Jerry Lynn Schmidt, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0069

Jerry Lynn Schmidt,
Appellant,

vs.

James Ernest Grotluschen, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed August 18, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Wilkin County District Court
File No. 84-CV-23-366

Matthew J. Barber, Jessica A. Servais, Hannah R. Mielke, Phillip H. Wagner, Schwebel,
Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kendra E. Olson, Curtis D. Ripley, Pemberton Law, P.L.L.P., Fergus Falls, Minnesota
(for respondents)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant brought an action for negligence and vicarious liability against
respondents, a county employee and county department, after a snowplow driven by the
county employee collided with appellant’s pickup truck. Appellant challenges the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to respondents on the basis of official immunity and
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vicarious official immunity. Because the undisputed material facts, taken in the light most
favorable to appellant, establish that the county employee was engaged in discretionary
snow-removal activities within the course and scope of his employment when the collision
occurred, we affirm.
FACTS1
On January 28, 2022, following a snow event, respondent Wilkin County Highway
Department (the county) dispatched employees to plow and clear snow from roads in the
county. One of those employees was respondent James Ernest Grotluschen. Grotluschen
operated a motor grader with a plow and a wing blade attached (the snowplow). According
to the county, the wing blade was used to clear “snow off the shoulders to prevent drifting”
and to clear intersections of snow and debris. The clearing of snow from the road shoulders
occurred after the road had already been plowed.
On the morning in question, Grotluschen was clearing the shoulders of County Road
168 as he approached the intersection with Highway 9. A stop sign was posted at the
intersection for traffic traveling on County Road 168 but not for traffic on Highway 9. As
Grotluschen approached the intersection, he looked both ways for traffic and did not see
any vehicles. He then elected to proceed through the intersection without stopping because
he wanted “to clean off the shoulder at the intersection and did not want to leave behind
piles or ridges of snow at the intersection that can be caused by stopping or slowing down

