State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0131

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michelle Lee Weisen,
Appellant.

Filed January 12, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-23-958

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Chelsea Langton, Assistant County
Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brayanna J. Smith, Special Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Appellant Michelle Lee Weisen challenges her conviction of first-degree drug
possession following a stipulated-evidence trial, arguing that the district court erred in
denying her motion to suppress her confession and methamphetamine found on her person.
Weisen also argues that her arrest was not supported by probable cause. Because we
conclude that Weisen voluntarily confessed and consented to the search of her person, and
that officers had ample probable cause to arrest Weisen, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are derived from stipulated evidence submitted to the district
court pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4.
A deputy initiated a traffic stop following a tip from narcotics investigators
regarding an individual driving through Cass County. As the deputy approached the car,
the driver lit a cigarette and asked the reason for the stop. The deputy told the driver that
he was speeding. The driver then admitted that his license was not valid. Weisen, who
was sitting in the passenger seat, told the deputy that the car did not belong to her or the
driver. The driver admitted that he had an active warrant for his arrest, and the deputy
confirmed that the driver had two outstanding warrants. The driver exited the vehicle, and
the deputy placed the driver under arrest and moved the driver to the deputy’s squad car.
The deputy returned to the vehicle to speak with Weisen. Weisen told the deputy
that she and the driver had been visiting the driver’s friends’ house in a nearby city. Weisen
described the friend’s house as “whitish gray.” The deputy observed that Weisen was
3
fidgety and appeared nervous. Weisen exited the vehicle at the deputy’s request. The
deputy then returned to the squad car and asked the driver who they had visited. The driver
responded that he did not know anyone at the house, which he described as a light-brown
trailer. After the driver consented to a vehicle search, the deputy again spoke with Weisen:
DEPUTY: Is there anything in that truck I should know about?
WEISEN: Nope, there’s nothing in there. Nothing.
DEPUTY: Anything on you that I should be aware of?
WEISEN: No. You can look, it’s okay— I mean you can,
because there’s nothing in there, zero. No, go ahead, I’m
serious.
DEPUTY: I’m just—I’m asking.
WEISEN: This makes me all nervous because . . . I’m not
used to this and I’m not around the best people, so it’s my own
fault.
DEPUTY: . . . So you’re saying there’s nothing in the
vehicle? There’s nothing on your person?
WEISEN: No. Uh-uh. No. You can search, honestly.
DEPUTY: Any narcotics in the vehicle?
WEISEN: No, none. None.
DEPUTY: Cocaine?
WEISEN: What?
DEPUTY: Coke?
WEISEN: No, none. There’s nothing. I mean honestly, I give
you permission to search. You can . . . I’m not kidding, there’s
nothing.
DEPUTY: Heroin?
WEISEN: Nope, . . . honestly—do you want . . . to go search?
I mean, I’m okay with that.

The deputy deployed a K-9 to sniff around the outside of the vehicle. The K-9 indicated
narcotics on the passenger side and rear of the vehicle. The deputy asked Weisen if there
was any reason that the K-9 would indicate on the vehicle. Weisen said no and offered,
“Honestly, there’s nothing in there. . . . He shouldn’t be indicating, honestly.” The deputy
told Weisen: “[The K-9] indicated on the car, so at this point in time, you are not free to
4
leave. Your property is going to be searched.” The deputy again asked Weisen if there
was anything on her person or in her purse that the officers should know about. Weisen
appeared to say no. Without any prompting, Weisen voluntarily handed her purse to the
deputy. The officers searched Weisen but did not discover any contraband. After the
search, Weisen requested to make a phone call. An officer on site said: “No phone calls
right now. If you need a smoke, you can do that.” Weisen explained that she left her
cigarettes in the car, and the deputy retrieved a cigarette for her.
The deputy searched the vehicle but did not discover any contraband. The deputy
then deployed the K-9 to search inside the vehicle. The K-9 indicated in the center console
and the passenger seat. The deputy returned to Weisen. Unprompted, Weisen told the
deputy that the only reason her story may be different from the driver’s story is because
she cannot lie. Weisen volunteered that she and the driver were at the friend’s house
looking for methamphetamine, but only the driver went into the house. Weisen also offered
that she did not know if the driver bought any methamphetamine, but he did smoke it. The
deputy told Weisen that the dog was focused on where she sat in the vehicle. The deputy
then said:
My question is, you can either be honest now and tell me if you
have it on your person, or I would ask that if you’d be willing
to go down to the Crow Wing jail and do a body scan to prove
that you don’t have anything on you.

