State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jhonathan Jontae Robinson, Appellant.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0208
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Jhonathan Jontae Robinson,
Appellant.
Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge
Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-21-3109
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Ronald H ocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County
Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.*
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment purs uant to
Minn
. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
This is a second appeal from the final judgment of conviction for obstruction of
legal process. See State v. Robinson, No. A23-0251, 2024 WL 222475 (Minn. App.
Jan. 22, 2024) (Robinson I), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2024). After this court determined
that law enforcement lacked probable cause to search appellant’s car based solely on the
odor of marijuana, we reversed and remanded for the district court to reopen the omnibus
hearing and decide remaining issues in appellant’s motion to suppress. Id. at *1-2, *4. On
remand, the district court again denied appellant’s motion to suppress. Arguing that the
district court erred on remand, appellant now contends that the evidence supporting the
obstruction conviction is the fruit of an illegal search. We disagree and conclude that
suppression of the disputed evidence was not required. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
This opinion summarizes the relevant facts with reference to this court’s opinion in
Robinson I as well as to record evidence.
On February 24, 2021, at about 12:13 a.m. in Savage, a law -enforcement officer
(first officer) stopped appellant Jhonathan Jontae Robinson for driving “68 miles per hour
in a 55 mile-per-hour zone.” Id. at *1. The first officer “smelled an odor of marijuana
coming from” Robinson’s car, so she returned to the squad car “to call for backup to assist
with a search.” Id. After a few minutes, the first officer told Robinson that she smelled
marijuana and “explained that she intended to conduct a search.” Id. Robinson denied that
his car smelled like marijuana and “refused to allow law enforcement to search.” Id.
3
A second law-enforcement officer (second officer) “arrived and observed that
Robinson was upset and that Robinson repeatedly refused law enforcement requests that
he exit the vehicle.” Id. “While physically removing Robinson from the vehicle, the second
officer ‘hit his hand.’” Id. Robinson told the officers that there was a firearm inside the car.
Id. The officers searched Robinson’s car and “found a loaded handgun in the center console
and a container of a green substance that tested positive for marijuana.” Id. After a Miranda
warning, Robinson stated that he owned the firearm and marijuana. Id.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Robinson with three counts: possession of
a pistol without a permit under Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2020); obstruction of legal
process with force under Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subds. 1(2), 2(2) (2020); and possession of
over 1.4 grams of marijuana in a motor vehicle under Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd. 3
(2020).
Arguing that the search of his car was illegal, Robinson moved to suppress all
evidence discovered in the search. Id. Robinson also moved to dismiss the charges for lack
of probable cause. Id. After a contested omnibus hearing, the district court denied
Robinson’s motions. Id.
In September 2022, the case proceeded to a jury trial. Id. at *2. On the first day of
trial, the state moved to dismiss the marijuana-possession charge. The district court granted
the motion and dismissed the charge. “The jury found Robinson guilty of both [remaining]
counts, and the district court sentenced Robinson to concurrent 365-day sentences.” Id.
4
In his first appeal,1 Robinson challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence and to dismiss the charges, arguing “that police lacked probable cause
to search his vehicle based on the smell of marijuana alone.” Id. In reversing the district
court’s decision, this court recognized that, while Robinson’s appeal was pending, “the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that marijuana odor cannot serve as the sole basis to support
probable cause for a vehicle search.” Id. (citing State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 175
(Minn. 2023)).
This court concluded that, “[b]ecause the odor of marijuana alone could not support
probable cause for law enforcement to search Robinson’s vehicle, the district court erred
in denying Robinson’s motion to suppress and to dismiss on that basis.” Id. at *2-3. This
court concluded, however, that “the district court did not address the merits of Robinson’s
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree claim” and declined to reach the issue “for the first time on
appeal.” Id. This court instructed the district court on remand “to reopen the omnibus
hearing as necessary to make a reasoned decision on the validity of Robinson’s
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree claim.” Id.2

1 In the first appeal, this court explained that, in denying Robinson’s motions, “the district
court determined that there was an objective legal basis for the traffic stop” based on the
first officer’s observation that Robinson was speeding. Robinson I, 2024 WL 222475, at
*2. This court also noted that “[t]here was no evidence and no finding by the district court
that Robinson displayed any signs of driving impairment. Nor was there any evidence or
finding by the district court that law enforcement observed contraband in plain view inside
Robinson’s vehicle.” Id.

