Zev Oman, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0096

Zev Oman,
Appellant,

vs.

Sharei Chesed Congregation, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 22, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-23-6010

Thomas F. DeVincke, Robyn K. Johnson, Malkerson Gunn Martin LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Jeffrey M. Markowitz, Rakiah B. Adams (pro hac vice), Arthur, Chapman, Kettering,
Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of his claims for breach of
contract and negligence per se stemming from appellant’s purchase of rights to burial lots
from respondent-congregation. We affirm.

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FACTS
In 2012, appellant Zev Oman purchased 24 rights to burial lots from respondent
Sharei Chesed Congregation (c ongregation). The rights to burial lots were located in
Gemelus Chesed Cemetery (cemetery), which is owned by the c ongregation. At all
relevant times, the cemetery was managed and supervised by an independent contractor,
respondent Michael J. Morris, LLC, which is owned by respondent Michael J. Morris. 1
The purchases are reflected in two documents entitled “Grant of Burial Lot
Agreement” and in three cemetery deeds. In the first rights-to-burial-lot agreement, signed
in March 2012, Oman purchased eight rights to burial lots that are identified by lot
numbers. The lot numbers are contiguous. In the second rights-to-burial-lot agreement,
signed in December 2012, Oman purchased 16 rights of burial lots that are also identified
by lot numbers. These lot numbers are also contiguous but located in a separate row from
the first group of eight lots that Oman purchased. The two agreements contain the
following language:
2. RIGHT OF BURIAL. The right of burial herein purchased
belongs solely to the GRANTEE(S), and is not transferable,
except with the prior written consent of the CEMETERY. The
CEMETERY reserves the right to withhold such consent solely
within its own discretion. The right of burial shall be granted
only to persons of the Jewish faith.

3. TITLE NOT ACQUIRED. The PURCHASER and the
GRANTEE(S) shall not acquire by this Grant of Burial any
title to any lot or any other interest in CEMETERY property
except such rights of interment in the above described
location(s). Such rights in any part of said locations(s) shall

1 Michael J. Morris, LLC, Michael J. Morris, and the congregation will collectively be
referred to as respondents.
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not be vested in the GRANTEE(S) or GRANTEE(S) heirs until
the purchase price has been fully paid, unless the CEMETERY,
in writing, agrees otherwise.

. . . .

10. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This contract contains all the
agreements between the PURCHASER and the CEMETERY
relating to this Grant of Burial Agreement. The PURCHASER
understands and agrees that no official or other representative
of the CEMETERY or funeral director or counselor has any
authority to make any oral or written statements or binding
agreements not contained in this contract.

From 2013 to 2015, the congregation provided Oman three cemetery deeds for 19
of the 24 lots. The cemetery deeds described the lot numbers consistent with the burial-lot
agreements. The deeds contain the following language:
That the said party of the first part, in consideration of the sum
of One Dollar ($1.00) and other valuable consideration, to it in
hand paid by the said party of the second part, receipt whereof
is hereby acknowledged, does hereby Grant, Bargain, sell, and
convey unto the said party of the second part, his heirs and
assigns, Forever, all the tract or parcel of land lying and being
in the Gemelus Chesed Cemetery, in the County of Hennepin,
State of Minnesota, described as follows [lot numbers.]

