State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0086

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Todd Clifford Bowlby,
Respondent.

Filed June 30, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-24-1280

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Corey J. Haller, Mille Lacs County Attorney, James Winfield Doty, Assistant County
Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for appellant)

Madison Bruber, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Schmidt ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota argues in this pretrial appeal that (1) the dismissal of
counts I and II meets the critical -impact test; (2) the district court erred by dismissing
counts I and II of the complaint in which the state charged him with violating a harassment
2
restraining order (HRO) for lack of probable cause by requiring the state to prove that
appellant intended to harass a protected party; and (3) the district court failed to act with
impartiality. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In summer 2024, deputies in Mille Lacs County attempted to execute a warrant to
arrest respondent Todd Clifford Bowlby for felony criminal damage to property. When
the deputies could not locate Bowlby at his home, they spoke with his neighbor, who told
the officers that she had seen him leaving his home hauling his fishing boat 20 minutes
earlier. The deputies later saw Bowlby driving a recreational vehicle (RV) from Highway
47 into the entrance at the Isle Airport. The deputies knew that an active HRO had been
issued that prohibited Bowlby from being within 250 feet of Johnson’s Portside, the
petitioner’s place of employment, which was approximately 100 feet from the airport
entrance, for two years. In addition to that prohibition, the HRO stated that “any conduct
[] in violation of the specific provisions provided in the ‘It is ordered’ section above
constitutes a violation of this [HRO].”
The deputies conducted a search of Bowlby’s RV, which revealed a firearm, two
boxes of .22 magnum ammunition, and a metal pipe that appeared to have a burnt leafy
substance inside it. The state charged Bowlby with violating the HRO while possessing a
dangerous weapon under Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(d)(4) (2024) (Count I); violating
the HRO within ten years of a previous domestic-violence conviction under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 6(c) (2024) (Count II); operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol
or marijuana under Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 1(f)(1) (2024) (Count III); operating a motor
3
vehicle while using cannabis on a street or highway under Minn. Stat. § 169A.36, subd. 2
(2024) (Count IV); and possession of cannabis in a motor vehicle in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 169A.36, subd. 3(1) (2024) (Count V).
Bowlby moved to dismiss counts I and II of the complaint. In his motion, Bowlby
argued that the state did not have probable cause to support counts I and II, because he did
not know that his actions of driving down Highway 47 to enter the Isle Airport violated the
HRO and there was no evidence that he was trying to “harass the petitioner[].” In
opposition, the state provided a copy of the HRO to the district court as an exhibit and
argued that it did not have to show that Bowlby intended to harass the petitioner to violate
the terms of the HRO.
The district court granted Bowlby’s motion to dismiss, determining that the
evidence presented by the state did not show that Bowlby knew he was violating the HRO.
The district court also reframed Bowlby’s argument and stated in part that (1) “the question
raised is not whether [Bowlby] knew of, or was within, the 250-foot restricted area but what
knowledge [he] was given on how that area was to be calculated given the area included
public spaces”; (2) Bowlby “knew he was not to be within 250 feet of Johnson’s Portside
for the purpose [of] contacting the [p]etitioning [p]arty,” but he had only driven past the
location and “did not stop on the shoulder of [the highway]”; (3) a “review of the location
of [Bowlby’s] home address, Johnson’s Portside address, and the Isle Airport address
revealed that [Bowlby’s] home is located 0.2 miles north of the Isle Airport and Johnson’s
Portside . . .” and that the HRO “does not prohibit [Bowlby] from being at the Isle Airport
or traveling on Highway 47”and “no matter what route [Bowlby] drove he would have to
4
pass close by Johnson’s Portside to travel to obtain reasonable and necessary services, such
as a grocery store, gas station or other necessities”; (4) Bowlby’s “proximity to Johnson’s
Portside was incidental and [] not harassing”; and (5) and “there is no evidence to show
[Bowlby] knew traveling on Highway 47 or being at the Isle Airport was a violation of the
distance requirement in the Ex Parte HRO.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The state has shown that the dismissal of counts I and II of the complaint
satisfies the critical-impact test.

