State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0192

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tremaine Tavion Williams,
Appellant.

Filed February 2, 2026
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-14997

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm and fifth-degree controlled-substance possession, appellant Tremaine Tavion
Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting testimony about
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drug sales and gang activity. Williams additionally contends that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel implicitly conceded his guilt during closing
argument without Williams’ acquiescence. Because the district court acted within its
discretion in its evidentiary rulings and Williams’ trial counsel did not concede guilt, we
affirm.
FACTS
Following a pursuit of Williams on foot, during which law enforcement recovered
a firearm and fentanyl, respondent State of Minnesota charged Williams by amended
complaint with one count of unlawful possession of ammunition or a firearm in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (Supp. 2023), and one count of fifth-degree
controlled-substance possession in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (Supp.
2023).
The district court held a three-day jury trial. Relevant to the issues on appeal, one
of the state’s law-enforcement witnesses testified that the area in which Williams was
found is “controlled by a gang that goes by the [name] 10oz.” Additionally, several
law-enforcement witnesses offered testimony about the drug investigation and local crime.
We draw the following facts from evidence presented during Williams’ jury trial.
In July 2024, an officer was monitoring the intersection of Chicago Avenue and Franklin
Avenue in Minneapolis via city-owned surveillance cameras, an area described by several
witnesses as having significant drug and gang activity. This officer observed Williams
interacting with other individuals whom the officer knew to have a history of illegal-drug
and firearm possession. In addition, an unidentified individual showed Williams a small
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object from his pocket. Williams and three others eventually entered a parked vehicle.
Over the course of about one-and-a-half hours of surveillance, the officer observed multiple
people approach this same parked vehicle and engage in what appeared to be drug
transactions.
The officer requested assistance from other officers to detain the individuals and
investigate the purported illegal drug activity. As multiple law-enforcement vehicles
approached the parked vehicle, Williams and the other occupants exited and fled on foot.
While in pursuit of Williams, officers observed him throw a firearm and other objects. Law
enforcement took Williams into custody and recovered a substance from his pocket that
was later confirmed to be fentanyl. During an interview after he had been informed of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966), a summary of which was
presented to the jury through law-enforcement testimony, Williams admitted that he had
fentanyl in his pocket and that he uses fentanyl. The officer testified that, during the
interview, Williams indicated that he may have touched the firearm, but he declined to
admit that he possessed it.
Williams filed a pretrial motion to exclude evidence of drug sales and other criminal
activity. At the pretrial hearing, Williams argued that the reasons for the initial
investigation are irrelevant to the elements of the charged offenses. The district court, in
denying Williams’ motion, determined that it was appropriate to present evidence of the
underlying investigation, explaining that the background of the investigation is “part of this
narrative.” Separately, the parties stipulated that Williams is ineligible to possess a firearm
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and that the substance which was found in Williams’ possession is a mixture containing
fentanyl weighing 0.338 grams.
The jury found Williams guilty on both counts. The district court entered
convictions on both counts and imposed executed prison sentences of 60 months to be
served concurrently.
Williams appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court acted within its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
Williams challenges the admission of two types of evidence: testimony regarding
purported drug sales that law enforcement observed while conducting surveillance and
testimony about the area being controlled by a gang. He argues that the evidence was
inadmissible under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403 and that the erroneous admission of
the evidence significantly impacted the verdict. Accordingly, he contends, this error
requires reversal of his convictions.
Appellate courts “will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of
discretion.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). An abuse of discretion occurs
when a district court “misapplies the law, makes findings unsupported by the record, or
resolves discretionary questions in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on
record.” State v. Johnson, 979 N.W.2d 483, 502 (Minn. App. 2022), aff’d, 995 N.W.2d
155 (Minn. 2023).
In challenging the admission of the evidence under Minnesota Rule of Evidence
401, Williams argues that the evidence was irrelevant “because it did little to make a fact
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of consequence more or less probable.” He adds that, even if all of the challenged evidence
was relevant, it confused and misled the jurors and it was unduly prejudicial such that the
district court should have excluded it under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. Among other reasons, relevant
“evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Relevance
We first address the relevance of the evidence. The bar for relevancy is not high as
“Rule 401 adopts a minimal relevancy approach.” State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 631
(Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Harris, 521 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn.
1994) (“Generally, evidence is relevant if in some degree it advances the inquiry and thus
has probative value.” (quotation omitted)).
In addressing the relevance of the challenged evidence, the district court explained
that the background of the investigation is “part of [the] narrative,” presumably referring
to the events leading to Williams’ arrest. We agree that the evidence is relevant. To be
convicted of fifth-degree drug possession, the state needed to prove that Williams
“unlawfully possess[ed] one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance classified
in Schedule I, II, III, or IV.” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1). The state presented
testimony that Williams was present in an area known as an “open-air drug market,” he
was with people known to have engaged in drug transactions, and he was in a vehicle where
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drug transactions purportedly occurred. And although this testimony did not unequivocally
show that Williams himself engaged in a drug transaction, his presence in proximity to
drug sales advances the likelihood that he unlawfully possessed drugs. Additionally, the
testimony gives context for Williams’ decision to flee after being approached by law
enforcement, and “evidence of flight suggests consciousness of guilt.” State v. Bias, 419
N.W.2d 480, 485 (Minn. 1988). 1 And regarding the gang evidence—which consisted
solely of an officer testifying that this area is known to be controlled by a certain gang—
we note that, although it does not directly relate to an element of one of the charged
offenses, it has at least some probative value because it gives context for the underlying
investigation. See Ali, 855 N.W.2d at 249 (“ [E]vidence is generally admissible to give
jurors the context for an investigation.”).
Rule 403 Balancing
We next address whether, under rule 403, the relevant evidence is “substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.” Williams argues that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial and confused and misled
the jurors. We address each argument in turn.
Williams argues that the evidence about drug sales and gang activity was unfairly
prejudicial because it “sought to persuade through illegitimate inferences and character
assassination.” More specifically, Williams maintains that the evidence invites a

