In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S.B.S. and R.E.L., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0172

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S.B.S. and R.E.L., Parents.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-JV-24-4597

Jennifer L. Thompson, JLT Law & Mediation, Litchfield, Minnesota (for appellant S.B.S.)

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Elizabeth Lee, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent Stearns County Human Services)

Katherine Malmanger, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent R.E.L.)

Stephanie Schwegel, Sauk Rapids, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant-mother S.B.S. challenges the district court’s order terminating her
parental rights as to her child, R.L. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Mother has five biological children, four of whom are still minors: R.L. (Child 2,
born in 2011), D.S.W. (Child 3, born in 2017), D.S.W. (Child 4, born in 2019), and D.S.W.
(Child 5, born in 2021). 1 After receiving “multiple reports of [R.L.] absconding or being
picked up by the police[,]” respondent Stearns County (the county) opened a case for this
family in August 2022. Prior to Stearns County’s initial involvement, mother and
Hennepin County Human Services had an extensive history. Between 2013 and 2024,
there were 33 reports of child neglect filed in Stearns County and Hennepin County,
including ten reports regarding an unsupervised child and five reports of alleged sexual
abuse committed by R.L. against a younger sibling.
On September 15, 2014, Hennepin County received its first report of alleged child
maltreatment when R.L. was three years old. The report stated that R.L. was found “in the
middle of the road” and that R.L. “was naked and carrying a girl’s coat.”
On February 19, 2018, Hennepin County received a report of alleged child
maltreatment for three of mother’s children, including R.L. (the youngest two children had
not yet been born). The report noted that mother’s “home had filthy conditions, dirty
mattresses, dirty diapers, as well as food and clothing scattered about the house.”

