City of Jackson, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0135

City of Jackson,
Appellant,

vs.

Bolton & Menk, Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Jackson County District Court
File No. 32-CV-22-148

Joseph J. Langel, Jordan H. Soderlind, Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney, P.A., St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Jeffrey W. Coleman, Stephen F. Buterin , Coleman & Erickson, LLC, Eden Prairie,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent
on the appellant’s claims for negligent misrepresentation and professional negligence.
Appellant contends that the district court erred by determining that its claims were barred
by the two- year statute of limitations in Minnesota Statutes section 541.051 (2024).
2
Because there is no genuine issue of material fact related to the applicability of section
541.051’s two-year statute of limitations and section 541.051 bars appellant’s claims as a
matter of law, we affirm.
FACTS1
This case involves appellant City of Jackson’s engagement of respondent Bolton &
Menk, Inc. (BMI), an engineering firm, in 2018 to make recommendations for an upgrade
to the city’s wastewater-treatment system and to design the same. The city’s wastewater-
treatment system functions, in part, through a series of lift stations that pump wastewater
into stabilization ponds. All wastewater in the city is ultimately directed to lift station 4,
which, in turn, pumps the wastewater directly into the stabilization ponds. Lift station 4
was constructed in the 1970s and had been updated in 2005. From 2016 to 2018, the city
reported ten unauthorized discharges of wastewater from its wastewater-treatment system,
four of which were caused by electrical or mechanical failures in its system.
In April 2017, the city asked BMI to estimate how much it would cost to upgrade
lift station 4 to a submersible-pump lift station, which would eliminate the need to enter
the lift station to perform pump maintenance. By 2018, the scope of the project expanded
to wholesale replacement of lift station 4 because of its age and condition. BMI
recommended that the city construct a new submersible lift station equipped with two

