Todd A. Wiederich, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-2026

Todd A. Wiederich, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Michael S. Horn,
Appellant.

Filed September 15, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CV-23-1641

Matthew S. Van Bruggen, Curtis D. Ripley, Pemberton Law, P.L.L.P., Wadena, Minnesota
(for respondents)

Erik F. Hansen, Kiley L. Eichelberger, Burns & Hansen, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges a judgment establishing a boundary by practical location,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by (1) granting respondents’ motion to
reconsider based on a claim they did not advance at trial, and (2) admitting hearsay
2
evidence on which it relied to find that respondents proved a practical boundary by express
agreement. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Michael S. Horn and respondents Todd A. Wiederich and Tiffany A.
Wiederich (together, the Wiederichs) own adjacent agricultural land. All the property held
by both parties was once owned by Horn’s grandfather (grandfather). Grandfather
conveyed the western half of the property (the western parcel) to the Wiederichs by a timely
recorded warranty deed in 2011. Grandfather retained the eastern half of the property (the
eastern parcel) until 2014, when he conveyed a remainder interest in the parcel to Horn,
reserving a life estate for himself. Grandfather died in 2018, leaving Horn as the fee-simple
owner of the eastern parcel.
At issue here is a discrepancy between the recorded boundary between the two
parcels—the location of which is undisputed—and a long -standing fence line that has
historically functioned as the divide between the parcels . The fence line is east of the
recorded boundary line and runs north to south at a slight angle, creating a trapezoidal plot
of land comprising approximately 13.52 acres (the disputed land).1

1 The depicted land survey imagery is a trial exhibit that has been cropped for privacy.
3

In July 2023, the Wiederichs commenced this action, seeking to quiet title to the
disputed land and requesting that the district court declare the fence line as the legal
boundary between the properties, “whether by adverse possession, practical location, or
otherwise.” Horn asked the court to declare the recorded boundary the authoritative
property line. The case proceeded to a one-day court trial.
At trial, Todd Wiederich testified that grandfather approached him about purchasing
the western parcel in 2011. The two agreed on a price and that the Wiederichs were
purchasing the land “from the fence line to the west.” Todd further explained that this was
consistent with how grandfather had rented the land to farmers in the past and that,
following the sale, grandfather “helped [the Wiederichs] farm” the western parcel,

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including the disputed land. The registered land surveyor hired by the Wiederichs testified
that the fence was part of “a very obvious field division,” separating “tillable” farmland to
the west from “grassland” to the east.
Horn testified that, when grandfather owned and farmed all of the land, he did not
use physical structures to demarcate the two parcels. But Horn acknowledged that,
following grandfather’s retirement in the early 2000s and before the sale to the Wiederichs,
grandfather had often rented out the western p ortion of the property—from the fence line
westward—to a single farmer .
Around 2017, Horn became aware that the fence line may not be the recorded
boundary between the two parcels. He approached grandfather about his concerns that the
Wiederichs were farming the Horns’ land, but grandfather told him to “let it go.” Horn did
so, out of respect for grandfather’s wishes. It was not until December 2022 —
approximately five years after grandfather’s death—that Horn again acted, commissioning
a land surveyor to determine the legal boundary.
At the conclusion of the trial, the district court invited the parties to submit proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders for judgment. After receiving these
submissions, the district court filed an order denying the Wiederichs’ claims and declaring
the recorded boundary as the legal boundary between the two parcels. In an accompanying
memorandum of law, the court explained that the Wiederichs “argue[d] only” that they had
acquired the disputed land “either (1) by adverse possession, or else (2) under the doctrine
of practical boundar[y] by acquiescence.” The court determined the Wiederichs had not
proven that they possessed the disputed land for the 15 years required for both claims. The
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district court went on to note that “[t]he undisputed facts introduced at trial would have
supported a claim for practical boundar[y] by express agreement,” but concluded that the
Wiederichs had not pleaded or presented such a claim at trial.
The Wiederichs moved the district court to reconsider, asserting that they made a
claim of practical boundary by express agreement at trial and in their proposed findings.
Horn agreed, stating in his opposing memorandum that he “will not take issue with [the
Wiederichs’] argument that [they] did, in fact, seek to establish the boundary between [the
parties’] respective properties via the doctrine of boundary by practical location by express
agreement at the trial of this matter.” Following a hearing, the district court granted the
Wiederichs’ motion and declared that the fence line divides the eastern and western parcels.
While noting that it “maintain[ed] some degree of skepticism” about whether the
Wiederichs’ original filings had properly raised an express-agreement claim, the court
decided the claim on its merits because Horn did not claim prejudice or unfair surprise and
it was “fair and just” to do so.
Horn subsequently moved for amended findings or a new trial, arguing that the
district court should have denied the Wiederichs’ motion to reconsider because it
improperly raised a new claim. Alternatively, he urged the court to amend its findings
related to the existence of an express agreement because they are based on inadmissible
hearsay. The district court denied the motion, explaining that it had not considered a new
argument posttrial and that the challenged statement is a nonhearsay verbal act.
Horn appeals.

