A25-0147

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0036
A25-0147

In re the Matter of:

Anthony Michael Kautz, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Sarah Beth Moore,
Appellant,

Susan and Randy Kautz,
Respondents,

Sherri Kerpan, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 15, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-FA-22-341

Anthony Michael Kautz, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Sarah Beth Moore, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Susan and Randy Kautz, Maplewood, Minnesota (pro se respondents)

Kathryn M. Lammers, Hunter N. Kinsey, Heimerl & Lammers, LLC, Minnetonka,
Minnesota (for respondents Sherri Kerpan, et al.)

2
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant mother challenges the order granting respondent paternal grandparents’
petition for third-party custody and the order denying her motion for a new trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Sarah Beth Moore (mother) and respondent Anthony Michael Kautz
(father) are the unmarried parents of R.M.K. (child), who was born in January 2019.
Respondents Sherri Kerpan and Michael Kerpan are child’s maternal grandparents.
Respondents Susan Kautz and Randy Kautz are child’s paternal grandparents.1
Mother has a long history of mental- and chemical -health issues. She used
methadone while she was pregnant, and child was addicted to it at birth. After child was
born, grandmother sometimes observed parents “under the influence of something,”
prompting her to keep child at her home for “several days at a time.” In November, child
protection services (CPS) became involved with the family after mother’s dog bit child in
the face, requiring 17 stitches. The ensuing investigation raised concern s over parents’
drug use, and CPS developed a safety plan in which grandmother agreed to check in with
the family “daily.” Grandmother regularly cared for child in her home on the weekends
and took him to his medical appointments.

1 For ease of reference, we will refer to paternal grandparents as “grandparents.” We refer
to Susan Kautz as “grandmother” and Randy Kautz as “grandfather.”
3
In June 2022, parents failed to pick child up from daycare. T he daycare provider
cared for child until mother returned and took child to Oklahoma to reside with maternal
grandparents. While in Oklahoma, mother and child moved around, spending time in a
homeless shelter, and ending up with a family friend in September. Two months later,
mother and child returned to Minnesota without notice; they were eventually located at a
mall without adequate winter clothing. On November 29, mother was civilly committed
as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness. The order for commitment
includes findings that mother “is ill with Unspecified Psycho tic disorder, which is a
substantial psychiatric disorder of her thought, mood, perception, orientation, and
memory,” and consequently “engages in grossly disturbed behavior” that “poses a
substantial likelihood of causing physical harm.”
2
In the meantime, father initiated this paternity action.3 Both sets of grandparents
moved to intervene as interested third parties and requested custody of child. Mother asked
the district court to deny the motions and return child to her. After a hearing, the district
court permitted both sets of grandparents to seek custody as interested third parties and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing. It also awarded temporary legal and physical custody of
child to grandparents, requiring that child be placed in their home in February 2023.
A five-day custody trial commenced in early June 2023 and finished in March 2024.
At trial, the district court heard testimony from 15 witnesses and received dozens of

2 A later report identifies mother’s diagnosis as “Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum
disorder.”

3 Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, father was adjudicated child’s parent.
4
exhibits. Mother, father, grandparents, and maternal grandparents testified consistent with
the facts above.4 All parties testified to mother’s love for child. And, apart from mother,
all of the parties expressed their belief that mother is not able to care for child because of
her mental- and chemical-health issues.
Father explained that, before mother became pregnant with child, they lived in New
Orleans and used drugs “every day.” When mother learned she was pregnant, they moved
back to Minnesota. Father described his various struggles with chemicals, including stints
with inpatient treatment. When asked if mother was using drugs when they lived together,
father stated “[n]ot really” and indicated that she drank alcohol. He also acknowledged
that child was born addicted to methadone. When child began attending daycare, father
dropped him off in the morning. Mother was supposed to pick him up in the afternoon but
sometimes failed to do so. Father was hospitalized for kidney failure when he learned
mother had taken child to Oklahoma. Father urged the district court to grant grandparents’
request for custody because he believed it is in child’s best interests.
Grandmother testified that she and grandfather have been child’s daily caretakers
since they were awarded temporary custody. She was familiar with the prior daycare
issues, and she and grandfather were often called upon to pick up child. Gr andmother
described mother’s interactions with child prior to June 2022, including seeing mother
“dissociat[e].” During these episodes, child yelled and hit mother, who did not respond.