1 In contesting relevance, Williams also argues that the drug-sale evidence is irrelevant to
firearm possession. This argument, however, does not address its relevance for drug
possession.
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prohibited inference of guilt by association and that descriptions of the “crime- ridden
nature of the neighborhood” invite a prohibited “where-there’s -smoke-there’s-fire”
inference.
“Unfair prejudice under rule 403 is not merely damaging evidence, even severely
damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate
means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn.
2005). In State v. Cogshell, for example, the district court received evidence of a similar
drug offense committed by the defendant 15 months prior to the underlying offense that
the state offered as proof of identity under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). 538
N.W.2d 120, 124 (Minn. 1995). Although characterized as a close call, the supreme court
held that rule 403 did not require exclusion of this evidence as unduly prejudicial. Id.
Here, the district court, in denying Williams’ motion to exclude the challenged
evidence, stated:
Is it quite possible that the testimony that we hear, some of it
anyway, is going to be prejudicial? Absolutely. But that’s not
the test. The test is, you know, is the probative value going to
tip the scale in favor of admission even though there’s some
prejudice. The prejudice won’t be outweighed, in other words.

The district court was correct. Although there may have been some risk of prejudice
by the submission of this evidence, there is no indication that the risk of unfair prejudice
was “substantially outweighed” by the probative value of the evidence, especially when
considering the district court’s broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings. See Minn.
R. Evid. 403; Ali, 855 N.W.2d at 249. Indeed, as the state notes, the district court did
prohibit the admission of certain evidence related to the broader investigation, including
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through its ruling prohibiting the state from asking a question about the manner in which
marijuana found in the parked vehicle was packaged. And as stated above, “evidence is
generally admissible to give jurors the context for an investigation.” Ali, 855 N.W.2d at
249. Here, evidence of the nearby gang activity and crime provides such contextual
information. Because the record supports the district court’s decision to allow the
challenged testimony, it acted within its discretion in its evidentiary ruling.
Williams additionally contends that the drug-sale evidence confused and misled the
jury. In making this argument, Williams argues that the “copious amounts of evidence
about narcotics sales” could have misled and confused the jury about “what crime he was
charged with and whether [he] could be guilty of constructively possessing the drugs other
people sold.”
Williams’ argument is unpersuasive. Prior to opening statements, the district court
informed the jury that Williams was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition or a
firearm and fifth-degree controlled-substance possession. And prior to closing statements,
the district court clearly instructed the jury on the elements of each offense. Due to these
clear instructions, there is no basis to determine that the brief presentation of evidence of
drug sales in the vicinity as contextual information confused the jury about the charges
against Williams. See State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 578 (Minn. 2009) (explaining that
appellate courts assume that a jury followed the district court’s instructions).
2