Before purchasing the rights of burial lots, Oman visited the cemetery with Morris
in early 2012, to view the burial lots. Oman informed Morris that he “wanted to purchase
all of the available contiguous [lots] in the orthodox section of the cemetery.” Morris
showed Oman the available contiguous burial lots, for which Oman ultimately purchased
the rights.
Sometime between 2012 and 2017, Morris remeasured the area of the two groupings
of lots where Oman purchased his rights of burial lots. He did so at the request of other
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families who wished to have burial lots near their family members. In the vicinity of
Oman’s eight contiguous lots , Morris “determined that, lo and behold, we could fit in
another four lots in this area based on the re- measurement.” These four additional lots
were placed adjacent to Oman’s eight contiguous lots. In the vicinity of Oman’s 16
contiguous lots, Morris determined three additional lots fit in the area. These three
additional lots were placed adjacent to Oman’s 16 contiguous lots.
In 2017, Oman visited the cemetery for a funeral and noticed that “there were
persons buried in the location of [his lots] that were not [his] family members.” Oman
expressed his concerns to Morris and the c ongregation, and Morris wrote in a letter to
Oman that the area was remeasured and additional burial lots were added to the row.
Oman buried his mother in one of the lots that he purchased. The burial occurred
after he learned that the additional lots were added to the area.
In 2023, Oman initiated the current lawsuit against respondents, asserting various
claims. Relevant to this appeal, Oman alleged that the congregation breached the contract
by changing the location and size of the lots. He also alleged negligence per se, claiming
that the congregation “was required to obtain [his] consent prior to subdividing or
rearranging the [c]emetery” under Minn. Stat. § 307.01 (2024), and that the congregation
“breached its duties owed” to him under the statute.
Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Oman’s breach-of -
contract claim failed because the parties’ contracted for burial rights in identified lot
numbers that Oman still retained. And they argued that Oman’s negligence-per-se claim
failed because they did not rearrange the cemetery in violation of the statute. Respondents
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supported their argument with exhibits of the burial-lot agreements, the cemetery deeds,
and deposition testimony of Oman and Morris. Oman opposed summary judgment on his
breach-of-contract and negligence-per-se claims. Oman included his affidavit,
spreadsheets that Morris created of the lots, and an expert-witness affidavit of a land
surveyor.2 The district court granted summary judgment on the breach-of-contract and
negligence-per-se claims.
Oman appeals.
DECISION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. City of Waconia
v. Dock, 961 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Minn. 2021). “When conducting this review, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and resolve all doubts and
factual inferences against the moving parties.” Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC, 922 N.W.2d
185, 190 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Summary judgment is properly granted only
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01; Lund v. Calhoun Orange, Inc., 20
N.W.3d 871, 875 (Minn. 2025). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is
sufficient evidence regarding an essential element to permit reasonable persons to draw
different conclusions.” St. Paul Park Refin. Co. LLC v. Domeier, 950 N.W.2d 547, 549
(Minn. 2020) (quotations omitted). But “the nonmoving party must do more than rest on
mere averments to create a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary

