A25-0143 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

John August Krueger, Appellant,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed August 25, 2025

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0143

John August Krueger,
Appellant,

vs.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
Respondent.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed; motion granted
Reilly, Judge*

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-23-2738

John A. Krueger, Krueger Law Firm , LLC, Roseville, Minnesota (self-represented
attorney)

Kelly Sofio, McKaylee E. Berg, Tomsche, Sonnesyn & Tomsche, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Ede , Judge; and
Reilly, Judge
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Following the grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent State Farm
Automobile Insurance Company, appellant John August Krueger contends that the district

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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court abused its discretion by denying his request to extend the discovery deadline, granting
respondent’s motion to exclude his expert witnesses, and denying his motion to amend his
complaint. We affirm.
FACTS
Krueger was injured in February 2015 when his car was rearended at a red light.
After settling his liability claim with the other driver’s insurer, Krueger brought separate
claims against his insurer, State Farm, for no-fault benefits and underinsured-motorist
(UIM) benefits. Krueger, who is a licensed attorney, represented himself in both matters.
The no-fault matter went to a jury trial in September 2023, and the jury awarded Krueger
his reasonable medical expenses. This appeal is about the district c ourt’s rulings on the
parties’ pretrial motions in the UIM matter. Krueger continues to represent himself on
appeal.
Krueger commenced the UIM action in June 2023. The district court held a
scheduling conference in November 2023. Both parties requested that trial be scheduled
one year from the conference. State Farm’s counsel stated that Krueger had a “giant wage
loss claim” that would require “some sort of expert or some discovery.” Counsel stated
that she would “serve some discovery” promptly. After the scheduling hearing, State
Farm’s counsel emailed a proposed joint discovery plan to Krueger and wrote that she
wanted to “get discovery moving.” Krueger neither responded to the email nor proposed
a discovery plan of his own.
The district court issued a scheduling order on February 1, 2024. In the order, the
district court scheduled the trial for May 2024 and the pretrial conference for an unspecified
3
date in April 2024. The order instructed the parties to complete discovery no later than 60
days before the pretrial conference. Because the scheduling order did not list a specific
date for the pretrial conference, it created an indeterminate discovery deadline in February
2024.
1 The order also required the parties to file their witness and exhibit lists “prior to
the date of the pretrial conference.”
On April 17, 2024, the district court sent a notice that the pretrial conference would
be held on April 19, thus retroactively setting the discovery deadline for February 19, 2024.
It is undisputed that Krueger made no witness or document disclosures before the February
19, 2024 deadline. The parties filed their witness and exhibit lists the day before the pretrial
conference, in accordance with the scheduling order. Krueger’s witness list included
various treating doctors who Krueger listed as “experts.” In his exhibit list, Krueger stated
that the “narrative reports” of the expert doctors had “been provided to [State Farm] in
prior no-fault litigation.”
At the pretrial conference, Krueger requested that the trial be rescheduled in
accordance with the parties’ earlier request for a trial in November 2024. Krueger also told
the district court that he did not receive notice that the scheduling order was filed and only
learned about the pretrial conference after State Farm filed its witness and exhibit lists the
day before the conference. State Farm’s counsel opposed Krueger’s request and stated that
the parties “had the no -fault trial last September” and “had the experts done.” Counsel
added that State Farm was “ready to go,” “there [was not] anything new to be discovered,”

