Cheryl M. Shega, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0168

Cheryl M. Shega,
Appellant,

vs.

American Bank of the North, et al.,
Respondents,

Laura Craig, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed August 4, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-20-1245

Amy R. Mason, Cummins & Bonestroo, Stillwater, Minnesota (for appellant)

Nicholas H. Callahan, Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg, LLP, Wayzata,
Minnesota; and

Jenna A. Jahn, Anderson, Ophoven & Stauffer, P.A., Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of her claim against
respondents, arguing that the district court erred when it determined that there existed no
genuine issues of material fact that respondents aided and abetted the financial exploitation
of a vulnerable adult. We affirm.
FACTS
This case involves an appeal from an order granting summary judgment to
respondent American Bank of the North (the bank) for disbursing appellant Cheryl M.
Shega’s certificate of deposit (CD) funds to the named payee-on-death (POD), Laura Craig.
The following facts are based on the record at summary judgment and presented in the light
most favorable to the estate of Cheryl Shega.1
Background Information
Cheryl Shega2 was the oldest of three children and lived with her parents, Edward
and Charlene Shega (the Shegas), throughout most of her life. Cheryl’s siblings are Nancy
Weiser and Gregory Shega. Although Cheryl was not formally diagnosed with a disability
until later in life, most people in her life were aware that she suffered from a mental illness.
Cheryl maintained a “childlike approach to life,” adopting a daily routine of sleeping in,

1 See Commerce Bank v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015)
(indicating that, on appeal from summary judgment, we “view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted”).

2 Because several family members share a last name, we refer to them by their first names
for clarity.
3
watching TV, and spending time on the internet. Cheryl did not work outside of the home,
other than a few jobs in her late twenties. The Shegas financially supported her most of
her life, even claiming her as a dependent on their taxes until 2016.
One of Cheryl’s hobbies was searching for long lost relatives. In 2012, she reached
out to defendant Laura Craig, a woman she believed was her cousin. Laura responded, and
the two began communicating primarily via email. In a February 2012 email, Cheryl
promised Laura that she would “never tell anyone where you are or that I am in contact
with you.”
When Cheryl’s mother, Charlene, died in March 2015, Cheryl began taking care of
her father, Edward, and the household chores. During this time, siblings Nancy and
Gregory did not live with or near Cheryl. Also during this time, Edward had a “significant
number of ambulance runs to the ER” and hospitalizations. Nancy and Gregory grew
concerned about their father’s health and flew back to speak with Cheryl in November
2016. There, Gregory asked Cheryl to see Edward’s trust, and Cheryl “became completely
out of control, in a way that [Gregory] had rarely witnessed.” Edward passed away in May
2017, and Cheryl remained living in his home.
In May 2019, law enforcement responded to a welfare check at the Shega’s home.
Law enforcement found the house was a mess and discovered Cheryl “on the ground,
unable to sit up . . . somewhat paranoid . . . [and] confused in appearance.” A neighbor
told police that Cheryl had not left the home in five months and crashed her car in a ditch
because she was “nearly blind.” And according to Gregory, the home was in complete
4
disarray, with piles of newspapers, waste, dozens of mice and rats, soiled clothing, and hair
and cat feces everywhere. Cheryl passed away on May 27, 2019.
The Shegas’ Revocable Living Trust
In November 2009, the Shegas executed The Shega Family Revocable Living Trust
(the trust). The Shegas named Cheryl as the sole beneficiary of the trust, identified her as
the personal representative of their wills, and named her as the financial power of attorney.
And if Cheryl predeceased the Shegas, then Gregory and Nancy would be the recipients of
the trust’s assets. The Shegas also signed a joint request for retitlement, which was
addressed to the bank and referenced three, unnumbered CDs.
After Cheryl’s death in May 2019, Nancy and Gregory found records of Cheryl’s
CDs that she inherited while going through paperwork in the home. There were four CDs
in particular. Between 2016 and 2017, Cheryl redeemed the CDs she inherited, had new
CDs issued in her name, and named Laura as the POD on the new CDs. The value of the
four CDs was approximately $250,000.
The Bank’s Involvement
Two days after Cheryl’s death, Nancy met with the bank’s retail manager vice
president, respondent Becky Radika (regional retail manager VP). During this meeting,
Nancy shared her concerns about Cheryl designating Laura as the beneficiary of the CDs.
The siblings’ attorney, David Crosby, sent two letters to the bank in June 2019. The first
letter, dated June 6, 2019, informed the bank that Nancy and Gregory were “preparing
filings with the [district court] regarding [Cheryl’s] estate.” The letter also explained:
5
Each of these certificates designated a cousin of Ms. Shega’s
as the POD owner of the certificate. My clients are concerned
because the cousin was not believed to have had any contact
with Ms. Shega for some 35 years; it was only after Ms.
Shega’s longtime caretaker died (her mother in 2015) that the
cousin apparently reconnected with Ms. Shega. Due to long-
standing medical, physical and emotional infirmities and
dysfunctions, Ms. Shega was a “vulnerable adult” under
Minnesota Statutes section 626.5572, subd. 21(4). My clients
have no information as to how or why the cousin was named
on the certificates, [ or] whether such actions were in
accordance with Minnesota law as to financial transactions
involving vulnerable adults.