2 Respondents moved to strike the land surveyor’s affidavit, which the district court denied
as moot after granting summary judgment to respondents.
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judgment.” Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 172 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted).
Oman first challenges the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of his
breach-of-contract claim, arguing that a dispute relating to material facts exists. He then
challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of his negligence-per -se claim, arguing that
summary judgment is precluded because Minn. Stat. § 307.01 protects him , and
respondents violated the statute by “rearranging” his burial lots. We begin with the breach-
of-contract claim.
Breach of Contract
The three elements of a breach-of-contract claim are: “(1) formation of a contract,
(2) performance by plaintiff of any conditions precedent to his right to demand
performance by the defendant, and (3) breach of the contract by defendant.” Lyon Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Ill. Paper & Copier Co., 848 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 2014) (quotation
omitted).
In granting summary judgment on the breach -of-contract claim, the district court
determined that the burial-lot agreements clearly and unambiguously provide Oman rights
of interment and that respondents’ addition of adjacent lots did not interfere with Oman’s
rights. The district court further stated that there “was no reduction in the number of burial
sites, there [was] no evidence that the dimensions of those sites are insufficient for burial,
and there was no relocation of those burial sites to another part of the [c]emetery.”
The parties dispute whether the district court correctly determined that respondents
did not breach the contract; namely, the two burial-right agreements and three cemetery
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deeds. But the dispute turns on the terms of the contract. Oman asserts that he purchased
“all of the burial [lots]” located in specified areas , that “the size of each burial [lot] was
necessarily reduced” when respondents added the adjacent lots, and that he “lost the full
benefit of his bargain.” He contends that respondents breached the contract by
“rearranging” the cemetery to add burial lots adjacent to the ones he purchased .
Respondents argue that Oman was not granted land, rather he was granted 24 rights of
burial in specified lots. We agree with respondents.
The goal of contract interpretation is “to determine and enforce the intent of the
parties.” Staffing Specifix, Inc. v. TempWorks Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 913 N.W.2d 687, 692
(Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “[A] contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or
more reasonable interpretations.” Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn.
2010). But “[a] contract’s terms are not ambiguous simply because the parties’
interpretations differ.” Staffing Specifix, 913 N.W.2d at 692. “Summary judgment is
inappropriate where terms of a contract are at issue and those terms are ambiguous or
uncertain,” but if the terms “may be given their plain and ordinary meaning, construction
of the contract is a matter for the court and summary judgment may be appropriate.” Bank
Midwest Minn., Iowa, N.A. v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 2004).
Oman’s assertion that he purchased “all of the burial [lots] located in the area”
between certain lots acquired by others overstates the agreements reached between him and
the congregation. We agree with the district court that the burial-right agreements clearly
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and unambiguously grant Oman rights of interment in specified lots. 3 The location of the
lots are described as follows: “LOT NUMBERS: 488-7[;] 487-1,2,3,4,5[;] 486-1,2” and
“LOT NUMBER[S] : 502-4,5[;] 501-1,2,3,4,5[;] 500-1,2,3,4,5[;] 499-1,2,3,4.” The
agreements do not grant Oman an area in the cemetery marked by other burial lot numbers.
Nor do they guarantee that respondents will not add additional adjacent lots to the area
where Oman’s lots are situated. And the burial-lot agreements state that Oman does not
acquire “any title to any lot or any other interest in cemetery property except such rights of
interment in the above described location(s).” (Emphasis omitted.) Because Oman was
granted 24 rights of burial in certain lots, and not an interest in a general area of land,
respondents did not breach the contract by adding adjacent lots.
Turning to the cemetery deeds, we note that t he district court did not mention the
cemetery deeds in its memorandum, but upon our de novo review, we conclude that the
deeds do not convey a specific area of land. In State v. Lorentz, the supreme court described
the nature of acquiring cemetery lots through deeds as follows: “the grantee can use the
land purchased for burial purposes only. The rights in the lot are limited and circumscribed.
It is not an ordinary sale of real estate.” 22 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. 1946).
The deeds here stated that the congregation:

3 In his brief, Oman appears to point to additional documents to interpret the parties’
agreements, including the expert affidavit of a land surveyor and a spreadsheet created by
Morris identifying the lots where eight of Oman’s rights are located. Extrinsic evidence
beyond the four corners of a contract is inadmissible to explain the meaning of a contract
that is unambiguous and fully integrated. Alpha Real Est. Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental
Plan of Minn., 664 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Minn. 2003). During oral argument, Oman conceded
that we need only consider the burial-lot agreements and cemetery deeds.
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Grant[s], Bargain[s], sell[s], and convey[s] unto [Oman], his
heirs and assigns, Forever, all the tract or parcel of land lying
and being in the Gemelus Chesed Cemetery, in the County of
Hennepin, State of Minnesota, described as follows, to- wit:
[Lot Numbers]

all situated in the Gemelus Chesed Cemetery . . . according to
the plat of said Gemelus Chesed Cemetery on file and of record
in the office of the Register of Deeds in and for the County of
Hennepin, State of Minnesota.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same subject to the Statutes of
the State of Minnesota, now in full force, or which may
hereafter be enacted . . . .