1 Child 1 is no longer a minor. We refer to the three children who share the initials
“D.S.W.” as “Child 3,” “Child 4,” and “Child 5.” D.N.W. is the father of Child 3, Child
4, and Child 5. R.E.L. is R.L.’s father. Because R.L. has a different father than his three
minor siblings, there are two separate district court files for the four children. The children
in need of protection or services (CHIPS) petition for R.L. is file 73-JV-23-3195, which is
associated with the termination file generating this appeal (73-JV -24-4597). The CHIPS
petition regarding Child 3, Child 4, and Child 5 is file 73-JV-23-3196, which is associated
with the separate district court file 73-JV-24-4605.
3
On July 10, 2019, Hennepin County received a report of maltreatment of mother’s
four children, including R.L. (the youngest child had not yet been born). The report noted
concerns about drugs being made in the home. The report also stated that R.L., eight years
old at the time, “was often seen running down the alley or in the street in bare feet” and
indicated that R.L. “had attempted to break into neighbors’ houses, broke items in
neighbors’ yards, and attempted to flood a neighbor’s basement with a garden hose.”
From December 6, 2019 to March 5, 2020, Hennepin County provided services to
the family after it was reported that R.L. had 19 unexcused absences from school.
On October 13, 2020, Hennepin County “received the first of several reports
regarding the alleged child maltreatment of” R.L. The reports stated that R.L., then nine
years old, “would run away from home, go to different stores, and would attempt to leave
the store with toys [and] law enforcement would then be called.” The reports also included
an educational neglect report, which stated that mother “had not enrolled [R.L.] in school
in a timely manner and [R.L.] had 44 full day unexcused absences from school.” R.L. was
taken to the Children’s Hospital for “behavior problems,” including pulling a knife on law
enforcement and running away. R.L. reported that mother “hit them with tree branches, a
belt, a cord, and metal[,]” and that mother hit and punched R.L.
In February 2021, Hennepin County received reports regarding alleged
maltreatment of R.L., Child 3, and Child 5. The reports stated that R.L., then nine years
old, was wandering around a hotel alone; seen waiting for a bus in February without a hat
or mittens; and had 14 unexcused absences from school. The report also stated that mother
was “observed to sit in her vehicle and get high” with R.L. and Child 3 in the car with her.
4
On September 17, 2021, Stearns County received a report from law enforcement
about R.L. running away from mother. The report stated R.L., ten years old, “left the area”
while mother’s vehicle was parked at a repair shop.
From December 8, 2021 to March 18, 2022, Hennepin County provided services to
the family after receiving a report of alleged maltreatment, which stated that R.L. had 25
unexcused absences from school.
On August 18, 2022, Stearns County received a report regarding alleged
maltreatment of R.L. The report noted that an employee called law enforcement around
6:30 a.m. after observing R.L., 11 years old, unsupervised outside of a Target store. When
law enforcement arrived, R.L. “attempted to take a swing at an officer and resisted the
officers and eventually dropped their body to the ground and began to kick items nearby,
as well as the officers.” Law enforcement placed R.L. in handcuffs, took R.L. to the
emergency room, and learned that R.L. had run away from the family home at 5:00 a.m.
seven days earlier . There is no evidence in the record that mother reported R.L. as a
missing child during the seven days he was away from the family home. Instead, mother
noted that R.L. leaves the house “multiple times” and that she is unable to control him.
On August 30, 2022, Stearns County received a report that R.L. had two interactions
with law enforcement the day before, and that law enforcement placed R.L. on a protective
care hold. The protective care hold was released on August 30 after the county developed
a safety plan with mother. Two days later, on September 2, Stearns County received
another report that R.L. had run away from home the day after he was released from the
protective hold. R.L. was found at Target and “had stolen multiple toys.”
5
On September 15, 2022, Stearns County received a report that R.L. was not enrolled
in school, “but was on a waitlist for Athlos Academy.” The county staff tried to explain to
mother that R.L. was legally required to be enrolled in and attend school, but mother
responded that she was not going to enroll R.L. in another school.
Two weeks later, Stearns County received a report that mother was with four of her
children and attempting to enroll Child 3 in school. The report noted that R.L. refused to
leave because he felt like mother was going to hit him. The report stated the children were
“standing on chairs and going to staff-only areas without much oversight.” The report also
noted one of the children was a toddler with a “‘soaked through’ diaper.”
On September 30, 2022, after R.L. had been enrolled in a junior high school, Stearns
County received a report that law enforcement had been dispatched to the school for a
problem with R.L. R.L. was refusing to go home because he said his mother would beat
him, make him stay in his room, and had hit him “with a belt or a shoe.”
On December 13, 2022, Stearns County received a report that R.L. attempted to take
a full cart of items out of Target without paying. The report stated that “law enforcement
was advised this was not the first time and typically [mother] would be waiting outside in
a vehicle when [R.L.] attempts to steal items.” Mother reported “this was typical behavior
for [R.L.] and that [R.L.] runs from home sometimes.” A report later that month stated
that R.L. “struggled with accountability, was unable to communicate their actual actions,
and appeared to deflect conversation regarding discussion on [R.L.’s] behaviors.”
On January 9, 2023, Stearns County received a report that R.L. had 16 unexcused
absences from school.
6
On August 18, 2022, June 29, 2023, September 11, 2023, November 9, 2023, and
December 28, 2023, Stearns County received reports about alleged sexual abuse involving
R.L. and Child 3. Four of the incidents took place in the house while mother was home.
Mother declined to participate in an interview about the allegations. The record includes
no evidence that mother ever investigated the veracity of the allegations.
On April 21, 2023, Stearns County filed CHIPS petitions for all four of mother’s
minor children. The incident that gave rise to the CHIPS petitions stemmed from a report
on April 11, 2023, when mother left R.L., then 12 years old, and Child 5, two years old at
the time, in the car while shopping. R.L. needed to use the bathroom and left Child 5 alone
in the car. Child 5 got out of the car and wandered around the parking lot alone, wearing
a t-shirt with no diaper or pants. Law enforcement was called and noted that Child 5 had
been wandering around the parking lot alone for “at least 20 minutes.”
In May 2023, all four children were adjudicated as children in need of protection or
services. The children remained at home with mother under protective supervision.
In June 2023, law enforcement found Child 3, five years old at the time, playing
alone in a parking lot and the county placed Child 3 on a 72-hour CHIPS hold. The next
day, the county requested that the rest of the children also be removed from mother’s home.
The district court issued ex parte orders for emergency protective care as to all four
children. Mother was thereafter arrested, and all four children were placed in foster care.
After an emergency hearing, the district court transferred temporary custody of the children
to the county and ordered that all four children remain in foster care.
7