As a preliminary matter, we first address whether the critical-impact test is met. We
conclude it has been met.
The state may appeal a pretrial order under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure
28.04, subdivision 1(1). The state must prove that (1) the pretrial order “will have a critical
impact on its ability to prosecute the case” and (2) “the ruling was erroneous.” State v.
McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court dismissed counts I and II of the complaint for lack of
probable cause. In addition, the record indicates that the district court misapplied the law,
which will be discussed further below. We therefore conclude that the critical-impact test
has been met.
II. Because the district court misapplied the law, its dismissal of counts I and II
requires reversal.

The state contends that the district court imposed an additional requirement that the
state present evidence that Bowlby “intended to harass” the petitioner. We agree.
5
A motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause should be denied when “the facts
appearing in the record, including reliable hearsay, would preclude the granting of a motion
for a directed verdict of acquittal if proved at trial.” State v. Florence, 239 N.W.2d 892,
903 (Minn. 1976). Put differently, the district court should not dismiss a complaint if there
is a fact question for the jury’s determination on each element of the crime charged.” State
v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 2018). Possibilities of innocence do not require a
directed verdict of acquittal as long as “the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories
seem unreasonable.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002) (quotation
omitted).
“The evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause is significantly less
than that required to support a conviction.” State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 790 (Minn.
1999) (emphasis added). And “[u]nlike proof beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance
of the evidence, probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Id. at 790-91. (quotations omitted).
Appellate courts review “factual findings underlying a probable cause determination using
the clear error standard, but review the district court’s application of the legal standard of
probable cause to those facts de novo.” State v. Abdus-Salam, 1 N.W.3d 871, 877-78
(Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted).
In determining whether probable cause supported the complaint, the district court
relied on this court’s decision in State v. Andersen, 946 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Minn. App.
2020). In Andersen, the district court issued an HRO prohibiting Andersen from being
within 100 feet of M.L.B.’s home but excluded M.L.B.’s address from the order. Id. at
6
629. The state charged Andersen with violating the HRO after M.L.B. saw him walking
through her apartment complex toward the direction of her apartment. Id. at 629-30. We
reversed the district court and concluded that the state had to prove that Andersen knew
the location of M.L.B.’s residence. Id. at 638.
Andersen is materially distinct from this case. Andersen had not been provided with
M.L.B.’s address, which would have prevented him from ever knowing if he violated the
HRO. The underlying concern in Andersen is not just knowledge, but notice of what
conduct the HRO prohibited him from engaging in. Id. at 636. Unlike Andersen, Bowlby
knew (1) the address of the petitioner’s place of employment; (2) that he could not be
within 250 feet of the petitioner’s place of employment; and (3) that being within the
prohibited distance constituted a violation of the HRO. To sustain a charge under Minn.
Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(b), the state need only prove that Bowlby knew the HRO existed
and that it prohibited him from being within 250 feet of the petitioner’s place of
employment. See id. at 632 (stating that “mens rea is the element of a crime that requires
the defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal.” (quotations omitted)). The
district court’s application of Andersen to these facts is inconsistent with how this court
analyzes whether a prohibited party had knowledge that they engaged in conduct that
violated the HRO. State v. Shaka, 927 N.W.2d 762, 771 (Minn. App. 2019).
Unlike Andersen, Bowlby’s lack of knowledge is not the result of information being
withheld from him but is instead the consequence of his failure to ascertain the boundary
set forth in the HRO and where he was prohibited from being present. Moreover, the record
suggests that, at the time the violation occurred, Bowlby drove his vehicle into the entry of
7
the airport, which is within the area prohibited by the HRO, rather than simply driving
along the highway, as the district court found.
The district court further determined that the complaint was not supported by
probable cause because Bowlby did not know “how that area was to be calculated given
the area included public spaces.” But Bowlby did not make this argument, request the
issuing court to clarify the parameters of the HRO, or seek modification of the parameters
of the HRO prior to the violation. Thus, at the time of the alleged violation, the HRO was
valid and enforceable, and it unequivocally prohibited Bowlby from being within 250 feet
of the petitioner’s place of employment, of which Bowlby was aware. This evidence shows
that counts I and II of the complaint were supported by probable cause.
It also appears that the district court dismissed the complaint because the state did
not submit evidence that Bowlby intended to violate the HRO, that Bowlby initiate d
contact with the petitioner, and that Bowlby’s single intrusion into the prohibited area did
not constitute a violation of the HRO. Bowlby argues that his transitory presence, lack of
contact with the petitioner, and single intrusion shows his lack of in tent. However, Minn.
Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(b), does not require the state to prove that Bowlby have multiple
contacts with the area, initiate contact with the petitioner, or have the specific intent to
violate the HRO to show probable cause.
We therefore conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law by dismissing
counts I and II.