This letter advises American Bank of the North of the above
facts and requests that no funds be distributed from any of Ms.
Shega’s certificates or any other accounts with your institution
absent compliance with all relevant laws, procedures and
policies or other court orders. Ms. [Nancy] Weiser and Mr.
[Gregory] Shega intend to continue their investigations and
prepare court papers in a timely and expedited manner.

On June 10, 2019, the district court appointed Nancy as a special administrator of
Cheryl’s estate because the “Assets of the Decedent may potentially be disbursed and said
allocation may have been the result of fraud and/or undue influence.” On June 25, 2019,
the siblings’ counsel sent a second letter to the bank and informed it that Nancy was
appointed as the special administrator for Cheryl. Crosby reminded the bank that Cheryl
was a “vulnerable adult” under Minnesota law, and explained that Nancy and Gregory were
“gathering information as to the circumstances that led to [Cheryl’s] execution of the
[CDs].”
Also on June 25, 2019, the bank’s executive vice president of retail banking Marci
Knight (executive vice president) emailed the regional retail manager VP and asked how
Nancy and Gregory discovered the CDs and the respective POD on each one. The
6
executive vice president also informed the regional retail manager VP that Crosby
“contacted [respondent bank employee Gerri Chapman] last week to ask her questions
regarding Cheryl’s mental stability. I instructed Gerri to not say anything and to have
something requested in writing. I then talked to [another bank employee] regarding this as
the attorney was going to send a subpoena.” The regional retail manager VP answered the
executive vice president’s question and informed her that she received documentation that
Nancy was appointed as the special administrator of Cheryl’s estate . The regional retail
manager VP also stated:
There is still nothing they can do on the CD’s with the cousin
being named the POD on the accounts. If she does come in to
claim them, I am sure we will have to pay them out to her
according to our documentation and then they would have to
fight it out in the courts. So far[,] the cousin has not reached
out to us at all.

The executive vice president replied that, “According to [the Minnesota Bankers
Association] legal counsel[,] we need to seek an attorney on this . . . if we want to enter an
interplea and turn the money over to the courts.”
Chapman was unaware that Nancy and Gregory’s attorney had reached out. She
was also unaware that Nancy had been appointed the special administrator. After Cheryl’s
death, in June 2019, Chapman attempted to locate Laura online. On July 7, 2019, she found
Laura’s husband Stephen Craig on Facebook and sent him a friend request “hoping to get
a connection to see if [she] could find out anything about Laura.” 3 When Stephen did not

3 Chapman’s first Facebook message reads, in full, “Hi, I know this may be very odd getting
a message from me but I am trying to get a hold of Laura Craig. My name is Gerri Chapman

7
respond, Chapman messaged him again two days later, stating it was “[v]ery important and
time sensitive.” In her deposition, Chapman explained that the bank likes to “get in touch
with the beneficiaries so we can get their name – the deceased[’s] name[] off the accounts
for reporting reasons.”
On July 8, 2019, the executive vice president emailed Chapman and the regional
retail manager VP and explained that Chapman “does not have to talk to [Nancy and
Gregory’s attorney] and if he so chooses to send a subpoena[,] then so be it.” She also
explained, “As Gerri has stated, Cheryl was of sound mind and knew who she intended to
leave her money to and at this time we will abide by how the accounts are set up.”
On July 25, 2019, Laura’s counsel sent a letter to the bank requesting that it release
the funds to Laura because she was the named beneficiary. The bank released the funds
from Cheryl’s CDs to Laura on July 26, 2019. The regional retail manager VP informed
Nancy that Laura’s counsel requested that the bank release the CD funds to Laura’s
account. She explained that the bank was “obligated by [its] legal documents to honor this
request to payout the funds to [Laura] which we did on July 26th.”

