A240457 Precedential Disbarred Processed

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Stephen J. Baird, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0398840. ...

Minnesota Supreme Court · Filed March 26, 2025

Opinion text

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A24-0457

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Filed: March 26, 2025
Stephen J. Baird, a Minnesota Attorney, Office of Appellate Courts
Registration No. 0398840.

________________________

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Kristine Nelson Fuge, Senior Assistant Director, Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Stephen J. Baird, Englewood, Colorado, pro se.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. An attorney who is licensed to practice law and is practicing law in

Minnesota at the time the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility

learns that the attorney has been publicly disciplined or is subject to public disciplinary

charges in another jurisdiction is subject to reciprocal discipline under Rule 12(d), Rules

on Lawyers Professional Responsibility.

2. Reciprocal discipline of disbarment under Rule 12(d), Rules on Lawyers

Professional Responsibility, is appropriate where an attorney was disbarred three times and

suspended for more than six months by another jurisdiction for failing to act with

reasonable diligence and promptness, failing to reasonably communicate regarding clients’

1
cases and to respond to clients’ reasonable requests for information, failing to keep clients

reasonably informed about the status of a matter, providing misinformation about the

statuses of clients’ cases, failing to refund unused fees or return clients’ files and records

after the termination of representation, failing to take remedial action with respect to an

employee’s lack of reasonable diligence and communication, and failing to take reasonable

steps to protect clients’ interests by making timely transitions of their cases to subsequent

counsel.

Disbarred.

O P I N I O N

PER CURIAM.

This case concerns the appropriate discipline for respondent attorney Stephen J.

Baird. Baird has been disbarred three times and suspended for more than six months by

the North Dakota Supreme Court. 1 Baird has also been disbarred by the Department of

Homeland Security, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the federal immigration courts.

1
North Dakota Rule for Lawyer Discipline 1.1(C) allows the court to subsequently
disbar an already-disbarred or -suspended attorney for misconduct that occurs before or
after the original disciplinary action. N.D.R. Law. Discipline 1.1(C) (“Any lawyer
admitted to practice law in this state (including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect
to acts committed prior to suspension, disbarment . . . , or with respect to acts subsequent
thereto which amount to the practice of law or which constitute misconduct subject to
sanctions) . . . is subject to the disability and disciplinary jurisdiction of the court under
these rules.”). When such a situation arises, the North Dakota Supreme Court has extended
the length of time that a disbarred or suspended attorney must wait before filing a petition
for reinstatement. See In re Kraemer, 411 N.W.2d 71, 75 (N.D. 1987) (holding that an
extension of the period of ineligibility for reinstatement is an appropriate disciplinary
sanction for an already-disbarred attorney); In re Teevens, 499 N.W.2d 887, 888
(N.D. 1993) (extending the period of time an already-disbarred attorney was ineligible for
reinstatement).

2
The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (the Director) brought

a petition for disciplinary action against Baird under Rule 12(d) of the Rules on Lawyers

Professional Responsibility (RLPR), seeking reciprocal discipline in the form of

disbarment. Because we find that disbarment is appropriate reciprocal discipline for

Baird’s misconduct, we grant the Director’s petition and disbar Baird.

FACTS

Pursuant to Minnesota Rule on Lawyers Professional Responsibility 12(d),

“[u]nless the Court determines otherwise, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a

lawyer had committed certain misconduct shall establish conclusively the misconduct for

purposes of disciplinary proceedings in Minnesota.” The following facts have been

established in Baird’s other disciplinary proceedings before the Supreme Court of North

Dakota.

First Disbarment

The facts of Baird’s disbarment can be found in In re Baird (Baird I), 977 N.W.2d

702 (N.D. 2022). In February 2020, M.M. retained Baird for help obtaining citizenship

and immigration status. In March 2020, Baird informed M.M. that he was closing his

office due to the COVID-19 pandemic and would not be taking phone calls, but that he

would respond to texts or emails. Baird subsequently failed to communicate with M.M.

for six months, despite M.M.’s repeated calls, texts, emails, and written messages slipped

under Baird’s office door. In August 2020, M.M. demanded a refund of his retainer fee and

filed a disciplinary complaint against Baird with the State of North Dakota, which spurred

Baird to resume communication with M.M. Baird then filed M.M.’s application for

3
citizenship with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), but

failed to tell M.M. about the filing. M.M. separately reached out to USCIS and learned

that his application was accepted. Baird subsequently withdrew his representation of M.M.

but did not refund M.M.’s fees or return his files.