On June 17, 2024, the county petitioned to terminate mother’s and R.E.L.’s parental
rights as to R.L., and mother’s and D.N.W.’s parental rights as to Child 3, Child 4, and
Child 5. Trial occurred on the petition over three days with testimony from thirteen
witnesses. On the first day of trial, R.L.’s father voluntarily terminated his parental rights.
R.L. has had five different out-of- home placements, including with: (1) a paternal
relative from which R.L. was removed “due to abuse concerns”; (2) a maternal relative
“who could not care for him and dropped him off at the St. Cloud Police Station”; (3) a
therapeutic foster home, which provided specialized care where R.L. received services and
therapy; (4) a residential placement; and (5) a crisis respite through “Cradle of Love” with
two-to-one staff. During these placements, there were multiple reports of R.L. becoming
aggressive that required law enforcement intervention.
Mother testified that R.L. always had special needs. Mother had previously worked
with the county to develop a safety plan to manage R.L.’s behavior. Mother testified that
compliance with the safety plan was “impossible” because R.L. “always runs away.”
Mother testified that R.L. did not have any services in Stearns County to help him. She
noted that R.L. had access to services when the family lived in Hennepin County.
After trial, the district court issued a 67-page order granting the county’s petition to
terminate mother’s parental rights as to R.L., then 13 years old. The district court denied
the county’s petition to terminate mother’s and D.N.W.’s parental rights as to Child 3,
Child 4, and Child 5. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights as to R.L.
8
DECISION
In reviewing a district court’s order terminating parental rights, we review the
underlying factual findings for clear error and the district court’s decisions regarding
whether a statutory basis to terminate parental rights exists, as well as its ultimate decision
regarding whether to terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of
Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021).
A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment
of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “A district court
abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Parental rights may be “terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). To terminate a person’s parental
rights, a district court must determine that the social service agency established the
following by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) the existence of at least one statutory
basis for termination; (2) termination is in the child’s best interests; and (3) the social
services agency made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” In re Welfare of Child. of
A.D.B., 970 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. App. 2022); see Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2024)
(addressing circumstances when reasonable efforts to reunite the family need not be made).
Mother challenges all three factors that the district court determined weighed in
favor of termination. We consider each of mother’s challenges in turn.
9
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the county
proved statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the county
proved there were statutory grounds for termination. The county, as the petitioner, bears
“the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence that ” statutory grounds for
termination exist. In re Welfare of C.K., 426 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. 1988). A district
court must base its decision on evidence of the conditions that exist at the time of the
termination. In re Welfare of Child of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. App. 2007), rev.
denied (Minn. July 17, 2007). Termination of a parent’s rights is intended for times when
it appears “that the present conditions of neglect will continue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980).
In a termination appeal, we examine the record to determine whether the district
court applied the appropriate statutory criteria. In re Welfare of D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d 247,
249 (Minn. App. 2003). The statute sets forth multiple grounds for termination of parental
rights. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1 (2024). The district court, here, relied on two
statutory grounds to terminate mother’s parental rights.
The district court relied upon Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b)(2), which provides that a court may terminate parental rights if “the parent
has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the
duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Such duties include
“providing the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and
control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development, if
10
the parent is physically and financially able.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).
“Failure to satisfy requirements of a court-ordered case plan provides evidence of a parent’s
noncompliance with the duties and responsibilities under section 260C.301, subdivision
1(b)(2).” In re Welfare of Child. of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 666 (Minn. App. 2012).
The district court, here, found that the county demonstrated, by clear and convincing
evidence, that mother “substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to
comply with the duties imposed upon that parent.” We conclude that the court acted within
its discretion in determining that the county proved that this statutory factor supported the
termination of mother’s parental rights. J.H. , 968 N.W.2d at 600. The district court’s
findings of fact are supported by the record and, therefore, not clearly erroneous. Id.
First, the district court found that mother “failed to provide adequate supervision for
her children resulting in her children being unsupervised and in potentially dangerous
situations” and that “the lack of supervision provided to the children borders on egregious.”
This finding is supported by the record of R.L.’s significant history of absconding. The
record demonstrates that R.L. would run away from home and be gone for days at a time
and there is no evidence that mother ever reported R.L. missing.
Second, the district court found that mother “has continuously failed to meet her
children’s . . . educational needs.” The record demonstrates that R.L. was often out of
school while in mother’s care and had at least 118 unexcused absences from school, which
does not include the periods of time when R.L. was not enrolled in school at all.
Third, the district court found that mother “has continuously failed to meet her
children’s medical” needs. The record shows that mother did not address the “extensive
11
dental needs” of all four children, resulting in a need for dental surgeries. R.L.’s dental
needs are so severe that sedation was recommended to obtain treatment. The record also
shows that mother frequently declined to authorize needed services.
Finally, the district court also found that mother had not sought assistance for R.L.
or Child 3 related to the reports of alleged sexual abuse. The district court found mother
failed to even determine the validity of the incidents from five separate reports, four of
which allegedly took place in the home while mother was present in another room. These
findings are also supported by evidence in the record.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the county proved,
by clear and convincing evidence, the facts supporting its determination that mother failed
to satisfy her parental duties under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b)(2) for termination of parental rights.2
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding it is in the best
interests of R.L. to terminate mother’s parental rights.

