State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0010

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Phia Vang,
Appellant.

Filed July 13, 2026
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-22-3133

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Daniel S . Adkins, Sean P. Kehren , North Star Law Group, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and
the district court’s imposition of an executed presumptive prison sentence. We affirm.

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FACTS
In September 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Phia Vang
with one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct with an individual under the age
of 16 with whom he had a significant relationship, involving multiple acts over an extended
period of time. In June 2024, the state amended the complaint and added a second count
of second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a victim under 13 years old.
The complaint alleged that, between the fall of 2016 and the winter of 2017, the
victim and her mother lived with Vang, while Vang and the victim’s mother were in a
romantic relationship. The victim reported that, during that time, Vang groped her breasts
under her shirt and rubbed her private areas, used the victim’s hand to rub his penis up and
down, and made her bend over, after which she felt something that she thought was urine
on her back. The victim reported that these incidents occurred more than five times and
stopped when she moved out of Vang’s house. The victim was 11 years old at that time.
According to Vang, the state offered, and Vang rejected, a plea offer for a 36-month
stayed prison sentence. The offer is not a part of the record.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The victim testified that when she was in fifth
grade, she , her mother , and her brothers lived with Vang . She viewed Vang as her
stepfather. The victim testified that, when she and Vang were alone in the car, Vang would
touch the victim on her thighs and move his hand up toward her private parts. On one
occasion, Vang tried to kiss her, and on another occasion he unzipped his pants and used
her hand to touch his penis. The victim also testified regarding sexual abuse that occurred
in the family’s home. On one occasion, Vang tried to use the victim’s hand to touch his
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penis. On another occasion, Vang removed the victim’s underwear and rubbed his penis
against the victim’s buttocks until she felt something wet on her back.
The victim’s mother , S.M. , testified that she began a romantic relationship with
Vang in 2015, that she relocated to Minnesota that year, and that she moved in with Vang
in 2016 because she was pregnant with his child. She confirmed that all of her children
lived with her at that time and that she sometimes left the children in Vang’s care when she
was at work. S.M. testified about her relationship with Vang , as well as their custody
disputes regarding their child. S.M. did not testify regarding the victim’s sexual-assault
allegations.
Vang testified in his own defense at trial. He denied sexual contact with the victim
and the allegations against him.
The jury found Vang guilty as charged. The district court ordered a presentence
investigation (PSI) and a psychosexual evaluation.
As sentencing approached, Vang filed a letter with the district court expressing his
remorse for his actions and admitting his guilt , and he moved the district court for a
downward dispositional departure. The state opposed the motion. T he district court
addressed Vang’s request for a departure at sentencing and determined that no substantial
and compelling circumstance justified a departure. The district court entered a judgment
of conviction for each count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and executed a 90-
month prison sentence for the first count and a concurrent 60-month sentence for the
second count.
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In January 2025, Vang appealed. In May 2025, Vang moved this court to stay the
appeal to allow him to pursue postconviction relief. We granted his motion. Vang
petitioned for postconviction relief on the following grounds: (1) the state failed to disclose
favorable evidence, (2) the district court failed to ensure that Vang’s rejection of the state’s
plea offer was accurate, voluntary and intelligent, and (3) the district court erred by denying
Vang’s request for a downward dispositional departure . The postconviction court denied
Vang’s requests for relief.1
We dissolved the stay and reinstated the appeal.
DECISION
“When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue
postconviction relief,” as is the case here, “we review the postconviction court’s decisions
using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft , 813 N.W.2d
814, 836 (Minn. 2012).
I.
Vang contends that the postconviction court erred by determining that he was not
entitled to relief based on alleged v iolation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Under Brady, “[t]he State violates the constitutional guarantees of due process when,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, it suppresses material evidence favorable to the
defendant.” Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d 295, 304 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). A
Brady violation has three elements:

1 However, t he postconviction court vacated Vang’s sentence on the second count of
criminal sexual conduct.
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(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant
because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching;
(2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the
prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and
(3) the evidence must be material —in other words, the
absence of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the
defendant.