In the spring of 2020, C.G. retained Baird to help with an application for asylum for

himself, his wife, and his children. C.G. provided Baird with his family’s original

passports, as well as a retainer fee. In September 2020, Baird told C.G. that he had filed

the asylum application with USCIS. Just as with M.M., Baird failed to communicate with

C.G. for several months, despite C.G.’s repeated attempts at outreach, including written

notes slipped under Baird’s office door. Baird told C.G. in November and December 2020

that he was still awaiting action from USCIS and had no further information. In

January 2021, Baird informed C.G. that he had no status updates on his asylum application

and could not provide a receipt that USCIS had received it. C.G. reached out to USCIS

himself and learned that no application had been received under C.G.’s passport number.

C.G.’s deadline to apply for asylum was fast approaching in March 2021, so he asked Baird

to refile the application, which C.G. mailed himself. The North Dakota Supreme Court

concluded from these facts that “Baird did not complete and submit the asylum application

in September 2020 as he told [C.G.].” Baird I, 977 N.W.2d at 706.

In August 2020, D.O. retained Baird for an adjustment of status with USCIS to

obtain a green card, get a work authorization, and get a travel permit. Baird accepted a

retainer fee and $1,760 for the USCIS filing fee. Baird told D.O. in September 2020 that

he had submitted D.O.’s application to USCIS, and then proceeded to fail to communicate

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with D.O. for the next six months despite D.O.’s numerous attempts at outreach. Baird

never provided D.O. with a mailing receipt or receipt from USCIS confirming that the

application was received. In February 2021, D.O. obtained a refund of the filing fee that

he had paid to Baird and submitted the application to USCIS himself. D.O. never received

a draft of any documents or a copy of his file. As with C.G., the North Dakota Supreme

Court concluded that “Baird did not complete or file the application for [D.O.’s] adjustment

of status with the USCIS as he told [D.O.].” Baird I, 977 N.W.2d at 707.

On April 27, 2021, following M.M.’s complaint to the state, North Dakota state

disciplinary counsel filed formal charges of misconduct against Baird. Baird did not

respond to the petition. On August 2, 2021, a hearing panel issued default findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and recommendations for discipline. The North Dakota Supreme Court

remanded to the panel for additional findings of fact, and on March 9, 2022, the panel

conducted a hearing about Baird’s conduct that consolidated complaints from M.M., C.G.,

and D.O. On May 11, 2022, the panel issued a report with amended findings of fact and

recommended disbarment and a refund of M.M.’s, C.G.’s, and D.O.’s retainer fees. The

panel’s report was properly served on Baird and was subsequently considered by the North

Dakota Supreme Court. Baird provided no objections to the report.

On July 21, 2022, Baird was disbarred by the North Dakota Supreme Court and

prohibited from seeking reinstatement for at least five years. Baird I, 977 N.W.2d at 711.

The court determined that Baird violated Rule 1.3, North Dakota Rules of Professional

Conduct (N.D.R. Prof. Conduct) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and

promptness in representing a client.”); Rule 1.4(a), N.D.R. Prof. Conduct (“A lawyer

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shall . . . make reasonable efforts to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of

a matter; [and] promptly comply with the client’s reasonable requests for information[.]”);

and Rule 1.16(e), N.D.R. Prof. Conduct (“Upon termination of representation, a lawyer

shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as

giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,

surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance

payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred.”). 2 See Baird I,

977 N.W.2d at 707–09.

The court adopted the hearing panel’s findings of four aggravating factors and no

mitigating factors. See id. at 709–10. The court considered it an aggravating factor that

Baird had previously received a public admonition in February 2021 for a violation of

Rule 1.4, N.D.R. Prof. Conduct, for failing to adequately communicate with clients in

another case. Id. at 710. The court also found that Baird violated Standard 9.22(c), North

Dakota Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (N.D. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction)

(“Aggravating factors include . . . a pattern of misconduct[.]”); Standard 9.22(d), N.D.

Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction (“multiple offenses”); and Standard 9.22(h), N.D. Stds.

Imposing Law. Sanction (“vulnerability of victim”). 3 Baird I, 977 N.W.2d at 710. Baird

2
These rules most closely mirror Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4,
7.1, 8.4(c), 8.4(d), 1.16(d), and 1.16(e).
3
The court also found that “Baird’s violations of N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 1.4 and
1.16(e) are both aggravating factors under N.D. Stds. Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9.22(c)
[(‘a pattern of misconduct’)].” Baird I, 977 N.W.2d at 710.

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never sought reinstatement in North Dakota and did not report the disbarment to the

Director.

Reciprocal Discipline

On September 8, 2022, Baird was reciprocally disbarred by the Board of

Immigration Appeals, the immigration courts, and the Department of Homeland Security.

See In re Baird (Baird IV), 996 N.W.2d 308, 308 (N.D. 2023). Baird did not report the

disbarments to the Director.

Second Disbarment

On December 8, 2022, the North Dakota Supreme Court disbarred Baird for a

second time and prohibited him from seeking reinstatement for five years. See In re Baird

(Baird II), 985 N.W.2d 56, 57 (N.D. 2022). In 2017, a woman retained Baird, seeking an

I-360 green card petition predicated on domestic violence by her ex-husband, who is a U.S.

citizen, and assistance in removal proceedings. 4 It took Baird four years, until

September 16, 2021, to file the I-360 petition, which contained minimal information and

was not provided to the client. The client hired subsequent counsel, who was unable to

reach Baird despite numerous attempts at communication. USCIS had set a deadline to

respond to a request for evidence in the case for October 18, 2021. Baird did not inform

4
An I-360 Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant Form allows for
a “[Violence Against Women Act] self-petitioning spouse of an abusive U.S. citizen” to
petition for a Green Card if they have been “battered by or have been the subject of extreme
cruelty perpetrated by: [their] U.S. citizen . . . spouse during the marriage.” U.S. Dep’t
Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., OMB No. 1615-0020, Form I-360,
Instructions for Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er) or Special Immigrant 6 (2018).

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subsequent counsel of the deadline and did not turn over the client’s incomplete file until

October 19, 2021, which was past the filing deadline.

The state disciplinary counsel brought a petition for discipline against Baird.

Because Baird did not respond to the petition, the hearing panel issued default findings of

fact and recommendations for discipline. It concluded that Baird violated Rule 1.3, N.D.R.

Prof. Conduct, by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness; Rule 1.4, N.D.R.

Prof. Conduct, by failing to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter

and by failing to respond to reasonable requests for information; and Rule 1.16(e), N.D.R.

Prof. Conduct, by failing to take reasonable steps to protect the client’s interests by making

a timely transition of her cases to subsequent counsel as requested by the client and by

failing to provide a complete copy of the client file to alternate counsel. 5 See Baird II,

985 N.W.2d at 56–57. The panel also made findings of three aggravating factors:

Standard 9.22(a), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction (“prior disciplinary offenses”);

Standard 9.22(c), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction (“a pattern of misconduct”); and

Standard 9.22(h), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction (“vulnerability of victim”). See id.

at 57. The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the hearing panel’s findings and

conclusions and ordered Baird to be disbarred. Baird did not inform the Director of the

proceedings and did not seek reinstatement.

5
These rules most closely mirror Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4,
1.16(d), and 1.16(e).

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Suspension

On August 17, 2023, the North Dakota Supreme Court suspended Baird for six

months and one day. See In re Baird (Baird III), 994 N.W.2d 377, 379 (N.D. 2023). A

married couple retained Baird to assist in their filing for bankruptcy. He delegated the file

to an associate attorney, who failed to act reasonably and diligently. Baird took over the

case himself, and also failed to act diligently by not keeping the clients informed about the

status of their matter; failing to respond to reasonable requests for information; failing to

protect the clients’ interests after the attorney-client relationship ended; and failing to take

remedial action for the associate attorney’s transgressions.

The state disciplinary counsel filed a petition for discipline, to which Baird did not

respond, and a hearing panel issued a report of default findings of fact and

recommendations for discipline. It found that Baird violated Rule 1.3, N.D.R. Prof.

