State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0104

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eugene Nathaniel Arnold, III,
Appellant.

Filed December 1, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-21-525

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dawn Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Evan Ottaviani, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Eugene Nathaniel Arnold III sent two documents entitled “cashier ’s check” to a
creditor to satisfy a debt. After a court trial, the district court found Arnold guilty of two
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counts of offering a forged check. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove
Arnold’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On December 28, 2020, the Sherburne County District Court entered judgment in a
criminal case against Arnold. The district court imposed a prison sentence but stayed
execution of the sentence. The district court also ordered restitution in the amount of
$1,564.78, a surcharge of $75.00, and a law library fee of $10.00, for a total of $1,649.78.
Two days later, Arnold mailed an envelope to the office of the Sherburne County
Court Administrator. Inside the envelope was a document entitled “CASHIER’S CHECK”
in the amount of $26,649.78. The purported cashier’s check, which was introduced into
evidence as exhibit 2, is appended to this opinion. The envelope included other documents,
including a “letter of credit,” which explains Arnold’s means of satisfying the judgment
debt, and a document warning that it would be fraudulent for the recipient to not process
the cashier’s check within three days.
A few weeks later, on February 12, 2021, Arnold mailed a second envelope to the
court administrator’s office. Inside the second envelope was another document entitled
“CASHIER’S CHECK,” this time in the amount of $1,564.78, which is the amount of
restitution ordered in the prior criminal case. The second purported cashier’s check, which
was introduced into evidence as exhibit 3, also is appended to this opinion. The second
envelope included other documents, including a letter explaining that the check was
enclosed “for private placement settlement of my account” and requesting that the recipient
“credit my account,” a letter from the United States Internal Revenue Service to “Eugene
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Arnold Private Bank E&T,” and an e-mail message apparently sent to Arnold by the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission.
A supervisor in the court administrator’s office reported the matter to the office of
the county sheriff. A deputy sheriff contacted Arnold by telephone in March 2021 and
recorded the conversation. The deputy asked Arnold to explain the authority under which
he issued the cashier’s checks. Arnold responded by asking the deputy to do a Google
search for Eugene Arnold Private Bank Estate and Trust. Arnold explained that his private
bank is “registered with the SEC,” which has “accepted ” the “authority for me to issue
these private instruments.” Arnold explained further that “this is real live monetary money
that is . . . federally regulated” and that “anyone who does not process those instruments
. . . will be prosecuted by the SEC” or another governmental entity. Arnold also stated that
the court administrator’s office could “take that check . . . to [a] transferring agent,” who
could submit it to an office of the federal government, which would “give . . . credit . . . for
that instrument.”
In April 2021, the state charged Arnold with two counts of offering a forged check,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 3 (2020). Arnold appeared without counsel at
all pre-trial proceedings. Arnold waived his right to a trial by jury, and the case was tried
to the court on one day in December 2021. Before the state called its first witness, Arnold
informed the district court that he did not intend to participate in the trial, and he left the
courtroom. Arnold did not return, and the trial proceeded in his absence.
The state called two witnesses: the court-administration supervisor who reported the
matter and the deputy who interviewed Arnold by telephone. The state also introduced
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five exhibits: the judgment in the prior criminal case, the two envelopes that Arnold sent
to the court administrator’s office and their contents, an audio-recording of the deputy’s
telephone call with Arnold, and a transcript of that telephone call.
In January 2022, the district court filed an order in which it found Arnold guilty of
both charges. At a sentencing hearing in October 2024, the district court imposed a
sentence of 15 months of imprisonment on count 1 but stayed execution of the sentence.
The district court did not impose a sentence on count 2. Arnold appeals.
DECISION
Arnold argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.
The applicable statute provides, “A person who, with intent to defraud, offers, or
possesses with intent to offer, a forged check, whether or not it is accepted, is guilty of
offering a forged check . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 3. To determine whether a
defendant offered or possessed “a forged check,” we refer to the preceding subdivision of
the check-forgery statute, which provides as follows:
A person is guilty of check forgery . . . if the person,
with intent to defraud, does any of the following:

(1) falsely makes or alters a check so that it purports
to have been made [1] by another, or [2] by the maker under an
assumed or fictitious name, or [3] at another time, or [4] with
different provisions, or [5] by the authority of one who did not
give authority; or

(2) falsely endorses or alters a check so that it
purports to have been endorsed by another.

