

*This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).*

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0119**

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Patrick Alan Haddeland,
Appellant.

**Filed July 7, 2025
Affirmed
Worke, Judge**

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-20-16698

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WORKE, Judge

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation after concluding that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Patrick Alan Haddeland with two counts of aiding and abetting the manufacture of counterfeit currency, aiding and abetting the receipt of stolen property, and identity theft. In November 2022, Haddeland pleaded guilty to identity theft and the other counts were dismissed. The district court sentenced Haddeland to 58 months in prison, but granted Haddeland a downward dispositional departure, and stayed the sentence for five years.

Haddeland failed to report to probation. Haddeland's probation officer (PO) alleged that Haddeland violated his probation because he failed to complete intake and notify his PO that he had been charged with new crimes—two counts of gross-misdemeanor counterfeiting of currency, felony mail theft, and providing false information to police.

After Haddeland was arrested in August 2023, the state moved to correct Haddeland's original 58-month sentence because his criminal-history score had been incorrectly calculated. Haddeland's correct criminal-history score at the time of sentencing was five and one-half, but he was incorrectly sentenced with a criminal-history score of two. The district court resentenced Haddeland to 58 months in prison, stayed for five years. This sentence was the same as Haddeland's original sentence. The district court noted that it was a downward durational and downward dispositional departure.

On December 6, 2023, Haddeland's PO filed a violation report alleging that Haddeland failed to complete outpatient treatment, contact his PO, and pay restitution. At a hearing, Haddeland admitted that he failed to pay restitution. The district court reinstated probation and ordered Haddeland to enter inpatient treatment. The district court stated that

if Haddeland was unsuccessfully discharged or he absconded, he was required to report to jail to serve 60 days.

On December 26, 2023, Haddeland's PO filed a violation report alleging that Haddeland had been discharged from inpatient treatment but failed to report to jail. The PO noted that "[Haddeland] has a history of non-compliance with probation and treatment providers," and has new criminal charges.

Haddeland was not arrested until August 31, 2024. At a contested probation-revocation hearing, Haddeland testified that he understood that he was required to complete treatment or serve 60 days in jail. He testified, however, that he left to "get a couple things. . . . [a]nd . . . it resulted in [him] not being able to come back" because the treatment center did not have the resources to pick him up. Haddeland stated:

[W]hen I couldn't return and I asked for help returning, man, I was salty. I was like, well, F-off then, you know. And that didn't help anything. That kind of spun things out of control for me. But, legitimately . . . did I obey the judge's orders, no, I didn't obey the judge's orders . . . [but] . . . I didn't think that my disobeying the judge's orders would translate to me . . . now in jeopardy of 58 months.

The district court revoked Haddeland's probation and executed his sentence. The district court found that Haddeland admitted that he left treatment and never reported to jail, which was an intentional and inexcusable violation of his probation. The district court determined that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation because the public needed to be protected from Haddeland's further criminal activity. Additionally, Haddeland admitted "flouting" the district court's order and his deliberate disobedience demonstrated his "preference for breaking the law over obeying the law."

The district court determined that Haddeland was also in need of treatment that could most effectively be provided when he is confined, and that it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation was not revoked because it would encourage Haddeland to disobey court orders. This appeal followed.

DECISION

Haddeland argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. A district court has “broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” *State v. Austin*, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” *State v. Fortner*, 989 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted).

Before revoking probation, a district court must “1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” *Austin*, 295 N.W.2d at 250. Haddeland challenges only the district court’s determination that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.

In determining if the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation, a district court considers subfactors, including whether “(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or (iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation

were not revoked.” *State v. Modtland*, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 2005). While “[o]nly one *Modtland* subfactor is necessary to support revocation,” *State v. Smith*, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023), *rev. denied* (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023), here, the district court found that all three existed.

Protect the public

Haddeland claims that his confinement is not necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity because his criminal-history score was factored into his sentence, the district court did not find that he had been convicted of new offenses, and he did not violate his probation by committing new offenses.

In deciding whether to revoke probation, a district court may consider an offender’s criminal history. *State v. Osborne*, 732 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Minn. 2007) (stating that district court may consider defendant’s record in determining the threat to the public and the need for confinement). A district court may also consider the severity of the underlying offense when making findings on the third *Austin* factor. *See Modtland*, 695 N.W.2d at 607; *see also Osborne*, 732 N.W.2d at 254 (stating that defendant who committed “severe” underlying offense was “entitled to less judicial forbearance”). Additionally, a district court may consider whether the offender received “a downward dispositional departure when deciding whether to revoke probation.” *State v. Fleming*, 869 N.W.2d 319, 331 (Minn. App. 2015), *aff’d*, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). And, while a district court may not reflexively revoke probation in response to a series of technical violations, *Osborne*, 732 N.W.2d at 253, a history of noncompliance with probation is relevant to determining

whether confinement is appropriate. *State v. Rottelo*, 798 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. App. 2011), *rev. denied* (Minn. July 19, 2011).

The district court stated that Haddeland had five criminal-history points, and that the offense was a severity-level eight. The district court stated that the presumptive sentence was 98 months in prison, but Haddeland was granted a durational and dispositional departure. The district court noted that Haddeland was afforded probation, he violated the conditions more than once, and that he was charged with at least four felonies that occurred when he was supposed to be in treatment or jail. These considerations are all relevant in deciding whether confinement is necessary to protect the public. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation after finding that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.

Correctional treatment can most effectively be provided during confinement

The district court determined that Haddeland needed treatment that could most effectively be provided when he is confined. Haddeland claims that the record does not show that he would receive treatment in prison, but it does show that he is willing to receive treatment in the community. But Haddeland's probation was revoked because *he failed to go to treatment in the community*.

Haddeland was required to report to treatment. He left, and when the treatment center could not pick him up, which it was never required to do, he never returned. Then he was on warrant status for nearly nine months. There is no evidence that Haddeland received treatment during that time. The district court stated: "Haddeland has demonstrated that he is interested in getting treatment only on *his* terms and when it's

convenient for *him*.” The record supports this determination. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation after finding that Haddeland needed treatment that could most effectively be provided when he is confined.

Unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation was not revoked

Finally, the district court determined that it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation was not revoked. Haddeland claims that the district court erroneously focused on “its image and concerns of how other hypothetical probationers might view this case and not on the seriousness of this single violation.”

First, the district court noted that Haddeland violated his probation more than once. The record shows that this was not a “single violation.” The district court also did not just consider how “hypothetical probationers might view this case.” The district court stated that allowing Haddeland to continue on probation “would tell *Haddeland* and other probationers that there is no serious consequence for violating a court’s order.” Haddeland admitted that when the treatment center was unable to pick him up, he “was like, well, F-off then.” He admitted that he “didn’t obey the judge’s orders,” but he did not think that “would translate to . . . 58 months [in prison].” The district court’s determination is supported by the record. *See State v. Bachmeier*, No. A12-0883, 2013 WL 599322, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 19, 2013) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that reinstating probation would depreciate the seriousness of violation when probationer “demonstrated that he does not take probation seriously”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation.

Affirmed.