Conduct (diligence); Rule 1.4, N.D.R. Prof. Conduct (communication); Rule 1.16(e),

N.D.R. Prof. Conduct (failing to protect clients’ best interests after termination of

representation); and Rule 5.1(c)(2), N.D.R. Prof. Conduct (“A lawyer shall be responsible

for another lawyer’s violation of [the Rules of Professional Conduct] if . . . the lawyer . . .

has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time

when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated, but fails to take reasonable remedial

action.”). 6 See Baird III, 994 N.W.2d at 379. The panel considered as aggravating factors

Standard 9.22(a), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction (“prior disciplinary offenses”);

6
These rules most closely mirror Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4,
1.16(d), 1.16(e), and 5.1(c).

9
Standard 9.22(c), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction (“a pattern of misconduct”); and

Standard 9.22(j), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction (“indifference to making

restitution”). See id. Despite Baird’s failure to respond to the petition for discipline or to

submit evidence of mitigating factors, the panel found two mitigating factors:

Standard 9.32(k), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction (“imposition of other penalties or

sanctions”); and Standard 9.32(m), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanction (“remoteness of

prior offenses”). See id. The supreme court adopted the hearing panel’s findings and

conclusions and ordered Baird suspended for six months and one day and to pay restitution

to the clients. Id. Baird did not inform the Director of the discipline he received and did

not seek reinstatement.

Third Disbarment

On September 28, 2023, the North Dakota Supreme Court disbarred Baird for a third

time, with a prohibition on reinstatement for five years. See Baird IV, 996 N.W.2d at 309.

Another client had retained Baird for help with an I-360 green card petition based on

domestic violence, which was required to be filed within two years of the client’s divorce.

Baird failed to communicate with the client, misrepresented facts when he did

communicate with him, did not respond to USCIS’s requests for evidence, and ultimately

failed to notify the client that his petition had been denied by USCIS because of Baird’s

failure to respond to the evidentiary request. Baird also failed to notify USCIS that his

office address had changed, which led to further delays in receiving notice that the client’s

petition had been denied. Following the termination of representation, the client did not

receive a copy of his file or a refund of his retainer fee.

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The state disciplinary counsel brought a petition for discipline against Baird. The

state disciplinary counsel was unable to personally serve Baird with the petition, so service

was made on the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 7 The hearing panel issued default findings

of fact and recommendations for discipline, finding that Baird violated Rule 1.3, N.D.R.

Prof. Conduct (diligence); Rule 1.4, N.D.R. Prof. Conduct (communication); and

Rule 1.16(e), N.D.R. Prof. Conduct (protecting the client’s best interests after termination

of representation). 8 See Baird IV, 996 N.W.2d at 309. The panel also found as aggravating

factors his prior disciplinary offenses, see Standard 9.22(a), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law.

Sanction, and a pattern of misconduct, see Standard 9.22(c), N.D. Stds. Imposing Law.

Sanction. See Baird IV, 996 N.W.2d at 309. The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted

the panel’s findings, disbarred Baird, and ordered him to pay restitution to the client. Baird

did not disclose the discipline to the Director or seek reinstatement in North Dakota.

Director’s Petition for Reciprocal Discipline

On August 21, 2023, the Director independently learned of Baird’s discipline in

North Dakota. The Director then filed a petition for reciprocal discipline of disbarment in

this court pursuant to Rule 12(d), RLPR. On April 2, 2024, this court ordered Baird to

submit a response as to whether reciprocal discipline was warranted. Baird failed to

respond by the end of the 30-day deadline imposed by the order. On May 31, 2024, the

7
This method of service is authorized by Rule 1, North Dakota Admission to Practice
Rules, which states that “the Clerk of the Supreme Court [is designated] as the applicant’s
agent for service of process for all purposes.”
8
These rules most closely mirror Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4,
1.16(d), and 1.16(e).

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Director filed a memorandum of law in support of reciprocal discipline. Baird did not file

a response. This court held oral argument on the matter on November 12, 2024. Baird did

not attend, nor did any counsel on his behalf. The Director has never received any

communication from Baird regarding the petition for reciprocal discipline.