2 This court also determined that the state forfeited its alternative argument that the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Id. at *3.
5
On remand, the district court held a review hearing at which it stated it would vacate
the firearm-possession conviction and dismiss that charge.3 The parties agreed that no
additional evidence was necessary for the district court to determine the
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree issue. The parties submitted briefing, and the district court took
the matter under advisement.
In November 2024, the district court issued a written order vacating the judgment
of conviction for possessing a pistol without a permit and dismissing that charge. The
district court also denied Robinson’s motion to suppress evidence of and to dismiss the
obstruction charge. T he district court found that “undisputed video evidence shows that
[Robinson] physically resisted the officers’ efforts to get him out of the car when he refused
and ended up physically striking one of the officers in the process.” The district court
reasoned that, although law enforcement’s order that Robinson “exit the car may have been
unlawful,” it is “well established that Minnesota law does not recognize [a] defendant’s
asserted right to resist an unlawful arrest or search.” The district court modified Robinson’s
sentence for the obstruction conviction to 364 days in jail “with 310 days of that time stayed
for 24 months” and 54 days of credit for time served.
Robinson appeals.

3 At the review hearing, the district court stated that “the court of appeals reversed” the
firearm-possession charge and remanded for the district court “to consider arguments about
whether the second charge, the obstruction charge, falls as well in light of the court of
appeals’ ruling that the search was invalid.” We do not agree with the district court’s view
of Robinson I, which remanded for the district court to consider whether evidence of “the
firearm” and Robinson’s “act in response” to the illegal search should be suppressed. Id. at
*4. The state did not object to vacating the firearm-possession conviction or dismissing the
charge.
6
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. “[W]arrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions applies.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011)
(quotations omitted). The automobile exception provides that “the police may search a car
without a warrant, including closed containers in that car, if there is probable cause to
believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence or contraband.” State v. Lester ,
874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). But the smell of marijuana alone
does not create probable cause to search a car during a traffic stop. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d
at 169-75.
On appeal, Robinson argues that Robinson I concluded that the search of his car was
illegal; therefore, he argues, the obstruction evidence must also be suppressed as fruit of
the poisonous tree under the United States Constitution.4 We recognize that our analysis of
the district court’s decision on remand is governed by our decision in Robinson I. See
Townsend v. State, 3 N.W.3d 13, 16 (Minn. 2024) (“[W]hen a court decides upon a rule of

4 Robinson alternatively argues that this court should suppress evidence of the obstruction
charge “under the protections provided by the Minnesota Constitution.” In his brief to this
court, Robinson offers no argument or legal authority to support his state constitutional
argument. And Robinson did not assert a state constitutional argument during district court
proceedings. Therefore, we decline to consider it. See State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 559
n.6 (Minn. 2017) (declining to reach a constitutional issue raised for the first time on
appeal); State v. Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that
inadequately briefed issues are not properly before an appellate court), rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 5, 1997).
7
law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the
same case.” ( quotations omitted)). In the first appeal, this court concluded that the
warrantless search of Robinson’s car was based solely on the odor of marijuana and that
the automobile exception did not apply in light of Torgerson, which was decided while
Robinson’s first appeal was pending. Robinson I, 2024 WL 222475, at *2-3.
The sole issue before us is whether the exclusionary rule applies to the evidence of
Robinson’s obstruction. Minnesota applies the exclusionary rule, or
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, which provides that, “[g]enerally, evidence seized in
violation of the constitution must be suppressed.” State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163,
177-78 (Minn. 2007); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963)
(establishing the fruit- of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine). The exclusionary rule suppresses
“tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful” search or
seizure. State v. McDonald-Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
Whether the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence is a question of
law that appellate courts review de novo. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn.
