Teresa Mae Lentz, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0034

Teresa Mae Lentz,
Appellant,

vs.

Minnesota Housing Finance Agency,
Respondent,

Woods of Elk River Station Association,
Defendant.

Filed August 18, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CV-24-698

Theresa M. Lentz, Elk River, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Kevin T. Dobie, Liebo, Weingarden, Dobie & Barbee, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order dismissing her complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Appellant argues that her complaint
states a claim that respondent’s foreclosure by advertisement was invalid and states a claim
2
that the foreclosure by advertisement violated her right to due process. Because the district
court correctly concluded that appellant’s complaint fails to state a claim, we affirm.
FACTS1
Appellant Teresa Mae Lentz executed a mortgage encumbering a residential
property. The property was subsequently foreclosed upon by respondent Minnesota
Housing Finance Agency. Minnesota Housing commenced foreclosure by advertisement ,
and on November 22, 2022, the Sherburne County Sheriff held a foreclosure sale at which
Minnesota Housing was the high bidder. Lentz did not redeem the property.
In May 2024, Lentz filed a complaint in district court alleging that the foreclosure
was invalid. She also simultaneously recorded a notice of lis pendens 2 in the county
recorder’s office. In September 2024, Minnesota Housing filed a motion to dismiss Lentz’s
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and to discharge the
notice of lis pendens. In response, Lentz filed a motion for a temporary injunction. In

1 The following facts are based on the allegations in Lentz’s complaint taken as true,
construing all reasonable inferences in favor of Lentz as the nonmoving party . See
Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021) (stating that
when reviewing a motion to dismiss, we “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true
and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” (quotation
omitted)).