ANALYSIS

Under Rule 12(d), RLPR, the Director may petition for reciprocal discipline based

on her knowledge, from any source, “that a lawyer licensed to practice in Minnesota has

been publicly disciplined . . . in another jurisdiction.” We may impose reciprocal discipline

“unless it appears that discipline procedures in the other jurisdiction were unfair, or the

imposition of the same discipline would be unjust or substantially different from discipline

warranted in Minnesota.” Id.; accord In re Jensen, 12 N.W.3d 731, 737 (Minn. 2024). This

court bears the “ultimate responsibility” to determine the proper discipline. In re

Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn. 2001). In deciding what discipline to impose, we

have held that the purposes of disciplinary sanctions are “to protect the public, to protect

the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as

by other attorneys.” In re Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004). “The purpose

for imposing identical disciplinary sanctions is to prevent a sanctioned attorney from

avoiding the consequences of misconduct by simply moving his or her practice to another

state.” In re Meaden, 628 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Minn. 2001) (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

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I.

We turn first to the question of whether the North Dakota proceedings against Baird

were fair. See Rule 12(d), RLPR. This court has consistently held that another

jurisdiction’s disciplinary proceedings are fair if the attorney is given notice of the

proceedings and an opportunity to “present evidence of good character and other mitigating

circumstances.” In re Koss, 572 N.W.2d 276, 277 (Minn. 1997). We “review the record

of the underlying proceedings to see if the lawyer being disciplined received notice of the

allegations against him and whether he was provided an opportunity to respond to those

allegations.” In re Schmidt, 586 N.W.2d 774, 775–76 (Minn. 1998).

The Director argued that North Dakota’s processes are fair, and we agree. This court

has previously found that North Dakota’s disciplinary processes are fair. See, e.g., id. at

776; In re Keller, 656 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Minn. 2003); In re Fahrenholtz, 896 N.W.2d 845,

847 (Minn. 2017); In re Overboe, 867 N.W.2d 482, 488 (Minn. 2015).

Baird did not participate in any of the four North Dakota disciplinary actions against

him. However, “an attorney’s decision not to participate in the disciplinary proceedings in

another jurisdiction is not relevant to our determination of the fairness of those

proceedings.” In re Wolff, 810 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 2012). We have repeatedly

determined that where an attorney was properly served with notice as to the proceedings

against him—regardless of his response—then due process has been satisfied. See, e.g.,

Keller, 656 N.W.2d at 401. The record in this case is clear that Baird received proper notice

of each of the actions against him. Baird I, 977 N.W.2d at 705; Baird II, 985 N.W.2d at

57; Baird III, 994 N.W.2d at 378; Baird IV, 996 N.W.2d at 309 (stating that disciplinary

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counsel was unable to personally serve Baird, but pursuant to North Dakota rules, the

petition was served on the Clerk of the Supreme Court). Even where Baird did not present

mitigating factors on his own behalf, the court carefully considered and found that there

were two mitigating factors that were appropriate in Baird’s suspension case. See Baird III,

994 N.W.2d at 379. We therefore conclude that North Dakota’s procedures were fair in

each of Baird’s discipline cases.

II.

We next turn to whether “the imposition of the same discipline would be unjust or

substantially different from discipline warranted in Minnesota.” Rule 12(d), RLPR.

Because Baird has not participated in Minnesota’s disciplinary proceedings, and because

Rule 12(d), RLPR, provides that we can use the other jurisdiction’s findings, we find that

the facts of Baird’s misconduct have been conclusively established. See Wolff, 810 N.W.2d

at 317–18 (deeming out-of-jurisdiction misconduct established where the respondent did

not respond to Minnesota’s disciplinary proceedings).

The first step in our Rule 12(d) analysis is determining whether “we would impose

some discipline” for the alleged misconduct. Jensen, 12 N.W.3d at 740. If we would not

otherwise impose any discipline, then reciprocal discipline would be “unjust.” Rule 12(d),

RLPR. In In re Otis, we held that imposing reciprocal discipline would be unjust where

the underlying cause of the troubling behavior had been addressed by medical treatment.

