State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0116

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Earl Fredrickson,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2025
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CV-24-186

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation because it clearly erred in finding that the need for appellant’s confinement
outweighed the policies favoring probation. We affirm.
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FACTS
In October 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Daniel Earl
Fredrickson with felony driving while impaired (DWI) —test refusal, driving after
cancellation—inimical to public safety, and driving without proof of insurance. A jury
found Fredrickson guilty of DWI—test refusal. This was Fredrickson’s fourth DWI-
related offense within the preceding ten years. In January 2024, the district court sentenced
Fredrickson to the presumptive sentence of 48 months in prison, stayed for three years.
Fredrickson’s probation required him to complete mental-health court.
On March 26, 2024, Fredrickson’s probation officer (PO) filed a probation-violation
report alleging that Fredrickson tested positive for methamphetamine. The district court
continued Fredrickson on probation.
On June 21, 2024, Fredrickson’s PO filed another violation report. Fredrickson was
required to follow the recommendations of an updated chemical-use assessment, but he
refused to participate in treatment intake. He also was charged with new criminal offenses
and failed to enter and complete mental-health court. A treatment report noted that
Fredrickson’s longest period of sobriety was one year while he was in drug court and ended
when he finished drug court. In an addendum to the violation report, it was recommended
that Fredrickson’s sentence be executed because the mental-health-court team had decided
to unsuccessfully discharge Fredrickson from the program because of his “unwillingness
to participate . . . in treatment.”
In September 2024, the district court held a probation- revocation hearing.
Fredrickson’s PO testified that Fredrickson failed to participate in treatment and mental-
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health court. She testified that Fredrickson “had expressed on more than one occasion that
he wanted to do in-patient treatment. [But] [h]e did not have that opportunity to be released
early from his sentence to do in-patient treatment.” She further testified that Fredrickson
would be terminated from mental-health court for several reasons. She testified:
So, first and foremost his unwillingness to participate in the
treatment offered . . . . His lack of cooperation with appearing
before the Judge and the Mental Health Court and refusing to
appear; his aggressive . . . texts and nature towards me became
- um, I guess as time went on and I think he wasn’t . . . getting
the results he was hoping for, his aggressiveness towards
me . . . kept increasing. Text messages that were calling me
names, threatening in nature and due to unwilling to, I guess,
to have a professional work relationship with a client because
of the continued aggressive behavior and unwillingness to do
treatment and unwillingness to even appear for the basic
requirement of Court for Mental Health Court, the team
decided and chose to recommend that he be removed from
Mental Health Court and recommended that he be committed
to the Commissioner of Corrections.

On cross-examination, Fredrickson’s attorney questioned whether Fredrickson’s
recommendations were based on his need or convenience. The PO testified that
Fredrickson wanted to be released early from his incarceration to go to inpatient treatment
because he found the requirements of mental- health court to be challenging, but he was
denied early release. The PO testified that, while mental-health court can be “onerous,”
Fredrickson was aware of the expectations.
Fredrickson testified that he had difficulty with mental-health court because he had
a problem with another participant. He testified that he believed he would be more
successful in a program that would teach him “coping skills.” Fredrickson testified that he
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had tried a program three or four years prior, and it was the “best program” he had ever
seen; however, he testified that he did not have success there either.
The district court found that Fredrickson intentionally and inexcusably violated his
probation by failing to obtain an updated assessment and follow treatment
recommendations, and by being unwilling “to participate in Mental Health Court.” The
district court revoked Fredrickson’s probation after finding that the need for Fredrickson’s
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation because “Fredrickson is in need of
correctional treatment that can . . . most effectively be provided during confinement.”
This appeal followed.
DECISION
Fredrickson argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation. A district court has “broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). “A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Fortner, 989 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Minn. App.
2023) (quotation omitted).
Before revoking probation, a district court must “1) designate the specific condition
or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable;
and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Austin,
295 N.W.2d at 250.
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Fredrickson challenges only the district court ’s determination on the third Austin
factor—that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.
In determining whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation, a district court considers whether “(i) confinement is necessary to protect the
public from further criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of
correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or (iii) it
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.”
State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 2005). “Only one Modtland subfactor is
necessary to support revocation.” State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023).
Here, the district court found that the need for confinement outweigh s the policies
favoring probation because Fredrickson needed correctional treatment that could most
effectively be provided if he is confined. Fredrickson argues that this determination is not
supported by the record because he was not allowed to go to his preferred treatment center,
and the district court and treatment providers did not do everything that they could to help
him or try as hard as they could have to get him into the right program.
We conclude that the record supports the district court’s determination that
Fredrickson needs correctional treatment most effectively provided during confinement.
Fredrickson essentially argues that the district court abused its discretion because he was
not permitted to choose his treatment program. But the record shows that Fredrickson
wanted to go to inpatient treatment and that he was denied early release. So, the treatment
program Fredrickson desired was unavailable to him. See State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d
6
539, 544 (Minn. App. 1992) (stating that district court does not abuse its discretion in
revoking probation when treatment program unavailable to probationer).
Additionally, Fredrickson mentioned the treatment facility he wanted to go to but
admitted that he had been there in the past and was unsuccessful. And the main reason that
Fredrickson provided for not participating in mental-health court was because he had an
issue with another participant.
The record shows that Fredrickson refused to cooperate and participate in treatment
and mental-health court. This court has stated that the refusal to comply with programming
and participate in treatment may support the revocation of probation. State v. Moot, 398
N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987). The district court
did not abuse its discretion by revoking Fredrickson’s probation and executing his prison
sentence.
Affirmed.