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Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2 (2020). We have inserted five bracketed numerals into
paragraph (1) of this subdivision to specifically identify the five ways in which a person
can falsely make a check.
Arnold’s argument for reversal has three parts. First, he argues that the state did not
prove that each of the documents he sent to the court administrator’ s office is a “check,”
as that term is us ed in the check-forgery statute. Second, he argues that the state did not
prove that he falsely made a check on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to
establish criminal liability under the false-authority clause. And third, he argues that the
state did not prove that he had an intent to defraud when he offered the forged checks.
To determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, this court
generally undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient. ” State
v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 187 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). We “carefully examine
the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them
would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d
895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “We assume that the jury believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205,
214 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). If an appellant’s argument implicates the meaning
of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review to the district court’s interpretation of
the statute. State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017); State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d
799, 803 (Minn. 2013).
6
A. Check
We begin by considering Arnold’s argument that the evidence is insufficient to
prove that each of the documents entitled “cashier’s check” is a “check.”
The word “check ” is defined within the check-forgery statute to mean “a check,
draft, order of withdrawal, or similar negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.631, subd. 1(b) (2020). The district court found that each of the two documents at
issue is a “check,” for purposes of the check-forgery statute, because each is labeled
“cashier’s check” and identifies a payee, an amount to be paid, and the number of an
account on which funds purportedly could be drawn. The district court’s findings are
supported by the evidence introduced at trial. The two documents at issue, on their face,
purport to be checks.
Arnold contends that the documents are not “check s” on the grounds that “a
cashier’s check is a check that a bank draws on itself,” see Lassen v. First Bank, 514
N.W.2d 831, 838 n.7 (Minn. App. 1994) (emphasis added), rev. denied (Minn. June 29,
1994), and that the United States Department of the Treasury, which is referenced in the
documents, is not a “ bank.” In making this argument, Arnold relies on the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), Minn. Stat. §§ 336.1-101 to 336.0A-306 (2024). But this court
has stated that “the definition of ‘check ’ under the check-forgery statute . . . is explicitly
broader than the meaning of the word ‘check ’ under the UCC.” State v. Jonsgaard, 949
N.W.2d 161, 166 n.6 (Minn. App. 2020). Indeed, the check-forgery statute’s definition of
“check” is broad enough to include several different things: “a check, draft, order of
withdrawal, or similar negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument.” Minn. Stat. § 609.631,
7
subd. 1(b). Importantly, the statutory definition of “check” does not expressly require that
the check be drawn, or be intended to be drawn, on a bank. See id. Arnold’s argument
would, in essence, require this court to insert words into the statutory definition to narrow
the scope of the definition. But we may not add words or phrases to an unambiguous
statute. See, e.g., Firefighters Union Local 4725 v. City of Brainerd, 934 N.W.2d 101, 110
(Minn. 2019).
Thus, the district court did not misinterpret or misapply the definition of “check” in
the check-forgery statute, and the evidence is sufficient to prove that each of the documents
at issue is a “check,” as that term is defined in section 609.631, subdivision 1(b).
B. False Authority
Arnold also argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he falsely made the
cashier’s checks that he mailed to the court administrator’s office.
The state argued to the district court that Arnold is guilty because he made checks
in violation of the fifth, false-authority clause of section 609.631, subdivision 2(1). In light
of the state’s theory, the relevant question is whether the state proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that Arnold falsely made a check “so that it purports to have been made . . . by the
authority of one who did not give authority.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(1).
The district court found that each check “ was falsely made and lacks legal
authority.” The district court reasoned that each check purports to identify an account at
the United States Treasury, the purported account number is not actually associated with
the Treasury, and the Treasury “does not have any accounts for individuals to charge
against.” In support of this finding, the district court cited United States v. Anderson, 353
8
F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2003), which states, that “the United States Treasury maintains no
depository accounts against which an individual could draw a check, draft, or any other
financial instrument.” Id. at 500.
In Arnold’s pro se supplemental brief, he argues as follows: “ Arnold does indeed
have the authority to issue private article 6 international bill of exchange . . . unregistered
instruments he create[d] directing the drawee/trustee to pay face value of instrument if the
instrument is presented by the one having the authority to collect.” This contention is not
supported by any evidence because Arnold did not introduce any evidence at trial. We
have reviewed the documents that Arnold enclosed in the two envelopes and his
conversation with the deputy sheriff, and we conclude that such evidence does not establish
that Arnold had authority to draw on Treasury funds using an apparently self-created, self-
described cashier’s check. In addition, Arnold does not cite any relevant legal principles
in his pro se supplemental brief. We are unaware of any legal basis for the proposition that
Arnold could draw on Treasury funds in the manner reflected in the purported cashier’s