1 The following facts are based on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to
appellant as the nonmoving party. See STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P.,
644 N.W.2d 72, 76- 77 (Minn. 2002) (stating that on appeal from summary judgment,
appellate courts view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party).
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too much.” When he went through the intersection, Grotluschen did not see appellant Jerry
Lynn Schmidt approaching on Highway 9. Grotluschen’s snowplow then struck Schmidt’s
vehicle, causing Schmidt’s vehicle to overturn.
Under Minnesota Statutes section 169.035, subdivision 1(a) (2024), all individuals
conducting work upon the highway, including snowplow operators, are exempt from
general traffic laws, including laws governing stopping at stop signs. In January 2022, at
the time of collision, the county had no written policy requiring snowplow operators to
stop at stop signs. According to the county supervisor in charge of road maintenance,
“plow operators have to use their own best judgment on how to best plow so the road
surface is smooth, without creating piles or ridges that can lead to drifting.” In his view,
“[h]ard and fast rules on how to plow wouldn’t work.” Instead, when a snowplow operator
approaches an intersection, the operator “has to make a judgment on how to plow based on
existing conditions because no two intersections are the same and the conditions can vary
from day to day.” Specifically, the snowplow operator needs to “take into account changes
in elevation at the intersection, the conditions of the road surface, the amount of the snow
or ice on the road, wind speed, direction and visibility, whether to slow or stop at an
intersection and other factors that may exist at the time.” When a snowplow operator is
driving a motor grader with a wing blade, “[s]topping at an intersection can . . . leave a
dangerous ridge of snow.” For these reasons, county snowplow operators “are not required
to stop at intersections.” Instead, “they have to make a decision whether it is safest to
continue plowing through the intersection or to slow and stop.”
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While there was no specific policy requiring snowplow operators to stop at
intersections, the Wilkin County Employee Handbook in effect at the time contained a
policy that required operators of county vehicles to “obey all traffic laws regarding the
operation of a motor vehicle.” And the Wilkin County Safety Program contained safety
policies including that county employees “[r]efrain from any unsafe act that might
endanger themselves, fellow workers, or others” and that they “[a]ssume their share of
responsibility for negligent or deliberate acts that cause injury to themselves, their fellow
workers or others.”
Schmidt sustained injuries as a result of the collision and filed suit seeking damages.
Schmidt alleged negligence on the part of Grotluschen and vicarious liability on the part of
the county. Grotluschen and the county (respondents) moved for summary judgment on
the basis of official immunity. Respondents argued that official immunity barred
Schmidt’s claims because Grotluschen was engaged in the discretionary act of snow
removal, within the scope and course of his employment, at the time of the collision.
Schmidt responded that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Grotluschen was
engaged in snow removal activities at the time of the collision and as to whether
Grotluschen violated a ministerial duty established by the Wilkin County Employee
Handbook and the Wilkin County Safety Program.
The district court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment. The district
court concluded that the undisputed facts established that Grotluschen “made the
discretionary decision to drive through the intersection without stopping to reduce snow
ridges” on the date of the accident and therefore he was entitled to official immunity. The
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district court also rejected Schmidt’s argument that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether county policies mandated that snowplow operators stop at all stop signs,
thereby eliminating any professional judgment giving rise to official immunity. In reaching
this decision, the district court relied on Minnesota Statutes section 169.035,
subdivision 1(a). Finally, the district court concluded that, because Grotluschen was
entitled to official immunity, the county could not be held vicariously liable for his driving
conduct.
Schmidt appeals.
DECISION
A district court properly grants summary judgment when the “movant shows that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01; Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC, 964 N.W.2d
613, 620 (Minn. 2021). “A fact is ‘material’ for purposes of summary judgment if its
resolution will affect the outcome of the case.” Sayer v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp.,
790 N.W.2d 151, 162 (Minn. 2010). Appellate courts review de novo the grant of
summary judgment to determine “whether there are genuine issues of material fact and
whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Montemayor v. Sebright
Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). A reviewing court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom summary judgment was granted. STAR Ctrs., Inc., 644 N.W.2d at 76-77. “All
doubts and factual inferences must be resolved against the moving party.” Montemayor,
898 N.W.2d at 628 (quotation omitted).
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To preclude summary judgment, “[a] genuine issue of material fact ‘must be
established by substantial evidence.’” McBee v. Team Indus., Inc., 925 N.W.2d 222, 230
(Minn. 2019) (quoting DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69-70 (Minn. 1997)). “Denials
or general averments” by a nonmoving party are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Southcross Com. Ctr., LLP v. Tupy Props., LLC , 766 N.W.2d 704, 707
(Minn. App. 2009). I nstead, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving
party must point to “specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.” Id.
Schmidt argues that the district court erred when it concluded that respondents were
entitled to summary judgment based on official immunity. “Under the doctrine of official
immunity, a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise
of . . . judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless
he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Vassallo by Brown v. Majeski,
842 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). “The purpose of official
immunity is to protect public officials from the fear of personal liability that might deter
independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Shariss v. City of
Bloomington, 852 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). “Official
immunity can apply to any act that involves an exercise of independent judgment, even at
the ‘operational level.’” Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462 (quoting Anderson v. Anoka
Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11 , 678 N.W.2d 651, 657 (Minn. 2004)). Vicarious official
immunity generally protects the governmental employer. Schroeder v. St. Louis County,
708 N.W.2d 497, 508 (Minn. 2006).
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Whether official immunity applies turns on “(1) the conduct at issue; (2) whether