1 Sixty days before April 1, 2024, is February 1, 2024. Sixty days before April 30, 2024,
is March 1, 2024.
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and that “State Farm [knew] everything” based on the no-fault case, which went to trial in
August 2023. Counsel argued that “the only reason [Krueger] want[ed] this delay is
because he blew it” by neglecting to heed the district court’s schedule and arran ge his
doctors’ depositions. The district court reviewed its records system, which showed that
Krueger accessed the scheduling order on February 5, 2024. The district court denied
Krueger’s request to continue trial and instructed the parties to file their pretrial motions.
In early May, Krueger notified State Farm that he intended to depose three of his
expert doctors later in May. In response, State Farm requested an “emergency call” with
the district court to address Krueger’s attempts to depose expert witnesses despite his
failure to timely disclose the experts’ identities and subject-matter expertise in accordance
with the district court’s scheduling order and the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
Krueger filed a response with the district court, stating that he “told [State Farm’s counsel]
we are using the same doctors that we used in the recent no-fault trial, same reports, same
medical records, same medical bill, same everything.” Krueger asserted that the new
depositions would cover just “1-2 additional visits for two doctors . . . and . . . medical
bills.” The record does not reflect whether the district court addressed the parties’ letters,
and it appears that Krueger deposed some of his doctors in May 2024.
On May 6, 2024, State Farm moved in limine to exclude the expert opinions of
Krueger’s treating doctors for Krueger’s failure to timely disclose them. State Farm
acknowledged that the experts in this UIM matter “may overlap” with those in the no-fault
trial. But State Farm argued that, unlike the no-fault trial, this case involved issues such as
“past medical expenses, future medical expenses, past wage loss, future wage loss, past
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emotional distress, future emotional distress and whether or not Mr. Krueger sustained a
permanent injury.” State Farm asserted that the opinions of Krueger’s experts in the no-
fault trial shed no light on these issues.
Krueger opposed State Farm’s motion, again arguing that he “supplied everything
in discovery” during the no-fault case. Krueger contended that State Farm’s counsel, who
also represented State Farm in the no-fault dispute, admitted after the no-fault trial in
September 2023 “that basically all the discovery in [the UIM] claim was already done in
the no-fault claim.”
Krueger also moved for leave to amend his complaint to add, as a plaintiff, his
wife—who had been injured in the underlying car accident —and state a claim for her loss
of consortium. To support his motion, Krueger pointed to an email thread showing that
the parties had discussed the potential loss-of -consortium claim during the settlement of
Krueger’s wife’s claims in April 2023. Krueger also asked State Farm’s counsel to
stipulate to the amendment in October 2023. State Farm’s counsel replied that she
presented Krueger’s request to State Farm and would “advise as to what they would like to
do.” According to Krueger, he never received a response about State Farm’s position on
the potential amendment. In his motion for leave to amend, Krueger asserted that the
omission of the loss-of -consortium claim from his complaint was “a mistake that neither
party spotted.”
The district court heard the parties’ motions in May 2024. At the hearing, the district
court continued the trial to October 2024 because of a scheduling conflict with another
trial. Despite moving back the trial date, the district court declined to reschedule the
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discovery deadline, telling Krueger that it had “made it very clear that [he] had to have
everything done by [the original trial date].” The parties then made oral arguments on their
motions and the district court took them under advisement.
The district court filed an order granting State Farm’s motion to exclude Krueger’s
expert opinions and denying Krueger’s motion to amend the complaint. The district court
determined that Krueger had not disclosed his experts at least 90 days before the trial, as
required by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 26.01(b)(4), and thus excluded their expert
opinions. The district court also addressed Krueger’s reliance on his purported discovery
agreement with State Farm’s counsel: “a party cannot rely on filings in a separate case and
court file.” As for Krueger’s motion to amend his complaint, the district court found the
request untimely because it came after the discovery deadline. The district court further
found that Krueger “failed to act diligently” to amend the complaint prior to the discovery
deadline.
State Farm then moved for summary judgment, arguing that Krueger, through his
failure to disclose anything to State Farm during discovery, waived his right to present the
evidence at trial required for him to succeed on his claim. Krueger opposed the motion,
relying again on the alleged oral agreement between himself and State Farm’s counsel
regarding discovery, and he urged the district court to reset the discovery deadline so that
he could provide State Farm “with all the exact same doctor reports, records, bills, [and]
exhibits that [were] already provided in the no-fault claim.” The district court granted State
Farm’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Krueger’s complaint with prejudice.
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DECISION
Krueger challenges the district court’s rulings on the discovery deadline, the
admissibility of his experts’ opinions, and his motion for leave to amend his complaint.
State Farm contends that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of its rulings.
State Farm further moves to strike a declaration filed in Krueger’s addendum to his reply
brief. We begin by addressing State Farm’s motion before turning to Krueger’s arguments.
Motion to Strike
In the addendum to his reply brief filed with this court, Krueger included his own
declaration in which he describes his purported oral agreement with State Farm’s counsel
regarding the need for discovery. State Farm moved to strike Krueger’s declaration and
any part of his reply brief that references the declaration, asserting that the declaration is
outside the appellate record. We agree with State Farm.
“The Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure are clear that documents not
filed with the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”
Derksen v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 11 N.W.3d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2024) (citing Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 110.01). “An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside
the record on appeal and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence
below.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988). Because Krueger’s
declaration was not received as part of the district court record, we grant State Farm’s
motion to strike and will not consider Krueger’s declaration or any part of his reply brief
that refers to it.
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Krueger’s Arguments
We now turn to Krueger’s arguments related to the district court’s various pretrial
rulings. Krueger asserts that the district court inadequately considered his contention that
State Farm agreed that a formal discovery process was unnecessary because all relevant
information was already disclosed in the no-fault matter. Krueger appears to argue that,
because of this purported agreement, the district court should not have excluded his experts
from testifying or, in the alternative, should have extended the discovery deadline to allow
him to make the disclosures. Krueger also argues that the district court should have granted
him leave to amend the complaint because State Farm “wholly understood” that he
intended to include his wife’s loss-of-consortium claim in the complaint.
Although not clear, we construe Krueger’s arguments as challenges to the district
court’s (1) refusal to extend the discovery deadline, (2) exclusion of his expert testimony,
and (3) denial of his motion for leave to amend the complaint.2 We review a district court’s
rulings on each of these issues for an abuse of discretion.
See 1300 Nicollet, LLC v. County of Hennepin , 990 N.W.2d 422, 431 (Minn. 2023) (“A
[district] court has discretion to grant or deny discovery requests, so we review these
decisions under an abuse of discretion standard.”); Benson v. N. Gopher Enters., Inc., 455
N.W.2d 444
, 445 (Minn. 1990) (“It has long been the law in this state that evidentiary
rulings, including a decision to exclude expert testimony, lie within the sound discretion of