Id. (quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(6) (stating that the prosecution
must disclose any “[m]aterial or information in the prosecutor’s possession and control that
tends to negate or reduce the defendant’s guilt”).
“Evidence is material under Brady if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 418 (Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted). “A
reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id. (quotations omitted). Cumulative impeachment evidence is ordinarily immaterial. See
Campbell v. State , 916 N.W.2d 502, 511 (Minn. 2018) (“If a witness has a lready been
impeached, further impeachment would be unlikely to have an effect on the outcome of the
case.”). Because the materiality analysis under Brady “involves a mixed issue of fact and
law, we review a district court’s materiality determination de nov o.” Walen v. State, 777
N.W.2d 213, 216 (2010).
In his petition for postconviction relief , Vang argued that the state violated Brady
by failing to disclose relevant impeachment evidence relating to two of the state’s
witnesses—the victim’s mother, S.M., and her boyfriend, J.L. Vang asserted that, before
his trial, the state was investigating S.M. and J.L. for felony deprivation of custodial and
parental rights to J.L.’s child. Vang also asserted that J.L. was charged in the month leading
6
up to his trial and that S.M. was charged two weeks after his trial. Although Vang
acknowledged that J.L. did not testify at his trial, he argued that the state’s failure to
disclose these investigations prevented him from successfully impeaching S.M. at trial.
In denying Vang’s petition, the postconviction court concluded that Vang met the
first two elements of a Brady violation. But the court also concluded that the undisclosed
impeachment evidence was not material because the evidence “was of little evidentiary
value,” Vang impeached S.M. on other grounds, S.M. was not a key witness, and J.L. did
not testify at trial.
On appeal, Vang argues that the undisclosed information regarding the criminal
investigations was material because the crimes for which the witnesses were investigated
and charged were also “related to children, which [Vang] was on trial for,” and without
that information, Vang was unable to impeach S.M. regarding her incentive to testify
against him. He also argues that the district court erred in reasoning that S.M. was
adequately impeached and that S.M. was not a key witness.
Evidence regarding any agreement by the state to grant S .M. a benefit in exchange
for her testimony in the underlying case would have been admissible impeachment
evidence. See Campbell, 916 N.W.2d at 510 n.4 (noting that “a plea bargain in exchange
for testimony is exculpatory evidence because it can be used to impeach a witness ,” and
that the state has an obligation to “disclose plea bargains made with witnesses in exchange
for their testimony”). But even if S.M. had received a favorable plea offer in exchange for
her testimony in this case, such impeachment evidence would have been cumulative.
7
In the context of Brady materiality, if “ a witness has already been impeached,
further impeachment would be unlikely to have an effect on the outcome of the case. ”
Campbell, 916 N.W.2d at 511. At trial, Vang impeached S.M.’s credibility by establishing
her incentive to testify against Vang. Specifically, S.M. acknowledged —on cross -
examination—that her relationship with Vang was “toxic,” that Vang did not treat her well,
that she had been suspicious of him and learned that he was dating other people, that she
initiated custody proceedings to establish custody of their child, and that she later sought
sole custody of their child. Any additional impeachment evidence in the form of a plea
offer in exchange for S.M.’s testimony at Vang’s trial was not material under Brady. See
id. (holding that additional impeachment evidence was not material where a witness had
already been impeached).
In addition, as the postconviction court observed, Brady generally “applies when
the prosecution fails to disclose impeaching evidence for a witness whose reliability may
well be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Ezeka v. State, 16 N.W.3d 768, 780 (Minn.
2025) (quotation omitted). Although Vang characterizes S.M. as a “crucial witness,” he
concedes that S.M.’s testimony “largely revolved around her confirming the dates that she
lived at either the Maplewood or Oakdale residences and the amount of time that [Vang]
spent at each residence.” S.M. also testified regarding her relationship with Vang and their
custody dispute regarding their joint child. But S.M. did not testify about the sexual-
misconduct allegations. At trial, only Vang, the victim , and the investigating officer
testified about Vang’s criminal sexual conduct. S.M.’s testimony therefore was not
necessarily determinative of Vang’s guilt or innocence. See id. at 778-81 (holding that
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undisclosed impeachment evidence was not material under Brady when the witness’s
testimony did not relate to the contested elements of the defendant’s charges).
In sum, admission of evidence regarding the pending criminal investigation and
ensuing charges against S.M. and J.L. would not have changed the outcome of Vang’s case,
and therefore, was not material under Brady. Thus, the postconviction court did not err in
concluding that Vang was not entitled to relief based on the alleged Brady violation.
II.
Vang contends that the postconviction court erred by denying his request to vacate
his conviction and reinstate the state’s original plea offer. Specifically, Vang argues that
such relief is warranted because he is “disabled in communication” and there is no formal
record of Vang’s accurate, voluntary, and intelligent rejection of the plea offer. Vang
asserts that his “Trial Counsel did not inform him that the plea offer consisted of a stayed
sentence of thirty-six (36) months”2 and that there is no record of his rejection of the plea
offer. Thus, according to Vang, the district court failed to ensure that his rejection of the
plea offer was intelligent.
Conceding that “[t]his is very likely . . . a case of first impression,” Vang contends
that the “[r]ejection of plea offers by [d]efendants arguably must meet the same standard”
that is necessary when “a [d]efendant accepts a plea offer.” Vang relies on Minn. Stat.
§ 611.31 (2024), which defines a “person disabled in communication,” in relevant part, as
a person who, “because of difficulty in speaking or comprehending the English language,