If a statutory ground for termination exists, the district court next considers the best
interests of the child, which is “the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 7 (2024). In analyzing a child’s best interests, a district court must weigh “three
primary factors: [1] the child’s interests in maintaining the parent-child relationship, [2] the
parents’ interests in maintaining the parent -child relationship, and [3] any competing

2 The district court also determined that the county proved statutory grounds for termination
under subdivision 1(b)(4). We need not address this statutory ground because we affirm
on the basis of the district court’s determination on subdivision 1(b)(2). In re Child. of
T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005).
12
interests of the child.” In re Welfare of the Child. of M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 744 (Minn.
App. 2013). The “competing interests” of the third factor “include a stable environment,
health considerations, and the child’s preferences.” Id. We review a district court’s
determination that the termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests for an
abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of the Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn.
App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
Mother argues the district court abused its discretion in determining that termination
was in R.L.’s best interests but not in Child 3’s best interests because the two children are
similarly situated. We are not persuaded.
As to R.L., the district court made the following best-interests findings:
Here, the [c]ourt finds that termination of [mother’s] parental
rights as to [R.L.] is in [R.L.’s] best interest . Although the
[c]ourt believes that [mother] loves [R.L.] very much, and
[R.L.] loves her, [R.L.’s] needs require that he be in a safe
environment and the evidence in the record shows that
[mother] is not able to provide the safe environment that [R.L.]
needs. . . . [R.L.] is in need of permanency, and permanency
is simply not an option with [mother]. It is in [R.L.’s] best
interest to have all efforts focused on finding him a permanent
home where his complex needs can be met. The [c]ourt also
notes that all of [R.L.’s] care providers, social workers, and
Guardian Ad Litem do not believe it would be appropriate for
[R.L.] and Child 3 to return to the same home environment.