4 Mother was represented by counsel during t he first two days of trial and represented
herself thereafter.
5
Grandmother expressed other concerns about mother’s ability to care for child, noting child
often wore dirty diapers and slept “in urinated bedding.”
Maternal grandparents testified that they have custody of mother’s older son.
Maternal grandmother began having concerns about mother’s mental health while mother
was in high school. During summer 2022, maternal grandmother saw mother “sit on the
deck just staring for hours into space.” And when mother did speak, she used an unknown
language and “spell[ed] things out . . . including exclamation point or underlining.”
Mother stated that child did not live with grandparents before February 2023 and
that she had secured a job and an apartment with a bedroom for child. She acknowledged
that certain professionals describe her as having schizophrenia, but she denied receiving
any such diagnosis. Rather, she attribute d her 2022 mental-health issues to “post-acute
withdrawal syndrome. ” And she explained that she maintains her mental health by
attending church, recovery meetings, and weekly sessions with a marriage and family
therapist practitioner. When asked whether she has mental-health issues that require
treatment, mother stated she “require[s] continued abstinence from illicit substances.”
While she professed that she has been sober since June 2022, she later admitted drinking
alcohol, but not “in excess.”
At the conclusion of trial, father and grandparents requested that grandparents
receive sole legal and sole physical custody of child. Maternal grandparents supported that
request and asked for grandparent visitation . Mother requested joint legal and joint
physical custody with father. The district court filed an order (1) granting grandparents
sole legal and sole physical custody, (2) granting maternal grandparents visitation, and
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(3) restricting mother’s and father’s parenting time. The district court determined that clear
and convincing evidence shows mother and father abandoned, neglected, or otherwise
exhibited disregard for child’s wellbeing, child would be harmed by living with either
parent, and it is in child’s best interests to award custody to grandparents. Mother moved
for various relief, including a new trial, amended findings, transfer of the case to juvenile
court, and removal of the district court judge. The district court denied the motions, with
the exception of amending certain findings of fact concerning the exhibits received at trial.
Mother appeals.5
DECISION
Mother raises nine issues on appeal, which we reorder and consolidate into six
issues for clarity and ease of discussion: (1) the district court erred by permitting
grandparents to seek custody as interested third parties and proceeding with an evidentiary
hearing, (2) the district court erred by refusing to assign a guardian ad litem (GAL), (3) a
new trial is required because the district court judge was biased, (4) the district court abused
its discretion by permitting the same counsel to represent father and grandparents, (5) the
district court abused its discretion in its best-interests analysis and by awarding custody to
grandparents, and (6) the district court abused its discretion by restricting mother’s
parenting time.

5 Mother filed two appeals, which we consolidated by order filed February 10, 2025.
7
I. The district court did not err by permitting grandparents to seek custody as
interested third parties and conducting an evidentiary hearing.

We begin with mother’s assertion that the district court erred by granting
grandparents’ motion to intervene as interested third parties.6 Mother’s arguments on this
point are unclear. To the extent she challenges the January 2023 order permitting both sets
of grandparents to seek custody as interested third parties and setting an evidentiary
hearing, her argument is outside the scope of review of the orders she appealed —the
custody order and order denying her posttrial motions. But we “may review any order
affecting the order from which the appeal is taken.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. Because
the decision allowing grandparents to seek custody affect s the district court’s award of
custody to them, we exercise our discretion to review mother’s challenge.
A petition for third-party child custody must “state and allege” that the petitioner
satisfies 15 statutory conditions. Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 2(a) (2024). This petition
“must be verified by the petitioner,” and its allegations “must be . . . established by
competent evidence.” Id., subd. 2(b) (2024). A petition seek ing custody as an interested
third party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that placement of the child
with petitioner is in the child’s best interest. Id., subd. 7(a)(2) (2024). And the petitioner
must establish by clear and convincing evidence one of the following child-endangerment
factors:

6 Mother also argues that the district court erred by “awarding Third Party Custody based
on allegations of being De Facto Custodians.” This argument is unavailing. Grandparents
alleged in their petition that they were de facto custodians, but the district court only
permitted them to seek custody as interested third parties.
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(i) the parent has abandoned, neglected, or otherwise
exhibited disregard for the child’s well-being to the extent that
the child will be harmed by living with the parent;
(ii) placement of the child with the individual takes
priority over preserving the day-to-day parent-child
relationship because of the presence of physical or emotional
danger to the child, or both; or
(iii) other extraordinary circumstances.

