State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0105

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Albert William Brown,
Appellant.

Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-23183

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Hennepin County jury found Albert William Brown guilty of possession of a
firearm by an ineligible person based on evidence that police officers found a handgun in
the front seat of his car, of which he was the driver and sole occupant . We conclude that
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the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the prosecutor did not plainly
engage in prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
During the evening of October 28, 2023, a sergeant with the Hennepin County
Sheriff’s Office saw a car run a red light. The officer conducted a traffic stop. The officer
searched a law-enforcement database and learned that Brown was the registered owner of
the car. When the officer approached the car, he saw that the driver, later identified as
Brown, was the only occupant of the car. The officer saw an open beer can in a cupholder
and the top of a liquor bottle on the driver’s seat, next to Brown’s hip. The officer asked
Brown to step out of the car.
A detective arrived at the scene while the sergeant was speaking to Brown and
participated in a search of Brown’s car. While standing inside the open driver’s-side door,
an officer saw part of a handgun under the front-seat armrests. That officer and the
detective lifted the armrests, which revealed a handgun wedged between the cushions of
the two front seats, with the handle upward. At trial, the detective testified that the handgun
would have been approximately four to six inches from the hip of a person sitting in the
driver’s seat. Subsequent investigation revealed that the handgun was loaded.
Investigators did not test the handgun for DNA or fingerprints.
The state charged Brown with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022). The case was tried to a jury on two
days in October 2024. At the outset of trial, the parties stipulated that Brown was ineligible
to possess a firearm. The state called three witnesses, including the sergeant and the
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detective mentioned above. Brown did not testify and did not introduce any evidence. The
jury returned a verdict of guilty. The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months of
imprisonment. Brown appeals.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Brown argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he knowingly possessed the handgun that was found in the front seat of his car while
he was the driver and sole occupant.
To prove the offense of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, the state
must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm while prohibited by law from
doing so. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2); State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn.
2017). The state must prove both an actus reus and a mens rea. See State v. Salyers, 858
N.W.2d 156, 1 60-61 (Minn. 2015). The actus reus of the offense is a defendant’s
possession of a firearm, which may be accomplished by either actual possession or
constructive possession. See id. (citing State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn.
1975)). The mens rea of the offense is a defendant’s knowledge that he or she was in
possession of a firearm, as well as the defendant’s knowledge that he or she had a prior
conviction. Id. at 161; Underwood v. State, 25 N.W.3d 26, 39 (Minn. 2025).
In this case, Brown does not challenge the state’s evidence of the actus reus; he
challenges only the state’s evidence of the mens rea by arguing that the state did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed the handgun. The parties agree
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that proof of Brown’s knowledge necessarily is based on circumstantial evidence. See
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601-02; Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 160 & n.2.
If a conviction rests on circumstantial evidence, this court reviews the sufficiency
of the evidence with a two-step analysis. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Minn.
2018); State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). At the first step, we “identify the
‘circumstances proved.’” State v. Isaac, 9 N.W.3d 812, 815 (Minn. 2024) (quoting State
v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn. 2021)). “In identifying the circumstances proved,
we assume that the jury resolved any factual disputes in a manner that is consistent with
the jury’s verdict.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88. Accordingly, we “disregard evidence that
is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. At the second step of
the analysis, “we examine independently the reasonableness of the inferences that might
be drawn from the circumstances proved,” determine whether “the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt,” and determine whether the circumstances proved are
“inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88
(quotations omitted). At the second step, we do not give deference to the jury’s verdict.
Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
At the first step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis, we begin by identifying the
relevant circumstances proved, which are as follows. A police officer stopped the car
Brown was driving. Brown was the registered owner of the car. Brown was the sole
occupant of the car. After Brown exited the car, officers saw a handgun wedged between
the cushions of the front seats, under the armrests. The handgun was located approximately
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four to six inches from where Brown’s hip would have been when he was in the driver’s
seat. The handle of the handgun was pointing upward. The handgun was loaded.
At the second step of the circumstantial- evidence analysis, we continue by
determining whether “the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt.” Moore, 846
N.W.2d at 88 (quotations omitted). Brown’s knowledge of the presence of the handgun
may be inferred from the fact that he owned the car and was the driver and sole occupant
of the car when the handgun was found; from the location of the handgun, only inches
away from where he was sitting while driving the car and easily within his reach; and from
the fact that the handgun was loaded and was positioned with the handle upward, which
indicates that the handgun was ready for use. Thus, the circumstances proved are
consistent with the jury’s finding that Brown is guilty. See Minn. Stat. § 609.672 (2020)
(providing that “presence of a firearm in a passenger automobile permits the fact finder to
infer knowing possession of the firearm by the driver or person in control of the automobile
when the firearm was in the automobile”).
We conclude by determining whether the circumstances proved are “inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 (quotations
omitted). Brown identifies only one hypothesis that might be inconsistent with the jury’s
finding of guilt: he asserts that “someone unbeknownst to Brown had left the firearm in his
car.” But no evidence was introduced at trial that any other person had occupied Brown’s
car at any time before he was stopped by a police officer. Cf. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 602-03
(reversing conviction of appellant who drove car registered to someone else with three
passengers who had access to firearm); State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 835-36 (Minn. App.
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2015) (reversing conviction of appellant who drove borrowed vehicle with contraband in
glove compartment). To prevail at this step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis, an
appellant “must . . . point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory
other than guilt.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 158 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
“A defendant may not rely on mere conjecture to argue that the circumstances proved, as
a whole, are consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of her innocence.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Without any evidence to support his argument, Brown’s sole alternative
hypothesis is not rational.
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to prove that Brown knowingly possessed the
handgun and, thus, sufficient to support his conviction of possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person.
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Brown also argues, in the alternative, that he is entitled to a new trial on the ground
that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal closing argument by
misstating the state’s burden of proof.
The right to due process includes the right to a fair trial. State v. Duol, 25 N.W.3d
135, 141 (Minn. 2025). “Prosecutors have an affirmative obligation to ensure that a
defendant receives a fair trial.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 686 (Minn. 2008)
(quotation omitted). Consequently, prosecutorial misconduct may result in the denial of
the right to a fair trial. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2006). “A prosecutor
engages in prosecutorial misconduct when he violates clear or established standards of
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conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this state’s case
law.” State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Brown challenges the following statements of the prosecutor during the rebuttal
closing argument:
So what I would ask you to do when you deliberate is to
consider what’s reasonable. Is it reasonable to think that
someone forgot a loaded handgun in the defendant’s car, or that
someone hid a loaded handgun in the defendant’s car and that
they did so not in the glove box, not in the trunk, not under a
seat, but just between the front seats, four to six inches from
the driver, touching the driver’s seat? Or is it more reasonable
that the gun was there because the defendant put it there? Is it
reasonable to think that the defendant is sitting in that driver’s
seat with a loaded gun four to six inches from his hip, four to
six inches from his right hand, and he doesn’t know it’s there,
or is it more reasonable that he knows it’s there? (Emphasis
added.)