and I am [a] personal banker at [the bank]. I just need to ask Laura a question. Can you
help?” The second message reads, “Hi [Stephen] I am really hoping you can contact Laura
and have her get in touch with me. Very important and time sensitive. Nothing bad – just
have a question.”
8
Procedural Posture
In July 2020, appellant Estate of Cheryl M. Shega (the estate) 4 sued Laura and
Stephen Craig, claiming that they exploited Cheryl, a vulnerable adult, and unduly
influenced her to make Laura the POD of her CDs. Some of the claims raised against the
Craigs were dismissed at summary judgment; the remaining claims were tried to a jury.
The estate prevailed on all remaining claims against the Craigs. The jury specifically found
that Cheryl was a vulnerable adult, that Cheryl’s designation of Laura as the beneficiary of
the CDs was the product of undue influence, and awarded the estate damages of
approximately $250,000. The claims against the Craigs are not the subject of this appeal.
Also named in the lawsuit was the bank, along with Chapman and Radika (together,
the bank). The estate claimed financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, tortious
interference, negligence, and aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable
adult. The bank moved for summary judgment.
In December 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for the bank on all
of the estate’s claims against it except the negligence claim, on which the bank later
prevailed at trial. For the claim of aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a
vulnerable adult, the district court determined that the estate failed to provide sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact.
The estate appeals.

4 The title of this matter identifies the plaintiff as Cheryl herself, and that title is not changed
in consequence of the appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01. But it is clear that the
claims were asserted by Cheryl’s estate, and we thus refer to the estate as the appellant
herein. Gregory Shega is the personal representative for the estate.
9
DECISION
The estate challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment on its claim
for aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, arguing that its claim
was not a statutory claim for aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable
adult pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 626.557, subdivision 20 (2020), but rather a
common-law claim for aiding and abetting the tort of undue influence. The estate further
argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized the tort of undue influence.
Finally, the estate argues that the district court erred in its application of the elements of
aiding and abetting tortious conduct to the undisputed facts . We address each argument in
turn.
5
I. The Minnesota Legislature did not create a statutory cause of action for aiding
and abetting the tort of undue influence.

As an initial matter, the bank argues that count 8 was a claim based on aiding and
abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult as defined by Minnesota Statutes
section 626.557, subdivision 20, which does not create a cause of action for aiding and
abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. The estate does not concede that