Id., subd. 7(a)(1) (2024). If the petition and supporting affidavit sufficiently allege facts
that, if proven, would satisfy the statutory criteria, the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. Lewis-Miller v. Ross, 710 N.W.2d 565, 570 (Minn. 2006).
We review de novo the district court’s determination whether to grant an evidentiary
hearing on a third-party custody petition. See id. at 568-70 (reviewing de novo whether
district court applied correct standard in making that determination); cf. Boland v. Murtha,
800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that appellate courts review de novo
whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted on custody-modification motion).
The district court determined that the “petition and affidavits presented” by both
sets of grandparents sufficiently alleged facts entitling them to an evidentiary hearing. The
district court noted grandparents’ allegations that parents exhibited disregard for child’s
wellbeing, neither parent was able to care for child due to their chemical-health issues and
mother’s mental-health issues, and “placement with either parent would harm the child.”
Mother takes issue with the district court’s reference to grandparents as being
child’s primary caregivers and providing financial support to child. But grandparents’
verified petition alleged that they were child’s primary caregivers since birth , caring for
him overnight “nearly every weekend,” “pick[ing] the child up from child care,” and
9
providing food and clothing. And it alleged that mother was “in the hospital . . . after
suffering a mental health crisis” and was unable to care for child. These allegations, if
proved, would establish that parents abandoned, neglected, or disregarded child’s
wellbeing under Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(a)(1)(i). On this record, we discern no
error by the district court in permitting grandparents to seek custody as interested third
parties and conducting an evidentiary hearing.
II. Mother is not entitled to relief based on the district court’s failure to appoint a
GAL.

If a district court has “reason to believe” that a child is a “victim of domestic abuse
or neglect . . . the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem.” Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2
(2024). “The guardian ad litem shall represent the interests of the child and advise the
court with respect to custody and parenting time.” Id. We review the appointment of a
mandatory GAL de novo. See J.A.S. v. R.J.S., 524 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn. App. 19 94)
(concluding district court erred by not appointing mandatory GAL when circumstances
presented “at least a threshold” indication of abuse).
The issue of appointing a GAL was raised at two points during the district court
proceedings. First, before trial, maternal grandparents moved the district court to appoint
a mandatory GAL under Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2. During the related hearing, mother
urged the district court to “deny . . . [the] proposed intervening parties’ motions in their
entirety,” and the district court did just that. To the extent that mother argues the district
court erred by denying maternal grandparents’ motion to appoint a GAL, as she requested,
mother waived this argument. See Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn. , 895
10
N.W.2d 623, 631 (Minn. 2017) (stating that “[w]aiver is the intentional relinquishment of
a known right” (quotation omitted)).
Second, as part of her motion for a new trial, mother argued that the district court
erroneously denied “several requests” to appoint a mandatory GAL. When asked at the
subsequent motion hearing if she had made such a request, mother vaguely asserted that
her attorney did so during a pretrial “meeting . . . or hearing,” and argued that “[w]hether
the parties request one does not change that the appointment is mandatory.” The district
court rejected mother’s argument, stating that “there are no issues pending before the Court
for which appointment of a [GAL] would be appropriate.” We see no error in the district
court’s decision not to appoint a GAL after trial because the issues of custody and parenting
time were already decided. As such, there were no tasks for a GAL to complete or custody-
related issues on which to advise the court. See Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subds. 2 (stating
that the GAL “shall represent the interests of the child and advise the court with respect to
custody and parenting time”), 2a (describing responsibilities of a GAL) (2024).
III. Mother is not entitled to a new trial based on judicial bias.
A judge may not hear a case in which they would be disqualified for bias under the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct. Minn. R. Civ. P. 63.02; Minn. Code of Jud. Conduct
2.11(A)(1) (stating a judge must disqualify themself when their “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned,” including when they have personal bias against a party). We
presume that a district court judge properly discharged their judicial duties. Hannon v.
State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). And we do not infer bias from adverse rulings
11
but examine the whole record for indications of favoritism or antagonism. Olson v. Olson,
392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986).
Mother contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court judge
was biased against her. 7 She cites as indicative of bias the judge’s: previous experience
with civil-commitment and mental-health court cases; generally favoring “one party over
another”; and statement in the order denying mother’s posttrial motions that mother’s
objections to the custody decision “lack merit and are not supported by law.” Mother’s
briefing does not include any legal support for these arguments. We do not consider
inadequately briefed issues. Lighthouse Mgmt. Inc. v. Oberg Fam. Farms, 966 N.W.2d 29,
40 (Minn. App. 2021) (stating that arguments not adequately briefed are forfeited), rev.
denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2021). Indeed, an “assignment of error based on mere assertion
. . . is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on
mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135
(Minn. 1971).
Moreover, our careful review of the entire record reveals no bias. To the contrary,
the judge appropriately advised the parties that she “practiced in [mental-health court] for
years” when discussing the admissibility of mother’s civil-commitment records. To the
extent mother contests the admission of these records, we see no obvious error in the district