1 Our recitation of the facts is based on the summary-judgment record viewed in the light
most favorable to appellant as the nonmoving party. See Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC,
964 N.W.2d 613, 620 (Minn. 2021) (providing that, on appeal from summary judgment,
appellate courts “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and resolv[e] all doubts and factual inferences against the moving party”).
3
pumps, each with a pumping capacity of 1,956 gallons of wastewater per minute (gpm).
BMI assured the city that the new pumps would be more efficient than the old pumps and
“would provide 3,000 [gpm].” In its former state, lift station 4 could pump only 1,935
gpm. BMI received approval from the city to proceed with the design phase.
The city approved BMI’s final design for the new lift station 4 in late 2018. The
city solicited bids on the project, ultimately awarding it to a contractor in February 2019.
Construction started in the fall of 2019, and the new lift station 4 was placed into service
in November 2019.
The city then tested lift station 4’s wastewater output. The city’s testing showed
that lift station 4 could pump only 2,400 gpm, well below the city’s expectation of 3,000
gpm. In March 2020, the city retained an independent engineer to provide a professional
opinion on whether lift station 4 could meet the city’s needs. The city received a
preliminary report from the independent engineer in April 2020 and the final report in
August 2020. In the final report, the engineer opined that lift station 4 required a minimum
capacity of 3,000 gpm “to prevent bypassing of raw sewage to the river from upstream lift
stations.” She noted that BMI’s design was for a maximum capacity of just 2,000 gpm.
The engineer also observed that lift station 4 required pumps with larger horsepower than
those recommended by BMI. To achieve 3,000 gpm, the engineer recommended that the
city replace the new lift station 4 with a new facility and estimated the cost to be greater
than one million dollars.
While the engineer was working on her final report, the city attorney sent a letter to
BMI to “place[] [BMI] on notice of [the city’s] claim for damages due to [BMI’s] improper
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design of lift station 4.” The letter was dated May 29, 2020. In the letter, the city attorney
stated that BMI was liable for “designing a system that actually reduced the capacity of a
system that needed more capacity.” The letter also provided BMI with the city’s estimate
of the cost to replace lift station 4 and stated the city’s desire to “work informally towards
a satisfactory resolution rather than having to proceed with more formal action.”
More than two years later, on July 1, 2022, the city mailed a summons and complaint
to BMI, asserting claims of negligence based on professional malpractice (professional
negligence) and negligent misrepresentation. The city alleged that BMI’s design was
“insufficient, defective, and inconsistent with relevant design standards.” The city further
alleged that the defects “affect the city’s ongoing use of the sanitary sewer system, give
rise to increased maintenance and replacement costs, and reduce the projected lifespan and
value of the system.”
Following discovery, BMI moved for summary judgment. BMI argued the city’s
claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations set out in Minnesota Statutes
section 541.051, which applies to claims to recover damages for injuries to property arising
from defective and unsafe conditions of improvements to real property. The city countered
that, despite BMI’s poor design, lift station 4 had not yet caused an injury to property and
therefore its claims fell outside of section 541.051. The city argued that its claims were
instead subject to the general six- year statute of limitations under Minnesota Statutes
section 541.05 (2024).
In its order, the district court concluded that the city’s claims were subject to section
541.051’s two-year statute of limitations and that the city’s claims accrued more than two
5
years before it commenced this action against BMI. Accordingly, the district court granted
BMI’s motion for summary judgment.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
The city challenges the district court’s ruling on summary judgment regarding the
application of section 541.051’s two-year statute of limitations to its claims. Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ.
P. 56.01. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Staub, 964 N.W.2d at 620.
“A statute of limitations applies to bar a certain kind of claim or cause of action
from being asserted after a certain designated time period.” City Bella Com., L.L.C. v. City
Bella on Lyndale, 994 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. 2023). “We review the construction and
applicability of statutes of limitations de novo.” Id.
Section 541.051 provides a two-year statute of limitations for certain claims:
Except where fraud is involved, no action by any person
in contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury
to property, real or personal, . . . arising out of the defective
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, shall
be brought against any person performing or furnishing the
design . . . of the improvement to real property .
. . more than
two years after the cause of action accrues . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a). Section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), applies broadly to
actions in “contract, tort, or otherwise” based on “any injury to property” arising out of a
“defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property.” Id. (emphasis added).
6
Along with a two- year statute of limitations quoted above , section 541.051,
subdivision 1(a), provides a ten-year statute of repose that bars any cause of action brought
“more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction.”
The district court determined that section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), applies because
the city’s claims of injury arose from BMI’s allegedly defective and unsafe design of lift
station 4, which was an improvement to real property. On appeal, the city does not dispute
that the inadequately designed lift station constitutes a defective and unsafe improvement
to real property within the scope of section 541.051, subdivision 1(a). Instead, the city
argues that its property has not suffered an “injury” within the meaning of section 541.051,
subdivision 1(a), because lift station 4, although under-designed for the city’s needs, has
not yet failed and caused any physical property damage. The city asserts that its claims are
merely for “maintenance costs and replacement costs” due to BMI’s misrepresentations
and professional malpractice, and therefore its claims are not subject to section 541.051’s
two-year statute of limitations. BMI responds that the language of section 541.051,
subdivision 1(a), is not limited to physical damage to property but also includes diminution
in property value and therefore the city alleged an “injury” sufficient to trigger section
541.051’s two-year statute of limitations.
The Meaning of “Injury”
The parties’ dispute requires us to interpret the meaning of “injury” as used in
section 541.051, subdivision 1(a). “[T]he meaning and scope of a statute of limitations is
a question of statutory interpretation, dictated in the first instance by its plain language.”
City Bella, 994 N.W.2d at 31. Our aim in interpreting a statute “is to ascertain and
7
effectuate the intent of the [l]egislature.” In re Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711,
715 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). “If the [l]egislature’s intent is clear from the
statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute according to its
plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.” State v. Struzyk,
869 N.W.2d 280, 284- 85 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). “In ascertaining this plain
meaning,” we afford words their common usage and we may rely on dictionary definitions
to determine the meaning of a word in the absence of a statutory definition. Great N. Ins.
Co. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 911 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Minn. 2018).
We conclude that the legislature did not intend the word “injury” as used in
section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), to be limited solely to physical damage as argued by the
city but instead intended the phrase to have broader application. We reach this conclusion
based on the plain meaning of the word “injury” as used in the phrase “any injury to
property.” Because this term is not statutorily defined, we turn to the dictionary definition
to determine its meaning. See Minn. Stat. § 541.051; Great N. Ins. Co., 911 N.W.2d at
516. The common dictionary definition for “injury” is “a particular form of hurt, damage,
or loss.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 904 (5th ed. 2018).
In turn, “damage” is defined as “any bad effect on something,” Black’s Law Dictionary
488 (12th ed. 2014), and “destruction or a loss in value, usefulness, or ability resulting from
an action or event,” American Heritage, supra, at 457. And “loss” means “the
disappearance or diminution of value.” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 1129. Applying
the relevant definitions, we conclude that the plain meaning of “injury” as used in relation
8
to property in section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), is any bad effect on property, including
but not limited to the loss in value or usefulness of the property.
Additionally, we note that the word “injury” in section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), is
not qualified by words such as “physical” or “tangible.” Rather, section 541.051,
subdivision 1(a), applies to “any injury to property.” Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a)
(emphasis added). The supreme court has held that “[t]he word ‘any’ is given broad
application in statutes.” Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep’t, 691 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 2005).
Our broad interpretation of section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), is therefore supported by the
legislature’s use of the word “any.”
Caselaw interpreting section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), also supports a broad
reading of “injury.” An “injury to property” under section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), can
be a physical harm, such as flooding or erosion. See, e.g., Ocel v. City of Eagan ,
402 N.W.2d 531, 532 -33 (Minn. 1987) (applying section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), in a
case involving damage caused by surface water discharged by city’s sewer system); Cap.
Supply Co. v. City of St. Paul, 316 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. 1982) (applying
section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), in a case involving “flooding, erosion, and other
property damage” caused by city’s storm-sewer system). But an “injury to property” can
also include other harms, such as a diminution in property value. For instance, in
Griebel v. Andersen Corp., the supreme court held that “the loss and diminution of the
market value of [a] home” was an injury to property for purposes of section 541.051,
subdivision 1(a). 489 N.W.2d 521, 522 (Minn. 1992). Caselaw therefore reflects that the
9
phrase “any injury to property” in section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), has not been construed
so narrowly as to apply only to physical property damage.
The City’s Claims Allege an Injury to Property
Having identified the broad meaning of “injury” for purposes of the phrase “any
injury to property,” we next consider whether the city has alleged an injury to property
such that its claims are subject to section 541.051’s two-year statute of limitations. When
determining whether section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), applies, appellate courts may look
to the “individual facts alleged in the complaint,” even in appeals arising from summary
judgment. Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 869, 871-72 (Minn. 2006)
(quotation omitted) (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant after examining
the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint and determining that section 541.051,
subdivision 1(a), barred plaintiff’s claims).
In its complaint, the city asserted that “the defects adversely affect the City’s
ongoing use of the sanitary sewer system, give rise to increased maintenance and
replacement costs, and reduce the projected lifespan and value of the system.” (Emphasis
added.) And, in the city’s letter placing BMI on notice of its claims, the city attorney
asserted that BMI’s design of lift station 4 caused the city’s wastewater-treatment system
to have “less capacity . . . than it started with.”
We conclude that the city’s alleged injuries fall within the broad meaning of “any
injury to property” under section 541.051, subdivision 1(a). The city has alleged that
BMI’s negligent design of lift station 4 reduced the value and usefulness of the city’s entire
wastewater-treatment system. The caselaw and the plain meaning of “any injury,” as
10
discussed above, indicate that the diminution in the value and usefulness of property
constitutes an injury to property within the meaning of section 541.051, subdivision 1(a),
and therefore subject to the statute’s two-year statute of limitations. See Griebel,
489 N.W.2d at 522; American Heritage, supra, at 457, 904 (defining “injury” and
“damage”); Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 1129 (defining “loss”).
The city attempts to distinguish Griebel, asserting Griebel held only that a
diminution in “market value” constitutes an injury to property. See Griebel, 489 N.W.2d
at 522 (emphasis added). The city further contends that its wastewater-treatment system
has no market value and therefore there is no injury based on a diminution of value. But
the city’s argument is conclusory—it provides no legal, factual, or logical support for its
assertion that lift station 4 has no market value. And even if lift station 4 has no market
value, the city has not explained why a reduction in general value, as opposed to market
value, is not an “injury to property” under section 541.051, subdivision 1(a). Moreover,
the city ignores that it has also alleged a diminution in the usefulness of its wastewater-
treatment system as a result of BMI’s design for lift station 4. And the city ignores the
plain meaning of the phrase “any injury” as used in section 541.051, subdivision 1(a).
Accordingly, the city’s claims for negligent misrepresentation and professional malpractice
are subject to section 541.051’s two-year statute of limitations.2