2 A lis pendens is a notice, filed with the county recorder’s office, to inform “purchasers
and encumbrancers” of the pendency of a legal action regarding the “title to, or any
interest[s] in or lien upon, real property.” Minn. Stat. § 557.02 (2024); see also Black’s
Law Dictionary 1115 (12th ed. 2024) (defining lis pendens as “[a] notice, recorded in the
chain of title to real property, . . . to warn all persons that certain property is the subject
matter of litigation, and that any interests acquired during the pendency of the suit are
subject to its outcome”).
3
support of her motion, Lentz claimed for the first time that foreclosure by advertisement
deprived Lentz of her constitutional right to due process.
In October 2024, the district court held a hearing on Minnesota Housing’s motion
to dismiss and Lentz’s motion for a temporary injunction. In a written order, the district
court granted Minnesota Housing’s motion to dismiss Lentz’s complaint and discharged
the notice of lis pendens. The district court construed Lentz’s complaint, without objection,
to allege that “the requisites for foreclosure [by advertisement] have not all been complied
with.” The district court concluded that Lentz’s complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted because the complaint did not allege facts establishing
noncompliance with statutory foreclosure requirements. In the same order, the district
court also denied Lentz’s motion for temporary injunctive relief, concluding that Lentz
failed to establish a basis for injunctive relief.
Lentz appeals.
DECISION
Lentz challenges the district court’s order dismissing her complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.02(e). We review a district court order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant
to rule 12.02(e) “de novo to determine whether the pleadings set forth a legally sufficient
claim for relief.” Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Minn. 2020). In
conducting our review, we must “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Halva, 953 N.W.2d
at 500 (quotation omitted). But we are “not bound by legal conclusions stated in a
4
complaint when determining whether the complaint survives a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim.” Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008).
Lentz appears to argue that the district court erred in granting Minnesota Housing’s
motion to dismiss because her complaint stated a legally sufficient claim that Minnesota
Housing’s foreclosure by advertisement and subsequent sale of her property were invalid.
Lentz makes three primary arguments in support of her contention that her complaint stated
a legally sufficient claim. We discuss each argument in turn below.
Requisites for Foreclosure
Lentz first argues that the district court erred in granting Minnesota Housing’s
motion to dismiss because she stated a claim that Minnesota Housing did not meet the
statutory requisites for foreclosure by advertisement and thus the foreclosure sale of her
property was invalid. Section 580.02 sets forth the requisites for foreclosure by
advertisement. This section requires that a party foreclosing by advertisement comply with
Minnesota Statutes sections 580.021 (2024) and, if applicable, 582.043 (2024). Minn. Stat.
§ 580.02(4)-(5). Lentz argues that her complaint stated a claim that Minnesota Housing
did not comply with sections 580.021 and 582.043. We disagree.
Section 580.021 applies to foreclosures of mortgages by advertisement. Minn. Stat.
§ 580.021, subd. 1. This statute requires a party foreclosing on a mortgage to provide
information to the mortgagor notifying the mortgagor that foreclosure prevention
counseling services are available and that the foreclosing party will transmit the
mortgagor’s “name, address, and telephone number to an approved foreclosure prevention
agency.” Minn. Stat. § 580.021, subd. 2. The foreclosing party must provide the
5
mortgagor’s information to a foreclosure prevention agency within one week of providing
notice to the mortgagor. Id., subd. 3. But section 580.021 applies only “to foreclosure of
mortgages . . . on property consisting of one to four family dwelling units, one of which
the owner occupies as the owner’s principal place of residency.” Id., subd. 1.
Lentz argues that section 580.021 does not apply to her property and, as a result,
Minnesota Housing could not comply with one of the requirement s for foreclosure by
advertisement, thereby rendering the foreclosure invalid. See Minn. Stat. § 580.02(4). In
support of her argument, she notes that her complaint alleges that her property is part of a
building that consists of six family dwelling units, but section 580.021 applies only to
“foreclosure of mortgages . . . on property consisting of one to four family dwelling units.”
Minn. Stat. § 580.021, subd. 1. Consequently, she argues that her property is not subject
to section 580.021. But even accepting as true Lentz’s allegation in her complaint, and her
interpretation of section 580.021, the inapplicability of section 580.021 does not invalidate
the foreclosure. Instead, it merely relieves Minnesota Housing of complying with the
mortgage-counseling requirements under section 580.021. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 580.02(4), .021, subd. 1. Consequently, Lentz has failed to state a claim that Minnesota
Housing’s foreclosure by advertisement was invalid for failure to comply with section
580.021.
Lentz also argues that she stated a claim that Minnesota Housing did not meet the
requirements of foreclosure by advertisement because it did not comply with section
582.043. See Minn. Stat. § section 580.02(5) (requiring compliance with section 582.043
prior to foreclosure). Section 582.043 provides that if the loan servicer has received a “loss
6
mitigation application ” from the mortgagor, the loan servicer must evaluate the
mortgagor’s “loss mitigation options” before proceeding to foreclosure except as otherwise
provided. Minn. Stat. § 582.043, subds. 5(3), 6. A “[l]oss mitigation option” includes a
“forbearance agreement.” Id., subd. 1(c). A mortgagor has a cause of action to set aside
the foreclosure of a property if there is a violation of section 582.043, including the
requirement that the loan servicer cease foreclosure proceedings due to the existence of a
loss mitigation option. Id., subd. 7(a). But a mortgager can bring an action under section
582.043, subdivision 7(a), only if a lis pendens has been recorded prior to the expiration of
the mortgagor’s redemption period, and a failure to do so results in a “conclusive
presumption that the servicer has complied with [section 582. 043].” Id., subd. 7(b). A
mortgagor’s redemption period for a foreclosure by advertisement is either six or twelve
months after the foreclosure sale of the home, depending on the circumstances of the
mortgage. Minn. Stat. § 580.23, subds. 1-2 (2024).
Lentz’s complaint alleges that Minnesota Housing’s loan servicer approved her for
a forbearance plan. As stated by the district court in its order, this allegation “raises a
potential claim” to set aside the foreclosure sale of Lentz’s property under section 582.043.
But Lentz’s complaint does not allege that she recorded a lis pendens prior to the expiration
of the statutory redemption period as provided by section 580.23. See Minn. Stat.
§ 582.043, subd. 7(b) (explaining that to obtain relief under section 582.043, the mortgagor
must file a notice of lis pendens within the redemption period as provided for by section
580.23). Instead, the complaint alleges that the sheriff’s sale of the property occurred on
November 22, 2022, and that Lentz filed the notice of lis pendens with her complaint in
7
May 2024, about one-and-one-half years after the foreclosure sale. Thus, the filing of the
lis pendens was well after the expiration of either the six or twelve-month redemption
period provided for by section 580.23. Because Lentz’s complaint does not allege that she
recorded the lis pendens within the statutory redemption period, her complaint fails to state
a claim under section 582.043. Minn. Stat. § 582.043, subd. 7.
In sum, Lentz’s complaint does not “set forth a legally sufficient claim” that the
foreclosure of her property was invalid due to a failure to meet the requirements of a
foreclosure by advertisement as described by section 580.02. See Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 68.
Lack of Default
Lentz also argues that she stated a valid claim for relief on the basis that Minnesota
Housing’s foreclosure was invalid because she did not default on her mortgage. In support
of this argument, Lentz contends that she was not in default beca use her property was
subject to “fraudulent” assessments and an “unlawful” lien. But in her complaint, Lentz
does not allege specific facts to support such a claim. Instead, she simply asserts “there is
no default in the mortgage.” And, in both her complaint and her brief, she does not provide
any legal basis to support such a claim. Consequently, Lentz’s complaint does not set forth
a legally sufficient claim based on a lack of default on the mortgage. See id. (stating that
this court reviews a grant of a motion to dismiss “to determine whether the pleadings set
forth a legally sufficient claim for relief”); see also Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons
Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (stating that an argument based on “mere
8
assertion” unsupported by legal authority is forfeited “unless prejudicial error is obvious
on mere inspection”).3
Due Process
Lentz further argues that the district court erred in granting Minnesota Housing’s
motion to dismiss because foreclosure by advertisement deprived her of her constitutional
right to due process. Minnesota Housing responds that the Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected this same argument in Guidarelli v. Lazaretti. 233 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1975). We
agree with Minnesota Housing.
Lentz argues that foreclosure by advertisement violated her right to due process
because foreclosure by advertisement denied her an “opportunity to be heard . . . before
[her] home [was] sold at a sheriff’s sale.” In Guidarelli, the supreme court rejected the
argument that foreclosure by advertisement violates the mortgagor’s right to due process
because it deprives them of their property without a hearing prior to the sale. Id. at 892.
The supreme court reasoned that foreclosure by advertisement “provides for 4 weeks’ prior
notice before sale, it permits the mortgagor to redeem [her] property within either 6 months
or 1 year, and most importantly, [she] is not deprived of the use and possession of the