The congregation issued the deeds for 19 of the 24 burial lots where Oman’s rights of
interment are located. The deeds described the lots consistent with the burial-lot
agreements. And like the burial-lot agreements, these descriptions of the lots do not convey
to Oman a general area in the cemetery marked by other burial lots.
Although the deeds purport to convey to Oman “all the tract or parcel of land lying
and being in” the cemetery, contrary to the burial-lot agreements, they also expressly state
that such conveyance is subject to Minnesota law. Under Minnesota law, “[e]very religious
corporation owning such cemetery may sell and convey lots therein for burial purposes
only. Deeds thereof may be executed by the treasurers of such corporations, or by one or
more of the trustees . . . authorized by resolution duly adopted by its board of trustees.”
Minn. Stat. § 307.04 (2024). As such, consistent with the burial-lot agreements, the deeds
convey 19 specific lots for burial purposes; they do not convey a specific amount or area
of land.
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Oman alternatively argues that the agreements and deeds create ambiguity as to
whether the burial lots he purchased must remain consistent with the recorded plat map,
which does not include the additional adjacent lots. We disagree. As discussed above, the
documents unambiguously convey to Oman the burial rights to specific lots, which still
exist.
Oman also contends that he “lost the full benefit of his bargain.” We are not
persuaded. Oman has burial rights in 24 lots in the cemetery. He has used one of those
lots to bury his mother. As noted by respondents, Oman does not argue that respondents
have interfered with these rights by preventing him from using his lots.
Oman seems to argue that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding
summary judgment based on his assertion that the size of each individual burial lot was
reduced. He asserts that the district court made an erroneous finding that the lots are “still
the original size.” 4 But the undisputed facts show that the size of Oman’s lots did not
change. In two separate letters written by Morris, he explained that “each burial space is
allocated 40 inches across by 8 feet long for a single grave.” During Morris’s deposition,
he maintained that burial lots are allocated a space of 40 inches wide. And during Oman’s
deposition, when asked if he knew how wide the lots were when he purchased them, he

4 We note that this finding is originally contained in the district court’s order denying
Oman’s motion for temporary injunctive relief, which is an order that Oman does not
challenge on appeal. In its summary judgment memorandum, the district court repeated
that finding only in a paragraph summarizing the prior order denying temporary injunctive
relief. To the extent that Oman challenges the order denying temporary injunctive relief,
his contention is outside the scope of his appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04
(describing appellate court’s scope of review).
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responded, “[n]o.” When asked if he knew “how wide each of [his] remaining spaces are
now,” he again said, “[n]o.”
Attempting to demonstrate a factual dispute, Oman points to his own affidavit,
which states:
6. When Defendants re-platted in this area, four (4) additional
burial plots (486-2A, 486-2B, 486-2C and 486-2D) were added
between my eight (8) burial plots and the [R.M.] burial plot,
thereby reducing the size of each [of] the burial plots I had
previously purchased . . . .

. . . .

8. When this area was re-platted by Defendants, three (3) new
burial plots were added (502-3A, 502-3B and 502-3C), and
these three (3) burial plots are located between my burial plot
at 502-4 and [H.S.’s] plot, thereby reducing the size of each of
the sixteen (16) burial plots I had previously purchased.