2 We recognize that claims for negligent misrepresentation and professional malpractice
may fall within section 541.05’s six-year statute of limitations in some cases. See Minn.
Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), (5)-(6) (stating that six-year statute of limitations applies to
actions “upon a contract,” “for criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person
or rights of another, not arising on contract,” and “for relief on the ground of fraud”). But,
to the extent that the city’s claims fall under both section 541.05 and section 541.051, the
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Fraud Exception
The city also argues that section 541.051’s two-year statute of limitations does not
apply to either of its claims because one of its claims was for negligent misrepresentation,
a claim that “sounds in fraud.” In support of this argument, the city notes that section
541.051, subdivision 1(a), begins with the qualifier “[e]xcept where fraud is involved” and
then specifies when the two-year statute of limitations and ten-year statue of repose apply.
See Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (“Except where fraud is involved, no action . . . shall
be brought . . . more than two years after the cause of action accrues, . . . nor in any event
shall such a cause of action accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the
construction.”). The city asserts that this qualifier means that “the two-year limitation
period [is] inapplicable” to both of its claims because one of its claims involves fraud. The
city argues that its claims are therefore subject only to section 541.051’s ten-year statute
of repose that requires a claim to be brought within ten years of “substantial completion of
the construction.” Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a).
The city’s interpretation of section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), conflicts with caselaw
construing the fraud exception. For instance, the supreme court has observed that fraud is
relevant to tolling the statute of repose when “the defendant has by fraud prevented the