As to Child 3, the district court made the following best-interests findings:
With regard to Child 3, the [c]ourt finds that termination is not
in Child 3’s best interest at this time. Child 3 appears to have
a significant connection with [mother], and [mother] has a
significant connection to her. It is unclear whether Child 3’s
trauma response is in part due to her separation from her
mother and her seven placements since separation. The [c]ourt
also notes that Child 3 has a significant connection to Child 4
13
and Child 5, and given that the [c]ounty has not met its burden
of proof as to Child 4 and Child 5, and given there is no current
permanency plan and Child 3 continues to need a higher level
of care, the [c]ourt feels it is in Child 3’s best interest s not to
terminate parental rights at this time to allow for additional
time with [mother] to see if her condition stabilizes and reduces
her needs, and to determine whether reunification between
[mother] and Child 4 and Child 5 is possible. The [c]ourt’s
assessment of what is in Child 3’s best interest[s] may change
with changes in circumstances regarding her progress in
treatment and the placement of Child 3’s siblings, and
[mother’s] ability to meet her ongoing needs.

(Emphasis added.)
The district court found that the age difference between R.L. and Child 3 required a
different best-interests determination. Additionally, Child 3, Child 4, and Child 5 share
the same father, and the district court found it to be in the best interests of those three
children to remain together in order to maintain the “family unit, including [their father].”
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined termination was in
R.L.’s best interests. The court thoroughly examined the needs and circumstances of each
unique child and came to varying conclusions about each of the four, unique children.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the county
made reasonable efforts at reunification.

Parental rights may not be terminated unless “the social services agency made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family” or those efforts were not required. A.D.B.,
970 N.W.2d at 730; see Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a). “Reasonable efforts are made upon the
exercise of due diligence by the responsible social services agency to use culturally
appropriate and available services to meet the individualized needs of the child and the
child’s family.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(f) (2024). When proceeding pursuant to a
14
termination of parental rights, the district court must consider whether the services
provided by the social services agency were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and, if
appropriate, the child;

(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s
family;

(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well- being of the
child;

(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the child and
family;

(5) culturally appropriate;

(6) available and accessible;

(7) consistent and timely; and

(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). “[T]he child’s best interests, health, and safety must be
of paramount concern.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a).
Mother argues that the district court’s finding that the county made reasonable
efforts at reunification with R.L. was an abuse of discretion because it is an “illogical
conclusion that runs contrary to the court’s own findings.” We disagree.
The district court found that the county engaged in reasonable efforts. The district
court made extensive findings in its 67-page order about the county’s efforts to reunify
mother with her children. The court summarized its findings as follows:
Here, the county has provided services that are relevant to the
safety and protection of the children. They developed a plan
and met weekly with [mother] to address these goals. The
15
plans were intended to meet the children and [mother’s] needs.
They have ensured that all of the children’s medical and dental
needs have been met. They have ensured the children have
access to individual therapy, occupational therapy, diagnostic
assessments, psychological assessments, neuropsychological
assessments, medication management, IEP planning, and all
services recommended by those assessments. The [c]ounty has
ensured [mother] had a Parental Capacity Assessment, a
Diagnostic Assessment, a Chemical Use Assessment, chemical
dependency treatment, Parenting Education, housing support,
and visitation with the children. They have met weekly with
[mother] to discuss her progress and to provide her with
referrals and information needed. They have given her
reminders and helped her with keeping a calendar. They have
provided her with bus passes, help with navigating the bus
system, medical rides and personally transported her when
necessary. They have connected her with an ARMHS worker
to assist her in scheduling her own appointments and meeting
her needs. All of these efforts were targeted at helping
[mother] become a safe parent for her children, and to help her
develop the skills necessary to be able to identify and meet the
children’s needs, to pr otect them, and to coordinate care on
their behalf. The [c]ourt also finds that these services were
adequate to meet [mother’s] needs and the needs of the
children. Although there were some delays in obtaining
services, the services were all available and accessible. The
[c]ounty also made efforts to obtain culturally appropriate
services, particularly with her diagnostic assessment and in
identifying a therapist and psychiatrist for [mother]. The
[c]ourt finds that referrals and services were provided in a
timely manner, and that although there were a lot of things
[mother] was expected to complete, she had over a year and a
half to work her plan, and in that time these services were
realistic given the significant needs of [mother] and the
children.