7 After the custody order was filed, mother sought to remove the district court judge for
bias. The judge denied her motion in a detailed written order. Mother does not appear to
challenge this order on appeal and did not follow the process for removing a judge in the
district court. See Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 106 (stating that a removal motion “shall be heard
in the first instance by the judge sought to be removed” and if the motion is denied, “it may
subsequently be heard and reconsidered by the Chief Judge of the district”).
12
court’s discretionary evidentiary ruling. See Aljubailah v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638, 644
(Minn. App. 2017) (stating that “[r]ulings on the admissibility of evidence lie within the
district court’s discretion”). Nor do adverse rulings—in and of themselves— indicate
judicial bias. Olson, 392 N.W.2d at 341. And the judge’s statement that mother’s new-
trial arguments “lack merit and are not supported by law” reflects that the judge considered
and rejected them; it does not demonstrate bias.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the same lawyers
to represent father and grandparents.

Under Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a), “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” A concurrent conflict of interest
exists when “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.” Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 1.7(a)(2). When determining whether such a conflict exists, “ [t]he critical
questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does,
whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued
on behalf of the client.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt. 8. We review a district court’s
refusal to discharge a lawyer for a conflict of interest for an abuse of discretion. M.M. v.
R.R.M., 358 N.W.2d 86, 90 (Minn. App. 1984); see also State by Swanson v. 3M Co. , 845
N.W.2d 808, 816 (Minn. 2014).
Mother argues that allowing the same lawyers to represent father and grandparents
“created a concurrent and successive conflict of interest” under Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7
13
and 1.8 (specific rules for conflicts of interest involving current clients). 8 Assuming
without deciding that mother has standing to make this argument, it fails because she has
not identified a conflict of interest.
L.K.U. and S.A.C. (collectively, counsel) represented father and grandparents
during the district court proceedings. When father initiated this action in October 2022, he
simply asked the court to award “custody and parenting time that is in the minor child’s
best interests.” After grandparents petitioned for custody, father joined their request,
attesting by affidavit that child should “be placed in the care of [his] parents” because he
was working on his substance-abuse issues. I n May 2023, father filed an affidavit stating
that he wanted to “share custody” of child with mother. When later questioned by the
district court, father explained under oath that he did sign the affidavits but still wishes for
his parents to pursue third-party custody of child. And he expressed his desire to proceed
to trial with counsel representing him and grandparents.
During the fourth day of trial, mother presented a letter, which was not received in
evidence, that purported to be a stipulation between her and father for mother to have “sole
custody.” L.K.U. contemporaneously informed the district court that grandparents wished
to offer CPS records as exhibits but father “may not [have] want[ed]” the same. After
directing counsel to speak with father off the record, the district court again questioned
father under oath about his position as to custody. Father testified that he wanted counsel