5 The bank argues that the estate failed to adequately cite to the record, in violation of
Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 128.03 and requests that we decline to
address the issues raised on appeal. However, the estate adequately cited to the record and
any evidence to which it referred without citing the record was not relevant to our analysis
of the issues on appeal. Therefore, we deny the bank’s request. We note, however , that
briefs to this court are required to cite to the record for each material fact. Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 128.03; see also Hecker v. Hecker, 543 N.W.2d 678, 681 n.2 (Minn. App. 1996)
(stating citations to the record “are particularly important where . . . the record is
extensive”) aff’d, 568 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1997); see also Cole v. Star Trib., 581 N.W.2d
364, 371-72 (Minn. App. 1998) (noting that failure to cite to the record can result in non-
consideration of an issue).
10
aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult pursuant to Minnesota
Statutes section 626.557, subdivision 20, is not a valid cause of action. However, the estate
contends that aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult under
section 626.557, subdivision 20, was not the claim raised at summary judgment. Because
the district court analyzed the underlying claim as aiding and abetting the financial
exploitation of a vulnerable adult, we start our analysis with whether there is a statutory
cause of action for aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. This
presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Graphic Commc’ns
Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund “A” v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Minn.
2014).
“The goal of all statutory interpretation is to ‘ascertain and effectuate the intention
of the legislature.’” Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012)
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2010)). Our first step is to determine whether the words of
the law are clear or ambiguous. Id. The statutory language is ambiguous if words “are
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 77. “[W]e give words and
phrases their plain and ordinary meaning” and “read the statute as a whole and give effect
to all of its provisions.” Graphic Commc’ns, 850 N.W.2d at 689.
We begin with the text of the statute. Minnesota Statutes section 626.557,
subdivision 20(a), states, “A vulnerable adult who is a victim of financial exploitation as
defined in section 626.5572, subdivision 9, has a cause of action against a person who
committed the financial exploitation.” (Emphasis added.) The plain language
unambiguously provides a cause of action only against the person who committed the
11
financial exploitation—in this case, Laura Craig. The relevant statutory language does not
indicate that a victim may sue for aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a
vulnerable adult. And reading the statute as a whole, it appears this was intentional by the
Minnesota Legislature. To be sure, the legislature created aiding -and-abetting liability in
another part of the same statute. See Minn. Stat. § 626.5572, subd. 2(a)(1)-(4) (2024)
(defining “abuse” to include “aiding and abetting” varying degrees of assault and criminal
sexual conduct, using drugs to “injure or facilitate crime,” and soliciting, inducing, or
promoting prostitution). Further, the legislature has created statutory causes of action for
aiding and abetting in other contexts, such as the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA),
Minnesota Statutes section 363A.14 (2024) (“It is an unfair discriminatory practice for any
person . . . intentionally to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce a person to engage in any of
the [19] practices forbidden by this chapter.”).
The statutory scheme of the exploitation of the vulnerable-adult law and the
example of the MHRA demonstrate that the legislature knew how to include aiding and
abetting claims, and if it wished to attach aiding-and-abetting liability for the financial
exploitation of a vulnerable adult, it would have done so here. “When the Legislature uses
limiting or modifying language in one part of a statute, but omits it in another, we regard
that omission as intentional and will not add those same words of limitation or modification
to parts of the statute where they were not used.” State v. Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d 414, 419
(Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
12
Accordingly, reading the statute as a whole, we conclude that section 626.557 does
not provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a
vulnerable adult.
II. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not recognized the common-law tort of
undue influence.

Having determined that section 626.557 does not provide a cause of action for
aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult we turn to the issue of
whether a common-law claim for the same exists. But a common-law claim for aiding and
abetting presupposes an underlying tort. At summary judgment, the estate asserted that the
primary claim underlying the aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable
adult was that of undue influence. The bank argues that undue influence is not a “tort”
under Minnesota law. 6 On appeal, the parties contest whether “undue influence” is a
recognized tort in Minnesota.7
The estate concedes that there is no Minnesota caselaw identifying undue influence
as a tort. However, relying on Neibuhr v. Gage, 108 N.W. 884, 887 (Minn. 1906), the
estate argues that undue influence is a “subtle species of fraud” and that fraud, in turn, “is
an intentional tort.” Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Minn. 1986). To further

6 Undue influence is a recognized basis to challenge the validity of a legal document. See
In re Est. of Torgerson, 711 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn.
June 20, 2006) (stating that a person contesting a will bears the burden of proving lack of
testamentary capacity or undue influence). Here, the estate is asserting that undue
influence is an independent tort.

7 The estate raised this argument only in the reply brief. And, generally, issues not raised
or argued in a principal brief cannot be raised in a reply brief. Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth.
v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010).
13
its claim, the estate relies on Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom , where the supreme
court held that, “at least in some circumstances, Minnesota law does recognize a claim
based on aiding and abetting the tortious conduct of another.” 601 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Minn.
1999).
The estate’s reliance on Neibuhr is misplaced. Neibuhr involved an action for fraud
in the purchase of corporate stocks and contract remedies for injuries that are “induced by
fraud.” 108 N.W. at 887. The court briefly considered potential sources of contractual
deceit and duress. Id. The court discussed the plaintiff signing a contract due to “fear[ing]
. . . accusation and false charge” and the trial court’s determination of the appropriate
remedy. Id. at 885, 887-88. The Neibuhr court held that injuries by duress and injuries by
deception have the same remedy because they are both “species of fraud.” Id. at 887. The
court noted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court in City Nat. Bank v. Kusworm, 64 N.W. 843,
845 (Wis. 1895), stated:
[t]he only difference between fraud, undue influence, and
duress is as to the method employed in overcoming the volition
of the victim. In case of fraud the volition is usually overcome
by deceit, false representations, or false pretenses. In case of
undue influence the volition of the victim is usually overcome
by importunities, flatteries, insinuations, and artifice, and yet
all the authorities class undue influence as a subtle species of
fraud.
Id.

