when it was at the gas station, but that it was attached to the exterior of the
driver’s side of the car when the sergeant pulled her over eight miles later. And Boyum,
herself, acknowledges that one inference from the evidence is that she disposed of the
pouch by tossing it out of her car window and thus was in possession of the drugs.
Finally, it is significant that the misstatement was made during the state’s closing
argument— when Boyum had an opportunity to rebut the statement during her closing—
and was not mentioned again in the state’s rebuttal.
Thus, even if the misstatement was plain error, we would conclude that the state has
satisfied its burden of establishing that the misstatement did not affect Boyum’s substantial
rights.
Affirmed.