2 Vang does not assert that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. As he indicated
in his brief to this court, “he does not pursue a claim against Trial counsel.”
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cannot fully understand the proceedings or any charges made against the person , . . . or is
incapable of . . . assisting in the presentation of a defense.” Vang argues that if a defendant
“could be considered ‘disabled in communication ,’” it is crucial that any plea offe r is
communicated to the defendant accurately and that the defendant’s rejection of the plea is
voluntary and intelligent.
In summarily rejecting this argument, the postconviction court reasoned that the
argument is without record and legal support. For the reasons that follow, we agree. First,
the record does not reflect that Vang is disabled in communication—he never requested an
interpreter in the underlying proceedings. Second, Vang cites no legal authority suggesting
that a defendant’s rejection of a plea offer must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. The
postconviction court noted that neither it nor the state had located any legal authority that
requires the district court to make a record of the specific terms of a plea offer or a
defendant’s rejection of a plea offer. We are also unaware of such authority.
Third, Vang’s assertion that the district court must ensure that the rejection of a plea
offer is accurate, voluntary, and intelligent , is inconsistent with the purposes of those
requirements when accepting a guilty plea: to ensure that the plea is valid. Specifically,
those requirements ensure that the defendant is not wrongly convicted of a more serious
crime, that the guilty plea is not based on improper pressure, and that the defendant
understands the direct consequences of the plea . See State v. Jo nes, 7 N.W.3d 391, 396
(Minn. 2024); State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). Those concerns are
irrelevant when a defendant rejects an plea offer and maintains a plea of not guilty.
10
Moreover, the district court is not allowed to participate in the plea -bargaining
process. The district court’s limited role is to be an “independent examiner of the propriety
of a plea submitted for judicial acceptance, and not a participant in the plea bargaining .”
See Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 565 (Minn. 2018) (quotations omitted). In fact, the
district court’s participation in the plea -bargaining process is prohibited. See Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.04, subd. 3(1) (stating that a “district court judge must not participate in plea
negotiations”). All the district court can do is accept or reject a proposed plea agreement.
Wheeler, 909 N.W.2d at 564-65. Thus, the district court is not required “to satisfy itself of
the intelligence of a defendant ’s decision to exercise his right to trial instead of accepting
a plea offer.” U.S. v. Braxton, 784 F.3d 240, 247 (4th Cir. 2015).3
Finally, “the separation of powers doctrine gives the state the authority to enter into
plea agreements with a defendant.” Johnson v. State, 641 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. 2002).
But “[n]o case law suggests that a prosecutor is under a duty to reoffer a plea offer that has
been rejected . . . .” Eason v. State , 950 N.W.2d 258, 267 (Minn. 2020) . And, absent a
manifest injustice, the district court cannot “improperly intrude[] into the prosecutorial
function” by accepting—over the state's objection —a guilty plea that conform s to a
rejected pretrial offer. State v. Hoffa, 511 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. App. 1994).
In sum, we discern no error in the postconviction court’s conclusion that Vang failed
to establish a basis for relief stemming from his rejection of the state’s plea offer.