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DECISION
Horn contends that the district court abused its discretion by (1) permitting the
Wiederichs to argue a claim of practical boundary by express agreement for the first time
on reconsideration, and (2) permitting hearsay testimony from Todd regarding the
agreement. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not consider a new argument on reconsideration.

“Motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express permission of the court,
which will be granted only upon a showing of compelling circumstances.” Minn. Gen. R.
Prac. 115.11. A reconsideration motion is not an opportunity to present “facts or arguments
available when the prior motion was considered.” Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 115.11 1997 comm.
cmt.; see also State v. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d 178, 190-91 (Minn. 2021) (holding that a
reconsideration motion does not permit the introduction of new evidence and citing Minn.
Gen. R. Prac. 115.11 1997 comm. cmt.). Rather, it is an opportunity for the district court
to consider whether an earlier decision was “palpably wrong in some respect.” Minn. Gen.
R. Prac. 115.11 1997 comm. cmt. We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion to reconsider for an abuse of discretion. Goerke Family P’ ship v. Lac qui Parle-
Yellow Watershed Dist., 857 N.W.2d 50, 52-53 (Minn. App. 2014).
Horn argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the Wiederichs’
motion because it entertained a new theory of relief, exceeding the “permissible scope” of
a reconsideration motion. The district court rejected this argument, explaining that it
“granted [the Wiederichs’] post-trial motion because it reconsidered the fact of whether
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[they] had presented the claim previously”— determining that they had. Horn asserts this
is a “distinction without a difference.” We are not persuaded for two reasons.
First, the record convinces us that Horn waived this argument. Leiendecker v. Asian
Women United of Minn., 895 N.W.2d 623, 631 & n.3 (Minn. 2017) (stating that “[w]aiver
is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,” while forfeiture is the “failure to timely
assert a right” (quotation omitted)). As noted above, Horn’s written response to the
reconsideration motion states that he “will not take issue with [the Wiederichs’] argument
that [they] did, in fact, seek to establish the boundary between [the eastern and western
parcels] via the doctrine of boundary by practical location by express agreement at the trial
of this matter.” In the same memorandum, Horn expresses his belief that the Wiederichs
“arguably raised the issue of express agreement to a sufficient degree to invoke the
boundary by practical location through express agreement prong to at least a threshold
level.” Horn’s lawyer reiterated this position at the motion hearing, explaining: “[O]ur
argument in this case has been [the Wiederichs] arguably raised enough questions at trial
that the Court could have considered [practical boundary by express agreement].” On this
record, we conclude that Horn waived his argument that the district court improperly
considered a new argument on reconsideration.
Second, Horn’s argument fails on its merits. Because Minnesota is a notice-
pleading state, “absolute specificity” in pleading is not required. Halva v. Minn. State
Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). A pleading is
satisfactory if it provides “information sufficient to fairly notify the opposing party of the
claim against it.” Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, a party may plead their case
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through broad, general statements that may be conclusory in nature. Id. at 503. That is
what the Wiederichs did. The ir complaint broadly asserted that the fence line is “the
practical location of the boundary” between the eastern and western parcels and requested
relief establishing the fence line as the legal boundary “whether by adverse possession,
practical location, or otherwise.” At trial, they presented evidence of an express agreement
between Todd and grandfather that the existing fence line was the boundary between the
two parcels. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.02 (stating “[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings”); Roberge v. Cambridge Coop. Creamery Co., 67
N.W.2d 400, 404 (Minn. 1954) (explaining that a claim may be litigated by consent “where
the novelty of the issues sought to be raised is reasonably apparent and the intent to try
these issues is clearly indicated by a failure to object or otherwise”). Indeed, Horn’s timely
objection to Todd’s testimony about the purchase terms undermines his contention that the
Wiederichs did not present their express-agreement claim at trial. Based on this record, we
conclude that the Wiederichs sufficiently raised and presented their practical-boundary-by-
express-agreement claim prior to seeking reconsideration.
2