Here, the Minnesota Supreme Court was not adopting undue influence as a tort .
Rather, this mention was in the context of how fraud could be achieved, with a brief
reference to undue influence within a quotation as “a subtle species of fraud” to illustrate
how deceit may achieve fraud. Id.
14
While acknowledging that there is not a case that “squarely states that [undue
influence] is a tort,” the estate identifies other state courts that have expressly stated undue
influence is a tort, which supports the holding in Neibuhr that undue influence is a “subtle
species of fraud. ” See Solon v. Slater, 287 A.3d 574, 588 n.8 (Conn. 2023) (stating that
“[u]ndue influence ‘is a species of fraud’ . . . or a type of duress . . . or coercion that
‘sound[s] in tort’” (citations omitted)); In re Niles, 823 A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 2003) (holding that
“[u]ndue influence is a pernicious tort that has been referred to as a ‘species of fraud’”);
Howe v. Palmer, 956 N.E.2d 249, 255 (Mass. App. 2011) (discussing the applicable statute
of limitations in the Massachusetts Court of Appeals and stating that “[a] claim for undue
influence sounds in tort”); Legum v. Brown, 909 A.2d 672, 680-81 (Md. 2006) (discussing
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Maryland and determining that a claim of undue
influence was a tort-based action); Patey v. Peaslee, 131 A.2d 433, 436 (N.H. 1957)
(describing fraud, duress and undue influence as torts in New Hampshire); Barnes v.
Channel, 810 S.E.2d 549, 550-51 (Ga. 2018) (describing the plaintiff’s tort action as
“alleging . . . undue influence involving the quitclaim deed”); Ressis v. Mactye, 485
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that a cause of action for undue
influence requires a “tort-feasor” to have coerced a plaintiff in order to obtain some
advantage).8
The estate identifies caselaw from other jurisdictions, which have referred to undue
influence as a tort. It claims that we should view Neibuhr in light of these cases and

8 We note that authority from other jurisdictions is merely persuasive and not binding on
this court. See Randall v. Paul, 897 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. App. 2017).
15
likewise hold that undue influence is a tort in Minnesota. This argument is unavailing.
First, as discussed above, Neibuhr does not hold that undue influence is a tort.
Additionally, assuming without deciding that Neibuhr did recognize undue influence as a
“subtle species of fraud,” the estate here does not argue that the bank aided and abetted
fraud and did not advance that argument in district court.
The bank contends that undue influence is not a “freestanding tort,” and that the
estate does not identify any underlying tortious conduct. Specifically, the bank argues that
the supreme court has not yet addressed whether undue influence is a recognized tort. We
agree.
Only the Minnesota Supreme Court has “the power to recognize and abolish
common law doctrines and to define common law torts and their defenses.” Alonzo v.
Menholt, 9 N.W.3d 148, 154 (Minn. 2024) (quoting Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d
300, 303 (Minn. 2007)); see also Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision
Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Minn. 1990) (“Creating a new tort is a function
properly reserved for the supreme court based upon appropriate facts and record.”); In re
Est. of Stanley, No. A09-941, 2009 WL 4910852, at *7 (Minn. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (same).
As this court has recognized, only the Minnesota Supreme Court has authority to recognize
new common-law doctrines for Minnesota. See, e.g., Wise v. Stonebridge Cmtys., LLC,
927 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. App. 2019) (“[I]t is not the function of this court to create
new causes of action.”); Stubbs v. North Mem’l Med. Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Minn. App.
1989) (explaining that, in declining to recognize a cause of action for the tort of invasion
of privacy, “it is not . . . the function of this court to establish new causes of action”) , rev.
16
denied (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990) ; Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 815 N.W.2d 848, 851
(Minn. App. 2012) (declining to recognize new wrongful-discharge claim) , aff’d, 841
N.W.2d 147 (Minn. 2014); Jane Doe 43C v. Diocese of New Ulm, 787 N.W.2d 680, 690
(Minn. App. 2010) (declining to recognize “broadly stated fraud theory”). The Minnesota
Supreme Court has not recognized undue influence as a freestanding tort.
Considering the above caselaw and this court’s longstanding practice, and because
the supreme court has not recognized undue influence as a tort, we refrain from adopting
the tort of undue influence.9
III. Alternatively, even if undue influence is a tort, the district court did not err by
granting summary judgment because the estate failed to present evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of the
claim.