(Emphasis added.)
“A self-serving affidavit that contradicts other testimony is not sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact.” Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 759 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Minn.
App. 2009). Oman’s affidavit contradicts Morris’s testimony and is self-serving. It is also
inconsistent with his deposition testimony that he does not know how wide the plots were
or are. It therefore does not create a factual dispute. Oman has not pointed to any other
facts that indicate the size of the lots have been altered. The undisputed evidence
demonstrates that burial lots are 40 inches wide by eight feet long and that Oman’s 24 lots
remain the same size.
In sum, summary judgment on Oman’s breach-of-contract claim was appropriate
because respondents did not breach the burial -lot agreements or deeds conveying the lots
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to Oman for burial purposes. Oman apparently hoped to preclude any other families from
purchasing burial lots in a specific area of the cemetery, but the agreements and deeds do
not give him that right. Nor did the agreements and deeds preclude the congregation from
rearranging the lots to accommodate more burial requests.
Negligence Per Se
“[N]egligence per se is a form of ordinary negligence that results from violation of
a statute. To prove a negligence claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant breached
a duty of care that proximately caused the plaintiff damage .” Johnson v. Paynesville
Farmers Union Co- op. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 706 (Minn. 2012) (quotations and
citation omitted). Id. In a negligence-per-se claim, a statutory duty of care substitutes the
ordinary prudent person standard of care “such that a violation of a statute . . . is conclusive
evidence of duty and breach.” Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 231 n.3 (Minn.
2002). But violation of a statute does not constitute negligence per se unless (1) “the victim
of the harm was intended to be protected by the statute” and (2) “the harm suffered is of
the kind intended to be prevented by the statute.” Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch.
Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 662–63 (Minn. 2004). Interpretation of a statute is a question
of law reviewed de novo. Dock, 961 N.W.2d at 229.
Oman’s negligence-per-se claim is based on respondents’ alleged violation of Minn.
Stat. § 307.01, which states:
Any private person and any religious corporation may
establish a cemetery on the person’s or corporation’s own land
in the following manner: The land shall be surveyed and a plat
thereof made. A stone or other monument shall be established
to mark one corner of such cemetery, and its location shall be
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designated on the plat. The plat and the correctness thereof
shall be certified by the surveyor, whose certificate shall be
endorsed thereon, and with such endorsement shall be filed for
record with the county recorder in the county where the
cemetery is located, showing the area and location of the
cemetery. Any person or association owning such private
cemetery may subdivide or rearrange the same, from time to
time, as may be necessary in the conduct of the business, but
no plat of such subdivision or rearrangement shall interfere
with the rights and privileges of the several lot owners of such
cemetery without their consent, nor need same be filed in the
office of the county recorder; provided, that a plat of the same
shall be kept for public inspection at such cemetery; and,
provided, further, that there shall be placed at the corner of
each lot of such subdivision or rearrangement cement or other
nondestructible markers three inches or more in diameter and
eight inches or more in length, one of such markers showing
the number of the lot.

(Emphasis added.)
The district court determined that Oman did not have a viable negligence-per-se
claim for two reasons. First, the court concluded that respondents did not violate the statute
because “the addition of the adjacent burial plots did not interfere with Oman’s ‘rights and
privileges’ insofar as he still has the agreed-upon burial rights.” Second, the district court
concluded that “the statute is not intended to protect lot owners such as Oman from the
addition of adjacent burial plots.”
Oman argues that respondents violated Minn. Stat. § 307.01 by rearranging burial
lots in a manner that interferes with his contractual rights. The statute explicitly permits
cemetery owners to rearrange the cemetery as necessary when conducting business. That
is what occurred here. Morris remeasured the areas in which Oman’s lots were located
upon a request from other families to bury their loved ones near each other. And he
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determined that additional lots could fit in those areas. The additional lots are located
adjacent to Oman’s two sets of contiguous lots; they are not located in the middle of the
contiguous lots. The statute prohibits rearrangement if it interferes with the rights of lot
owners and those owners do not consent to rearrangement. As discussed above, Oman’s
contractual rights are for 24 rights of interment. Oman’s rights of interment were not
interfered with by the additional lots being placed in the area. There is no genuine issue of
material fact that Oman’s lots still exist , and that Oman can exercise his 24 rights of
interment in the lots that he purchased.
Because we conclude that the rearrangement did not interfere with Oman’s rights in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 307.01, we need not reach Oman’s additional contention that the
district court erred in determining as a matter of law that appellant was not among the class
of persons intended to be protected by the statute. See Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817
N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that we “may affirm a grant of summary
judgment if it can be sustained on any grounds”). We also do not consider respondents’
alternative bases to affirm.
In sum, respondents did not violate Minn. Stat. § 307.01, and summary judgment
on Oman’s negligence-per-se claim was appropriate. While we can appreciate the
fervently held desire of appellant to have all of his family buried together, separate and
apart from anyone else, we are obligated to follow the law.
Affirmed.