In the Matter of the Welfare of: T. J. D., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0024

In the Matter of the Welfare of: T. J. D., Child.

Filed July 28, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-24-1297

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Laura Geyer Heinrich, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant T.J.D.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Carl E. Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to domestic
assault to correct a manifest injustice because he entered an inaccurate plea. We agree and
reverse and remand to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea.
FACTS
Police arrested 17-year-old appellant T.J.D. on December 5, 202 4, after he argued
with his mother and she called the police. Respondent State of Minnesota charged him
2
with fear-based domestic assault. At a detention hearing on December 6, 2024, appellant
pleaded not guilty. After spending the weekend in custody, at a detention hearing on
December 9, 2024, appellant pleaded guilty to the domestic-assault charge and admitted to
the following: on December 5, 2024, he had a friend over and was making them eggs; his
mother became upset because he used the last of the eggs and started arguing with him
about how he needed to get a job; he became upset, “exchanged a few words [with his
mother], and she had [his] friend leave”; he yelled and swore at his mother “in front of her
daycare,” which she runs out of their home; he smashed an egg carton on the ground; and
he twice admitted that his actions put his mother in fear of bodily harm. No additional
documents supplemented appellant’s plea colloquy. The district court found that appellant
provided a sufficient factual basis of the assault, adjudicated him delinquent, and ordered
probation for six months. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that he entered an inaccurate guilty plea to domestic assault
because there was an insufficient factual basis that he intended his mother to fear immediate
bodily harm, an element of the charged crime, and he must be allowed to withdraw it to
correct a manifest injustice.
1 We agree.
Whether a guilty plea is valid is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.
State v. Brown, 896 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. App. 2017). There is no absolute right to

1 Appellant also argues that his plea was unintelligent and that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Because we agree that appellant’s plea was inaccurate and that he
must be permitted to withdraw it, we need not address his other arguments.
3
withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). However, “the
court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to
the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists when a guilty plea is not
valid.” State v. Jones, 7 N.W.3d 391, 395 (Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted). To be valid,
a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. An accurate plea is one that
is supported by a proper factual basis. Id. A proper factual basis includes sufficient facts
in the record to support the conclusion that the defendant’s conduct meets the requirements
of the charge to which he is pleading. State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003).
In Minnesota, a person is guilty of fear-based domestic assault when they “commit[]
an act [against a family or household member] with intent to cause fear in [that person] of
immediate bodily harm or death.”
2 Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2024) (emphasis
added). The phrase “with intent to” is defined by statute as “the actor either has a purpose
to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause
that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2024). Assault-fear is a specific-intent crime.
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 311 (Minn. 2012). The “focal point for inquiry” for an
assault-fear charge is the intent of the defendant, not the effect upon the victim. Id. at 308.

2 As the state notes in its brief, “[t]he complaint and delinquency order cite subdivision
1(2), the assault-harm paragraph, instead of paragraph (1) for assault-fear. The charge has
been treated as assault-fear throughout the proceedings in district court and T.J.D.’s brief,
and the inaccurate citation does not undermine the validity of the plea. See State v.
Famuyiwa, 15 N.W.3d 372, 378 (Minn. App. 2024).”
4
The factual basis for a ppellant’s guilty plea to assault was limited to the following
information: he and his mother had an argument on December 5, 2024; he “was yelling
and swearing in front of her daycare and her, and [he], like, smashed an egg carton on the
ground”; he could not recall what he said to his mother during their argument, “[j]ust
whatever [he]could”; and he did not lay his hands on his mother. The district court asked
appellant, “And yelling, that would put [your mother] in fear of bodily harm; is that fair to
say?” Appellant responded “Yeah.” After asking appellant if he put hands on his mother,
the district court again asked, “You just put her in fear of bodily harm. Is that fair enough?”
Appellant again responded “Yeah.”
3 Appellant did not admit that he intended to cause his
mother fear of bodily harm. Additionally, appellant did not acknowledge “the truth and
accuracy of the facts of the complaint” and so our review is limited only to the facts he
admitted on the record. Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. App. 2021).
The state relies on our recent decision in Woart v. State, No. A24-0023, 2024 WL
4113000 (Minn. App. Sept. 9, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2024). This reliance is
misguided for two reasons. First, our nonprecedential opinions are not binding and can
only be used as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Second,
despite some similarities, Woart is distinguishable from this case. We acknowledge that
both cases involve the same charge of fear-based domestic assault, in which the appellants
had an argument with the alleged victims. Id. at *1. Similarly, both appellants were asked

3 The supreme court has explicitly discouraged the use of leading questions to establish, as
the district court did here, the factual basis of a defendant’s guilty plea. Jones, 7 N.W.3d
at 396.
5
leading questions to establish the basis of their pleas and neither were expressly asked
whether they intended to cause the victims fear of bodily harm. Id. at *2. But Woart is
distinguishable because Woart engaged in a physical act towards the victim from which
his intent to cause fear could be inferred—he swung a pillowcase at her. Id. at *1. Here,
appellant did not admit to taking any physical action towards his mother that would provide
evidence of his intent. While he admitted that he yelled at his mother, he could not
remember what he said. Additionally, appellant stated that he smashed an egg carton on
the ground, not at or even towards his mother. For these reasons, Woart is distinguishable
and the state’s reliance upon it is unpersuasive.
The district court’s questions to appellant about putting his mother in fear of bodily
harm focus on whether appellant’s mother was in fear, not whether appellant intended to
cause her fear. But see Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308 (“The intent of the [defendant], as
contrasted with the effect upon the victim, [is] the focal point for inquiry.” (quotations
omitted)). Any answer appellant gave the district court in response to its leading questions
about how his mother felt was purely speculative because he could not know what his
mother was thinking or feeling at the time of their argument. Appellant did not admit that
he intended to cause his mother to fear bodily harm, and there was no supplemental
evidence for the district court to consider. See Rosendahl, 955 N.W.2d at 302. We
therefore conclude that there was an insufficient basis to establish the intent requirement
of the domestic-assault charge. Id. Accordingly, appellant entered an inaccurate guilty
plea and must be permitted to withdraw it to correct a manifest injustice.
Reversed and remanded.