In the Matter of the Eligibility of R.M.C. for Crime Victim Reimbursement - Reimbursement Claim No. 048733.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0040

In the Matter of the Eligibility of
R.M.C. for Crime Victim Reimbursement -
Reimbursement Claim No. 048733.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed
Segal, Judge*

Minnesota Crime Victims Reimbursement Board
File No. OAH 21-2401-39705

Francis Herbert White, III, Francis White Law, PLLC, Woodbury, Minnesota (for relator
RMC)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Nathan J. Hartshorn, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Crime Victims Reimbursement Board)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Segal ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Judge
Relator R.M.C. appeals from a decision of respondent Minnesota Crime Victims
Reimbursement Board (the board) to deny reimbursement of expenses that R.M.C. claims
were incurred as a direct result of a crime committed against her mother, A.M. The board
denied the claim for reimbursement on the grounds that (1) the claim was untimely and

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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(2) the expenses for which R.M.C. sought reimbursement were not a direct result of injuries
incurred by R.M.C.’s mother due to a crime. Because the board did not make any errors
of law and the board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
A.M. was in her 90’s at times relevant here and suffered from Alzheimer’s disease,
diabetes, and other conditions. 1 From about 2014 until August 2017, A.M. lived with
R.M.C. Between August and September 2017, A.M. was placed at Catholic Elder Care
(CEC), while A.M. recovered from pneumonia. This was A.M.’s first stay at a care facility.
After A.M.’s return to R.M.C.’s home, R.M.C. “observed a marked change in A.M.’s
behavior,” including that she “began refusing to participate in bathing and changing with
at-home caregivers and did not tolerate any male caregivers.”2
In early December 2017, A.M. was referred to a dermatologist who took cultures of
lesions that appeared on A.M.’s buttocks. The test results, issued on December 7, 2017,
showed that A.M. was infected with herpes virus type two (HSV-2). HSV-2 is “a sexually
transmitted infection that emerges in the genital area that can be spread through sexual
intercourse, oral contact, or skin to skin contact.” A.M.’s physician commented that this
diagnosis “was a new and notable finding” that “raised concerns for sexual abuse of a

1 The facts are summarized from the findings of fact adopted by the board that are not
disputed by R.M.C. and the exhibits in the record. Because R.M.C. did not order any of
the transcripts from the contested-case hearing in this matter, the record before us on appeal
is limited to the board’s findings and decision, recommendation of the administrative-law
judge, and the exhibits.

2 All quoted statements in this section are from the findings of fact adopted by the board.
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vulnerable adult.” As noted in the findings, R.M.C. represented that, “[t]o the best of [her]
knowledge, neither of her parents[, A.M. or A.M.’s late husband,] were ever diagnosed
with any sexually transmitted disease” prior to the December 7 diagnosis.
In January 2018, A.M. was readmitted for two weeks to CEC for rehabilitation for
injuries due to a fall and a urinary tract infection. Two months after A.M.’s discharge, a
second test with cultures taken from new skin lesions also came back positive for HSV-2.
One of A.M.’s doctors then filed a report of possible maltreatment of a vulnerable adult.
In response to the report, the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) conducted an
investigatory visit to CEC in September 2018 . After completing its investigation, MDH
concluded that it “could not confirm that abuse of A.M. occurred.”
As A.M.’s Alzheimer’s progressed, A.M. transitioned from living with R.M.C. to
residing in care facilities. Between March 2018 and her death in May 2021, A.M. lived in
five different facilities. She “suffered serious falls” at some of these facilities, two of which
were the subject of lawsuits initiated by R.M.C. A.M.’s final residence was English Rose
Suites and Home Care where she lived for the last eight months of her life. According to
the exhibits in the record, English Rose was able to provide personal cares for A.M. by
female-only staff.
On December 16, 2020, R.M.C. submitted a claim to the board on behalf of A.M.’s
estate for reimbursement of expenses incurred for A.M.’s care at the care facilities and for
music and massage therapy. R.M.C. asserted that the expenses were incurred as a result of
an alleged sexual assault that A.M. suffered during her first stay at CEC. On the same day
that she submitted the claim, R.M.C. reported the alleged sexual assault to law
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enforcement. Law enforcement advised R.M.C. that they would not open an active
investigation into a possible sexual assault of A.M. at CEC because MDH had already
investigated the allegation in 2018.
In May 2021, the board denied R.M.C.’s reimbursement claim, citing insufficient
evidence that A.M. was the victim of a crime. R.M.C. requested reconsideration and the
board reversed its initial determination and found that A.M. was a crime victim. The board
then reviewed the expenses submitted by R.M.C. for reimbursement, which included, as
relevant to this appeal, $99,500 for the entry fee and care of A.M. at English Rose.3 The
board denied reimbursement for the expenses.
R.M.C. sought reconsideration but the board affirmed its decision. The board noted
that it denied reimbursement for the English Rose expenses because “the victim’s
placement there was for medical care and treatment that was unrelated to the crime.”
R.M.C. then appealed the board’s decision to an administrative-law judge (ALJ),
who held a contested-case hearing. The ALJ recommended that the board affirm its denial
of R.M.C.’s claim. The ALJ reasoned that R.M.C. filed her claim outside of the three-year
statute-of-limitations period and failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
English Rose expenses were incurred as a direct result of the alleged sexual assault.
R.M.C. submitted exceptions to the ALJ’s recommendation and the parties
presented arguments to the board. The board adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact,

