Aisha Roble and OBO Minor Children, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0077

Aisha Roble and OBO Minor Children,
Appellant,

vs.

Yasmina Marmo,
Respondent.

Filed November 17, 2025
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-24-706

Maxwell Shek, Shek Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Sean Paul Kehren, North Star Law Group, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Aisha Roble appeals from a district court decision to deny her petition for
a harassment restraining order (HRO) against respondent Yasmina Marmo. Roble argues
the district court: (1) made inadequate findings; (2) reached an unsupported credibility
determination; and (3) improperly concluded there were no reasonable grounds to believe
Marmo harassed Roble. We affirm.
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FACTS
In June 202 4, Roble petitioned for an HRO against Marmo. According to the
petition, Marmo is in a romantic relationship with Roble’s ex-husband and the father of
Roble’s children. Roble alleged that Marmo: (1) made false reports to the police and Child
Protective Services (CPS) (the false-reports incident); (2) followed Roble to and around
Roble’s apartment building (the apartment incident); (3) created and maintained a fake
social-media account containing false information about Roble (the social-media incident);
and (4) accompanied ex-husband to the children’s school and made demands to see the
children (the school incident).
The district court issued an ex parte HRO and scheduled a two-day evidentiary
hearing. The parties stipulated that CPS received false reports about Roble. The parties
also stipulated to the admission of exhibits, including a police report (the police report)
indicating CPS was contacted three times regarding Roble—one call from a 612 area-code
phone number associated with Roble’s sister (sister) and two calls from a 320 area -code
phone number.
Regarding the false-reports incident, Roble called sister to testify. Sister denied
contacting CPS. Roble then introduced the police report. The police report stated that the
320 phone number belonged to Marmo, but acknowledged that the police did not verify
that Marmo was the caller. Roble also introduced subpoenaed call logs from the 320 phone
number, which corroborated her claim that the 320 phone number was used to call CPS,
the school, and Roble’s family members. However, the call logs did not identify the owner
of the 320 phone number.
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With respect to the apartment incident, Roble testified that one day a “woman . . .
showed up at her apartment to make a false report to the police.” Roble introduced
photographs she took of the woman during the incident. The woman in the photographs
wore a surgical mask, winter jacket, casual pants, and sandals. Roble testified that the
woman in the photographs was Marmo. Roble also submitted a police-created incident
report (the incident report). The incident report identified the woman involved in the
apartment incident as N.M., a resident at Roble’s apartment building.1 Roble testified that
the incident report stated N.M. owned the 320 phone number—the same number connected
to Marmo in the false-reports incident.
Roble only offered her own testimony to support her allegations regarding the
social-media incident. Roble testified that she believed Marmo made a fake social-media
profile using Roble’s name, photographs, and birthday. Roble stated the profile contained
false information, including that she worked at a strip club.
Finally, Roble offered the following evidence regarding the school incident. Roble
testified that the school contacted her about an “unidentified wom an” accompanying ex-
husband on a visit to the school. Roble admitted that the school did not identify the woman,
but Roble insisted it was Marmo.
After Roble rested her case, Marmo testified. Marmo first denied knowing or
having a relationship with ex- husband. Marmo then denied involvement in all four
incidents. Regarding the false-reports incident, Marmo denied making complaints to CPS.

1 The parties agree that Marmo never lived in Roble’s apartment building.
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She repeatedly stated the 320 phone number did not belong to her. And Marmo explained
that confusion over her identity was possible because she experienced identity theft in
2019. With respect to the apartment incident, Marmo denied going to Roble’s apartment.
Marmo explicitly denied that she was depicted in the photographs on the basis that she
wears traditional Muslim attire , and the woman in the picture ha d a lighter skin tone.
Marmo also denied creating the fake social-media profile. And Marmo responded to the
school incident by insisting she did not know ex-husband.2
At the conclusion of the hearing, the referee denied the HRO. Making oral findings
on the record, the referee found neither party was credible. Specifically, regarding Roble’s
testimony, the referee found she was “not particularly credible” because of “inconsistencies
in” her testimony. The referee found that the 320 phone number made numerous false
reports about Roble, but the evidence did not prove that Marmo was the source of the false
reports. Accordingly, the referee concluded that Roble failed to meet her burden to
establish that Marmo harassed Roble. A district court judge confirmed the referee’s
decision.
Roble appeals.
DECISION
Roble challenges the district court’s decision to deny the HRO petition. See Griffis
v. Luban, 601 N.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Minn. App. 1999) (“Orders and findings recommended