Weisen repeated several times that she had nothing on her person and volunteered
that if anyone had drugs, it was the driver. The deputy again asked Weisen if she was
willing to go to the jail and submit to a body scan. Weisen asked why she would do that,
5
and the deputy stated that the K-9 indicated inside the vehicle. Weisen volunteered that
she was driving earlier that night and, because she was tired, switched sides with the driver
on their way back from the friend’s house. Weisen then offered: “I admit, I hang out with
not good people. I’ve done really sh-tty stuff before. But would you please talk to him?
Please ask him. Please.”
Another officer arrived at the scene and asked Weisen if anyone had searched her
purse. Weisen said she did not know. The officer asked, “Would you consent to a search
of your purse?” Weisen responded, “Oh, that’s fine. Go ahead. Yes, I’m okay with that.”
As a second nearby officer walked away to obtain gloves, the officer said to Weisen:
If there’s something on your person, they’re gonna find it one
way or another. So, I’m telling you, before those guys get
back . . . I just got here. But, before those guys get back, better
be open and honest with it. If you have something—just hear
me out—if you have something on your person that the body
scanner’s gonna catch, kay? It’s not like they’re going to go in
your pants and grab it, but body scanner will catch anything
that’s on your or whatever. Anywhere, whatever. Yeah so,
why don’t you just be honest with us? You can tell me. I’ll go
back and tell them, and tell them. . . . Based on your reaction
here, there’s something here that you’re not telling us.

Weisen said she did not want the driver to be mad at her. The officer replied: “Don’t
worry about him being mad at you. Right now you have to be looking out for yourself.
Why don’t you look out for yourself and be honest with us, is it on you or is it on him?”
Weisen stated, “He gave it to me.” The officer then asked, “Okay, so where is it?” Weisen
pointed to her left leg and responded, “It’s right here.” The officer clarified, “It’s in your
pants?” Weisen confirmed, “It is.” The officer handcuffed Weisen, briefly walked away
to obtain gloves, then returned and asked Weisen: “Would you be willing to go in your
6
pants and get it for us?” Weisen immediately consented, “Yeah, that’s fine.” The officer
removed Weisen’s handcuffs, administered a Miranda warning, and asked Weisen if she
understood her rights. Weisen clearly indicated her understanding. The officer again asked
Weisen if she would be willing to remove the substance from her pants. Weisen said yes
and removed the contraband herself.
The substance tested positive for methamphetamine with a weight of over 80 grams.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Weisen with first-degree drug possession, 50
grams or more, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2022). Before trial,
Weisen moved to suppress the methamphetamine and her confession, alleging that her
confession was involuntary and that she did not consent to a search. The district court
denied Weisen’s motion. To preserve these issues for appeal—which the parties agree are
dispositive—the parties stipulated to the state’s case to obtain review of the pretrial ruling
pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court found Weisen guilty of the
singular count. Weisen appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in denying Weisen’s motion to suppress her
voluntary confession.

