State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0138

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Phoenixx Paislee Raverty,
Appellant.

Filed December 1, 2025
Reversed
Harris, Judge

Nicollet County District Court
File No. 52-CR-23-157

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Fischer Zehnder, Nicollet County Attorney, St Peter, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction for fifth- degree drug possession, arguing that
the district court erroneously denied her motion to suppress evidence because the state
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trooper lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop.
Because we conclude that the record does not support that the trooper had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify expanding the scope of the initial stop based on the totality
of the circumstances, we reverse.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Phoenixx Paislee Raverty with
felony fifth-degree drug possession and misdemeanor possession of hypodermic syringes
under Minnesota Statutes sections 151.40, subdivision 1, and 152.025, subdivision 2(1)
(2022). Raverty moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search and to dismiss
the charges for lack of probable cause, contending that the state trooper lacked a reasonable,
articulable suspicion to expand the traffic stop. The facts below are derived from testimony
and exhibits presented during the suppression hearing.
In April 2023, a state trooper initiated a traffic stop on Raverty and her passenger
after noticing objects hanging from her car’s rearview mirror. The trooper asked Raverty
for her license and insurance, asked the passenger for their license, and informed Raverty
that he would only issue her a warning. A few moments later, the trooper noticed a
container with beer bottles in the backseat and asked both occupants, “You’re not drinking
any of the beer, are you?” Both occupants answered no. After running their licenses, the
trooper discovered that the passenger had a drug conviction and was a sex offender;
Raverty’s license came back “clear.” Notably, the trooper observed no indication of
impairment in Raverty but believed the passenger had slurred speech. The trooper returned
to Raverty’s passenger-side door with the warning and explained, “Everything’s good . . . .
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It’s just a warning.” The trooper then asked, “Do you mind if I just make sure there’s no
open containers right in here, since those bottles are right there out in the open and stuff?”
After Raverty and the passenger exited the vehicle, the trooper began searching the
car for open containers. The trooper found loose hypodermic needles in the center console.
He then reached over the center console to search through Raverty’s purse on the driver’s
seat and found more needles inside. 1 The trooper immediately stepped out of the car and
told Raverty about the needles in her purse. Raverty responded, “I never gave you
permission to search my . . . stuff.” The trooper later searched Raverty’s car a second time
and ordered a dog-sniff search of the vehicle. The trooper eventually found a small bag of
methamphetamine.
In September 2023, Raverty filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that
the trooper did not have “reasonable articulable suspicion” to expand the scope of the stop.
The district court denied Raverty’s motion to suppress.
In September 2024, Raverty waived her right to a jury trial and agreed to a
stipulated-evidence trial to preserve her suppression argument for appeal under Minnesota

1 The district court noted that the trooper presumably believed that “the possession of
hypodermic needles may have been illegal.” On the offense date, April 30, 2023,
Minnesota Statutes section 151.40, subdivision 1, made it “unlawful for any person to
possess . . . hypodermic syringes or needles or any instrument or implement which can be
adapted for subcutaneous injections.” But in 2023, the Minnesota Legislature amended the
provision by removing “possession” from subdivision 1. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 15,
§ 3. The 2023 version of section 151.40, subdivision 1, now reads: “It is unlawful for any
person to manufacture or sell hypodermic syringes or needles or any instrument or
implement which can be adapted for subcutaneous injection.” However, this amendment
did not go into effect until August 1, 2023, after Raverty’s offense date. The district court
acknowledged that Raverty’s “possession of hypodermic needles could be considered as a
possible violation of the law, depending on the circumstances.”
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. 2 The parties agreed that the pretrial
challenge was dispositive. The district court found Raverty guilty of fifth-degree
possession of methamphetamine, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.025,
subdivision 2(1) , and entered judgment of conviction and stayed imposition of the
sentence. The district court did not adjudicate Raverty guilty or impose a sentence on the
possession of a hypodermic needle.
Raverty appeals.
DECISION
The district court erroneously denied Raverty’s motion to suppress the
evidence when it determined that the trooper had reasonable, articulable suspicion to
expand the scope of the traffic stop.3

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution guarantee the “right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also
Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The Fourth Amendment also protects individuals during
investigative stops by police. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). Generally,
an officer may not seize a person in a motor vehicle without probable cause. State v.
Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). But an officer may, consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, briefly detain a person in a motor vehicle for purposes of a limited

2 The stipulated evidence included the trooper’s squad-car footage, his body-worn camera
footage, and his investigative report. Both parties also stipulated that the substance found
in Raverty’s purse was 0.5 grams of methamphetamine.

3 Instead of submitting a responsive brief, the state filed correspondence conceding that
Raverty’s convictions should be reversed.
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investigation if the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person might be
engaged in criminal activity. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’”
State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)). Under this standard, the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated
hunch.” Id. (quotation omitted). In each case, “the officer must be able to point to
something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” Id. (quotation omitted). An
officer may also incrementally expand a stop to conduct a limited investigation “only if the
officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.” State v.
Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002).
Under the Minnesota Constitution, “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop
[must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose
of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.”
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). We look to the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether there is reasonable, articulable suspicion. Davis , 732
N.W.2d at 182. Unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies, “any evidence
obtained as a result of an unreasonable search or seizure must be suppressed.” State v.
Bradley, 908 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. App. 2018). When, as here, the facts are not in
dispute, we review a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence de novo. State v.
Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011). This includes a district court’s legal
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determination that an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a search or
seizure. State v. Garding, 12 N.W.3d 697, 703 (Minn. 2024).
Raverty does not contest that the trooper had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop
to investigate an equipment violation. Instead, she argues that the district court erred in
determining that the trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope
and duration of the traffic stop to search her car for open alcohol bottles. 4 An officer’s
observation of a traffic-law violation generally creates an objective basis for stopping the
car. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). The investigative stop “must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”
Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 135 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). But
“any expansion of the scope or duration of a traffic stop must be justified by a reasonable
articulable suspicion of other criminal activity.” State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn.
2003).
A recent case from this court, State v. Babineau, 23 N.W.3d 396 (Minn. App. 2025),
is particularly instructive. There, officers stopped appellant’s car for an equipment
violation. Id. at 402. The officers did not observe signs of impairment in the driver or

