In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. N. C. and P. D. C., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0070

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
A. N. C. and P. D. C., Parents.

Filed September 2, 2025
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-JV-23-5257

Kimberly Stommes, Jeddeloh Snyder Stommes, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)

Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Kyle E. Day, Assistant County Attorney, Buffalo,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Janell Trocke, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant mother challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights.
We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2024, respondent Wright County Health & Human Services (the county)
petitioned the district court to terminate the parental rights of appellant ANC (mother) to
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her child ADC (the child), who was born in January 2023.1 In November 2024, the district
court held a trial on the termination petition. At the start of trial, the child was
approximately 22 months old and had been in out-of-home placement her entire life, with
the exception of a trial home visit with mother from February 2, 2024, to May 14, 2024.
The district court set forth the circumstances leading to the termination of mother’s parental
rights in its detailed posttrial findings of fact, which are summarized below.
On January 13, 2023, mother gave birth to the child. On January 14, a physical
altercation occurred between mother and the child’s father in the hospital room while the
child was present. The same day, the county received a child-protection report stating that
both mother and the child had tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine.
Mother admitted that she had used chemicals as recently as January 11. On January 23,
the county filed a child in need of protection or services petition seeking p rotective care
for the child. The district court held an emergency-protective-care hearing, placed the child
in protective care, and granted the county temporary custody of the child.
In February 2023 , the district court adjudicated the child in need of protection or
services based on mother’s ongoing substance use and addiction issues. The district court
ordered mother to complete chemical -dependency treatment and to comply with all
recommendations. The district court also ordered mother to abstain from the use of alcohol
and controlled substances, submit to random drug testing , attend therapy, obtain a stable
and sober living environment, attend anger management classes, sign all necessary releases

1 PDC is the child’s biological father. PDC consented to the termination of his parental
rights to the child, and he has not participated in this appeal.
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for the county and guardian ad litem, remain law abiding, and follow all court orders. The
district court approved and adopted a case plan and ordered mother to comply with the
requirements of the plan.
Between February 2023 and the November 2024 termination trial, mother failed to
comply with the requirements of the court -ordered case plan. Specifically, mother failed
to maintain her sobriety. The district court’s findings show that mother unsuccessfully
attempted to complete chemical -dependency treatment at least six times during the
pendency of this matter.
Although most of mother’s attempts to complete chemical -dependency treatment
were unsuccessful, the district court found that mother “demonstrated marked progress in
her sobriety and parenting skills during the fall of 2023 and winter/early spring of 2024.”
During that time, mother successfully completed and graduated from outpatient chemical-
dependency treatment programming, and her drug screens were negative. On February 2,
2024, mother began a trial home visit with the child.
However, this period of compliance ended abruptly when mother met with her social
worker on May 13, 2024, and “reported being drugged and sexually assaulted on May 11,
2024, while [the child] was in respite care.” The following day, mother tested positive for
amphetamines. The social worker and child -protection team met “due to several
inconsistencies in [mother’s] report of the sexual assault and possible drug use.” The social
worker and child-protection team agreed that the child should be in respite care until the
case could be further assessed. On May 16, mother submitted to chemical testing and the
result came back negative for all substances except THC . The social worker informed
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mother that the child would return to her care. Shortly thereafter, the social worker
received a police report that revealed “contradictions in [mother’s] recitation of the facts ”
and included “a statement from [mother] that she had smoked crack and had taken
mushrooms.” After receiving this report, the child remained in respite care.
Between May 15, 2024, and June 3, 2024, mother missed ten video calls with the
child and “[h]er visits with [the child] became more and more sporadic.” At a May 31,
2024 review hearing, the county alleged that mother “was using drugs ” and “associating
with drug users.” At a June 12, 2024 review hearing, the district court asked mother if she
needed any additional resources from the court or the county, and mother indicated that
she did not. On June 20, 2024, mother tested positive for methamphetamine, and her trial
home visit with the child officially ended.