Weisen argues that the district court erred in refusing to suppress her confession to
having methamphetamine on her person because (1) the confession was obtained in
violation of her Miranda rights and (2) the confession was not voluntary.
We begin by setting forth the scope of this appeal. Our appellate review of pretrial
rulings is limited to the pretrial issues decided by the district court. Minn. R. Crim.
7
P. 26.01, subd. 4; State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 147 n.1, 149 (Minn. 2009) (stating that
review of a Rule 26.01, subd ivision 4 proceeding is limited to the dispositive pretrial
ruling). In her pretrial suppression motion, Weisen argued only that her confession was
involuntary, specifically stating: “For the same reason that the defendant’s ‘consent’ was
invalid, her admissions to police were involuntary.” Weisen did not argue, and the district
court did not rule on, the separate issue of whether her confession was obtained in violation
of her Miranda rights. And that issue is not identified in the parties’ stipulation in
preserving pretrial issues for appeal. Because this issue was not argued to or decided by
the district court and preserved for appeal pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, the
matter is not properly before us.
Turning to the issue that was decided by the district court and preserved for appeal,
we review de novo the district court’s legal determination that a confession was voluntary.
State v. Zabawa, 787 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2010). We accept the district court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. The state bears the burden to prove
the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In determining
whether a confession is voluntary, the central question is “whether the defendant’s will was
overborne at the time he confessed.” State v. Nelson, 886 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). Our inquiry focuses on whether actions of law enforcement, together
with circumstances surrounding the interrogation, “were so coercive, so manipulative, so
overpowering that [the appellant] was deprived of [their] ability to make an unconstrained
and wholly autonomous decision to speak as [they] did.” State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d
327, 333 (Minn. 1991). We consider the length of the interview, whether warnings were
8
given, the adequacy of such warnings, whether the defendant’s physical needs were met or
ignored, and whether the defendant was denied access to friends. Zabawa, 787 N.W.2d at
183 (citing Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 333). Based on our review of the entire record, we
conclude that the totality of the circumstances do not support a determination that Weisen’s
will was overborne such that her confession was involuntary.
We are not persuaded that the length of interrogation establishes that the confession
was involuntary. While the traffic stop lasted over an hour, the exchange between Weisen
and law enforcement spanned less than 15 minutes. The length of their dialogue does not
indicate involuntariness. See State v. Wilson, 535 N.W.2d 597, 603-04 (Minn. 1995)
(concluding that confession was voluntary when appellant was questioned for
approximately an hour and a half); see also State v. Jungbauer, 348 N.W.2d 344, 3 46-47
(Minn. 1984) (determining that a confession was voluntary when the defendant was not
subject to prolonged interrogation).
We are also not persuaded that police used coercive tactics during the interaction
with Weisen. Although Weisen asserts that the officer’s statement that a body scanner
would find anything on her person was coercive, the officer’s statement was “not the kind
of statement[] that would make an innocent person confess.” State v. Williams, 535
N.W.2d 277, 288 (Minn. 1995). The isolated statement that a hypothetical search would
reveal contraband would have no coercive effect on an innocent person. That is particularly
true given the totality of the circumstances, including that Weisen repeatedly volunteered
information, handed over her purse, and made forthcoming statements untethered to any
particular question by law enforcement. And we have concluded that circumstances
9
arguably more coercive than those presented here did not render a confession involuntary.
See State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 112 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that police
statements that they had influence with the county attorney “were not the kind of statements
that would make an innocent man confess”); see also State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 326
(Minn. 1997) (reasoning that confession was voluntary where the defendant was led to
believe surveillance video of crime existed, but police did not inform defendant after police
discovered no video existed).
In addition, the circumstances surrounding Weisen’s confession “hardly meet the
standard of stress-inducing techniques required to invalidate a confession.” See Williams,
535 N.W.2d at 288 (concluding that officer did not engage in coercive tactics when
appellant was held in detention cell for over six hours, detective hypothesized about what
type of physical evidence might be discovered, called appellant a liar, and without a factual
basis, told appellant that one of the surviving victims could identify him); cf. State v.
Garner, 294 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Minn. 1980) (holding that confession elicited from an
intoxicated accused who had been intentionally lied to, threatened with excess criminal
charges, and physically approached in an intimidating way was involuntary); cf. Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (holding that written confession elicited from
accused held in incommunicado detention and induced by promise of communication with
his wife was involuntary). In determining that Weisen’s confession was not coerced, the
district court found that “[t]here was no indication that [Weisen] felt threatened by the
officer and she remained engaged and mostly cooperative.” We cannot conclude that the
district court’s finding is clearly erroneous. See Zabawa, 787 N.W.2d at 182. The video
10
footage confirms that Weisen repeatedly offered information to police, handed her purse
over without being asked, and affirmatively invited and consented to searches of the car
and her person.
Given the totality of circumstances, law enforcement did not coerce Weisen’s
confession. Because the state met its burden to demonstrate that Weisen’s confession was
voluntary, the district court did not err in denying Weisen’s motion to suppress her
confession.
II. The district court did not err in denying Weisen’s motion to suppress the
methamphetamine because Weisen consented to the search of her person.