4 Additionally, Raverty argues that the district court erred because (1) the trooper lacked
reasonable, articulable suspicion to investigate the passenger and to request a search of her
car for open beer bottles, (2) the search of her car for open containers was pretextual for a
drug investigation, (3) she did not freely and voluntarily consent to the trooper’s search of
her car, (4) even if she did consent, the trooper exceeded the scope of that consent , (5) the
trooper lacked probable cause to search her purse for needles, and (6) the trooper lacked
probable cause to request a dog-sniff search of her car. Because we conclude that the
trooper unlawfully expanded the scope and duration of the traffic stop, we need not address
these arguments in this opinion.
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anything illegal in the car. Id. at 403. When the officers returned to their squad car, one
officer informed the other that he thought he may have smelled marijuana in the car. Id.
The other officer reapproached the car and questioned appellant about the odor of
marijuana. Id. We concluded that this expanded the scope of the initial equipment-
violation stop. Id. at 405-06 (citing Fort , 660 N.W.2d at 419) (concluding that
“investigative questioning” related to weapons and narcotics expanded the scope of a
traffic stop).
Like in Babineau, the initial stop of Raverty’s car was unrelated to the trooper’s
questions about open containers or other substance-related crimes; it was for objects
hanging in the rearview mirror. Similar to Babineau, the trooper approached Raverty and
the passenger, inquired about the hanging objects and the cooler of beer bottles in the back
seat, and returned to his squad car to investigate both occupants. Similarly, the trooper
observed no signs of impairment in Raverty. He reapproached the car to issue a warning
and return their drivers’ licenses. At this point, the investigative stop should have ended.
Indeed, the district court found that under these circumstances, a warning ticket would
typically result in the conclusion of the investigative stop and the driver would be allowed
to leave. However, the trooper then asked both occupants to exit the car so that he could
ensure there were no open containers. Although the trooper observed the cooler of beer
bottles during the initial stop, he did not initiate an investigation into the open containers
until after the initial stop for hanging objects. Therefore, the trooper’s questioning of
Raverty and the passenger about other open containers and asking them to exit the car
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expanded the scope of the hanging-objects traffic violation. See Babineau, 23 N.W.3d at
406.
Having determined that the trooper expanded the scope of the traffic stop, the next
question is whether that expansion was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of
additional criminal activity. See State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). An
officer’s subjective good-faith belief that criminal activity is afoot is not enough; rather,
we must “examine whether the suspicion was objectively reasonable.” Britton, 604
N.W.2d at 88. Further, an officer’s detection of an odor of alcohol coming from a
passenger during a traffic stop does not, by itself, provide a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of an open-container violation sufficient to permit an officer to expand the traffic
stop by requesting to search the vehicle. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Minn
2005).
In State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. 2021), a deputy pulled over the
defendant after noticing his truck had no front license plate and the back license plate was
covered in snow. When the deputy approached the vehicle, he observed a case of beer in
the backseat that was missing cans and had the flap open. Id. The deputy then learned that
Taylor’s driver’s license was cancelled inimical to public safety, which the deputy knew
too often to be due to repeated impaired-driving-while-intoxicated driving violations. Id.
The supreme court concluded that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion after he
observed an opened beer can that was within arm’s reach of the driver, noticed other beer
cans missing from the case, and discovered that appellant’s license was cance led as
inimical to public safety. Id. at 753-54. The supreme court recognized that these facts,
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though lawful, are “relevant to the determination of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 754. The
supreme court added that the reasonable-suspicion standard is a “low hurdle,” but it
requires more than a “mere hunch.” Id. at 752, 757 (quotation omitted). It may even arise
without any physical indicia of impairment if “other factors” sufficiently suggest a driver
is impaired. Id. at 758. But the absence of such indicia is part of the totality of the
circumstances for a court to consider in determining whether it is objectively reasonable to
suspect impaired driving. Id.
Here, the only fact supporting the trooper’s suspicion of potential criminal activity
was the cooler of beer in the back seat and the passenger’s “somewhat slurred words.” The
trooper did not notice any indications of drug use or any furtive movements by Raverty
and observed no odor of alcohol emanating from the car or either occupant. Moreover,
both occupants denied drinking and there was no indication that the beer bottles were
recently opened. See State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (stating that
evasive conduct may amount to reasonable suspicion). Based on the totality of these
circumstances, the trooper did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify
expanding the scope of the initial stop to include an open-container investigation.
Because we conclude that the record does not support reasonable, articulable
suspicion to expand the traffic stop, the district court erred in denying Raverty’s motion to
suppress. And because the parties agreed that the ruling on the suppression motion was
dispositive under rule 26.01, subdivision 4, we reverse Raverty’s conviction for fifth-
degree drug possession.
Reversed.