State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0007

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Myon Demarlo Burrell,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-18680

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Erica Holzer, Evan A. Nelson, Clayton J. Carlson, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for unlawful firearm
possession and fifth-degree drug possession, appellant Myon Demarlo Burrell argues that
the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence against him because
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the police lacked (1) reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of his initial
traffic stop to conduct an impaired-driving investigation and (2) probable cause to conduct
a warrantless search of his vehicle. In making both arguments, Burrell contends that several
of the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. We affirm.
FACTS
Based on evidence discovered in a search of Burrell’s vehicle following a traffic
stop, respondent State of Minnesota charged Burrell with one count of being a prohibited
person in possession of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (Supp.
2023), and one count of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 152.05, subd. 2(1) (Supp. 2023). Burrell moved to suppress the evidence.
After a contested omnibus hearing, the district court filed an order denying Burrell’s
motion. Burrell waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the state’s case to preserve
his right to appeal the dispositive suppression ruling pursuant to Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4.
Omnibus Hearing and Order Denying Motion to Suppress
The sole witness at the omnibus hearing was Officer Nordby, who conducted the
traffic stop and was one of the officers who searched Burrell’s vehicle. In addition to
Officer Nordby’s testimony, the district court received several exhibits, including video
footage from Officer Nordby’s body-worn camera (BWC) and squad-car dash camera. The
following summarizes the evidence presented.
On the morning of August 29, 2023, Officer Nordby was traveling west on North
42nd Avenue in Robbinsdale when he observed a white SUV traveling in the opposite
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direction straddling the dotted center line dividing two eastbound lanes. In his rear- view
mirror, Officer Nordby observed the SUV continue to straddle the center line between the
eastbound lanes. Officer Nordby made a U-turn to travel eastbound toward the SUV and
activated his car’s dash camera.
Officer Nordby caught up to the SUV, followed it, and monitored its speed by
activating his squad car’s radar. Officer Nordby recorded the SUV’s speed at 37 miles per
hour in a 30- mile-per-hour zone and observed the SUV cross over or straddle the line
dividing the eastbound traffic lanes several more times. He also observed the SUV briefly
cross over the solid line between eastbound traffic and a turn lane for westbound traffic.
Based on this driving conduct, Officer Nordby initiated a traffic stop.
As he approached the vehicle, Officer Nordby, who by this time had activated his
BWC, saw smoke come out of the vehicle as the driver lowered the window. Officer
Nordby spoke with the driver, who identified himself as Burrell. During the interaction
with Burrell, Officer Nordby smelled burnt marijuana, saw that Burrell’s eyes appeared
bloodshot and that his pupils were dilated, and “observed some little marijuana particles
on the center console area.” Officer Norby suspected that Burrell might have been driving
while impaired by marijuana. Officer Nordby returned to his squad car and requested
backup because he was going to conduct an impaired-driving investigation.
When another officer arrived at the scene, Officer Nordby asked Burrell to step out
of his vehicle. Officer Nordby informed Burrell that he suspected Burrell had been smoking
marijuana in his SUV based on Burrell’s “driving conduct,” the smoke that came out of the
window, and the odor of burnt marijuana. Burrell explained to Officer Nordby that the odor
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of burnt marijuana was due to his having smoked marijuana in the vehicle the day before.
Officer Nordby again stated that he saw smoke come out of the window, and Burrell
explained that he had sprayed an air freshener to mask the odor remaining from the day
before. Burrell denied smoking marijuana that morning and submitted to a horizontal-gaze-
nystagmus (HGN) test. During the HGN test, Officer Nordby observed that Burrell’s eyes
exhibited a “lack of smooth pursuit” and “involuntary jerking,” which are signs of
impairment.
Following the HGN test, Officer Nordby informed Burrell that he intended to search
the vehicle. Burrell said that he did not consent to a search, and Officer Nordby replied,
“When I have all that smoke coming out, man, that gives me enough.” Officer Nordby and
other officers then searched Burrell’s vehicle, finding a nine-millimeter handgun with an
extended magazine in the center console, as well as several capsules containing drugs in a
backpack.
In its order denying the motion to suppress, the district court found that Officer
Nordby had testified credibly. The district court concluded that the police had reasonable
and articulable suspicion to support the initial stop, that the police had reasonable and
articulable suspicion of drug use and driving under the influence to support an expansion
of the stop, and that the search of Burrell’s vehicle was supported by probable cause.