check. Indeed, our research reveals that a person may not use a self-created document to
draw on funds held by the federal government. See, e.g., McGee v. Nissan Motor
Acceptance Corp., 619 App’x 555, 555 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s
frivolous civil claims based on “bill of exchange” purporting to draw on United States
Treasury funds); El v. AmeriCredit Fin. Srvcs., Inc., 710 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2013)
(describing scheme to draw on United States Treasury funds as “frivolous”); State v. Pettus, 2019 WL 2244756, *7-8 (Ohio. App. May 24, 2019) (affirming conviction of forgery and
reasoning that appellant “had no authority to write checks on” account belonging to federal
9
government agency). We also note that, in a case concerning Arnold’s attempts to satisfy
a child-support obligation with checks that (like the checks in this case) reference a “UCC
Contract Trust account ,” a federal appellate court described the checks as “transparently
phony.” Arnold v. Circuit Ct. of Cook Cnty., 741 App’x 337, 339 (7th Cir. 2018).
Accordingly, we conclude that Arnold did not have authority to use the two self-created,
self-described cashier’s checks to discharge his debt to the court administrator’s office.
In the principal brief filed by his appellate attorney, Arnold argues that the district
court erred by misinterpreting the false-authority clause of the check -forgery statute.
Arnold contends that the word “makes” in section 609.631, subdivision 2(1), should be
interpreted according to its specialized or technical meaning. He attempts to extract such
a meaning from the UCC. But in Jonsgaard, we noted that “the UCC terms governing
negotiable instruments do not precisely align with the terms used in the check -forgery
statute.” 949 N.W.2d at 166 n.6. In any event, the UCC does not define the word “makes.”
See Minn. Stat. § 336.3-103. In Jonsgaard, we relied on the ordinary meaning of “makes”
in saying that it “includes ‘executing, signing, or delivering’ a document.” Jonsgaard, 949
N.W.2d at 169 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1144 (11th ed. 2019)). We also
recognized, “A common method of falsely making a check is filling in the blanks of another
person’s check and forging that person ’s name on the signature line on the front of the
check.” Id. But we did not say in Jonsgaard that the common method of falsely making
a check described there is the only method. Neither the UCC nor Jonsgaard establishes a
specialized or technical meaning of the word “makes” that could be applied to the check -
forgery statute.
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Arnold also contends that the check-forgery statute should be interpreted to conform
to the common-law understanding of forgery, which, he asserts, does not include “signing
a check with one’s own name under the false assumption of the authority of another.” In
support of this contention, Arnold cites State v. Wilson, 9 N.W. 28 (Minn. 1881), in which
the supreme court reversed a conviction under a general forgery statute on the ground that
forgery requires a false signature of another person. Id. at 28-30 (citing Minn. Gen. Stat.
ch. 96, § 2). But, as Arnold acknowledges, the Wilson opinion predates the enactment of
the existing check-forgery statute, including the false-authority clause, by more than 100
years. See 1987 Minn. Laws ch. 329, § 13, at 1945-46. Arnold also cites State v. Hanson,
182 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1971), in which the supreme court affirmed a conviction of
aggravated forgery, but the defendant’s guilt in that case was not based on evidence of the
assertion of “authority of one who did not give such authority.” Id. at 708 (quoting Minn.
Stat. § 609.625, subd. 1). The common-law principle on which Arnold relies does not
apply because it is inconsistent with, and has been superseded by, the false-authority clause
in the check-forgery statute.
Furthermore, there is no textual basis for interpreting the word “authority” in the
false-authority clause so that it would exclude the authority of the federal government .
Again, Arnold’s argument would require this court to insert words into the false-authority
clause to limit it to the authority of a person who is an account holder. But, again, we may
not add words or phrases to an unambiguous statute. See, e.g., Firefighters Union Loc al
4725, 934 N.W.2d at 110.
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Thus, the district court did not misinterpret or misapply the check-forgery statute,
and the evidence is sufficient to prove that Arnold falsely made a check “so that it purports
to have been made . . . by the authority of one who did not give authority,” in violation of
section 609.631, subdivision 2(1).
C. Intent to Defraud
Arnold also argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he had an intent to defraud when he mailed the cashier’s checks to the court
administrator’s office.
The check-forgery statute expressly provides that a defendant must have acted “with
intent to defraud.” Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 3. The phrase “with intent to” is defined
by statute to mean “that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result
specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 9(4) (2020); see also State v. Stahosky, 836 N.W.2d 769, 773 (Minn. App. 2013)
(applying intent-to-defraud language in aggravated-forgery statute).
The district court made the following findings concerning this element:
Defendant Arnold offered the purported checks to gain
material advantage over court administration and Sherburne
County Community Corrections. Defendant Arnold hoped his
checks would eliminate his financial obligation to pay
restitution without bearing the cost himself, at the expense of
either court administration or some third party such as the U.S.
Treasury Department. In fact, Defendant Arnold additionally
presented court administration with an unwarranted demand
for payment, demonstrating he sought not only to erase a debt
but to win a profit. Furthermore, Defendant Arnold hoped that
by persuading court administration to believe he had paid his
restitution, he could end his probationary period prematurely.
The state has proven this element beyond reasonable doubt.
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A defendant’s intent at the time of an alleged criminal act usually must be proved
with circumstantial evidence. State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145, 152 (Minn. 2023); State