3 R.M.C. initially sought reimbursement for all of A.M.’s placements at care facilities
beginning in March 2018, along with the costs of music and massage therapy, and personal
care attendants. It appears from the record that R.M.C. dropped her claims for these other
expenses prior to the board’s final decision.
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conclusions of law, and recommendation “in their entirety,” and affirmed its prior denial
of R.M.C.’s claim. The board agreed that R.M.C.’s claim was untimely because she did
not submit it until December 16, 2020, and the applicable limitations period for seeking
reimbursement expired on December 7, 20 20, three years after the date that A.M. was
diagnosed with HSV- 2. The board also concluded that R.M.C. had not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the English Rose expenses were incurred as a direct
result of A.M.’s sexual assault.
This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
R.M.C.’s challenge to the board’s decision is subject to the standard of review set
out in the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 14.001-.69 (2024). See
Minn. Stat. §§ 14.63 (providing for certiorari appeal from agency decision following
contested case), 611A.57, subd. 5 (2024) (providing that, where the board denies
reimbursement after reconsideration, claimants are “entitled to a contested case hearing
within the meaning of [the administrative procedure act].”). As relevant here, when
reviewing the board’s decision, we
may affirm the decision . . . or remand the case for further
proceedings; or [we] may reverse or modify the decision if the
substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced
because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or
decisions are:
. . . .
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted.

Minn. Stat. § 14.69.
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“[T]he substantial-evidence standard governs judicial review of factual issues
requiring agency judgment.” In re PolyMet Mining, Inc., 965 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. App.
2021) (citing In re Application of Minn. Power for Auth. to Increase Rates for Elec. Serv.,
838 N.W.2d 747, 757 (Minn. 2013)). A decision is supported by substantial evidence if
there is “such evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” In re Restorff, 932 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). This
standard requires “more than a scintilla of evidence, more than ‘some’ evidence, and more
than ‘any’ evidence.” Webster v. Hennepin County, 910 N.W.2d 420, 428 (Minn. 2018).
In our analysis, we address first R.M.C.’s challenge to the board’s decision to deny
her claim for reimbursement for lack of timeliness, and then review R.M.C.’s argument
that the English Rose expenses were a direct result of the crime of sexual assault against
R.M.C.
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I. We discern no error in the board’s determination that the claim for expense
reimbursement was untimely.

The Minnesota Crime Victims Reimbursement Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.51-.68
(2024), provides for the reimbursement of economic loss incurred by claimants as the result
of a crime. 5 Claims for reimbursement under the act must be filed with the board within

4 As noted above, the board determined that A.M. was the victim of a crime. We rely on
this determination in our analysis and make no independent assessment of whether, when,
or where an assault occurred.

5 In 2023, the legislature amended the Minnesota Crime Victims Reimbursement Act to
replace the word “reparations” with the word “reimbursement.” See 2023 Minn. Laws
ch. 52, art. 5, § 56- 73, at 907-14. Consequently, we refer in this opinion to the claim as
one for “reimbursement.” See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617
7
three years after the date of a crime victim’s injury or death except, as relevant here, “if the
victim’s injury or death was not reasonably discoverable within three years of the injury
or death, then the claim can be made within three years of the time when the injury or death
is reasonably discoverable.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.53, subd. 2(5) (emphasis added).
R.M.C. contends that the board erred in its determination that her claim for
reimbursement was untimely because it is not reasonable to conclude that A.M.’s injury
was discoverable on December 7, 2017, the date of the initial HSV-2 diagnosis. R.M.C.
maintains that it was not until A.M.’s second discharge from CEC in January 2018 that she
could have reasonably discovered the sexual assault. R.M.C. argues that if she knew that
her mother was sexually assaulted at CEC as of December 7, she never would have allowed
A.M. to be readmitted for care at CEC. She maintains that this proves that R.M.C. did not
know her mother was a crime victim as of December 7.
But, as R.M.C. acknowledges, the “reasonably discoverable” standard is an
objective standard, not a subjective standard. See id; cf. D.M.S. v. Barber, 645 N.W.2d
383, 387 (Minn. 2002) (stating that determining when the “delayed discovery” limitations
period for claims of sexual abuse begins to run “is answered through the application of the
objective, reasonable person standard”). Thus, the question is not when R.M.C. personally
came to the realization that her mother was the victim of a sexual assault, but when that
conclusion was “reasonably discoverable.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.53, subd. 2(5).