8 Mother also cites Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9 (duties to former clients) and 1.10
(imputation of conflicts of interest to law firm). We need not address her arguments
because rules 1.9 and 1.10 do not govern concurrent representation of clients.
14
to argue for custody to be awarded to grandparents, which he understood to mean that his
parents would be “in control” of child. As to the letter mother offered, father stated that it
“was just to show that I am starting to have faith in [mother’s] parenting ability” and that
he did not mean for it to change his position. As to admission of the CPS records, father
said, “I guess I’ll have to go with [grandmother’s] decision.” Father also affirmed that he
wanted counsel to continue representing him. Based on father’s testimony, the court found
“that there is not a conflict between [his] and [grandparents’] positions.”
On this record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to disqualify counsel. Each time f ather seemed to change his position as to
custody, the district court thoroughly addressed the issue with counsel and father. Each
time, father confirmed that his position remained the same as grandparents— that
grandparents be awarded sole legal and sole physical custody of child. In short, we are
convinced that counsel’s concurrent representation of father and grandparents did not
materially interfere with counsel’s exercise of independent professional judgment and did
not compromise their representation of father or grandparents.
V. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting grandparents’
petition for third-party custody.

Our review of a district court’s third-party custody determination is generally
limited to determining whether the district court has abused its discretion. Lewis-Miller,
710 N.W.2d at 568. A district court abuses its discretion by making unsupported findings
of fact or by improperly implying the law. Ramirez v. Luna, 830 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn.
15
App. 2013). We will not set aside a district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but we review questions of law de novo. Id.
As noted above, a person seeking to obtain custody of a child as an interested third
party must “show by clear and convincing evidence that one of the [ child-endangerment]
factors exists.” Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(a)(1). If they do so, they must also “prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the child” to be in their
custody and present clear and convincing evidence that they do not have a disqualifying
criminal conviction. Id., subd. 7(a)(2), (3). In determining whether a petitioner is entitled
to third-party custody, the district court considers eight statutory factors:
(1) the amount of involvement the interested third party
had with the child during the parent ’s absence or during the
child’s lifetime;
(2) the amount of involvement the parent had with the
child during the parent’s absence;
(3) the presence or involvement of other interested third
parties;
(4) the facts and circumstances of the parent’s absence;
(5) the parent’s refusal to comply with conditions for
retaining custody set forth in previous court orders;
(6) whether the parent now seeking custody was
previously prevented from doing so as a result of domestic
violence;
(7) whether a sibling of the child is already in the care
of the interested third party; and
(8) the existence of a standby custody designation under
chapter 257B.

Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(b) (2024). And in determining the child’s best interests,
the district court considers 12 additional factors including, in relevant part:
(3) the child’s primary caretaker;
(4) the intimacy of the relationship between each party
and the child;
16
. . . .
(7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining
continuity;
. . . .
(9) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved . . . ;
(10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give
the child love, affection, and guidance, and to continue
educating and raising the child in the child’s culture and
religion or creed, if any;
(11) the child’s cultural background; and
(12) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser,
if related to domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01,
subdivision 2, that has occurred between the parents or the
parties.

Minn. Stat. § 257C.04, subd. 1(a) (2024).
In granting grandparents’ petition, the district court analyzed and made detailed
findings as to the 8 interested third-party factors and the 12 best-interests factors. And it
carefully weighed the best-interests factors, ultimately determining that “it is in the child’s
best interests for [grandparents] to be awarded third party custody.”
Mother advances three general challenges to the custody determination, arguing:
(1) the district court erred by considering inadmissible evidence, (2) the district court
clearly erred in numerous findings of fact, and (3) the district court’s analysis of six of the
best-interests factors is unsupported by the findings of fact. None of these contentions
persuades us to reverse.
Inadmissible Evidence
Mother first contends that the district court erred by considering a psychological-
evaluation report (the report) that she offered but the court did not receive when making its
17
credibility determinations.9 She asserts this error violated her right to due process, which
includes the “right to a reasonable decision based solely on the record.” In re Welfare of
Child. of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008).
In its custody order, the district court found that mother’s civil-commitment records
were the “most informative and credible evidence” of her mental and chemical health and
that “other documents ”—including the report—were not as credible because they were
based solely on mother’s self-reporting. In response to mother’s new -trial motion, the
district court amended the order to reflect that it had not received the report as evidence.
But the court expressly concluded that the challenged findings as to mother’s mental health
“are still supported by other evidence properly received elsewhere in the record.”
The record supports this conclusion. The district court received conflicting
evidence about mother’s mental and chemical health, including her civil-commitment
records; testimony from both grandmothers describing mother’s mental state in 2022; and
mother’s testimony that she was “never” diagnosed with schizophrenia, believes she
experienced only “post-acute withdrawal syndrome,” and does not currently have a mental-
health diagnosis. It was the district court’s responsibility to weigh the evidence and make
credibility determinations, to which we defer. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468,
472 (Minn. App. 2000).