3 “This court is bound by Minnesota Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court
precedential decisions but may consider federal caselaw as persuasive. ” Widner v. Ace
Auto Parts & Salvage Co ., 21 N.W.3d 274, 284 (Minn. App. 2025) . We cite Braxton as
persuasive authority.
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III.
Vang contends that the district court erred by denying his request for a downward
dispositional departure.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for criminal
offenses and seek to “maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability
in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2024). “Consequently, departures from the
guidelines are discouraged and are intended to apply to a small number of cases.” State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). A district court may depart from the
presumptive sentence only when there are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2016).
If substantial and compelling circumstances exist, the district court has broad
discretion to depart, and we generally will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). This court will reverse the district court’s
refusal to depart from the presumptive sentence only in a “rare” case. Id. “[A]s long as
the record shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information
presented before making a determination ,” we will not rever se the district court ’s refusal
to depart. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
A defendant ’s particular amenability to probation can justify a downward
dispositional departure from a presumptive sentence. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308
(Minn. 2014). The requirement of particular amenability ensures that “the defendant ’s
amenability to probation distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents
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the substantial and compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Id.
at 309 (quotation omitted).
Relevant factors for determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to
probation include the defendant’s age, prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude
in court, and support of friends and family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
But e ven if there is evidence that the defendant would be particularly amenable to
probation, a district court is not required to grant a dispositional departure. State v. Olson,
765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009).
In seeking a dispositional departure, Vang argued that he expressed remorse for his
conduct in a letter to the district court. Vang also argued that he was particularly amenable
to treatment because the PSI stated that he was a good candidate for formal sex -offender
treatment and he was motivated to pursue that treatment. He further argued that he had the
support of his family, as well as a criminal history score of zero.
The district court disagreed and denied Vang’s request for a downward dispositional
departure. The district court explained that Vang had failed to take accountability and
“denied the offense until very recently, approximately two months after the original
sentencing date, and over four months after a jury returned guilty verdicts.” The district
court noted that, between the time Vang was charged and the jury trial commenced, Vang
“took efforts to intimidate the victim from going forward with the[] allegations that were
filed in the criminal complaint.” The district court also explained that it did not find Vang’s
letter expressing his remorse to be credible because the letter was “incongruous with the
testimony that was presented at trial.” And given the timing of the letter, the district court
13
found Vang’s expression of remorse “primarily self -serving.” The district court thus
reasoned that Vang was not “exceptional or distinctive” compared to other offenders .
Instead, he was “typical of similar offenders.” The district court therefore concluded that
there was no “substantial and compelling basis to depart from the presumptive sentence.”
Although the PSI indicated that Vang was a good candidate for formal sex-offender
treatment, “the mere fact that the person who prepared a report for the district court reached
a certain conclusion ” about a defendant’s candidacy for treatment “does not necessarily
justify departing from the presumptive disposition under the guidelines .” Soto, 855
N.W.2d at 309 (quotations omitted). And although Vang had a criminal history score of
zero, “a defendant’s clean record does not by itself justify mitigation of sentence because
that factor, in the form of defendant ’s criminal history score, has already been taken into
account by the Sentencing Guidelines in establishing the presumptive sentence. ” Trog,
323 N.W.2d at 31. Moreover, even if the record suggested that Vang would be particularly
amenable to probation, the district court was not required to grant a dispositional departure.
Olson, 765 N.W.2d at 664-65. This simply is not a “rare” case in which we would reverse
the imposition of a presumptive sentence. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Vang’s request for
a downward dispositional departure.
Affirmed.