3 Lentz’s brief makes one other argument challenging the grant of the motion to dismiss.
Lentz argues that she was entitled to a “statement in writing showing the entire amount
remaining unpaid on the mortgage” pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 580.09 (2024).
Her brief asserts that she received no such document. But Lentz does not appear to have
asserted a claim on this basis in her complaint. Consequently, Lentz’s complaint does not
set forth a legally sufficient claim that she is entitled to relief based on a violation of section
580.09. See Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 68 (stating that this court reviews a grant of a motion to
dismiss “to determine whether the pleadings set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief”
(emphasis added)).
9
property prior to the public foreclosure sale.” Id. (footnotes omitted). Lentz makes no
argument distinguishing the circumstances of this case from Guidarelli, and we are bound
by supreme court precedent. State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010). Lentz’s due-process argument is unavailing.4
In sum, Lentz has not “set forth a legally sufficient claim” that Minnesota Housing’s
foreclosure and subsequent sale of her property failed to comply with statutory
requirements, was invalid due to lack of default, or violated her right to due process. See
Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 68. The district court therefore did not err when it granted Minnesota
Housing’s motion to dismiss Lentz’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.5 See id.
Affirmed.

4 In her brief, Lentz also appears to suggest that she was denied due process at the hearing
on Minnesota Housing’s motion to dismiss because the hearing started late and because
she was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. However, Lentz did not order a
transcript of the hearing, and as a result we cannot discern whether the motion hearing
complied with the requirements of due process. See Fischer v. Simon, 980 N.W.2d 142,
144 (Minn. 2022) (stating that “a party seeking review has a duty to see that the appellate
court is presented with a record which is sufficient to show the alleged errors” (quotation
omitted)).

5 To the extent that Lentz also challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for a
temporary injunction, Lentz makes no argument beyond her assignment of error. Because
we discern no prejudicial error on mere inspection, we conclude any such argument is
forfeited. See Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135 (stating that an assignment of error in a brief
based on “mere assertion” and not supported by argument or authority is forfeited unless
“prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection”).