1

1 The di strict court also concluded that the search of the vehicle was valid as a search
incident to a lawful arrest for DWI—an issue we do not reach because, as explained below,
we conclude that the warrantless search was supported by probable case.
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Convictions and Sentences
The district court held a stipulated-evidence trial and found Burrell guilty on both
counts. It sentenced Burrell to 60 months in prison on the firearm-possession conviction
and to a concurrent 19 months in prison on the drug-possession conviction.
Burrell appeals.
DECISION
Burrell challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress the
evidence seized from his vehicle. He argues that the police lacked reasonable, articulable
suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop to conduct an impaired-driving
investigation. He next argues that the police lacked probable cause to conduct a warrantless
search of his vehicle. We address each argument in turn.
I. Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion to Expand the Stop
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. While warrantless seizures
are generally unreasonable, an exception to the warrant requirement exists for a brief
investigatory detention if the police have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016). A traffic stop supported by
reasonable, articulable suspicion may be expanded to include investigation of other
suspected illegal activity but “only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of
such other illegal activity.” State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). When
determining whether an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand a stop,
6
courts consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 251
(Minn. 2007).
Appellate courts review a district court’s factual findings related to a motion to
suppress for clear error. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). “[F]indings
are clearly erroneous when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or
not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole,” leaving the reviewing court “with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment
of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted); see also State v.
Thompson, 988 N.W.2d 149, 158 (Minn. App. 2023) (applying Kenney), rev. denied (Minn.
June 20, 2023) . Appellate courts defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.
State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 728 (Minn. App. 2014).
Burrell makes a two-pronged argument to challenge the district court’s
determination that Officer Nordby had reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the stop
to conduct an impaired -driving investigation. First, he contends that three of the district
court’s factual findings—the smoke that Officer Nordby claimed to observe coming out of
Burrell’s window; the red, bloodshot condition of Burrell’s eyes; and the presence of “little
marijuana particles on the center console area”—are clearly erroneous. Second, he argues
that the remaining, uncontroverted factual findings— Burrell’s driving conduct and the
odor of marijuana—are insufficient to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion of
impaired driving. Burrell does not argue that, if the district court’s factual findings are not
clearly erroneous, the totality of the circumstances did not provide the police with
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Burrell was driving while impaired by marijuana.
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Smoke Coming out of Burrell’s Vehicle
Burrell challenges the district court’s finding that “smoke appeared . . . to emanate
from [Burrell’s] vehicle” when Burrell rolled down his window as Officer Nordby
approached. Officer Nordby testified that he saw smoke come out of the vehicle, and the
district court found his testimony credible. Burrell argues that the district court clearly erred
in crediting that testimony because the BWC and dash-camera video footage does not show
smoke coming out of Burrell’s vehicle and Officer Nordby, when viewing t he BWC and
dash-camera video footage during the omnibus hearing, acknowledged that smoke could
not be seen on the dash-camera footage and stated that the BWC footage showed only that
the area around the window “kind of appear[ed] to be hazy.” Burrell’s argument is
unconvincing.
As Officer Nordby testified, various factors could account for a difference between
what he observed in person and what is visible in his BWC or dash-camera footage. These
factors include lighting, the quality of the camera, the density of the smoke, different
perspectives, or different proximity to the thing observed. Burrell disputes Officer
Nordby’s explanation, noting that the dash-camera footage here captured smoke coming
out of the window of a different car that was briefly traveling ahead of Officer Nordby as
he was following Burrell. But the fact that the dash- camera footage captured different
smoke coming from a different car in a different location does not mean that it would
necessarily capture the smoke coming out of Burrell’s vehicle. We conclude that the video
footage is not sufficiently definitive to overcome the deference owed to the district court’s
determination that Officer Nordby testified credibly. See Ware, 856 N.W.2d at 728. As a
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result, the district court’s factual finding that Officer Burrell observed smoke emanating
from Burrell’s vehicle is not clearly erroneous.2
Condition of Burrell’s Eyes
Burrell also contends that the BWC footage disproves Officer Nordby’s testimony
that Burrell’s eyes were bloodshot and red and that his pupils were dilated. This argument
is likewise not convincing. Although Burrell’s eyes can be seen on the BWC footage
throughout his interaction with Officer Nordby, the BWC was pointed directly at either the
door of Burrell’s SUV (while Burrell was still inside the vehicle) or Burrell’s midsection
(after Burrell had exited the vehicle). The BWC footage therefore does not show Burrell’s
eyes from the same vantage point or with the same clarity that Officer Nordby had during
his interaction with Burrell. Thus, the BWC footage does not provide a basis on which to
decide that the district court clearly erred in crediting Officer Nordby’s testimony.