582 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Minn. 1998). In In re Sklar, we held that reciprocal discipline may

be unjust where the lawyer can identify specific prejudice arising from a long delay

between the underlying misconduct and the imposition of the discipline. 929 N.W.2d 384,

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390 (Minn. 2019). And in Jensen, we reiterated that reciprocal discipline would be unjust

“if the lawyer shows that the circumstances that caused the misconduct have changed . . .

and the discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction is no longer necessary to protect the

public.” 12 N.W.3d at 738–39.

None of those circumstances apply here. There is no great delay between the

underlying events of Baird’s misconduct and the Director’s petition for reciprocal

discipline in Minnesota. See Sklar, 929 N.W.2d at 390 (finding “no concerning gaps in the

procedural history of this case” where the Director’s petition for reciprocal discipline was

filed one-and-one-half years after discipline was first imposed in California). Baird did

not advance any argument, nor did the North Dakota Supreme Court find, that the

circumstances giving rise to Baird’s misconduct have changed or that he is no longer a

danger to the public. To the contrary, the nature of Baird’s actions indicate that public

safety continues to be a concern. We therefore determine that imposing reciprocal

discipline would not be unjust.

The second step in our analysis is whether reciprocal discipline in the form of

disbarment would be substantially different than what we would impose in Minnesota. See

Jensen, 12 N.W.3d at 740. There are four factors that guide us in what discipline to impose:

“(1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative weight of the disciplinary violations;

(3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal profession.” In re Ulanowski,

800 N.W.2d 785, 799 (Minn. 2011) (quoting In re Nelson, 733 N.W.2d 458, 463

(Minn. 2007)). We also weigh any aggravating or mitigating factors that are found. Id.

“This does not mean that we may only impose reciprocal discipline if we would impose

15
discipline identical to that imposed in the other jurisdiction.” Jensen, 12 N.W.3d at 740.

Rather, reciprocal discipline in the form of disbarment must be “significantly” outside the

range of discipline we would otherwise impose. Rule 12(d), RLPR.

Our decision in In re Igbanugo, 989 N.W.2d 310, 324 (Minn. 2023), is instructive

in this matter. In Igbanugo, the respondent attorney consistently failed to perform work

for clients in immigration matters, including failing to act on outstanding visa petitions,

failing to file permanency petitions after telling the clients he would file them, delaying

filing paperwork for over two years, and failing to refund fees after the termination of

representation. Id. at 318–20. We ultimately imposed suspension for a minimum of ten

months, but in so doing, we recognized that misconduct in immigration matters has

“potentially grave consequences” because it can put clients “at risk for deportation or

removal.” Id. at 329 (citing In re Fru, 829 N.W.2d 379, 388–89 (Minn. 2013)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Our decision in In re Fru is likewise instructive. Fru engaged in a “pattern of

incompetence, neglect, and noncommunication” in immigration matters, including by

misrepresenting the status of a client’s I-360 petition. Fru, 829 N.W.2d at 389. We

indefinitely suspended Fru for a minimum of two years. Id. at 391.

We must weigh Baird’s misconduct as a whole. Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d at 160

(“[T]he cumulative weight and severity of multiple disciplinary rule violations may compel

severe discipline even when a single act standing alone would not have warranted such

discipline.”). Here, Baird’s misconduct dates back at least as far as 2017, see Baird II,

985 N.W.2d at 56, and was at least as severe as in Igbanugo and Fru. His failures impacted

16
at least seven clients, as well as C.G.’s wife and children who were also seeking asylum.

See In re Matson, 889 N.W.2d 17, 23, 26 (Minn. 2017) (disbarring an attorney for neglect

and abandonment of ten clients). In one case, Baird neglected to file a client’s I-360

petition for over four years, which is much longer than the two-year delay in Igbanugo.