Brown argues that the prosecutor misrepresented the state’s burden of proof by
asking jurors to determine whether the state’s theory of the case or Brown’s theory of the
case is “more reasonable.” Brown contends that those statements imply that the state need
prove only that much —that the state’s theory is more reasonable than Brown’s theory—
without regard for the state’s obligation to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Brown did not object to the rebuttal argument at trial. Accordingly, we apply a
modified plain-error test. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012). To
prevail under the modified plain-error test, an appellant first must establish that an error
occurred. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. The appellant then must show that the error was
plain. Id. “An error is plain if it was clear or obvious. ” Id. (quotations omitted). At the
third step of the modified plain-error test, the burden shifts to the state to show “that there
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is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had
a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. (quotations omitted). If the state does
not satisfy that burden, the appellate court proceeds to the fourth step to determine whether
the plain misconduct should result in a new trial “to ensure the fairness and integrity of
judicial proceedings.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 256 (Minn. 2023).
It is elementary that the state bears the burden of proving all elements of a criminal
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970);
Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 248-49. To misstate the state’s burden of proof is “highly
improper” and is considered prosecutorial misconduct. State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d
739, 750 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111 ,
122 (Minn. 2009); State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2000). Brown relies heavily
on State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 2002), in which the prosecutor made the
following statement in closing argument: “When we have difficult cases like this,
sometimes the only way to deal with it is just to weigh the story in each hand and decide
which one is most reasonable, which one makes the most sense.” Id. at 685. The supreme
court commented that the prosecutor’s statement “was a misstatement of the state’s burden
to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 690.
In this case, Brown’s attorney acknowledged in closing argument the possibility that
the handgun belonged to Brown but also suggested that some other person might have left
the handgun in Brown’s car. Brown’s attorney concluded his closing argument by stating
that “those are equal possibilities,” that “the tie goes to the runner,” and that, “if you can’t
decide one is more likely than the other, that’s not guilty.”
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Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor began his rebuttal argument by referring to
and reiterating the district court’s instruction concerning reasonable doubt. The prosecutor
then asked the jury to consider whether the inferences suggested by Brown’s attorney were
reasonable. In doing so, the prosecutor twice asked the jury to consider whether the
inference suggested by the state was “more reasonable.”
Because Brown did not object at trial, the prosecutor did not have an opportunity to
explain the purpose of or otherwise justify the challenged statements. Nonetheless, it
appears that the prosecutor was responding directly to Brown’s attorney’s statement that,
“if you can’t decide one is more likely than the other, that’s not guilty.” In essence,
Brown’s attorney made an argument based on the premise that the state’s theory and the
defense theory were equally likely, and the prosecutor apparently sought to persuade the
jury to reject that premise. Such an argument is justified because a prosecutor “ has the
right to fairly meet the arguments of the defendant.” Jackson, 773 N.W.2d at 123; see also
State v. Simion, 745 N.W.2d 830, 844 (Minn. 2008) (reasoning that prosecutor may argue
that a defense lacks merit). Also, the prosector’s statement was specific to the evidence in
this case. In that way, the challenged statement is different from the challenged statement
in Strommen, in which the prosecutor made a general statement that, in difficult cases,
jurors should “weigh” each party’s “story” and choose the one that is more reasonable or
sensible than the other. 648 N.W.2d at 685. The prosecutor in this case did not make such
a general statement; the prosecutor merely asserted that the parties’ respective theories
were not equally plausible. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was not
clearly or obviously contrary to the Strommen opinion.
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Thus, the prosecutor did not plainly engage in prosecutorial misconduct.
Affirmed.