Assuming that Minnesota has recognized aiding and abetting the tort of undue
influence, the estate argues that it is entitled to a new trial because a jury could have found
that the bank substantially assisted the Craigs when it disbursed the CD funds to Laura.
The bank argues that there were no genuine issues of material fact for the three elements
of the aiding-and-abetting claim.
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact”
and the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
A party opposing summary judgment must produce competent, admissible evidence that
creates a genuine issue for trial. Twin Cities Metro-Certified Dev. Co. v. Stewart Title

9 Because we conclude that supreme court precedent does not recognize undue influence
as a tort, we need not address the bank’s argument that the estate’s common-law claim for
aiding and abetting tortious conduct is preempted by the Uniform Commercial Code.
17
Guar. Co., 868 N.W.2d 713, 720 (Minn. App. 2015). There is no genuine issue of material
fact if the record as a whole could not lead a rational decision -maker to decide for the
nonmoving party. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 2008).
If a party fails to establish an essential element of its claim, the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment. Bebo v. Delander, 632 N.W.2d 732, 737 (Minn. App. 2001), rev.
denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2001). This court reviews de novo whether there are genuine issues
of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law. Montemayor v.
Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017). We also view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. STAR
Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002).
With this in mind, we turn to the elements of aiding and abetting. “[A]ll who
actively participate in any manner in the commission of a tort, or who procure, command,
direct, advise, encourage, aid, or abet its commission, or who ratify it after it is done are
jointly and severally liable for the resulting injury.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 185-86
(quotation omitted). There are three elements to prove aiding and abetting: “(1) the
primary tort-feasor must commit a tort that causes an injury to the plaintiff; (2) the
defendant must know that the primary tort-feasor’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty;
and (3) the defendant must substantially assist or encourage the primary tort-feasor in the
achievement of the breach.” Id. at 187.
The estate does not contest the district court’s determination on the first element of
aiding and abetting that the primary tort-feasor, the Craigs, committed a tort that caused an
injury to the Shegas. We therefore consider only the latter two elements.
18
A. The estate did not offer evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact that the bank had actual knowledge of Laura undu ly
influencing Cheryl.

The estate claims that the bank “knew that the Craig’s conduct constituted a breach
of duty” and highlights three supporting facts in the record. First, Nancy informed Radika
of her concerns about how Laura became the beneficiary of Cheryl’s CDs. According to
Nancy’s affidavit, Radika then “contacted legal counsel for American Bank and based on
this phone call, she put a post-it note on the Affidavit that stated: ‘Court order to freeze –
open Probate case.’” Second, Crosby sent two letters to the bank: the first letter, sent on
June 6, 2019, explained that Cheryl may have been exploited as a vulnerable adult and,
therefore, requested that no funds be released to Laura pending the investigation. The
second letter, sent on June 25, 2019, notified the bank that Nancy had been appointed as a
special administrator and reminded the bank that Nancy and Gregory were investigating
the circumstances that led to Cheryl designating Laura as the CDs beneficiary. And third,
the order naming Nancy as the special administrator informed the bank that the “allocation
of [Cheryl’s] assets may have been the result of fraud and/or undue influence.”
The bank claims that the “record contains not so much as a hint that [the bank and
its employees] knew of any alleged influence on Cheryl’s decision to name Laura” as the
POD on the relevant CDs. The bank is mistaken. An internal email between the bank and
counsel for the Minnesota Bankers Association demonstrates that the bank was advised
about the pending litigation. On June 24, 2019, the Minnesota Bankers Association’s
counsel wrote:
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This is likely a scenario that will require the bank
getting legal counsel involved. I don’t know if the bank has
any reason to suspect the cousin/POD did anything wrong, but
if the siblings are serious about fighting this, then they will get
the bank involved with the court action at some point. Until
that happens, the bank, along with legal counsel, has a choice
to make. Now that it has notice of a possible controversy, it
could petition the court and start an interpleader action which
is basically telling the court that there is/will be a dispute over
this money and the bank doesn’t want to hold it anymore so we
are going to deposit [it] with the court while the two parties
fight over it.