8
III. The district court failed to act with impartiality.

The state argues that the district court lacked impartiality by relying on facts that
neither party presented and posits that some of the factual findings it made were the result
of the district court’s own research. The state’s claim has merit.
Appellate courts presume that a judge has “discharged [their] duties properly.” State
v. Schlienz, 774 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn. 2009). To remain impartial, judges should avoid
the appearance of impropriety and act to ensure that parties have no reason to think their
case is not being handled fairly. State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 580 (Minn. 2013).
“[J]udges may not engage in independent investigations of facts in evidence—regardless
of whether the evidence and investigation involve immutable facts.” State v. Dorsey, 701
N.W.2d 238, 251 (Minn. 2005). In addition, a judge cannot “act as counsel for a party to
the litigation.” State v. Malone, 963 N.W.2d 453, 464 (Minn. 2021).
Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review to determine whether a district
court denied a party the right to an impartial fact-finder. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 249.
A. The district court lacked im partiality by conducting independent
research and relying on facts outside of the record.

To support its argument that the district court conducted independent research, the
state points to the district court’s findings that:
The evidence presented shows [Bowlby’s] home address is
42414 Highway 47, Isle, MN; Johnson’s Portside’s address is
42099 Highway 47, Isle, MN; and the Isle Airport’s address is
42150 State Highway 47, Isle, MN. A review of the location
of Defendant’s home address, Johnson’s Portside address, and
the Isle Airport address revealed that [Bowlby]’s home is
located 0.2 miles north of the Isle Airport and Johnson’s
Portside, which are located directly across from each other on
9
Highway 47. The Ex Parte Harassment Restraining Order does
not prohibit [Bowlby] from being at the Isle Airport or
traveling on Highway 47. Given the limited choices, review of
each of the locations revealed that no matter what route
[Bowlby] drove he would have to pass close by Johnson’ s
Portside to travel to obtain reasonable and necessary services,
such as grocery store, gas station, or for other necessities.