the conduct is discretionary or ministerial and, if ministerial, whether any ministerial duties
were violated; and (3) if discretionary, whether the conduct was willful or malicious.”
Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462. In determining whether a duty is discretionary or ministerial,
we focus on the nature of the act. Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 490 (Minn. 2006).
A duty is discretionary “if it involves more individual professi onal judgment that
necessarily reflects the professional goal and factors of a situation.” Id. at 490-91
(quotation omitted). In contrast “[a] ministerial duty leaves nothing to discretion; it is a
simple, definite duty arising under and because of stated conditions.” Id. at 490 (quotations
omitted). We look to the “nature, quality, and complexity” of a duty to distinguish whether
a duty is discretionary or ministerial. Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 507-08.
Schmidt does not argue that Grotluschen engaged in willful or malicious conduct.
Instead, the focus of Schmidt’s appeal relates to whether Grotluschen was engaged in a
discretionary or ministerial duty when he drove through the intersection without stopping
and collided with Schmidt’s vehicle. Because “plowing snow is often hazardous, and
snowplow operators are generally allowed to choose the manner and means of doing the
job,” a snowplow operator is normally entitled to official immunity for decisions made
while the snowplow operator is actively engaged in snow-removal activities. Shariss,
852 N.W.2d at 282-83. Official immunity typically applies because the snowplow operator
is “responding to uncertain circumstances that require the weighing of competing values
on the grounds that these circumstances offer little time for reflection and often involve
incomplete and confusing information such that the situation requires the exercise
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of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” See id. at 282 (emphasis omitted)
(quotations omitted). “But when a snowplow driver is not actively engaged in
snow-removal operations and performs a discrete act that requires little or no independent
judgment,” the operator is performing a ministerial task not protected by official immunity.
Id. at 283.
Schmidt argues that the district court erred when it determined that there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Grotluschen was engaged in a discretionary
duty. Specifically, Schmidt argues that genuine issue s of material fact exist as to
(1) whether Grotluschen was actively engaged in snow-removal operations at the time of
the collision, and (2) whether county policy documents applicable to all employees created
a ministerial duty that required Grotluschen to stop at all stop signs. We addr ess each
argument in turn and conclude that neither is persuasive.
Snow-Removal Operations
Schmidt first argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Grotluschen was engaged in discretionary snow-removal operations at the time of the
collision with Schmidt’s vehicle. Schmidt contends that the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to Schmidt, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Grotluschen
was not actively engaged in snow-removal operations at the time of the accident. In support
of his argument, Schmidt points to his own deposition in which he stated that, as he was
driving down Highway 9, he “could see [Grotluschen], you know, coming down the
plowed, . . . the gravel road.” (Emphasis added.) Schmidt also points to Grotluschen’s
deposition testimony in which Grotluschen admitted that the “wing blade” on the motor
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grader was “raised” up after the accident, and that he “probably” raised it after the accident,
but did not know for sure. Schmidt argues that, taken together, this evidence creates a
reasonable inference that Grotluschen was not actively engaged in snow clearing at the
time he entered the intersection, but instead he was merely proceeding through the
intersection and his vision was obscured by the position of the plow blades when he struck
Schmidt’s car. This inference, Schmidt asserts, creates a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Grotluschen was engaged in snow-removal operations at the time of the
collision and consequently a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Grotluschen was
engaged in a discretionary duty entitling him to official immunity. We are not persuaded.
By focusing on evidence that County Road 168 was already plowed and
Grotluschen’s plow blades may have been up at the time of the collision, Schmidt’s
argument construes the official immunity granted to snowplow operators too narrowly.
Schmidt’s argument fails to consider the undisputed evidence that Grotluschen was
dispatched to clear the shoulders of County Road 168 to prevent snow drifting, not to clear
the road itself. Clearing snow off the shoulders of a road is within the scope of a snowplow
operator’s discretionary snow-removal operations. See In re Alexandria Accident of
Feb. 8, 1994, 561 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. App. 1997) (affirming the grant of official
immunity for the act of plowing snow off the shoulder of a highway) , rev. denied (Minn.
June 26, 1997). And, at the time Grotluschen entered the intersection of County Road 168
and Highway 9, he was still driving his assigned route for purposes of clearing snow from
the shoulders. Additionally, the county supervisor’s affidavit states that the decision of a
snowplow operator to enter an intersection requires the operator to evaluate a variety of
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factors such as “changes in elevation at the intersection, the conditions of the road surface,
the amount of the snow or ice on the road, wind speed, direction and visibility, . . . and
other factors that may exist at the time.” Schmidt has presented no evidence that calls into
question the county supervisor’s affidavit in this regard.
Consequently, because the undisputed evidence shows that Grotluschen’s decision
to enter the intersection without stopping required the exercise of his professional judgment
and the weighing of several factors while engaged in snow clearing operations, we
conclude that Grotluschen was engaged in a discretionary duty at the time of the collision.
See Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at 490-91 (stating that a duty is discretionary “if it involves more
individual professional judgment that necessarily reflects the professional goal and factors
of a situation” (quotation omitted) ). Schmidt’s reliance on evidence that the road was
plowed and that Grotluschen’s plow blades may have been up at the time of the collision
focuses too narrowly on the moment of the accident rather than the larger act of clearing
snow. The argument therefore fails to give rise to a disputed issue of material fact as to
whether Grotluschen was engaged in the discretionary act of snow-removal operations.
See Shariss, 852 N.W.2d at 283 (looking at a snowplow operator’s conduct as a whole to
determine whether they were “actively engaged in snow-removal operations” and within
the scope of official immunity) ; see also Alexandria Accident, 561 N.W.2d at 549
(recognizing official immunity for the act of plowing the shoulder of a highway). 2 As a