v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. 2015). If a conviction rests on circumstantial
evidence, this court applies a heightened standard of review with a two-step analysis. State
v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Minn. 2018); State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn.
2014). At the first step, we “identify the ‘circumstances proved.’” State v. Isaac, 9 N.W.3d
812, 815 (Minn. 2024) (quoting State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn. 2021)). “In
identifying the circumstances proved, we assume that the jury resolved any factual disputes
in a manner that is consistent with the jury’s verdict.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88.
Accordingly, “we disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the jury ’s verdict.” State v.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). At the second step of the analysis, “we
examine independently the reasonableness of the inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved,” determine whether “the circumstances proved are consistent with
guilt,” and determine whether the circumstances proved are “inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 (quotations omitted). At the
second step, we do not give deference to the jury’s verdict. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d
638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
In this case, the relevant circumstances proved are as follows. Arnold was obligated
to pay $1,649.78 to the court administrator. Shortly after the entry of judgment in the prior
criminal case, Arnold sent two envelopes to the court administrator’s office. Each envelope
contained a document entitled “cashier ’s check,” which bears some resemblance to a
13
check, references the Treasury Department and an account number, and identifies the
district court as the payee. Arnold included other documents in the envelopes, which state,
in various ways, that the purported cashier’s checks would satisfy Arnold’s judgment debt.
Arnold made oral statements to a deputy sheriff that the SEC had conferred authority on
him “to issue these private instruments,” which he described as “real live monetary
money,” which the payee could submit to the federal government for “credit.”
Having identified the relevant circumstances proved, we next must “examine
independently the reasonableness of the inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved” and determine whether “the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 (quotations omitted). The state contends that the
circumstances proved support a reasonable inference that Arnold intended to defraud the
court administrator’s office. We agree with the state that the circumstances proved allow
for a reasonable inference that Arnold intended to defraud the court administrator’s office.
Thus, the circumstances proved are consistent with the district court’s finding of guilt.
We next must determine whether the circumstances proved are “inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). Arnold contends that
the state’s evidence is “consistent with the inference that [he] held a sincere belief that the
theory of property rights described in the documents he sent to Sherburne County was a
valid interpretation of old federal laws.” In response, the state contends that “Arnold’ s
theory is inconsistent with the evidence at trial and is altogether unreasonable.”
In considering Arnold’s asserted rational hypothesis that he is not guilty, we must
begin with the principle that, as a matter of law, Arnold did not have authority to draw on
14
United States Treasury funds by creating and issuing two documents entitled “cashier’s
check.” See supra part B. To prevail, Arnold “must . . . point to evidence in the record
that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142,
158 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). But he does not identify any evidence or any
circumstance proved that would support the inference that he contends is reasonable. To
be clear, Arnold did not testify that he had a sincere belief that he had authority to use the
purported cashier’s checks to satisfy his debt to the court administrator’s office. “The
absence of evidence in the record regarding certain circumstances does not constitute a
circumstance proved from which reasonable inferences may be drawn.” Id. Thus, the only
reasonable inference from the circumstances proved is that Arnold intended to defraud the
court administrator’s office when he mailed the two purported cashier’s checks.
Before concluding, we note that Arnold also argues that the state did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that the purported cashier’s checks were forged.
Arnold does not cite any legal authority for the proposition that the state is required to
prove such knowledge. The check-forgery statute does not require proof that a defendant
acted “knowingly.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subds. 2, 3. The only mental state identified
in the statute is an “intent to defraud.” See id. We are unaware of any caselaw interpreting
the statute to require proof of a defendant’s knowledge that a check was forged. Cf. 10
Minnesota Dist. Judges’ Ass’n, Minnesota Practice–Jury Instruction Guides § 18.07, at
294 (7th ed. 2024). In this situation, it would be inappropriate to “add[] words to a statute
that the Legislature omitted.” State v. Garcia-Gutierrez, 844 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn.
2014) (concluding that section 609.582, subdivision 1(b), does not require evidence of
15
knowledge). As a practical matter, a defendant’s knowledge of the forged nature of a check
is subsumed within the concept of intent to defraud; if the state has proved that a defendant
acted with intent to defraud when offering a forged check, the state necessarily has proved
that the defendant knew that the check was forged. “[M]ultiple layers of mens rea” are not
required if not expressly stated in a criminal statute. See State v. Lyons, 997 N.W.2d 771,
775 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024). Thus, we need not separately
consider Arnold’s argument concerning knowledge.
In sum, the evidence is sufficient to support Arnold ’s convictions of offering a
forged check.
Affirmed.

16
Exhibit 2
December 30, 2020 document labeled cashier’s check in the amount of $26,649.78

17
Exhibit 3
February 12, 2021 document labeled cashier’s check in the amount of $1,564.78