Presbyterian Family Foundation, On Behalf of Solveig C. Berg, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0060

Presbyterian Family Foundation,
On Behalf of Solveig C. Berg,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Neil Norby,
Appellant.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CV-24-1989

Alexander J. Hertogs, Sieben & Cotter, PLLC, South St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Dan D. Plambeck, Stefanson Plambeck & Foss, PLLP, Moorhead, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges a harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that the district
court abused its discretion by (1) issuing the HRO against him based on unsupported
findings of fact and legal error, and (2) denying his request for medical records. We affirm.
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FACTS
Solveig C. Berg is an 89-year-old woman subject to emergency guardianship.1 Berg
resides at an assisted living and memory-care facility (facility) in Moorhead. She moved
to the facility in 2021 with her late husband, who passed away in summer 2023. Berg is
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, depression, and high blood pressure; experiences pain
throughout her body; and takes medication four times daily to manage these conditions.
Berg resides in an apartment, but facility staff ensure that she receives her required
medications and help her with her daily cares, including showering and dressing.
Shortly after her husband’s death, Berg began receiving visits from appellant Robert
Neil Norby, who introduced himself to staff members as Berg’s “cousin.” After Norby
entered Berg’s life, staff noticed that she became “more withdrawn” and “confused,” and
did not leave her apartment. Berg began refusing to take her medication at Norby’s
direction. Norby then discontinued the services of Berg’s regular pharmacy provider;
canceled Berg’s appointments with her long -time medical providers; and discontinued
Berg’s receipt of hygiene, cleaning, and meal services from facility staff. Norby took Berg
to a new medical provider and began administering Berg’s medications and assisting with
her daily cares.
Over time, staff noticed that Berg’s appearance became “rundown,” and her health
significantly deteriorated. Her cognition declined to the point that she could no longer