latter controls. See Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2024) (“When a general provision in a
law is in [irreconcilable] conflict with a special provision in the same or another
law, . . . the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the
general provision.”); Fagerlie v. City of Wilmar, 435 N.W.2d 641, 643-44 (Minn.
App. 1989) (applying section 541.051’s two-year statute of limitations to statutory-
nuisance claim based on defective and unsafe construction of wastewater-treatment plant
even though section 541.05’s “catch-all provision applying generally to all actions for
liability created by statute” could have also applied).
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plaintiff from discovering the defective and unsafe condition.” Wittmer v. Ruegemer ,
419 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Minn. 1988), superseded by statute on other grounds, 1988 Minn.
Laws ch. 607, § 1, at 680-81 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1 (1988)). But the
mere allegation of fraud does not extend or eliminate the two- year statute of limitations
“because the limitation period does not, according to its terms, begin to run until discovery
of the defective condition.” Id. at 498; see also Minn. Stat. § 5 41.051, subd. 1(c)(2)
(providing that the statute of limitations begins to run “upon discovery of the injury”).
Thus, fraud is relevant only to the two-year statute of limitations when “it is contended that
the plaintiff should, by exercising reasonable diligence, have sooner discovered the
defective condition.” Wittmer, 419 N.W.2d at 498. In other words, by establishing
fraudulent concealment by the defendant, a plaintiff can rebut a contention that the two-
year statute of limitations started running earlier. See id.
Here, the city does not allege that BMI fraudulently prevented the city from
discovering the defective and unsafe conditions in l ift station 4. Accordingly,
section 541.051’s fraud exception does not alter the applicability of the two-year statute of
limitations to the city’s claims.
Accrual of the City’s Claims
Having determined that section 541.051’s two-year statute of limitations applies,
we next consider whether the district court erred by determining that this action accrued
more than two years before the city commenced it. Under section 541.051, a cause of
action generally accrues “upon discovery of the injury.” Minn. Stat. § 541.051,
subd. 1(c)(2). “When reasonable minds can differ about when the injury was discovered,
13
summary judgment is inappropriate because the issue should be left to the trier of fact.”
Lake Superior Ctr. Auth. v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 458, 472-
73 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 23, 2006).
Based on our de novo review of the record, we conclude that reasonable minds could
conclude only that the city did not commence this action within two years of its claims
accruing. We need not look further than the city attorney’s letter to BMI dated May 29,
2020, in which the city placed BMI on notice of the city’s “claim[s] for damages due to
[BMI’s] improper design.” In the letter, the city attorney asserted that BMI was liable for
“designing a system that actually reduced the capacity of a system that needed more
capacity.” It cannot be reasonably disputed that the city was aware of its injury by May 29,
2020.3 And the city mailed its summons and complaint to BMI more than two years later,
on July 1, 2022. Accordingly, because there is no disputed issue of material fact regarding
whether the city’s claims for injury to its property are barred by section 541.051’s two-year
statute of limitations, the district court did not err by granting BMI summary judgment on
that basis.
Affirmed.

3 The city contends that it did not discover the injury until the independent engineer issued
her formal report in August 2020. The city adds that it “is not an engineer” and could not
have known the full nature of its injuries until the expert issued her final report. But for a
claim to accrue, the plaintiff need not be “aware of the extent” of their injury. Day
Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321, 333-34 (Minn. 2010). Even if the
formal report clarified the extent of the city’s injury, the city attorney’s letter definitively
establishes that the city had at least discovered its injury by May 29, 2020. For this reason,
the city’s reliance on the expert’s formal report is unavailing.