9 Mother also seeks a writ of prohibition barring the district court from considering
excluded evidence, basing “future decisions on stale evidence from” the civil-commitment
orders, and to “prevent[] further procedural errors.” Because m other did not seek a writ
pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 120.01-.04, we do not consider this request.
18
Findings of Fact
Mother challenges numerous findings of fact, which we review for clear error.
Ramirez, 830 N.W.2d at 166. Under the clear-error standard, we will not reweigh evidence,
engage in fact -finding, or reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); see also Ewald v. Nedrebo, 999 N.W.2d
546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Kenney in a family -law appeal), rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 28, 2024). Accordingly, we “need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence
to prove or demonstrate the correctness” of the district court’s findings. Kenney, 963
N.W.2d at 222.
We agree with mother that the following findings are clearly erroneous: (1) that
“[mother and father] have a criminal history, including drug possession charges”; and
(2) that mother “has participated in multiple mental and chemical health treatment
programs during her life, recently including a civil commitment on February 24, 2023,
NuWay treatment, Adult and Teen Challenge, and others.” The first of these findings lacks
record support; maternal grandmother’s testimony regarding bailing mother out of jail does
not reference the nature of the criminal charges. The second finding is contrary to the
record to the extent that Adult and Teen Challenge is mother’s employer, not one of her
treatment providers.
But our review of the entire record convinces us that these erroneous findings of
fact are harmless. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring error to be disregarded when it “does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties”). To persuade us otherwise, mother argues
that these findings impacted the court’s credibility determinations , prejudiced her, and
19
“materially affected [the] custody decision.” We disagree. Aside from the single finding
regarding drug-possession charges, the district court’s order does not mention any aspect
of mother’s criminal history and there is no indication that the district court relied on it in
evaluating mother’s credibility. And we see no prejudice from the erroneous inclusion of
Adult and Teen Challenge when discussing mother’s past treatment.
We discern no error in the remainder of the challenged findings of fact because they
are supported by the record. Indeed, mother’s arguments are best characterized as
reflecting her disagreement with how the district court weighed conflicting evidence, not a
lack of supporting evidence. But the fact that the record could support different findings
does not mean that the district court’s finding are clearly erroneous. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
at 223 (stating that if the “record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary” (quotation omitted)).
Best-Interests Determinations
Mother next argues that the district court abused its discretion in analyzing 6 of the
12 best-interests factors. The district court determined that factors 3 (child’s primary
caretaker), 4 (intimacy of the relationship between each party and child), 7 (length of time
child has lived in a stable environment), 10 (capacity of parties to love child and continue
raising in child’s culture and religion), and 12 (effect on child of the actions of abuser)
weighed in favor of granting custody to grandparents. The district court found that factor
20
11 (child’s cultural background) was neutral.10 Mother generally argues that each of these
factors weigh in her favor. And she contends that the “excessive prolonging of trial”
contributed to the district court’s decision to grant custody to grandparents. We are not
persuaded for three reasons.
First, many of the best -interests findings flow from the district court’s credibility
determinations. The district court noted that it “has concerns about the credibility of
significant portions of [mother’s] testimony. ” In contrast, it found both maternal and
paternal grandparents’ testimony “highly credible.” We do not reweigh such
determinations or substitute our judgment for that of the district court. Kenney, 963
N.W.2d at 221.
Second, all of the district court’s challenged best-interests findings are supported by
the record. As to factor 3, the district court identified multiple caretakers, including all of
the parties. It found that grandparents have been child’s primary caretakers since February
2023, and that this factor favors grandparents because they “have been reliable caregivers
and have provided the most consistent and stable primary care [child] has had since his
birth.” The record supports the district court’s analysis of this factor.
In reviewing factor 4, the intimacy of the relationship between each party and child,
the district court observed that all parties have a “fair degree of intimacy” and a “close
relationship” with child. The district court also stated it “does not doubt that Mother and
[child] love each other,” but found that mother’s lack of consistent, safe care for child can