We have disbarred or indefinitely suspended attorneys who engaged in repeated

instances of client neglect and failure to communicate. See Schmidt, 586 N.W.2d at 776,

777 (reciprocally disbarring attorney who converted his clients’ funds for his own use;

neglected client matters; failed to communicate with his clients; practiced law while on

suspension in Minnesota; lied to his clients, creditors of his clients, and a Minnesota court;

and failed to cooperate with the North Dakota disciplinary board); In re Fallon,

389 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 1986) (imposing indefinite suspension for failure to answer

letters and return calls); In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1983) (imposing

disbarment for gross neglect of client matters, failure to communicate with clients, and

failure to cooperate). Moreover, the North Dakota court found that Baird engaged in

affirmative misrepresentations when he “did not complete and submit the asylum

application[s] in September 2020 as he told [C.G.]” and D.O. Baird I, 977 N.W.2d at 706,

707. This court takes instances of untruthfulness seriously. See In re Jones, 383 N.W.2d

303, 307 (Minn. 1986) (“We have not hesitated to disbar attorneys for failure to maintain

the profession’s high standards of truthfulness.”). We have also disbarred attorneys for

patterns of misconduct including client neglect, abandonment of practice, and failure to

return client files, all of which are forms of misconduct that the North Dakota court found

in Baird’s cases. See In re Harp, 560 N.W.2d 696, 697, 701 (Minn. 1997) (disbarring an

17
attorney for, among other misconduct, client neglect and noncommunication, failure to

return client files, failure to return unearned fees, the abandonment of his law practice, and

noncooperation with the Director).

As relevant to the cumulative weight of the violations, Baird’s misconduct rises

above the level of a “brief lapse in judgment” or “a single, isolated incident.” In re

Fairbairn, 802 N.W.2d 734, 743 (Minn. 2011). And as relevant to harm, Baird’s “client

neglect undermines the public’s confidence in the legal profession, harming both the public

and the profession.” Matson, 889 N.W.2d at 24. The record shows a multi-year pattern of

“incompetence and mishandling and neglect of client matters . . . and other repeated

violations of [Baird’s] duty to his clients and the public.” Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d at 713.

Moreover, in all three of his disbarments, the North Dakota Supreme Court found only

aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. 9 We have disbarred attorneys for neglect of

9
Across all four of its proceedings, the North Dakota Supreme Court found as
aggravating factors a pattern of misconduct; multiple offenses; vulnerability of the victims;
prior discipline history; and a demonstrated indifference to making resolution. Minnesota
considers many of these to be aggravating factors as well. See In re Nwaneri, 978 N.W.2d
878, 890 (Minn. 2022), reinstatement granted, 982 N.W.2d 402 (Minn. 2022)
(“Individuals with uncertain legal status in this country facing removal or deportation are
particularly vulnerable and that vulnerability can be an aggravating factor.” (citing Fru,
829 N.W.2d at 379)); In re Udeani, 945 N.W.2d 389, 396 (Minn. 2020) (noting that a
history of prior discipline, similarity of current misconduct to previous misconduct,
vulnerability of clients, an indifference to making restitution, and failure to cooperate with
the disciplinary proceedings in front of this court are aggravating factors). However, we
are precluded from double-counting “the same acts . . . as both additional misconduct and
an aggravating factor.” In re Taplin, 837 N.W.2d 306, 313 (Minn. 2013). Because we
considered the existence of multiple offenses as contributing to the cumulative weight of
his violations, we do not consider that an aggravating factor in Baird’s case.
The only findings of mitigating factors were in Baird’s suspension case, where the
court noted the “imposition of other penalties and sanctions and remoteness of prior

18
several client matters when there are no mitigating circumstances. See In re Braggans,

280 N.W.2d 34, 35 (Minn. 1979) (disbarring an attorney for “inexcusable neglect” of his

clients’ matters and where he “presented no facts or arguments by way of mitigation which

would justify a further delay in imposing the sanction of disbarment”).

Our precedent indicates that disbarment in this case is not substantially different

than what we have done with past instances of grievous client neglect and

misrepresentation to vulnerable clients who are subject to immigration proceedings or

bankruptcy. We therefore conclude that disbarment is not substantially different from the

discipline that is warranted in Minnesota for Baird’s misconduct.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that reciprocal discipline in the form of

disbarment is appropriate. We order that Stephen J. Baird is disbarred from the practice of

law in the State of Minnesota, effective upon the date of this opinion. Baird must comply

with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice to clients, opposing counsel, and tribunals), and must

pay to the Director the sum of $900 in costs and disbursements pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR.

Consistent with his discipline in North Dakota, Baird will not be eligible for reinstatement

to the practice of law in Minnesota until he is eligible for reinstatement in North Dakota no

sooner than five years from the date of his most recent disbarment in North Dakota.