State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0153

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Aaron Michael Armstrong,
Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2025
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-23-210

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Renee N. Courtney, St. Cloud City Attorney, James P.A. Morrighan, Assistant City
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Aaron Michael Armstrong challenges his conviction for gross-
misdemeanor driving while impaired (DWI). In his primary brief, Armstrong argues he is
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entitled to a new trial because he did not validly waive his right to counsel. Armstrong
raises additional arguments in his self-represented supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Armstrong with two counts of third-degree DWI under Minn.
Stat. §§ 169A.20(1)(1), 20(1)(5) (2022). Armstrong appeared without counsel at his initial
appearance and told the district court that he would “[p]ossibly hire or represent [himself].”
At a status conference six months later, the district court asked whether Armstrong
had applied for a public defender, advised him of the option, and offered to put him under
oath to determine whether he qualified. When Armstrong declined and exhibited
confusion, the district court explained the income requirements.
At a subsequent status conference, Armstrong informed the district court that he
sought legal aid at the law library but would proceed “pro se.” The district court confirmed
with Armstrong that he intended to represent himself. Armstrong responded affirmatively.
At the next status conference, the district court asked Armstrong if he intended to
represent himself. When Armstrong replied yes, the district court reiterated that Armstrong
had a right to an attorney and that, if he met certain income requirements, he could qualify
for a public defender. Armstrong said he understood. He then stated that he wanted a jury
trial and mentioned having “side counsel” to help him. The district court advised
Armstrong of the difficulties of representing himself in a jury trial and noted that
Armstrong would have to follow court rules and statutes during the process. The district
court encouraged Armstrong to hire an attorney.
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At a contested omnibus hearing, after discussing the scope of the issues raised by
Armstrong, the district court explicitly confirmed that he was waiving his right to counsel.
Armstrong also mentioned he was “kind of educated” with aspects of the proceeding
because of his past involvement with the legal system, including a prior DWI charge in
Ohio.
At a pretrial hearing, the district court again asked whether Armstrong intended to
hire an attorney. Armstrong said he hoped to hire an attorney but did not know if he could
afford one. The district court then described, in detail, the general procedures for jury
trials, and Armstrong’s rights and responsibilities. The district court also, again,
encouraged Armstrong to consult an attorney or possibly hire one before his jury trial.
Later in the hearing, the district court reminded Armstrong that conducting a jury trial while
self-represented was challenging and that Armstrong would need to give a firm answer on
whether he intended to represent himself.
At a settlement conference, the district court confirmed that Armstrong was self-
represented. The district court then informed Armstrong that he had the right to stipulate
to a prior conviction— used to enhance the current charge—so the information would not
be presented to the jury. The district court told Armstrong that an attorney could help him
with this process and help him protect his rights. The district court then explained that,
during the jury trial, the judge is an “independent magistrate” who determines disputes
between the parties and would not be able to assist him in the process. Continuing, the
district court told Armstrong he had the right to represent himself but reiterated that
Armstrong’s rights might not be fully protected because he did not know what he needed
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“to do to protect those rights.” Armstrong told the district court he understood. Armstrong
mentioned that he would like some assistance but could not afford an attorney. The district
court then, again, explained the public-defender qualification process. Armstrong
responded that he might qualify but he had previous difficulty with attorneys. After further
discussion, the district court offered to get Armstrong the paperwork for a public defender
to complete at the hearing, but Armstrong declined. Thereafter, the following exchange
occurred:
THE COURT: So what you’re telling me is that you don’t
want a lawyer?

ARMSTRONG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Again, sir, I would advise you to think carefully
about that. I’ll give you what you want and if that’s your
desire, you can proceed without an attorney, but there may be
more rights you’ll not be able to protect like you weren’t
prepared today to protect that other one because you’re not
familiar with them. That’s a choice you need to make. Are
you telling me you wish to represent yourself even though you
may not be able to fully protect your rights under these
circumstances?

ARMSTRONG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, understand that you are
declining the opportunity to associate counsel both by
application for the public defender and by hiring private
counsel and that you are demanding your constitutional right
to represent yourself, which you certainly have.