1 In 2022, Berg was subject to general guardianship following a finding of incapacity. In
September 2023, Berg petitioned for and was granted a temporary substitute guardian. The
temporary guardian’s appointment expired in December 2023.
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speak; she was unable to stand, walk, or feed herself; she lost continence; and open sores
appeared on her legs. Eventually facility staff became so concerned that they sent Berg to
the hospital because her blood pressure was dangerously high.
In addition to taking over Berg’s health and personal-care routines, Norby expressed
great interest in her finances. Norby repeatedly asked facility staff and Berg’s attorney-in-
fact (attorney) how Berg paid her expenses, the location and status of her real estate
interests, and information about her other assets. Eventually, facility staff became aware
that Norby was “hid[ing]” Berg’s bills, which were going unpaid.
In May 2024, Norby took Berg to a meeting with her financial advisor and attempted
to transfer $415,000 of Berg’s funds to an account with a different bank. The financial
advisor refused to do so out of concern for Berg and reported the incident to police. In the
report, the financial advisor indicated that Norby—who introduced himself as Berg’s “new
husband”— effectively “dragg[ed]” Berg into the bank by “pull[ing] [her] backwards” on
her walker. And they noted that Berg did not appear to be “fully present mentally,” at one
point asking who the “client” was that they were discussing and reacting with a “shocked
expression” upon finding out it was her. The subsequent police investigation revealed that,
unbeknownst to attorney or facility staff, Norby had married Berg on April 19, 2024.
On June 5, based on communications with facility staff and county social services,
attorney petitioned for the appointment of respondent Presbyterian Family Foundation
(guardian) as emergency guardian and conservator over Berg. The next day, attorney
petitioned for an HRO against Norby on Berg’s behalf, alleging that Norby was harassing
Berg, a vulnerable adult, by financially exploiting her and denying her medical care. The
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district court granted an ex parte HRO. Norby opposed the HRO and requested a n
evidentiary hearing. Following guardian’s appointment, an amended HRO petition was
filed naming it as petitioner.
The evidentiary hearing took place on August 8, August 29, and September 5.
Attorney, guardian, and two facility staff members—a registered nurse and the executive
director—testified consistent with the facts described above. They also testified that,
following the issuance of the ex parte HRO, Berg was returned to the medication regimen
and care services she had received before Norby’s in tervention, yielding dramatic
improvements. At the time of the hearing, Berg no longer refused her medications; had
regained the ability to independently stand, walk, feed herself, and use the bathroom; and
was able to identify individuals and engage in conversation. In short, Berg had returned to
what the executive director described as her “baseline.”
Berg testified that she wants to see Norby and that he is “[her] husband.” She
acknowledged that she had stopped taking some medications but could not “recall”
canceling her pharmacy services. Berg testified that her health was “fine” while she was
off her prescribed medications and that she was only hospitalized for “dehydration.”
Norby testified that he had known Berg “most of [his] life.” He explained that they
had an on-and-off relationship for many years and that she had called him after her
husband’s death. He admitted marrying Berg but denied preventing her access to medical
care, explaining that the changes he made were to save her money and better address her
pain. He acknowledged setting up the appointment with Berg’s financial advisor but
contended that he did so at Berg’s request.
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Norby was the final witness called on the last day of the evidentiary hearing. During
his testimony, his attorney orally moved the district court to compel the production of
Berg’s medical records. Counsel asserted that the records were necessary to assess whether
Norby interfered in Berg’s care. Guardian objected to the request as untimely. The district
court agreed and denied the discovery request as “extremely late .” At the conclusion of
the hearing, the district court g ranted the HRO against Norby, concluding that “ [t]he
preponderance of the evidence supports a finding of intrusive . . . acts and words that have
had a substantial adverse effect on Ms. Berg.” The court reasoned that Berg was “being
harmed by [Norby’s] interference with her medical care, and there were people who were
having to look over her finances as a result of . . . Norby’s actions.”
Norby appeals.
DECISION
Norby argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) granting the HRO
and (2) denying his request for Berg’s medical records. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the HRO.
A district court may issue an HRO if it finds that “there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(b)(3) (2024). Harassment is defined, in relevant part, as “repeated incidents of
intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are
intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another,
regardless of the relationship between the actor and the intended target.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1)
(2024). This definition requires “both objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the
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part of the harasser and an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject
to harassing conduct.” Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App. 2006) , rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).
We review the issuance of an HRO for abuse of discretion. Kush v. Mathison, 683
N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). A district court
abuses its discretion when it makes findings of fact unsupported by the evidence,
misapplies the law, or renders a decision that is against logic and the facts in the record.
Wilson v. Wilson, 11 N.W.3d 331, 339 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17,
2024). We give “due regard” to the district court’s credibility determinations and will not
set aside its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Peterson v. Johnson, 755
N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
Norby contends that the district court abused its discretion by making clearly
erroneous findings of fact and misapplying the law. Neither argument persuades us to
reverse.
Findings of Fact
Norby first argues that two of the district court’s 15 factual findings are unsupported
by the record: (1) that Norby discontinued the bathing, meal, and house-keeping services
Berg enlisted, causing her to become “unkempt, run-down, and unclean to the point of
developing sores on her legs”; and (2) that the facility “discovered that Ms. Berg’s bills
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were being hidden in her apartment and were not being paid.” But these findings mirror
the testimony of the facility staff members. Both staff members testified that when Norby
stopped allowing them to help Berg with her daily cares, Berg began “look[ing] rundown,”
was unclean, and displayed open sores on her legs. And the executive director explained
that they were unable to help Berg pay her overdue medical expenses because the bills
were being “kept in [her] apartment hidden from [them].” This record amply supports the
district court’s challenged findings.
Norby next appears to challenge the district court’s credibility determinations and
assessment of the evidence presented at the harassment hearing by offering several
alternative interpretations of the evidence favorable to his position. But the district court—
having had the opportunity to observe the live testimony —is best positioned to weigh
evidence and assess witness credibility. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-23. That the evidence
might support contrary inferences or findings of fact does not make a district court’s
findings clearly erroneous. Id. at 223.
Legal Conclusions
Norby also challenges the district court’s conclusion that his conduct meets the
statutory definition of harassment. He does not dispute that interference with an
individual’s medical care or financial security can constitute harassment. But he contends
that (1) his actions we re not “objectively unreasonable” because he was responding to
Berg’s “request for help”; and (2) Berg desired his assistance and did not believe that his
conduct adversely affected her. We are not convinced for two reasons.
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First, Norby provides no authority for the proposition that an intent to help defeats
a finding that a person’s actions constitute harassment. Indeed, such a proposition is
contrary to the statutory language. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (defining
“harassment” as “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts . . . that have a substantial
adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect” (emphasis added)); Back
v. State, 902 N.W.2d 23, 32 (Minn. 2017) (stating that use of the disjunctive “or”
demonstrates the legislature intended to require only one of the multiple grounds listed);
see also Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 567 (explaining that harassment requires “objectively
unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser” (emphasis added)). Regardless
of his intent, Norby’s conduct prevented Berg from accessing stabilizing medical treatment
and personal cares critical to managing her chronic conditions. We see no error by the
district court in concluding that this conduct is objectively unreasonable.
Second, review of the record reveals that the district court considered Berg’s
expressed desire to see Norby but assigned it limited weight due to her dementia diagnosis,
guardianship status, “confus[ion]” over her medical care, and apparent lack of attention at
the hearing. The court also noted that Berg’s marriage to Norby is immaterial under the
harassment statute. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd 1(a)(1) (stating that harassment can occur
“regardless of the relationship between the actor and the intended target”). Moreover, the
HRO petition against Norby was brought on Berg’s behalf by guardian. See id., subd. 2(a)
(2024) (“A person who is the victim of harassment or the victim’s guardian . . . may seek
a restraining order from the district court . . . .” (emphasis added)). Given the timing of
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Berg’s marked physical and cognitive decline, guardian had an objectively reasonable
belief that Norby’s conduct had a substantial adverse effect on Berg.
In sum, we discern no clear error in the district court’s findings of fact or legal error
in its conclusion that Norby engaged in objectively unreasonable conduct that had a
substantial adverse effect on Berg’s safety, security, or privacy. Accordingly, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the HRO.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Norby’s late request
for Berg’s medical records.

On the last day of the evidentiary hearing, Norby orally moved the district court to
compel disclosure of Berg’s medical records. The district court denied the request as
“extremely late.” We will not disturb the denial of a motion to compel discovery absent
an abuse of discretion, Smith v. Kessen, 996 N.W.2d 581, 590 (Minn. App. 2023), rev.
denied (Minn. Jan. 31, 2024), which we do not discern here.
To persuade us otherwise, Norby argues that his motion was not “extremely late and
no prejudice to the parties could result” from sharing Berg’s records. But Norby could
have requested the records during the month that lapsed between his request for an
evidentiary hearing and when the hearing commenced. And he had another full month to
do so while the hearing transpired between August 8 and September 5. On this record, we
see no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Norby’s discovery request as
untimely.
Affirmed.