2 The difficulty in identifying the precise rulings that Krueger challenges is amplified by
his failure to brief “the applicable standard of appellate review for each issue” as required
by the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd.
1(d).
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the [district] court.”); Metro Bldg. Cos., Inc. v. Ram Bldgs., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 204, 210
(Minn. App. 2010) (“The district court has broad discretion to grant or deny leave to amend
a complaint, and its ruling will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”
(quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010). “A district court abuses its
discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). For these
reasons, we discern no abuses of discretion in any of the district court’s rulings.
First, we address the district court’s decisions to adhere to the original discovery
deadline and to grant State Farm’s motion to exclude Krueger’s experts. Krueger does not
dispute that he made no discovery disclosures before trial , as required by the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the rules, parties must generally make initial disclosures
“without awaiting a discovery request.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.01(a)(1). The rules also
require parties to identify expert witnesses and disclose the subject matter of their
testimony at least 90 days before the trial date. Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.01(b)(1), (3)- (4). If a
party “fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26.01 . . . , the
party is not allowed to use that information or witness . . . at trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or harmless.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.03(a). The rules also require
parties to confer and “attempt[] in good faith to agree on [a] proposed discovery plan.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.06(b). Krueger admits that he did not respond to State Farm’s attempt
to negotiate a joint discovery plan. In short, Krueger met none of his discovery obligations
under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Krueger contends that his failure to abide by the rules of civil procedure was
justified by his purported oral agreement with State Farm. But the record contains no
evidence of the agreement, other than Krueger’s own declarations. Krueger emphasizes
State Farm’s position at the pretrial conference on April 19, 2024, during which State
Farm’s attorney seemingly acknowledged the sufficiency of the discovery in the no-fault
case: “So, we had the no-fault trial last September, had the experts done. We know all of
the issues; we know all of the medicals. Mr. Krueger’s treatment has been —I know
everything, State Farm knows everything, he knows everything, there isn’t anything new
to be discovered.” But earlier, in November 2023, State Farm’s counsel also sent Krueger
a proposed joint discovery plan and said that she wanted to “get discovery moving.”
Krueger never responded to that email. The record does not show whether State Farm’s
counsel in fact agreed to forgo discovery and instead shows Krueger’s inaction with regard
to discovery. Krueger also cites no caselaw, and we are aware of none, supporting his
proposition that a party is relieved of his disclosure requirements because he made similar
disclosures in another case involving the same parties, but different claims.
3 For these
reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accommodate
Krueger’s failure to comply with the court’s scheduling order and the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure.

3 Krueger could have filed a request with the district court to modify the discovery
procedures, thereby memorializing the purported agreement with State Farm. See Minn.
R. Civ. P. 29 (providing that parties can stipulate to “modify other procedures governing
or limitations placed upon discovery”).
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Likewise, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of
Krueger’s motion to amend his complaint. When considering whether to grant a motion
for leave to amend the complaint, a district court can consider whether the moving party
acted with diligence in moving to amend their pleading.
Meyer v. Best W. Seville Plaza Hotel, 562 N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn. App. 1997), rev.
denied, (Minn. June 26, 1997). By his own admission, Krueger was aware of the loss-of-
consortium claim during settlement negotiations in April 2023, yet he did not include it in
his June 2023 complaint. And in October 2023, Krueger recognized his failure to assert
the claim but still did not move for leave to amend the complaint. Only in April 2024, after
the discovery deadline and roughly one month before the scheduled trial date, did Krueger
finally move for leave to amend his complaint. Given Krueger’s failure to diligently move
to amend his complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Krueger’s
motion.
We also note that our function “is limited to identifying errors and then correcting
them.” Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). As the appellant, Krueger
has the burden of proving reversible error. Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65
(Minn. 1944). Krueger’s arguments lack legal citation and are based largely on
unsupported assertions of fact. Appellate courts generally regard such arguments as
forfeited. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135
(Minn. 1971) (stating that assignments of error based on “mere assertion” and not
supported by argument or authority are typically forfeited “unless prejudicial error is
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obvious on mere inspection”). Because of the inadequacy of Krueger’s briefing, our ability
to review the district court’s rulings is significantly hampered.
We are not unsympathetic to Krueger’s appeal. We acknowledge that he seems to
have believed that he had an agreement with State Farm and that State Farm’s position
during pretrial proceedings on discovery and the proposed amendment was unclear. We
also acknowledge that the district court’s scheduling order did not provide definite
deadlines. On this record, a different court may have extended discovery deadlines once
the trial was continued and permitted Krueger the opportunity to disclose his experts or
amend his complaint. But “we are not free to substitute our judgment for that of the
[district] court absent a clear abuse of its discretion.” Arundel v. Arundel, 281 N.W.2d 663,
667 (Minn. 1979). Krueger neglected to comply with the discovery process in violation of
the district court’s scheduling order and the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. He also
failed to act diligently in moving to amend his complaint. Accordingly, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding his expert opinions, refusing to extend the
discovery deadline, and denying his motion to amend the complaint.
Affirmed; motion granted.