At a pretrial hearing, the district court once again confirmed that Armstrong was
representing himself. During a discussion, Armstrong indicated he would like “some kind
of counsel, like a sidebar counsel” but otherwise wanted to represent himself. The district
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court said that it would appoint advisory counsel but could not guarantee that advisory
counsel would be available for trial. The district court then clarified whether Armstrong
wished to represent himself; Armstrong responded affirmatively. The district court again
reminded Armstrong that he had the right to an attorney and that if he could not afford one
and qualified for the public defender, the district court would appoint an attorney to
represent him. The district court also confirmed that Armstrong had been advised
“repeatedly on the record” and that his desire to represent himself remained unchanged.
The district court then asked again if Armstrong wanted to represent himself, and
Armstrong responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” Again, the district court reminded Armstrong
that self-representation is difficult at a jury trial and informed him that, if advisory counsel
was available, he could consult with them during the trial. Before ending the hearing, the
district court asked Armstrong, “your demand today is to represent yourself at trial?”
Armstrong responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”
At a motion hearing held before the jury trial, the district court again advised
Armstrong that he had the right to be represented by counsel. The district court further
advised that Armstong still might qualify for a public defender. The district court, again,
reiterated the ways an attorney could assist him given their knowledge of the law and
procedures. The district court further reminded Armstrong that he would need to comply
with those rules and procedures. The district court also addressed Armstrong’s motion to
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suppress his blood-test results.1 After taking testimony from law enforcement, the district
court denied Armstrong’s motion, finding that Armstrong received the appropriate
advisory under Minn. Stat. § 171.177 (2022).
Armstrong then appeared, self-represented, for the jury trial with advisory counsel.
The jury found Armstrong guilty of both counts. The district court entered a conviction on
one count. See Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 2 (2022).
Armstrong appeals.
DECISION
On direct appeal, Armstrong challenges his conviction on several grounds.
Armstrong argues in his primary brief that he did not validly waive his right to counsel.
And in his supplemental brief, Armstrong argues that (1) the district court improperly
denied his motion to suppress and (2) the state violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), when it did not introduce certain evidence at trial.2 We first address the issue raised
in Armstrong’s primary brief and then address the arguments in his supplemental brief.
I.

Armstrong asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because he did not validly waive
his right to counsel. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal
defendant the right to counsel. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, §§ 6-7.

1 Armstrong challenged the sufficiency of the implied-consent advisory under Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.51, subd. 2 (2022), on the ground that he could not read the search warrant without
his glasses, a fact that was not in evidence.
2 Armstrong raises several other claims in his supplemental brief but offers no legal support
or argument. Claims that are not supported by legal arguments or citations to legal
authority are forfeited. State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 165-66 (Minn. 2020).
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Any waiver of that right must be knowing and intelligent. State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d
880, 885 (Minn. 2012). If a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to
counsel, the defendant “must be allowed to represent himself despite his lack of the legal
ability to conduct a good defense.” State v. Thornblad, 513 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. App.
1994). The district court has a duty to ensure a valid waiver of the right to counsel. State
v. Hawanchak, 669 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation omitted).
“We review a finding that a defendant validly waived his right to counsel for clear
error.” State v. Bonkowske, 957 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. App. 2021) (citation omitted).
“When the facts are undisputed, however, the question of whether a waiver-of-counsel was
knowing and intelligent is a constitutional one that is reviewed de novo.” Rhoads, 813
N.W.2d at 885. “An invalid waiver and the corresponding denial of the right to counsel
are ‘structural error[s]’ that require reversal. ” State v. Gant, 996 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Minn.
App. 2023) (quoting Bonga v. State, 765 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. 2009)).
Armstrong argues that the district court failed in its obligation to ensure that
Armstrong had full knowledge and understanding of his right to counsel. Where, as here,
a defendant is charged with a “gross misdemeanor punishable by incarceration,” waiver of
the right to counsel can be “in writing or on the record,” and requires only that the district
court be satisfied that the waiver “is voluntary and has been made by the defendant with
full knowledge and understanding of the defendant’s rights.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04,
subd. 1(3). The more specific advisements required in Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4),
apply only to cases involving felony charges. To ensure a defendant knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waives their right to counsel, a district court should advise the
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defendant “of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” to establish that the
defendant makes the “ choice . . . with eyes open.” State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160,
173 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).
Here, the record shows that at the first appearance and every hearing prior to the
jury trial, the district court raised Armstrong’s right to counsel. At each hearing, Armstrong
informed the district court that he intended to represent himself. The record demonstrates
that the district court offered several times to aid Armstrong in determining whether he
qualified for a public defender. Armstrong repeatedly refused. And the district court gave
Armstrong extensive warnings about the difficulties of representing himself. And after
each warning, the district court would ask Armstrong if he still intended to represent
himself, and he consistently responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” We conclude the district court
fulfilled its obligation to advise Armstrong “of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.” See id.
Armstrong argues in the alternative that, even if the district court fulfilled its
advisory obligations, the record nonetheless demonstrates that he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to counsel. For support, Armstrong relies on our decision in
Gant.
3 In Gant, we evaluated four factors when assessing whether a defendant had waived
his right to counsel in the absence of a procedurally valid waiver: (1) the defendant’s
“previous representation by counsel;” (2) the availability of “standby counsel”; (3) the