2 We find additional support for our conclusion in two of our nonprecedential decisions.
See Honcik v. Norman County, No. A23-1821, 2024 WL 3250561 (Minn. App. July 1,
2024), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2024); Gustafson v. Semmer, No. A09-1201,
2010 WL 608017 (Minn. App. Feb. 23, 2010). In Honcik, we affirmed the district court’s
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result, Schmidt’s argument that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding
summary judgment is unavailing.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Grotluschen was engaged in discretionary
snow-removal operations at the time he entered the intersection and collided with
Schmidt’s vehicle.
County Policies
Schmidt next argues that, even if Grotluschen was engaged in snow-removal
operations at the time of the collision, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the county had a policy that required Grotluschen to stop at the stop sign, thereby
transforming an otherwise discretionary duty into a ministerial duty. Schmidt does not

grant of official immunity to a snowplow operator who proceeded through an intersection
controlled by a stop sign without stopping to facilitate the clearing of a snow drift.
2024 WL 3250561, at *1. There, we reasoned that we “look at the evidence as a whole”
rather than at a specific moment in time when determining whether a particular act is
discretionary. Id. at *4. And in Gustafson we concluded that the position of the plow
blades on a snowplow when turning around on the highway was “part of the larger act of
operating a plow, an activity that includes multiple discretionary decisions.”
2010 WL 608017, at *2.
To persuade us otherwise, Schmidt relies on this court’s nonprecedential decision
in Ayers v. Kalal, in which this court affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the basis
of official immunity. No. A15-0694, 2015 WL 9264116, at *2-3 (Minn. App. Dec. 21,
2015). The facts in Ayers are distinguishable. In Ayers, the city “had a policy that required
all plow operators to obey all traffic laws.” Id. at *2. Here, it is undisputed that the county
had no such policy specific to snowplow operators. Also, in Ayers, there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the county employee was engaged in salting and sanding
when the accident occurred. Id. at *1. Here, it is undisputed that Grotluschen was plowing
the shoulders of the road. Thus, to the extent that we consider the persuasive value of our
nonprecedential opinions in reaching our decision, Honcik and Gustafson are more
persuasive. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating that nonprecedential
opinions are not binding authority but may be cited as persuasive authority).
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dispute that, at the time of the collision, there was no specific county policy that required
snowplow operators to stop at all stop signs while conducting snow -removal operations.
Instead, Schmidt points to language in two county documents —the Wilkin County
Employee Handbook and the Wilkin County Safety Program—to support his argument.
Respondents counter that neither document creates a county policy that requires snowplow
operators to stop at all stop signs. We agree with respondents.
“[G]overnmental entities have the authority to eliminate by policy the discretion of
their employees . . . .” Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at 493. This occurs when the governmental
entity “sets a sufficiently narrow standard of conduct” and the employee “is bound to
follow the policy.” Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462-63 (quotation omitted). But policies that
do not impose a duty that is “absolute, certain, and imperative,” do not impose a ministerial
duty. See id. at 463.
Schmidt argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the county
has established a ministerial duty that requires snowplow operators to stop at all stop signs
through its employee handbook and safety program policy. Schmidt first focuses on the
Wilkin County Employee Handbook to support his argument. He contends the handbook
creates a duty for all county employees to stop at all stop signs because it includes a policy
that requires operators of county vehicles “to observe and obey all traffic laws regarding
the operation of a motor vehicle, including speed limits.” However, state law exempts
persons “actually engaged in work upon [a] highway” from complying with general traffic
laws, including laws relating to stop signs. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.035 subd. 1(a), .30(b)
(2024). Because Grotluschen was “actually engaged in work upon [a] highway” when he
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entered the intersection, there was no law requiring him to stop at the stop sign. Therefore,
Schmidt’s reliance on the handbook language fails. As a result, Schmidt has not
demonstrated that the handbook creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
county had a policy that required Grotluschen to stop at all stop signs while operating the
snowplow. See Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 463 (stating that “a government policy that sets a
sufficiently narrow standard of conduct will make a public employee’s conduct ministerial
if he is bound to follow the policy” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)).3
Schmidt also argues that county policies found in the Wilkin County Safety Program
support his contention that there is a factual dispute as to whether Grotluschen violated a
ministerial duty when he did not stop at the stop sign. Schmidt notes that the safety
program requires employees to “[ r]efrain from any unsafe act that might endanger
themselves, fellow workers, or others” and “[a]ssume their share of responsibility for
negligent or deliberate acts that cause injury to themselves, their fellow workers or others.”
But these policies in the safety program do not impose an absolute or certain duty to
complete a specific task and therefore do not establish a ministerial duty. See id. at 462
(stating that a ministerial duty is one that is “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
merely the execution of a specific duty” (quotations omitted)). Consequently, Schmidt has

3 Schmidt argues that we should not consider respondents’ argument based on section
169.035, subdivision 1, because respondents did not rely on that statutory provision in their
principal memorandum in support of summary judgment, and only did so in their reply
memorandum. Because we may affirm the grant of summary judgment on any grounds,
we reject this argument. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn.
2012) (stating that “we may affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on
any grounds”).
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not demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the county had
a policy requiring Grotluschen to stop at the stop sign while operating the snowplow. See
id. at 463 (stating that government policy must set a “sufficiently narrow standard of
conduct” to create a ministerial duty (quotation omitted)).
In sum, the district court did not err when it concluded that there is no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Grotluschen was engaged in discretionary snow-removal
operations at the time of the collision with Schmidt’s vehicle. The undisputed evidence
reflects that Grotluschen exercised judgment when he decided to enter the intersection
without stopping after looking for vehicles and while engaged in snow-removal operations.
Therefore, Grotluschen is entitled to official immunity for his actions. Additionally, as
Schmidt does not dispute, the county is entitled to vicarious official immunity based on
Grotluschen’s immunity from suit. See Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 508. The district court
therefore properly granted summary judgm ent in favor of respondents. See Staub,
964 N.W.2d at 620 (stating that summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”
(quotation omitted)).
Affirmed.