As Bowlby concedes, neither party presented evidence to the district court with
information regarding the distance from Bowlby’s apartment to Johnson’s Portside. As a
result, it appears that the district court ascertained the distance between Bowlby’s home
and Johnson’s portside through its own independent research.
In Dorsey, the judge independently investigated a fact that neither party introduced
into evidence during a bench trial, and then announced the results of the investigation to
counsel, effectively introducing “a material fact that was favorable to the state—and which
the state had not yet introduced.” 701 N.W.2d 238, 251. The supreme court concluded
that the judge’s independent investigation of facts, “whether or not they involve immutable
facts,” was a basis for reversal because it deprived Dorsey of a fair trial and an impartial
fact-finder. Id. at 251. The supreme court also expressed concern about the precedent that
may be set when a judge conducts independent research of facts outside of the record,
including confirmatory immutable facts, because it compromises the bedrock principle
“that judges may not investigate or rely upon extra-record knowledge when sitting as the
finder of fact.” Id.
The district court’s apparent investigation into the distance between appellant’s
home and Johnson’s Portside constitutes the type of independent investigation that is
prohibited by a judicial officer, as explained in Dorsey. While Dorsey addressed the right
10
of a criminal defendant to have an impartial judge, there is no dispute that all parties are
entitled to an impartial judge. See Hansen v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 43 N.W.2d 260, 264
(Minn. 1950) (stating that judge must be fair to both sides and should refrain from
comments that would injure either party to litigation). We therefore conclude that the
district court committed reversible error by conducting its own investigation into facts
outside of the record.
B. The district court lacked impartiality by collaterally attacking the HRO.
The record also shows that the district court made additional factual findings and
arguments that were not presented by Bowlby and apparently relied on those findings to
determine that the complaint was not supported by probable cause. This was error.
Notably, the district court found:
The Petitioning Party did not request [Bowlby] in this case
remain a certain distance from his job site. No evidence has
been presented to indicate the reviewing judge considered any
public spaces that would or could be located within the 250-
foot radius of Johnson ’s Portside. It is probable that had the
reviewing judge known the public highway and municipal
airport location the reviewing judge may not have included a
distance requirement but would have limited the order to what
was requested by the petitioning party or excluded Highway 47
and the Isle Airport from the distance requirement. Regardless,
the Petitioning Party, by not including a request for distance
requirement from the jobsite, was not objecting to Defendant’s
presence along Highway 47. Likewise, because [Bowlby’s]
presence on Highway 47 or at the municipal airport was not
inconsistent with the Petitioning Party ’s request, the Ex Parte
HRO Petitioning Party did not contact Law Enforcement to
report seeing [Bowlby] in a prohibited location or that
[Bowlby] had contacted him. (Emphasis added).

11
The district court also noted that Bowlby “attempted to get the HRO changed to
address the 250-foot distance prohibition” after being charged with violating the HRO, but
he did not pay the $75.00 filing fee. The district court’s legal determination that Bowlby
did not know he violated the HRO by driving on the highway because the petitioner in the
HRO proceeding “did not object to Bowlby driving on the highway” is not supported by
the record. The district court’s comments and assumptions about the parame ters of the
HRO appear to be arguments that Bowlby could have but did not make to the district court
that issued the HRO in a different proceeding. The district court’s comments and
assumptions were effectively a collateral attack on the HRO on behalf of Bowlby.
In State v. Schlienz, the supreme court held that the district court’s on-the-record
discussion with the prosecutor suggesting the specific objections the state could make in
opposition to a plea-withdrawal motion disqualified the district court judge from presiding
over a case because the judge’s conduct “called into question the judge’s impartiality.”
774 N.W.2d at 369.
Similarly, the district court’s actions here, specifically its sua sponte collateral attack
on the HRO, call into question its impartiality. Notably, the district court based its decision,
in part, on facts not in the record and arguments that Bowlby did not make. The district
court therefore made erroneous factual findings and legal determinations. Bowlby does
not dispute that the district court looked in the civil file, but instead, “would venture to
guess that many district court judges look in civil files . . . when they coincide with criminal
matters.” Bowlby provides no cite to support this contention. To the extent that Bowlby’s
contention is true, the district court’s inquiry into the civil proceeding reaches far beyond
12
judicial notice, in that it not did not just acknowledge the civil proceeding but formulated
its own arguments and made legal conclusions based on those arguments. See Minn. R.
Evid. 201(b), (e) (permitting courts to take judicial notice of facts “not subject to reasonable
dispute . . . [and] capable of accurate and ready determination,” provided the parties have
an opportunity to be heard on the issue). Indeed, the district court’s speculation as to what
Bowlby intended to argue, its challenges and interpretation of the HRO beyond what was
stated, and its determination that the petitioner would not have objected to Bowlby’s
conduct on the day of his arrest, were not arguments Bowlby raised in his motion to dismiss
or by the petitioner in the civil proceeding.1
Reversed and remanded.

1 We decline to address reassignment of the case to a different district court judge because
neither party requested we do so.