Beginning on June 21, 2024, mother missed numerous random drug tests. Between
early June and August 1, 2024, mother did not visit the child and missed all video calls
with the child. On June 26, 2024, mother reported to her probation agent that she had used
“methamphetamine, crack, cocaine, and ecstasy within the past week.” And on Ju ly 3,
mother reported to the social worker that she was high. On the same day, mother indicated
that she had completed a chemical-dependency evaluation and would be entering inpatient
treatment. But m other did not enter treatment at that time. At a July 8, 2024 review
hearing, the county reported that mother’s sweat patch came back positive for
methamphetamine.
Throughout July 2024, mother failed to appear for drug testing. On July 17, mother
completed another chemical -dependency evaluation, which recommended that she enter
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treatment, but she did not do so . On July 18 , mother was booked on fifth -degree drug
possession charges. On July 31, mother had a positive drug test.
Between August and November 2024, mother made several more unsuccessful
attempts to complete chemical-dependency treatment. During this time, mother was
unsuccessfully discharged from two programs. On November 18, 2024, mother had
another positive drug test. And at trial, mother “admitted that she ha[d] been using fentanyl
and heroin for the past three months.” At the time of trial, mother “claimed that she had
been sober for seven days ,” and she was in treatment at Recovering Help in Mora,
Minnesota.
In December 2024, the district court terminated mother’s parental rights to the child.
The district court concluded that the county proved three statutory grounds for termination,
that the county had made reasonable reunification efforts, and that termination of mother’s
parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Minnesota courts will terminate parental rights “only for grave and weighty
reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O. , 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). The petitioner
bears “the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence that . . . [a] statutory
termination ground[] exists.” In re Welfare of C.K. , 426 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. 1988).
A district court’s decision in a termination proceeding must be based on evidence
concerning the conditions that exist at the time of the termination. In re Welfare of Child
of T.D. , 731 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. July 17, 2007).
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Termination of a parent’s rights is intended for those situations in which it appears “that
the present conditions of neglect will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In
re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980).
In a termination appeal, we examine the record to determine whether the district
court applied the appropriate statutory criteria. In re Welfare of D.L.R.D. , 656 N.W.2d
247, 249 (Minn. App. 2003). We review the underlying findings of fact for clear error, and
we review a determination that a statutory ground for termination exists, as well as the
court’s ultimate decision to terminate parental rights, for an abuse of discretion. In re
Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
6, 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey , 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn.
2022) (quotation omitted).
We will affirm a termination order if at least one statutory ground for termination is
supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the best interests of the
child, so long as either the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family if
reasonable efforts were required or those efforts were not required. In re Child. of T.A.A.,
702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005) ; see Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2024) (addressing
circumstances when a county need not make reasonable efforts); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8 (2024) (noting reasonable efforts may not be required in some
circumstances). Ultimately, the party challenging a termination must show error and
prejudice to obtain relief. See Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc. , 237 N.W.2d 76,
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78 (Minn. 1975) (stating that to prevail on appeal, an appellant must show both error and
prejudice resulting from the error); In re Welfare of Child. of J.B. , 698 N.W.2d 160, 171
(Minn. App. 2005) (applying Midway in a termination-of-parental-rights case), petition for
rev. dismissed (Minn. May 3, 2005).
I.
Mother contends that the statutory termination grounds on which the district court
relied were not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Minnesota law sets forth multiple statutory grounds for the involuntary termination
of parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2024). One of the three grounds
on which the district court relied was Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), which provides
that a district court may terminate parental rights if “the parent has substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship” and that either “reasonable efforts by the
social services agency have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the
petition or reasonable efforts would be futile.” “Failure to satisfy requirements of a court-
ordered case plan provides evidence of a parent’s noncompliance with the duties and
responsibilities under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2).” In re Welfare of Child. of
K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 666 (Minn. App. 2012).
The district court concluded that mother failed to comply with the duties imposed
by the parent -child relationship “due to her severe and chronic substance abuse and
unaddressed mental health issues.” The district court found, based on mother’s testimony,
that mother “knew she had to maintain sobriety and she knew what was at stake if she did
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not do so.” The district court further found—and the record supports—that mother failed
to comply with her case plan requirements. The court therefore concluded that mother
substantially, continuously, and repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon her by the parent-child relationship.
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that there was clear and
convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2). First, mother argues that “[the county] did not provide reasonable efforts”
and that, therefore, there was not sufficient evidence that “reasonable efforts by [the
county] ha[d] failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the petition.” For the
reasons explained in Section II of this opinion, the district court correctly determined that
the county made reasonable efforts . Thus, mother’s reasonable-efforts-based argument
regarding the district court’s statutory basis for termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2), fails.