10 The district court also found that the remaining best-interests factors were neut ral or
weighed in favor of granting grandparents’ custody request.
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impair the parent-child connection. In the end, the district court determined this factor
favors grandparents, noting their consistent caregiving since child’s birth. These findings
are supported by the record, as described above.
The district court determined factor 7, the length of time child has lived in a stable
environment, weighs in favor of grandparents because child “has lived with [grandparents]
for over a year . . . . [And child] experienced significant instability and turmoil for the first
several years of his life” when parents were primarily responsible for child. Mother points
to the CPS records as evidence that child was in a stable environment for “more than” two
years while in her care. But the record demonstrates that parents lacked stable housing
during those years, grandmother was an integral part of CPS’s safety plan for child, and
grandmother cared for child on numerous occasions because parents did not do so.
As to factors 10 and 11, the capacity of the parties to love and raise child in child’s
culture and religion, and child’s cultural background , the district court found that
grandparents demonstrated love for child; they will “continue educating and raising [child]
within a Christian belief system, as shown by them enrolling [child] in a Catholic school
and agreeing to raise him in a Christian fait h,” and “[a]ll parties share the same Euro-
Christian culture.” The record supports these findings. Mother ’s contention that a
“Catholic school is insufficiently aligned with the child’s specified religion” does not
persuade us otherwise. Moreover, the district court addressed mother’s wish to raise the
child within her faith tradition by repeatedly modifying her parenting time during the
course of the trial so she could bring child to her church services.
22
As to factor 12, the effect on child of an abuser’s actions, the district court
determined this finding favors grandparents because there are “no allegations of domestic
abuse by” them. This finding is supported by the record, which includes a January 2023
amended order for protection prohibiting father from having contact with mother. 11
Finally, we note that this five-day custody trial took place over nine months, during
which time child lived with grandparents and mother was not able to assume a caretaker
role. But district courts have “great discretion to determine the procedural calendar of a
case.” Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 412 (Minn. 1982). In addressing mother’s concerns,
the district court noted “[g]iven the complex and sensitive nature of this case, [the court]
was deliberate in its efforts to provide extensive trial time, so as not to deprive any party
the opportunity to fully and adequately present their case.” We do not doubt that the district
court made efforts to timely resolve this custody dispute.
Because all but two of the challenged findings of fact are supported by the record
and the two erroneous findings are harmless error, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by awarding legal and physical custody of child to grandparents.
VI. The district court did not abuse its discretion by restricting mother’s parenting
time.

Under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(b) (2024), if a district court finds, “after a
hearing, that parenting time with a parent is likely to endanger the child’s physical, mental,
or emotional health or safety or impair the child’s emotional development, the court shall
restrict parenting time with that parent as to time, place, duration, or supervision.” We

11 The order for protection was granted after father did not appear for a hearing.
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review a district court’s parenting-time decisions for an abuse of discretion. Suleski v.
Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 2014).
The district court determined that granting mother unsupervised and unlimited
parenting time “is likely to endanger [child’s] physical and emotional health and impair his
emotional development.” Accordingly, the court awarded mother supervised parenting
time every Tuesday and Thursday from 5:00 to 7:30 p.m., every Saturday from 11:00 a.m.
to 6:30 p.m. (including 2.5 hours of unsupervised parenting time every other Saturday),
and on certain holidays. Mother’s parenting time is also contingent on her attending
therapy and maintaining sobriety.
Mother argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing these restrictions,
particularly without making specific findings of endangerment. We are not persuaded. In
restricting mother’s parenting time, the district court explicitly referenced the
approximately 12 pages of findings it made on the 8 interested-party factors and 12 best-
interests factors. For example, the district court explained that mother “clearly wants to be
more involved with [child], but the Court believes restrictions on her involvement are
warranted at this time due to [mother’s] mental and chemical health history and her
repeated refusal to acknowledge, and take appropriate steps to treat, these issues.” Because
the district court carefully evaluated mother’s parenting-time request and the record
supports its determinations, we see no abuse of discretion.
In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in permitting
grandparents to seek custody as interested third parties and awarding them sole legal and
sole physical custody of child and restricting mother’s parenting time. We do not doubt
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mother’s expressed love for child and desire to care for him. And we observe, as the district
court did, that grandparents are “supportive of reasonable contact” between child and
mother and that mother will likely continue to have a place in child’s life in the years ahead.
Affirmed.