3 We note that Gant involved a sentencing hearing for a felony- level offense. Gant, 996
N.W.2d at 7. Thus, the defendant was subject to the more specific advisories required in
Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4).
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“district court[’s] engagement” with the defendant; and (4) the defendant’s “prior
experience” with the criminal-justice system. 996 N.W.2d at 8-11.
First, we are not persuaded by Armstrong’s implication that the district court
provided a procedurally invalid waiver. As described above, the rules of criminal
procedure do not require a comprehensive on-the-record inquiry where, as here, the
defendant was charged with gross-misdemeanor offenses. Instead, rule 5.04,
subdivision 1(3), only requires that the district court be “satisfied that [the waiver] is
voluntary and has been made by the defendant with full knowledge and understanding of
the defendant’s rights.” For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the district court
made the necessary inquiries to evaluate that Armstrong fully understood his rights.
Second, even if we apply Gant, we conclude Armstrong validly waived his right to
counsel. Regarding the first factor, the record shows that Armstrong obtained advice from
legal aid on two issues relevant to his case. With respect to the second factor, although he
did not have the constitutional right to “standby counsel,” the district court provided
Armstrong with advisory counsel throughout the jury trial. On the third factor, the district
court exhibited extensive engagement with Armstrong on this issue, advising him both of
his right to representation and the difficulties of being self -represented. And with respect
to the last factor , Armstrong had prior experience with the criminal-justice system,
including a previous DWI charge in Ohio, and expressed familiarity with the legal process
and prior interactions with attorneys on the record in this case.
For these reasons, the record demonstrates that Armstrong’s waiver was knowing
and intelligent, and we conclude Armstrong validly waived his right to counsel.
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II.

In his supplemental brief, Armstrong raises two arguments: (1) the district court
improperly denied his motion to suppress and (2) the state violated Brady when it did not
introduce certain body-camera footage. We address each argument in turn.
Armstrong first asserts that the district court improperly denied his motion to
suppress blood-test evidence on the basis that he was not read the implied-consent advisory
under Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2. We review whether an implied-consent advisory
violates a defendant’s due-process rights de novo. Magnuson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
703 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. App. 2005). A blood or urine test may be conducted pursuant
to a search warrant. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 3 (2022). When directed to perform a
blood or urine test pursuant to a search warrant, “the person must be informed that refusal
to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1.
Here, the district court denied Armstrong’s motion to suppress on the basis that he
received the appropriate advisory under section 171.177. To reach this decision, the district
court considered Armstrong’s argument that he could not read the search warrant without
his glasses, even though that fact was not in evidence. The district court rejected
Armstrong’s argument and observed that the advisory under section 171.177 is the
applicable standard when the facts of the case involve a blood or urine test pursuant to a
search warrant. We agree with the district court’s determination that Armstrong received
the appropriate implied-consent advisory, and the district court correctly denied his motion
to suppress.
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Armstrong argues second that the state violated Brady when it “suppressed
evidence.” Armstrong appears to conflate Brady’s disclosure requirements with an
obligation to present evidence at trial.4 Brady only requires that the state provide favorable
evidence to the defendant; it does not dictate the evidence the state must introduce at trial.
See Pederson, 692 N.W.2d at 459 (providing that “evidence at issue must be favorable to
the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or it is impeaching” to satisfy one of the Brady
factors) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the arguments made in the
supplemental brief warrant relief.
Affirmed.

4 The state introduced a video exhibit at a pretrial hearing, and the video was admitted into
evidence, but the video was not presented at trial. The state is not required to present all
evidence in its possession to a jury, only such evidence as is necessary to prove each
element of the offenses charged. See Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459-60 (Minn.
2005); see also State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 234-35 (Minn. 1999) (providing that
state’s duty to disclose and present evidence is limited to material evidence relevant to case
and necessary to ensure fair trial).