Next, mother argues that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support
grounds for termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) because, during her
trial home visit with the child, mother ensured the child was fed, introduced the child to
new foods, bathed the child, took the child to daycare , and made sure the child socialized
with other children. Mother claims that she therefore met all the child’s needs.
Contrary to mother’s claims, however, the district court found that mother failed to
comply with the third and fourth requirements of her court -ordered case plan —which
expressly related to providing a safe home for the child and meeting the child’s needs. The
court explained that mother had not maintained a residence or consistent employment, and
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that, by her own admission, mother missed more video and in -person visits with the child
than she could count. The court also explained that mother’s parenting assessment
identified that mother’s “history of substance use and abuse and her potential for relapse”
as “the most significant barrier to [mother’s] capacity to maintain a safe and suitable
environment for [the child] .” The court observed that mother “has no insight into the
widespread effects of her drug use” and that mother “does not demonstrate the aptitude to
understand how her missed visits have negatively impacted [the child] and the ability to
form the necessary parent-child bond.”
This court recognizes mother’s efforts during her trial home visit with the child and
her success during that limited period. However, we are not persuaded that mother’s brief
period of success renders the district court’s termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2), an abuse of discretion.
Lastly, mother argues that she did not fail to satisfy the requirements of the court -
ordered case plan and that, therefore, there is not clear and convincing evidence supporting
termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). As to her mental health, mother
argues that she completed a parenting and neuropsychological assessment and that she
attended some mental -health therapy. Mother also argues that , throughout the pendency
of this matter , she completed multiple chemical -dependency evaluations, completed
treatment in March and October of 2023, graduated from treatment in April of 2024, and
demonstrated that she can stay clean for a period of nine months. Finally, mother argues
that “as of the time of trial she was sober[,] and she [had] addressed her chemical use in a
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manner which would allow her to safely parent [the child].” Mother therefore asserts that
she complied with her case plan.
The district court found that mother failed to comply with the mental -health
components of her court-ordered case plan. The court found that mother “ha[d] not
participated in consistent and significant individual therapy to address her mental health
diagnoses,” that she “failed to demonstrate adequate mental health and maturity to
consistently meet [the child’s] needs,” and that she “does not understand or appreciate her
significant mental health diagnoses or the effect the diagnoses have on her parenting
abilities.” The court noted that mother’s mental -health diagnostic assessment contained
specific recommendations that she abstain from mood -altering chemical substances and
complete chemical -dependency treatment. And t he district court found t hat mother’s
mental health “significantly impacts and triggers her chemical use” and that her “continued
use of substances throughout the pendency of this matter demonstrates that her underlying
mental health issues have not been addressed.” The record provides clear and convincing
support for those findings.
As to mother’s commitment to sobriety, the district court found that mother failed
to comply with that case-plan requirement “in any meaningful way.” The court explained
that mother had not consistently attended sober -support meetings or demonstrated the
ability to remain sober , had not completed chemical -dependency treatment since May
2024, had admitted to using methamphetamine, fentanyl, cocaine, GHB, and heroin in the
time leading up to trial, had consistently failed to submit to drug testing, and had “upwards
of ten chemical dependency evaluations” that “largely contain[ed] the same
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recommendations.” The district court credited the social worker’s testimony that mother
“knows she needs help to stay sober, she does not have the commitment to change, and she
is unable to maintain sobriety in a non -structured setting.” Finally, the court found that
mother’s “last -ditch effort to address her chemical dependency” and her seven days of
sobriety at the time of trial did not demonstrate compliance with the case plan considering
her significant number of unsuccessful treatment attempts throughout the pendency of this
matter. Again, the record provides clear and convincing support for those findings.
Given the record before us , we are not persuaded that the district court’s
determination that mother failed to comply with her court-ordered case plan is against logic
or the facts in the record. See J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 603 (holding that court did not abuse
discretion in determining statutory violation under Minn. Stat. 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2)
despite parent’s recent progress when parent’s otherwise inconsistent attempts to address
chemical health were undisputed). Thus, mother fails to show that the district court abused
its discretion by concluding that the county proved—by clear and convincing evidence—a
statutory basis to terminate her parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).