Burrell also suggests that Officer Nordby’s testimony about Burrell’s eyes was not
credible because Officer Nordby mentioned only Burrell’s driving conduct and the smoke
coming out of Burrell’s vehicle—not Burrell’s eyes —when he radioed for backup when

2 The district court also found support for its finding that Officer Nordby observed smoke
come out of the vehicle because “even [Burrell] admits something came out of the vehicle”
since he “declar[ed] . . . that the vapor was ‘air freshener.’” Burrell disputes the district
court’s interpretation of his statements, arguing that he was not admitting that anything had
come out of the window but rather was simply acknowledging that he had used air
freshener to mask the odor of marijuana. The footage from Officer Nordby’s BWC shows
that Burrell responded to Officer Nordby informing Burrell that the officer observed smoke
coming out of Burrell’s window by stating, “[T]hat was an air freshener, actually,” and that
Burrell later respond ed to Officer Nordby’s assertion that smoke emanated from his
window by twice stating, “It wasn’t smoke.” We see no clear error in the district court’s
interpretation of this exchange.
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expanding the stop to an impaired-driving investigation. But the fact that Officer Nordby
did not list all his observations over the radio at that moment does not compel the
conclusion that the district court clearly erred by crediting the officer’s omnibus-hearing
testimony about Burrell’s eyes.
Marijuana Particles
Burrell also argues that, because “no marijuana particles are seen” in the BWC
footage of Officer Nordby searching the interior of Burrell’s vehicle, the district court
clearly erred in crediting Officer Nordby’s testimony that he observed “marijuana
particles” on the vehicle’s “center console area.” Again, this argument is unconvincing.
While the BWC footage does not show any “marijuana particles” on the center console,
the footage of the “console area” is not so clear or comprehensive as to compel the
conclusion that the district court clearly erred in crediting Officer Nordby’s testimony.
Burrell also suggests that Officer Nordby’s testimony was not credible because the
BWC footage shows that Officer Nordby opened the center console “without collecting,
brushing off, or mentioning ‘little marijuana particles’” and because Officer Nordby did
not refer to the particles when he called for backup. Neither argument convinces us that the
district court clearly erred by determining that Officer Nordby’s testimony was credible.
In sum, we discern no clear error in the three factual findings challenged by
Burrell—regarding the smoke, the condition of Burrell’s eyes, and the observation of
marijuana particles. Burrell does not argue that the totality of the circumstances, if it
includes these factual findings, did not furnish reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand
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the scope of the traffic stop to conduct an impaired-driving investigation. We thus conclude
that the expansion of the stop was constitutional.
II. Probable Cause for Warrantless Search of the Vehicle
Warrantless searches of a vehicle are per se unreasonable under the United States
and Minnesota Constitutions “unless one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement applies.” State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Minn. 2023) (quotation
omitted). One of these exceptions is the automobile exception, which permits police to
search a vehicle without a warrant during a traffic stop “if there is probable cause to believe
the search will result in a discovery of evidence or contraband.” Id. at 168-69 (quotation
omitted). Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, “there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” in the place searched.
State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). In reviewing a
pretrial order on a suppression motion, appellate courts review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502.
The district court concluded that the police had probable cause to search Burrell’s
vehicle for evidence of driving under the influence based on the smell of marijuana, the
presence of marijuana residue on the console, the physical indicia of intoxication exhibited
by Burrell, and Burrell’s performance during the HGN test. The state argues that probable
cause was additionally supported by the smoke emanating from Burrell’s vehicle and
Burrell’s driving conduct.
