State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-2037

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Corey Devon Young,
Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-22-3527

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kimberly Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Patrick Monnens, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A St. Louis County jury found Corey Devon Young guilty of second-degree
intentional murder based on undisputed evidence that he fired a handgun at another person
at close range, causing the person’s death. At trial, Young’s attorney urged the jury to find
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Young guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree unintentional felony murder.
On appeal, Young argues that the district court erred on the ground that the lesser-included-
offense jury instruction improperly directed the jury to consider the greater offense before
considering the lesser offense. We conclude that the jury instruction did not improperly
direct the jury in the manner described by Young. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from an incident involving Young, who was 17 years old at the
time, and X.A.S., who also was 17 years old. Young and X.A.S. met in middle school and
were close friends until they had a falling out in the tenth grade.
During the evening of July 2, 2022, X.A.S. and three other teenage boys went to a
home in the city of Duluth to confront Young. One of the boys later testified at trial that
X.A.S. wanted to fight Young so that the two could settle their differences and be friends
again. The confrontation was captured by two surveillance videocameras—one at the front
door of the home, which captured the incident clearly, and another in a city park some
distance away. The videorecordings were introduced into evidence at trial and played for
the jury.
After X.A.S. and the other boys arrived at the home, Young came outside and
walked toward the front yard. Both Young and X.A.S. stood on the front sidewalk, less
than ten feet apart, and faced each other. Young reached into a fanny-pack-style bag that
was strapped across his chest and pulled out a handgun. Young pointed the handgun at
X.A.S., who did not move and did not attempt to defend himself or flee. Young fired three
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shots in quick succession. X.A.S. fell to the ground after the second shot. X.A.S. was
taken to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead.
Young was certified for prosecution as an adult, and the state charged Young with
second-degree intentional murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2020),
and possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(1) (2020). The case was tried to a jury on four days in May and June 2024. The
state called seven witnesses, including the friends of X.A.S. who were present and
witnessed the incident. Young called two witnesses and, in addition, testified in his own
defense. Young testified that he intended only to scare X.A.S. and did not intend to hit
him with a bullet or to kill him.
At the instructions conference, Young objected to the district court’s proposed
instruction regarding the lesser-included offense of second-degree unintentional felony
murder. Young argued that the district court’s proposed instruction would improperly
direct the jury to consider the greater offense before the lesser offense. The district court
overruled Young’s objection and instructed the jury as follows:
The law provides that upon the prosecution of a person
for a crime, if the person is not guilty of that crime, the person
may be guilty of a lesser crime. Lesser crime in this case is
felony murder in the second degree.

The presumption of innocence and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt apply to this lesser crime. If
you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has
committed each element of the lesser crime, but you have a
reasonable doubt about any different element of the greater
crime, the defendant is guilty only of the lesser crime.

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In closing argument, Young’s attorney asked the jury to find Young guilty of the lesser-
included offense on the ground that Young did not intend to kill X.A.S.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on the charges of second-degree intentional murder
and possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. The jury did not return a verdict on
the lesser-included offense of second-degree unintentional felony murder. The district
court imposed concurrent sentences of 330 and 15 months of im prisonment. Young
appeals.
DECISION
Young argues that the district court erred in its jury instruction on the lesser-
included offense. Specifically, Young contends that the district court erred “by instructing
the jury that they should consider the lesser-included offense if they found Young not guilty
of the greater offense, which suggested the order the jury should consider the charges and
deprived Young of having the jury considering his presented defense.”
In general, a district court must instruct a jury in a way that “fairly and adequately
explain[s] the law of the case” and does not “materially misstate[] the applicable law.”
State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011). Appellate courts review jury
instructions “as a whole to determine whether the instructions accurately state the law in a
manner that can be understood by the jury.” State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn.
2014). A district court has “considerable latitude in selecting language for jury
instructions.” State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 147 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, we review a district court ’s jury instructions under an abuse- of-discretion
standard of review. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d at 361.
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A criminal defendant may be found guilty of “either the crime charged or an
included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(1) (2020). Accordingly, a
defendant “is entitled to appropriate instructions advising the jury of its power to return a
verdict of guilty of the lesser offense,” so long as “the evidence adduced at trial would
permit a finding of guilty of an included crime.” State v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d 588, 593
(Minn. 2005). If a district court gives a lesser-included-offense instruction,
“[c]onsideration of both the greater- and lesser-included crimes is important because it may
cause the jury to evaluate the evidence differently with regard to an essential element.”
State v. Prtine, 784 N.W.2d 303, 316 (Minn. 2010). Consequently, “it is error for a district
court to suggest the order in which the jury should consider the charges.” Id. A district
court also errs if it “instructs the jury to consider the lesser crimes only if it finds the
defendant not guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Davis, 864 N.W.2d 171, 179 (Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted).
These principles are illustrated in three supreme court opinions. In Prtine, the jury
asked the district court a question during deliberations: “If we agree on a higher charge, do
we need to rule on the lesser charges?” 784 N.W.2d at 316. The district court answered
by instructing the jury that “it should proceed ‘down the line’ until it arrived at a guilty
verdict and after arriving at a guilty verdict it was not required to consider the remaining
offenses.” Id. at 317. The supreme court concluded that the district court erred. Id. In
Davis, the district court instructed the jury that it “need not consider . . . the lesser offenses
that are now being submitted.” 864 N.W.2d at 179. The supreme court concluded that the
district court erred because “the jury easily could have interpreted instructions that it ‘need
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not consider’ lesser offenses to mean that it should consider the most serious charge first”
and “could have concluded . . . that if it found the defendant guilty of the most serious
charge, it need not continue its deliberations.” Id. In State v. Woodard, 942 N.W.2d 137
(Minn. 2020), the district court instructed the jury on the charged offense of first-degree
murder and the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. Id. at 141. The supreme
court concluded that the district court erred by instructing the jury that it should “only
consider murder in the second degree if there’s a not guilty finding on murder in the first
degree.” Id. at 144.
The district court’s instruction in this case is unlike the instructions in Prtine, Davis,
and Woodard. In this case, the district court did not specify the order in which the jury
should consider the greater and lesser offenses, as in Prtine. See 784 N.W.2d at 316-17.
In addition, the district court did not instruct the jury that it “need not consider” the lesser
offense or that it needed to consider the lesser offense “only” if it were to find Young not
guilty on the greater offense. See Woodard, 942 N.W.2d at 141, 144; Davis, 864 N.W.2d
at 179. The first paragraph of the challenged instruction (which is quoted above) is
consistent with the relevant statute and does not specify one offense that should be
considered before the other. See Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(1). T he second paragraph
avoids the pitfalls of Davis and Woodard by referring to the lesser offense before referring
to the greater offense and by avoiding mandatory or imperative language.
Furthermore, the district court also instructed the jury that “[t]he order in which
these instructions are given is of no significance” and that “[y]ou are free to consider the
instructions in any order that you wish.” And when the district court later explained the
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six verdict forms that were given to the jury (two for each submitted offense), the district
court stated, “You should draw no inference from the order in which the forms are given
to you.” These instructions effectively communicated that the jury should consider both
the greater and the lesser murder offenses, regardless of the order in which the two offenses
were presented in the instructions and the verdict forms.
Thus, the district court did not err in its jury instruction concerning the lesser-
included offense because the district court did not suggest the order in which the jury
should consider the greater and lesser offenses and did not instruct the jury to consider the
lesser offense only if it were to find the defendant not guilty of the greater offense.
Affirmed.