2 The district court cited Juntti v. Bedore, No. A09-2328, 2010 WL 3306932 (Minn. App.
Aug. 24, 2010), to support its determination that it was “fair and just” to consider the
practical-boundary-by-express-agreement argument on its merits. Horn argues that this
reliance is misplaced because Juntti did not “involve a claim for express agreement being
raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider.” Since we concluded above that the
district court did not consider a new argument for the first time on reconsideration, we do
not address Horn’s argument.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Todd’s testimony
regarding his express agreement with grandfather.

Horn next asserts that we should reverse because the district court relied on
inadmissible hearsay. To establish a practical boundary by express agreement, a party must
first prove there was an “express agreement between the landowners to set an exact, precise
line.” Slindee v. Fritch Invs., LLC, 760 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations
omitted). The disseiz or bears the burden to “clearly, positively, and unequivocally”
establish the boundary’s practical location. Id.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and
is generally inadmissible unless subject to a prescribed exception or exclusion. Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c), 802. The district court has broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary
matters, including the admission of hearsay, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of that
discretion. Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015). The appealing party
bears the burden to establish both evidentiary error and resulting prejudice. Kroning v.
State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Minn. 1997).
Over Horn’s hearsay objection, Todd testified:
Well, we run a cattle farm, and we needed more
farmland. And [grandfather] had approached me about selling
the west, from the fence west of the property that [grandfather]
owned. . . .

And we agreed on a price. [Grandfather] and I agreed
on a price. And we agreed that the fence was —to the west is
what we were purchasing.

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In his motion for amended findings, Horn reasserted his objection, characterizing Todd’s
statement as untrustworthy, inadmissible hearsay. The district court conclud ed that the
statement is admissible as a nonhearsay verbal act.3
Occasionally, an oral or written statement is significant in a lawsuit not because of
its truth or falsity, but because it carries legal implications. 11 Peter N. Thompson,
Minnesota Practice § 801.04 (5th ed. 2023). A statement offered for its legal significance
is considered a “verbal act” and is not governed by the hearsay rule. Id. Our supreme court
has applied the verbal act doctrine in the context of contract formation. Claggett v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co., 193 N.W. 957, 957 (Minn. 1923). Accordingly,
“[w]hen the making or existence of an oral contract becomes an issue in a law suit, any
witness who was present when it was made may testify as to what both parties said touching
the terms of the contract.” Lepak v. Lepak, 261 N.W. 484, 485 (Minn. 1935) (quotation
omitted).
On appeal, Horn does not dispute—and we agree—that Todd’s statement regarding
his agreement with grandfather to purchase the land west of the fence is admissible as a
verbal act. Still, he argues that the district court “[went] beyond” using the statement as
such and, instead, relied on it to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that Todd and
grandfather agreed that the fence line is the legal boundary between the two parcels. This
argument is unavailing. The challenged statement relates to one of the contract terms —

3 The district court also concluded that Todd’s testimony is admissible as a statement
against grandfather’s interest under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Because we conclude that
the statement constitutes a nonhearsay verbal act, we do not consider this alternative basis
for admission.
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what property the Wiederichs purchased from grandfather. But that is the exact purpose
for which verbal-act evidence may be admitted. See id. Nothing in the record suggests
that the district court relied on Todd’s statement in any way other than establishing the
terms of the oral contract. In short, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court
in admitting or considering the statement as a verbal act.
Finally, Horn asserts that the district court should not have considered the statement
because Todd had “ample motive to testify falsely.” We agree with the district court that
any such motive goes toward the weight of Todd’s testimony, not its admissibility. And
the Wiederichs offered ample corroborating evidence related to grandfather’s use of the
land.
In sum, the district court did not permit the Wiederichs to present a new claim in
their motion for reconsideration. And we see no abuse of discretion by the district court in
admitting Todd’s statement regarding the terms of the agreement. For these reasons, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Wiederichs’
motion and establishing the fence line as the boundary by practical location.
Affirmed.