Weisen asserts that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress
methamphetamine found on her person by improperly applying the consent exception to
the warrant requirement.
In reviewing whether there exist s a valid exception to the warrant requirement to
justify a warrantless search or seizure, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Stavish, 868 N.W.2d 670, 677 (Minn.
2015). Because the question of whether a consent to search is voluntary or stemmed from
duress or coercion is one of fact, the “clearly erroneous standard controls our review of a
district court’s finding of voluntary consent.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted).
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, “[w]arrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable unless one of ‘a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’
11
applies.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). “Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.”
Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 846.
The state bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
consent to search was voluntary. Id. “Whether consent is voluntary is determined by
examining the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn.
2013) (quotation omitted). Actions can indicate consent to search. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at
848. Consent can be voluntary even if the encounter is uncomfortable for the person being
questioned. Id. at 846. “An individual does not consent, however, simply by acquiescing
to a claim of lawful authority.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 569. “Put another way, the issue
is ‘whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officer[’s] requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter.’” State v. Deszo, 512 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1994)
(alteration in original) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)).
Whether Weisen consented to a search of her person again requires us to consider
the totality of the circumstances, “including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person
the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 569
(quotation omitted). The circumstances immediately preceding the discovery of the
methamphetamine on Weisen’s person are: about one hour into the stop, and after Weisen
had repeatedly encouraged law enforcement to search the vehicle, an officer asked Weisen
if anyone had searched her purse. Again, Weisen readily consented to a search of her purse.
Then the officer told Weisen that if there was something on her person, the officers would
12
find it one way or another. The officer urged Weisen to be honest, and told Weisen that he
could tell she was hiding something.
Weisen said she did not want the driver to be mad at her. The officer told Weisen
not to worry about that and said, “Why don’t you look out for yourself and be honest with
us, is it on you or is it on him?” Weisen then confessed to having the methamphetamine
on her person. Weisen offered, “It’s right here,” and pointed to her left leg. The officer
asked if it was in her pants and Weisen said, “It is.” The officer briefly walked away, then
asked Weisen if she would be willing to retrieve the contraband from her pants. Weisen
said yes. Then, the officer paused and read Weisen the Miranda warning, which Weisen
affirmatively indicated she understood. The officer again asked Weisen if she would be
willing to remove the substance from her pants. Weisen again responded yes and removed
the contraband from her pants.
We discern no distinction between the exchange immediately preceding Weisen’s
confession to possession of methamphetamine on her person and other aspects of the
exchange between Weisen and law enforcement, including unprompted information
volunteered by Weisen and her repeated invitations to search the vehicle and her purse.
Weisen identified the location of the methamphetamine in her pants and twice affirmatively
agreed to remove the methamphetamine from her pants. There is ample support in the
record for the district court’s finding that Weisen “voluntarily consented to the search of
her person before and after being read the Miranda warning.”
The circumstances do not support Weisen ’s argument that her consent was merely
a submission to the officer’s show of authority akin to the situation presented in Diede.
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795 N.W.2d at 847. There, officers continued to question the defendant after an
“unequivocal refusal to consent to a search.” Id. at 847-48 (concluding that appellant’s
consent was not voluntary when, before appellant consented, “she had been seized, was
subject to a show of police force, had received repeated requests to open the package, and
had already refused consent to search the package”). Unlike the circumstances in Diede,
Weisen did not refuse a search, let alone unequivocally refuse a search. And the officer
did not exhibit any show of force, instead asking Weisen if she was “willing” to remove
the methamphetamine from her pants.
Nor are the circumstances similar to those in Deszo, in which a search of defendant’s
wallet was involuntary when an officer’s questioning was “official and persistent,”
defendant was confined in a squad car, law enforcement encroached on defendant’s
personal space, and there was “no indication that defendant was aware that he could refuse
to let the officer see the wallet.” 512 N.W.2d at 880 -81. Unlike the circumstances in
Deszo, officers twice asked Weisen whether she would be willing to remove the contraband
from her pants. Twice, Weisen said yes. Weisen removed the contraband from her pants
after officers read her the Miranda warning. She was not subjected to persistent
questioning, confined in a squad car, and did not otherwise express any refusal to engage
with law enforcement. On this record, the district court did not clearly err in determining
that Weisen’s consent to search was voluntary.
III. Probable cause supported Weisen’s arrest.

Finally, Weisen argues that the district court erred in determining that her arrest was
supported by probable cause. “[W]e review the district court’s findings of historical fact
14
relating to the probable cause determination for clear error under the clearly erroneous
standard but we independently review de novo the issue of probable cause.” State v. Lee,
585 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn. 1998). “The test of probable cause to arrest is whether the
objective facts are such that under the circumstances a person of ordinary care and prudence
would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed.” State v.
Johnson, 314 N.W.2d 229, 230 (Minn. 1982) (quotation omitted).
First, Weisen argues that the district court erred in relying on her confession as one
of the factors supporting probable cause. As we explained above, the district court did not
err in admitting Weisen’s confession because Weisen’s confession was voluntary. Next,
Weisen argues that the district court’s finding that she admitted that the driver went to his
friend’s house looking for methamphetamine is clearly erroneous. But this finding is
supported by the record. Body-camera footage shows that Weisen s tated that she and the
driver were at a house looking for methamphetamine, but only the driver went into the
house. And both Weisen’s confession and the statement that she and the driver went to a
house looking for methamphetamine support a probable-cause finding because these are
the type of facts that would induce a person “of ordinary care and prudence” and “entertain
an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The district court cited additional factors in support of its finding of probable cause,
including that (1) investigators informed the officers that Weisen would be transporting
narcotics; (2) investigators provided officers with a description of the vehicle and license
plate, and stopped such vehicle; (3) the driver and Weisen provided inconsistent statements
about their activities that night; (4) a K-9 alerted to the presence of narcotics multiple times
15
where Weisen sat in the vehicle; and (5) two officers separately observed a lump in
Weisen’s pants. See State v. Camp, 590 N.W.2d 115, 118-19 (Minn. 1999) (concluding
that probable cause existed to arrest for possession of methamphetamine where officers
received information from another deputy that appellant may possess methamphetamine,
parties acted evasively , appellant’s story did not match the driver’s statement, search
revealed object suspected to be narcotics, and officer was aware of appellant’s previous
convictions). Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that law enforcement
had probable cause to arrest Weisen for drug possession.
Affirmed.