2 Williams additionally argues that the challenged evidence is inadmissible under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404 . Rule 404 places restrictions on the introduction of
character evidence and evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. However, although
Williams initially addressed rule 404 in his pretrial motion, he indicated at a pretrial hearing
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II. Williams did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel did not concede guilt.

Williams argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel implicitly conceded his guilt to the drug offense without his acquiescence by only
advancing arguments regarding the evidence underlying the firearm offense.
Appellate courts typically review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims by
applying the Strickland test. See, e.g., Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). Under this test, the defendant
must show that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”
and “that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.” Id. (quotations omitted).
A different standard applies, however, when a defendant argues that counsel was
ineffective for conceding guilt without consent or acquiescence . “When defense counsel
concedes the defendant’s guilt without consent, counsel’s performance is deficient and
prejudice is presumed.” State v. Luby, 904 N.W.2d 453, 457 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). Only the defendant can make the decision to concede guilt, and “if that decision
is taken from the defendant, the defendant is entitled to a new trial, regardless of whether
he would have been convicted without the admission.” Id. (quotation omitted). In
evaluating ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims involving an alleged unauthorized

that rule 404 was no longer at issue. Williams did not subsequently raise a rule 404
challenge at trial, nor does he raise a plain-error argument on appeal. We therefore need
not consider this argument on appeal. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn.
1996) (explaining that appellate courts generally do not consider issues that a party did not
present to the district court).
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concession of guilt, appellate courts first “review the record de novo to determine whether
defense counsel made a concession of guilt.” Id. If counsel conceded guilt, “the defendant
is entitled to a new trial unless he acquiesced in that concession.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We begin by addressing whether counsel conceded guilt. “A concession may be
express or implied.” Id. Williams argues that his trial counsel implicitly conceded guilt.
Appellate courts “must exercise great caution when defining an implied concession lest the
semantics of every questioned word, statement or misstatement of counsel by inadvertence,
negligence or perhaps cleverness . . . become an automatic ground for a new trial.” Torres
v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). An implied concession
only occurs “where a reasonable person viewing the totality of the circumstances would
conclude that counsel conceded the defendant[’]s guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Williams’ argument regarding concession focuses on his trial counsel’s statements
during closing argument. He contends that his trial counsel failed to make arguments about
the evidence underlying the drug offense, adding that his trial counsel only asked the jury
to acquit him of the firearm offense. Williams argues that, as a result, the jury would have
understood that counsel conceded his guilt for the drug offense.
Although Williams is correct that his trial counsel did not directly reference the drug
offense during closing argument, when considering the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that trial counsel did not concede guilt. During closing argument, trial counsel
emphasized to the jury the high bar for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, indicating
that this standard is “required for each element of each offense.” Trial counsel additionally
stated that, “when the State charges multiple counts with multiple elements within each of
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them, precision is required, and that’s why you’re here.” Trial counsel also made
arguments challenging the reliability of a post Miranda statement during which Williams
allegedly made inculpatory statements regarding both offenses, including a purported
admission to possessing fentanyl.
And as the state notes, trial counsel’s statements throughout trial indicate a lack of
concession of guilt. During the opening statement, trial counsel broadly stated that
Williams is “not guilty” and that “[i]t’s the State’s job to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.” And trial counsel asked several questions during cross-examination that implicitly
appeared to be attempts to challenge the state’s witnesses on facts relevant to both
possession offenses.
Because the totality of the circumstances does not demonstrate that Williams’ trial
counsel conceded guilt, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim accordingly fails.
Affirmed.