Because we affirm th is statutory ground for termination, we do not address the other
statutory grounds on which the district court relied. T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 708 (stating
that only one statutory ground for termination need be proved).
II.
Mother contends that the district court erred in its reasonable efforts determination.
The district court must make “specific findings” in every termination proceeding that either
“reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were
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made including individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of
efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family”
or that “reasonable efforts for reunification [were] not required.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 8. When reasonable efforts are required, as is the case here, courts must consider
whether the services provided to the parent and child were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child ’s family and, if
appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s
family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well -being of the
child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the child and
family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). “Reasonable efforts encompass more than just a case
plan.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012)
We review a district court’s findings identifying the efforts the county made to
reunify a family for clear error. In re Welfare of Child. of J.C.L. , 958 N.W.2d 653, 658
(Minn. App. 2021) , rev. denied (Minn. May 12, 2021) ; see J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d at 87
(stating that we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error). But we review
the district court’s determination whether those efforts were reasonable for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn. App. 2015)
(concluding that the district court’s “reasonable -efforts finding was not an abuse of
discretion”), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). “A district court abuses its discretion by
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making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence , misapplying the law, or
delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d
at 506 (quotation omitted).
The district court found that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify mother
with the child within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260.012 (2024). Specifically, the court
found that the county “provided services and made numerous referrals for [mother]” and
that these efforts “were specifically formulated to address [mother’s] chemical dependency
and mental health needs, in addition to helping [mother] learn to effectively create
boundaries and make safe and responsible decision[s] that were in [the chi ld’s] best
interests.”
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion because it “utterly failed
to consider” the factors set forth under Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). The record refutes this
argument. The district court found that the county’s reunification efforts included
the out of home placement plan; contact via in -person, phone,
and email; chemical dependency evaluations; inpatient and
outpatient chemical dependency treatment; drug testing;
transportation to drug testing; parenting assessment; parenting
education curric ulums; parenting skills; life skills;
coordination with probation services; fuel cards; bus passes;
public assistance application; housing resources; nutrition
resources; phone service; supervised visits; YMCA
membership; therapeutic foster care support; transportation for
[the child] to visits; transportation to court for [mother]; Help
Me Grow evaluation for [the child]; Follow Along program for
[the child]; medical [] check-ups for [the child]; WIC (Woman,
Infants & Children nutritional benefits) for [the child];
childcare for [the child]; early learning scholarship for [the
child]; Anoka County home monitoring program; and clothing
for [the child].

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The district court further found that the county’s efforts and provision of resources
to mother were “specifically formulated” to address her chemical -dependency, mental -
health, and parenting needs. The court also found that the county provided “significant
and consistent services to [mother] regarding her drug use, which was the most critical
effort to reunifying the family.” The district court’s findings are supported by the record ,
and they refute mother’s argument that the district court failed to con sider the factors set
forth under Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h).
Mother complains that the county “failed to update [her] case plan to provide
assistance to her as a result of the trauma of her sexual assault ,” that she did not receive
domestic-violence services, and that she did not receive assistance locating, or getting to
sober meetings or eye-movement-desensitization-and-reprocessing (EMDR) therapy. The
thrust of each of these arguments is that the services offered by the county were insufficient
to achieve reunification. The district court ultimately found, however, that “[r]eunification
has failed not because the County did not make reasonable efforts to help [mother] locate
treatment facilities or support her attempts at sobriety, but because [mother] would abruptly
leave treatment for insignificant reasons and quickly relapse upon exit.” The court further
found that, despite mother’s dissatisfaction with the social worker, the social worker was
“responsive to [mother] and continued to provide support, resources, and referrals for
further help.”
Moreover, to the extent that mother complains that the county did not provide the
requisite resources or amend her case plan after her alleged sexual assault in May 2024,
the district court specifically asked mother at a June 12, 2024 review hearing if she needed
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any additional resources from the court or the county. Mother declined additional
resources.
On this record, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in
finding that the county made reasonable reunification efforts.
III.