2 At the hearing, to prove Marmo and ex-husband knew each other, sister offered testimony
that she had seen Marmo and ex- husband at the mall together. And Roble introduced
evidence of an email address that Marmo, Marmo’s mother, and ex-husband used at various
times between 2021-2024.
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by a referee become effective when countersigned or confirmed by a district court judge.”).
We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Borth v. Borth, 970
N.W.2d 699, 701 (Minn. App. 2022). “A district court abuses its discretion if it makes
findings of fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the
matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We give “due regard” to the district court’s credibility determinations and will not disturb
its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d
758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008).
Roble makes three arguments on appeal. First, she argues the district court made
inadequate findings to facilitate meaningful appellate review. Second, she claims the
record does not support the district court’s finding that she was not credible. Last, she
contends the district court abused its discretion when it concluded she failed to meet her
burden to establish that Marmo was responsible for the harassing conduct. We address
each argument in turn.
I.
Roble argues the district court made inadequate findings to facilitate meaningful
appellate review. A district court’s findings must be specific enough to allow for
meaningful appellate review such that we can determine the basis on which the district
court made its decision. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. We are not required to reverse a decision
for more adequate findings when the decision is supported by a clear record and facts that
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are not seriously disputed. See Crowley Co. v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 394 N.W.2d 542,
545 (Minn. App. 1986).
Roble first asserts the district court’s finding that she was “not particularly credible”
because of “inconsistencies in” her testimony was not sufficiently specific. We disagree.
Upon reviewing the record, it is apparent that Roble’s testimony conflicts with some of the
stipulated evidence. Therefore, the district court’s finding is specific enough to facilitate
appellate review.
Roble asserts second that, even if the credibility determination was reasonably
supported, the district court’s findings are insufficient because the district court failed to
explain why it disregarded the third-party reports stating that Marmo owned the 320 phone
number. We are not persuaded. Roble’s argument disregards the fact that the police report
and the incident report reach inconsistent conclusions regarding the owner of the 320 phone
number. Therefore, the district court did not need to provide more detailed findings for us
to understand the basis for its decision.
II.
Roble next argues that, even if there are adequate findings, the district court made
an unsupported credibility determination because “her testimony remained internally
consistent, was not impeached, and was largely cumulative of the stipulated exhibits.”
Credibility determinations are for the district court to make and ordinarily will not be
disturbed on appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating due regard is given to district
court’s opportunity to judge credibility of witnesses). “Having seen the live testimony, the
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district court is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.” Wilson v.
Wilson, 11 N.W.3d 331, 337 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Dec. 17, 2024).
Contrary to Roble’s argument, ample evidence supports the district court’s
credibility determination. For example, Roble testified that Marmo went to the school, but
admitted the school never identified Marmo as the woman with ex-husband. And Roble
offered inconsistent testimony regarding the owner of the 320 phone number ; she first
testified the 320 number belonged to Marmo, then she testified the same number belonged
to N.M. Because the record supports the district court’s findings, we will not disturb the
district court’s credibility determination.
III.
Finally, Roble argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied the HRO
because she met her burden to establish that Marmo harassed Roble. While the statute does
not specifically identify a burden of proof by which a petitioner must prove facts necessary
to obtain an HRO, a district court can issue an HRO after a hearing if the petitioner
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that “there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(b)(3) (2024); see also Rixmann v. City of Prior Lake, 723 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn.
App. 2006) (“In a statutorily created cause of action, the legislature generally has the power
to determine the standard of proof. We regard the legislature’s silence about the standard
of proof as a signal that the legislature intended the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard.” (citation omitted)), review denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2007); Oberg v. Bradley, 868
N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. App. 2015) (citing Rixmann to address standard of proof for an
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order-for-protection). Harassment means “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted
acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a
substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the
relationship between the actor and the intended target.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 1(a)(1) (2024).
First, Roble relied solely on her own testimony to prove that Marmo was involved
in the social-media incident and school incident. Given the adverse credibility
determinations, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded neither
incident was proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Second, given the adverse credibility determinations, the stipulated evidence was
particularly important to determine whether Roble connected Marmo to the false-reports
incident and apartment incident. Roble maintains that the stipulated evidence showed that
Marmo owned the 320 phone number. We are not persuaded. The police report and
incident report reach conflicting conclusion s regarding ownership of the 320 phone
number. And the call logs did not identify the owner of the 320 phone number. Therefore,
the stipulated evidence is inconclusive regarding the ownership of the 320 number. And
because the 320 phone number was the primary evidence Roble relied on to connect
Marmo to both the false-reports incident and apartment incident, the district court
appropriately concluded Roble failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence that
Marmo was involved in either incident.

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For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Roble’s HRO petition.
Affirmed.