N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as
it exists at the time they rule on a case”).
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The evidence that A.M. was sexually assaulted during her first stay at CEC, as
R.M.C. herself represents, consists of two factors: (1) behavioral changes that R.M.C.
observed immediately upon A.M.’s release from A.M.’s first stay at CEC in September
2017; and (2) the HSV -2 diagnosis on December 7. Because knowledge of both factors
existed by December 7, we conclude that the board’s determination that A.M.’s injury was
reasonably discoverable on December 7, 2017, is supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the three-year limitations period began on December 7, 2017, and ended on
December 7, 2020 —nine days before R.M.C. filed her claim on behalf of A.M.’s estate.
We therefore see no basis to reverse the board’s decision.
II. The board’s determination that the English Rose expenses were not the direct
result of injuries caused by the sexual assault is supported by substantial
evidence in the record.

But even if we were to conclude that R.M.C.’s claim was timely filed, we still would
not reverse the board’s decision to deny the claim. The board determined that the care at
English Rose was required because A.M. suffered from Alzheimer’s and that the
Alzheimer’s, as explained in the ALJ’s recommendation, “was not caused by a criminal
act against A.M.” R.M.C. asserts that the board’s determination is contrary to the record
because it ignores the fact that she specifically chose English Rose for A.M.’s care because
the facility was able to provide female caregivers for A.M. We are not persuaded.
Under the crime victims reimbursement statute, crime victims are entitled to
reimbursement for “economic loss.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.53, subd. 1. “Economic loss” is
defined in the statute as “actual economic detriment incurred as a direct result of injury or
death.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.52, subd. 8(a). As both parties acknowledge, the phrase “direct
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result” has not previously been defined by the Minnesota Supreme Court or this court. 6
Nevertheless, the board and the parties all relied on the standard articulated by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Boettcher, which interpreted “result” in the context
of criminal restitution statutes. 931 N.W.2d 376, 380-81 (Minn. 2019).
In Boettcher, the supreme court affirmed that “[t]he general rule . . . is that a district
court may order restitution only for losses that are directly caused by, or follow naturally
as a consequence of, the defendant’s crime.” Id. at 381. We are persuaded that the plain-
language definition articulated in Boettcher is appropriate to apply in the context of crime
victim reimbursement. Accordingly, we interpret the phrase “direct result,” as it appears
in Minn. Stat. § 611A.52, subd. 8(a), to mean “directly caused by, or follow naturally as a
consequence of.” Id.
Turning to R.M.C.’s argument, she contends that the English Rose expenses
followed naturally as a consequence of A.M.’s sexual assault and that letters she submitted
from English Rose’s administrator and A.M.’s physician while at English Rose support her
claim. But these letters do not support R.M.C.’s position. The letters from the English
Rose administrator and physician, in fact, substantiate the board’s finding that “A.M.’s care
would have been required regardless of the alleged assault” because of A.M.’s
Alzheimer’s, history of falls, and other conditions.

6 “Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review.”
Pietsch v. Minn. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 683 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 2004). “If the
language of the [statute] is clear and free from ambiguity, we must give effect to the plain
meaning and give no deference to the agency’s interpretation.” In re Alexandria Lake Area
Sanitary Dist. NPDES/SDS Permit No. MN0040738, 763 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. 2009).
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The letter from the administrator explained that A.M. received one- on-one care to
address her Alzheimer’s symptoms and that interventions were put in place to address
“[A.M.’s] history of falls which caused an injury to her hip.” The letter from the
administrator stated that English Rose “accommodated” a “request . . . that female
caregivers provide personal cares to [A.M.].” The letter does not state that A.M.’s care at
the facility was necessitated by the crime or that English Rose was the only facility that
could provide female-only care. And the record shows that A.M. was placed at four other
care facilities between the time of the sexual assault and her stay at English Rose.
Similarly, the letter from the physician noted that “[A.M.] was admitted to [English
Rose] for her ongoing care following a traumatic fracture of the hip with blood loss anemia
and her advanced dementia with associated behaviors,” among other conditions.
Moreover, the physician expressly declined in the letter to opine that “[A.M.’s] placement
at [English Rose] was a ‘necessity and direct result of her sexual assault.’”
R.M.C. also argues that reimbursement is nevertheless required under the eggshell-
plaintiff doctrine. We disagree. The board’s decision is based on the lack of causation
between the crime and the need for care at the care facility—in other words that the English
Rose expenses were not a direct result of the sexual assault. But the eggshell-plaintiff
doctrine relates to the scope of damages that may be collected by a tort victim; it is not a
substitute for proof of causation. See Roye v. Munye, 702 N.W.2d 729, 742 (Minn. 2005)
(“[A] defendant should be responsible for the harm that the defendant caused even if the
harm is more severe because the plaintiff is more susceptible to injury—the eggshell
11
plaintiff doctrine.” (emphasis added)). The eggshell-plaintiff doctrine is therefore
inapplicable in this context.
We thus conclude that the board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in
the record.
Affirmed.