Burrell first argues that, because the smoke emanating from Burrell’s window is the
only reason that Officer Nordby articulated to Burrell before searching the vehicle, our
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review of probable cause is limited to only two circumstances: the smoke and the
undisputed odor of marijuana. And, Burrell continues, because the district court clearly
erred in finding that Officer Nordby observed smoke come out of Burrell’s window, only
the odor of marijuana is left and the odor of marijuana alone is insufficient under
Torgerson. 995 N.W.2d 164.3
Burrell’s argument fails for two reasons. First, we have already concluded that the
district court did not clearly err in finding that Officer Nordby observed smoke coming out
of Burrell’s vehicle. Second, Burrell offers no authority for the proposition that, in
determining the totality of the circumstances, we are restricted to the observations that an
officer articulated to a driver. Although the totality of circumstances may include the
“reasonable inferences that police officers draw from facts, based on their training and
experience,” assessing probable cause is “an objective inquiry.” State v. Lester, 874
N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016). Officer Nordby’s subjective beliefs about whether he had
probable cause or what probable cause was based on do not dictate the circumstances that
a court may consider in evaluating probable cause. See State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358,
363 (Minn. 2011) (“The actual, subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in

3 The state asserts that, even if the odor of marijuana is the only factual finding left to
support probable cause, it is sufficient because the search was conducted before the
supreme court issued its opinion in Torgerson and the Lindquist exception to the
exclusionary rule therefore applies. See State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 870, 876
(Minn. 2015) (holding that the “exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of a
defendant’s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures” does not
apply “when law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate
precedent”). We need not address the question whether Torgerson or Lindquist applies
because, as we explain, multiple circumstances in addition to the odor of marijuana support
the existence of probable cause to search Burrell’s vehicle.
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evaluating reasonableness.”). Because the totality of circumstances is not limited to the
undisputed odor of marijuana, Burrell’s Torgerson argument fails.
Burrell next argues that the broader totality of circumstances does not support
probable cause. The argument is unconvincing. Burrell again challenges the district court’s
factual findings regarding Officer Nordby’s observations of smoke, the condition of
Burrell’s eyes, and the presence of “marijuana particles” on the center console. But we
have already concluded that those findings are not clearly erroneous. Burrell also argues
that his traffic violations were “far too tame to support probable cause of drug use.” We
agree that the driving conduct was minor; while it still could contribute to probable cause
in conjunction with other circumstances, it is not critical to the probable cause issue here.
Burrell does not dispute the odor of burnt marijuana. This leaves one circumstance—the
“lack of smooth pursuit” and “involuntary jerking” exhibited by Burrell’s eyes during the
HGN test administered by Officer Nordby.
In his brief, Burrell argues that we should conclude that this factual finding is clearly
erroneous because “the video evidence disproves” Officer Nordby’s account of Burrell’s
performance on the HGN test. At oral argument, Burrell argued that we should conclude
that the finding is clearly erroneous because Officer Nordby did not tell Burrell that he had
failed the test or immediately place him under arrest after the test concluded. Neither
argument is persuasive.
Again, for the reasons discussed above, the BWC footage of the HGN test does not
clearly contradict Officer Nordby’s testimony. In fact, the district court viewed the footage
itself and found that Burrell’s eyes “very clearly demonstrate a lack of smooth pursuit in
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following Officer Nordby’s finger, and an involuntary jerking of [Burrell’s] eyes is clearly
visible as Officer Nordby initially passes his finger across [Burrell’s] field of vision.” We
see no clear error in that finding. As to Burrell’s other argument, the fact that Officer
Nordby did not tell Burrell that he exhibited signs of impairment or immediately place him
under arrest after the HGN test does not compel the conclusion that the district court clearly
erred in crediting Officer Nordby’s testimony or making its own finding from viewing the
BWC footage.
In sum, we conclude that none of the district court’s factual findings challenged by
Burrell were clearly erroneous and that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the
warrantless search of Burrell’s vehicle was justified by probable cause.4
Affirmed.

4 Because we conclude that the police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search
of Burrell’s vehicle for evidence in the context of an impaired-driving investigation, we do
not address Burrell’s argument that police could not have had probable cause to believe
they would find evidence or contraband because “[m]arijuana is no longer contraband in
Minnesota.” See Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 169. This argument, and the state’s response
that the police had probable cause to believe the search would result in evidence of a
violation of Minnesota’s open-package law for cannabis, see Minn. Stat. § 169A.36 (Supp.
2023), are not relevant to whether the police had probable cause to search for evidence of
impaired driving.