Mother contends that the district court erred in its best-interests determination. If a
statutory ground for termination of parental rights is proved, “the best interests of the child
must be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2024). Thus, a
district court’s order terminating parental rights must include a finding that termination is
in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 771 N.W.2d 538, 545, 547
(Minn. App. 2009). “The ‘best interests of the child’ means all relevant factors to be
considered and evaluated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a) (2024).
In assessing a child’s best interests, the district court must balance “(1) the child’s
interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child .” In re Welfare
of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted); see Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (requiring the district court to a nalyze these factors in a
termination proceeding). Although the interests of the parent and child must be balanced,
they are not “weighed equally.” In re Welfare of Udstuen , 349 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Minn.
App. 1984). Instead, if the district court rules that a basis to terminate parental rights exists,
the best interests of the child are the paramount concern. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7;
In re Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15,
16
2003). We review the district court’s determination that termination is in the child’s best
interests for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600.
In addressing the child’s best interests, the district court relied on the testimony of
the child’s guardian ad litem, which it expressly credited. Based on that testimony, the
district court found that the child “needs permanency and stability ” and that the child was
“thriving in her current placement.” The court also found that mother had “not
demonstrated she can be a safe and stable parent, and she has not maintained her sobriety[,]
nor has she maintained a relationship with [the child].” The distric t court credited the
guardian ad litem’s testimony that mother “has not demonstrated that she understands or
has the ability to meet or understand [the child’s] needs.” Accordingly, the court reasoned
that the child’s need for “a sober home with a mentally healthy parent, stability, and safety
outweigh the interest in preserving the parent-child relationship between [mother] and [the
child].” Thus, the district court determined that termination was in the best interests of the
child.
Mother argues that the district court’s best-interests findings are not supported by
record. Mother also argues that the district court “did not adequately analyze the best
interests of the child because the Court did not specifically make findings regarding the
child’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship, the parent’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship[,] and any competing interest of the child.”
In support of these arguments, mother relies on her own testimony at trial, in which
she claimed that “it would be in [the child’s] best interests” to live with mother and that
the child “would rather be with her than [mother’s] relatives.” Mother argues that, during
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her trial home visit , she met all the child’s needs and that there was no testimony that
mother “had ever been inappropriate during [supervised] visits or had failed to meet the
child’s needs during the visits.” Mother also argues that she has “shown the capacity to
participate in chemical dependency treatment” by completing several chemical -
dependency evaluations during the pendency of this matter , by completing treatment
successfully in March and October 2023, by graduating from a treatment program in April
2024, and by participating in treatment at the time of trial.
Mother’s reliance on her own testimony regarding the child’s best interests is
unavailing because the district court explicitly found that mother’s testimony was not
credible, and we defer to that determination. See In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393,
396 (Minn. 1996) (“Considerable deference is due to the district court’s decision because
a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.”). Moreover,
mother essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021).
As detailed in the district court’s findings —which are supported by the record —at
the time of trial, mother had not demonstrated a real commitment to sobriety or the ability
to provide the child with a stable home. And the district court found that the child had
been “thriving in her current placement[,]” where her needs were being met and she was
achieving her developmental milestones. The court weighed these considerations and
determined that the child’s “needs for a sober home with a mentally healthy p arent,
stability, and safety outweigh the interest in preserving the parent-child relationship.” See
In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018) (stating that the
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district court’s findings as to “mother’s chemical-dependency issues, her unstable housing
situation, and the fact that [the child] has been successful while in foster care[,]” were valid
considerations when assessing the best-interests factors).
Finally, we are not persuaded by mother’s argument that the district court did not
“adequately analyze the best interest of the child” because the court “did not specific ally
make findings regarding the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, the
parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship[,] and any competing interests
of the child.” This court has previously recognized that facts similar to those on which the
district court relied are “valid considerations” based on the “relevant factors.” Id. at 657.
Moreover, although the district court did not make specific findings regarding each factor,
consideration of the relevant factors is nonetheless implied in the court’s analysis.
In sum, mother has not shown that the district court’s best-interests determination
was based on erroneous findings or was otherwise an abuse of its discretion. See J.H., 968
N.W.2d at 600 ( “In reviewing the district court ’s order terminating parental rights, we
review the underlying findings of fact for clear error .”); see Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506
(abuse of discretion occurs where court’s decision is against logic and the facts in the
record).
Because mother has not shown a basis for relief, we affirm.
Affirmed.