This shows that the bank was at least aware of the alleged undue influence and the
potential for litigation. The question that remains, however, is whether the bank had
“actual knowledge” of the Craigs’ undue influence
.
“[A]iding and abetting liability is based on proof of a scienter— the defendants must
know that the conduct they are aiding and abetting is a tort.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 186.
A “bare inference that the defendant must have had knowledge of the primary violation is
insufficient.” Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).
However, “[i]n cases where the primary tortfeasor’s conduct is clearly tortious or illegal
. . . a defendant with a long-term or in- depth relationship with that tortfeasor may be
deemed to have constructive knowledge that the conduct was indeed tortious.” Witzman,
601 N.W.2d at 188. But when the allegedly tortious conduct is not obvious, we are
“reluctant to impose liability on an alleged aider and abettor for anything less than actual
knowledge that the primary tortfeasor’s conduct was wrongful.” Id.
Here, the bank lacked a “long-term or in-depth relationship” with the Craigs and,
therefore, the bank cannot be said to have constructive knowledge. For aiding and abetting
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liability to attach in this case, there must be evidence sufficient for a jury to find that the
bank had actual knowledge. And although there is some record evidence suggesting the
bank was aware of the Craigs’ undue influence, nothing in the record supports a finding
that the bank had actual knowledge.
B. The estate did not offer evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact that the bank substantially assisted the Craigs in unduly
influencing Cheryl to designate Laura as the beneficiary of her CDs.

For the third element, the estate had to show that the bank “substantially assist[ed]
or encourage[d] the primary tort -feasor in the achievement of the breach.” Id. at 187. In
the context of professionals, “substantial assistance means something more than the
provision of routine professional services.” Id. at 189; see also Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d
542, 556 (Mass. 1994) (“[T]he plaintiff must show that the defendant knew of the breach
and actively participated in it such that he or she could not reasonably be held to have acted
in good faith.”).
According to the estate, the bank “substantially assisted or encouraged” the Craigs
when it released the CD funds to Laura the day after Crosby requested that it not release
the funds. But this action occurred two years after the Craigs committed the underlying
tort of undue influence by convincing Cheryl to make Laura the POD. And the record is
devoid of any evidence proving that the bank substantially assisted or encouraged Laura
and Stephen Craig at the time Cheryl named Laura as the POD on her CDs.
To convince us otherwise, the estate analogizes its case to that of a bank robbery.
In its example, the primary tort-feasor —the Craigs—stood up the bank and demanded
money; the aider and abetter—the bank—was waiting in the getaway car, ready to drive
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off. The estate seems to suggest that although the bank did not substantially assist the
Craigs in unduly influencing Cheryl to name Laura as the POD, the bank ultimately
facilitated the achievement of the crime by releasing the funds. This analogy is
unpersuasive.
As the bank’s brief points out, the bank in this hypothetical is more akin to a taxi
driver providing routine, professional services. To this end, the supreme court has affirmed
that in cases alleging aiding and abetting by professionals, “substantial assistance” requires
something more than carrying out routine, professional services. Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at
188-89 (quotation omitted). In Witzman, the “substantial assistance” alleged by the
appellants was the mere performance of “routine accounting duties,” such as “preparing
financial statements, setting up draw accounts, recording conveyances, and providing tax
advice.” Id. at 189. The supreme court explained, “If we were to recognize that such
routine services constitute substantial assistance, then it would be the rare accountant
indeed who would not be subject to automatic liability merely because his client happened
to be a tortfeasor.” Id. In our case, the bank was discharging a typical duty of disbursing
funds that Laura was legally entitled to according to the POD on Cheryl’s CDs.
If all that were not enough, Minnesota Statutes section 45A.06(a) (2018) provides
that a broker-dealer or investment adviser may delay a disbursement if it reasonably
believes that the “requested disbursement or transaction may result in financial exploitation
of an eligible adult.” But, the only instance when a bank must delay disbursement is when
the “commissioner of commerce, law enforcement agency, or prosecuting attorney’s
office” informs the bank that financial exploitation “may have occurred, may have been
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attempted, or is being attempted.” Id., subd. 2. Here, the bank received no such notice
from either agency or office.
In sum, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate as a matter
of law because the estate has not presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact that the bank had actual knowledge and substantially assisted or encouraged
the Craigs in unduly influencing Cheryl. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the bank.
Affirmed.