The district court summarized the county’s efforts as to reunification with R.L. as follows:
The [c]ourt finds that the conditions that led to [R.L.’s]
removal are likely to remain for the foreseeable future.

[R.L.] has extensive needs. [Mother’s] testimony
demonstrates that she is not fully capable of understanding or
16
addressing these needs. Despite his long history of elopement,
the dangerous situations he puts himself in in doing so, and his
continued elopement even when under 2:1 supervision,
[mother] has testified that if returned home, [R.L.] simply will
not run anymore. She testified that she had a “long talk” with
[R.L.] and feels that he now understands he cannot run away
from home. She also testified at trial that [R.L.’s] condition
“tells him to go” and that she has noted in the past that she
cannot control him from running.

. . . .

[R.L.’s] needs are complex, and likely permanent even with
supportive therapy. [Mother] also has complex needs,
and . . . has repeatedly demonstrated she lacks the capacity to
fully understand [R.L.’s] needs to properly care for
him. . . . There is no trajectory which predicts when [R.L.] will
need less than Level 5 care, or that he will be in a position to
safely return to the care of a parent in the foreseeable future.
[Mother] has also demonstrated difficulty in understanding
[R.L.’s] complex needs.

. . . .

The [c]ourt also notes that [mother’s] unwillingness to
contemplate that [R.L.] may have engaged in inappropriate
[behavior] further demonstrates that the reasonable efforts
have not corrected the condition that led to out of home
placement for [R.L.] [Mother] has shown the [c]ourt through
her testimony that, even after engaging and substantially
complying with her case plan, her mind remains fixed that
[R.L.] did not engage in inappropriate . . . behaviors and has
not identified a plan to ensure [R.L.’s] alleged behaviors are
explored or that protections are in place for the other children
in the event the allegations are true. The [c]ourt finds that if
[R.L.] were returned to [mother’s] care, she would be unlikely
to seek out or follow up on any assessment of [R.L.]
for . . . behaviors or to take allegations made against him
seriously.

Mother argues the district court finding that mother was not given an opportunity
for low supervised or unsupervised visits with the children is contrary to the above findings
17
regarding the county’s reasonable efforts. But the finding that mother cites is situated
within the court’s analysis related to Child 3’s best interests.
The district court’s findings demonstrate that R.L. has more significant supervision
needs than any of the other children. He lives in a specialized foster home that provides
enhanced supervision. Before being placed in the specialized foster home, R.L. often ran
away. The record further shows that Mother reported multiple times that she is not capable
of controlling R.L. or stopping him from running away.
The district court also made findings that the county’s efforts were, at times, stifled.3
The court found that mother was not cooperative when the county arranged for services
that were recommended in R.L.’s diagnostic assessments. Mother gave no reason for her
lack of cooperation, did not attend meetings with R.L.’s providers, and did not sign
authorizations for R.L. to receive medication.
The district court made thorough findings about the county’s efforts at reunification,
which are supported by the record. And those findings support its determination that the
efforts made by the county were reasonable. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the county made reasonable efforts at reunification.
Affirmed.

3 Mother also argues she was never “offered any services specific to empathetically
parenting victims of sexual abuse.” But the record reveals that mother refused to
participate in an interview related to the allegations and never independently investigated
the veracity of the allegations. The district court did acknowledge that it was unclear
whether mother had received any services to help her process the allegations after she
refused to acknowledge the possibility that abuse occurred.