2004). The question central to this analysis is “whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88 (quotation omitted).
In making this determination, the Minnesota Supreme Court has directed courts to
weigh four Warndahl factors to determine whether evidence should be suppressed as fruit
of the poisonous tree: (1) “the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct”;
8
(2) “intervening circumstances”; (3) “whether law enforcement would have obtained the
evidence without the illegal conduct”; and (4) “the temporal proximity between the illegal
conduct and allegedly resulting evidence.” State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 161 (Minn.
2020); see State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989) (listing four Warndahl
factors). No caselaw requires all four factors to favor suppression of the evidence, so we
treat this as a balancing test. We address the parties’ arguments on each factor in turn.
A. Purpose and Flagrancy of Police Misconduct
The purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct in conducting the illegal search “is
especially important, because the aim of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct
by removing the incentive to disregard constitutional guarantees.” State v. Bale,
267 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1978). Robinson appears to argue that, because law
enforcement lacked the authority to search his car, to order him out of the car, or to arrest
him, this factor “weighs in favor of suppression.” The state counters that law enforcement’s
search of Robinson’s car based solely on the odor of marijuana was not “flagrant”
misconduct because it “was repeatedly approved by this Court” until the supreme court’s
landmark decision in Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 175.
To begin, apart from the illegal search of his car, Robinson has made no claim of
other misconduct by law enforcement. And Robinson I determined that the search of the
Robinson’s car was illegal because it was based solely on the odor of marijuana. 2024 WL
222475, at *3. It is therefore significant, as recognized in Robinson I, that the search of
Robinson’s car followed the law at the time of Robinson’s traffic stop. Id. at *2-3.
9
The traffic stop occurred on February 24, 2021—two years before the supreme court
issued Torgerson. At that time, this court’s precedential caselaw stated that the odor of
marijuana alone supported probable cause to search a car. State v. Pierce, 347 N.W.2d 829,
833 (Minn. App. 1984) (“It has long been held that the detection of odors alone, which
trained police officers can identify as being illicit, constitutes probable cause to search
automobiles for further evidence of crime.”). And this court recently concluded that, before
Torgerson was issued , “a well-trained law- enforcement officer would have acted in
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent” when conducting a search
based solely on the odor of marijuana. State v. Douglas, 12 N.W.3d 751, 754, 758-62
(Minn. App. 2024) (listing court of appeals opinions relying on Pierce’s holdi ng),
rev. granted (Minn. Dec. 17, 2024). Because this court’s caselaw permitted the search of
Robinson’s car at the time of the traffic stop, we conclude that the officers were not
flagrantly disregarding constitutional guarantees when they searched Robinson’s car. See
Bale, 267 N.W.2d at 733. Thus, this factor weighs against suppressing the evidence of
obstruction.
B. Intervening Criminal Act by Robinson
Minnesota caselaw has long held that the commission of a new crime by a defendant
purges the taint of a pr ior unlawful search or seizure. See City of St. Louis Park v. Berg ,
433 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn. 1988) (“This court has rejected the contention that evidence of
a defendant’s resistance to an illegal arrest must be suppressed as forbidden fruit of a Fourth
Amendment violation by the police.”); State v. Wick, 331 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn. 1983)
(“Minnesota law does not recognize [a] defendant’s asserted right t o resist an unlawful
10
arrest or search .”); State v. Engel, 18 N.W.3d 540, 550 (Minn. App. 2025) (describing
caselaw on intervening circumstances), rev. granted (Minn. June 17, 2025).
Robinson argues that the evidence supporting his obstruction conviction was “not
intervening circumstances that precluded exclusion of the evidence” because he “was not
resisting arrest or trying to flee” and “was not charged with or convicted of assaulting an
officer.”5 The state counters that Robinson’s “act of physically resisting and
pushing/hitting [an officer] was an intervening act that removes the taint from the illegal
act” and that “Minnesota case law is firm on the subject: defendants cannot resort to
self-help in the face of an unlawful search or arrest.”
The record supports the state’s view of Robinson’s conduct as an intervening
criminal act. First, the jury found that Robinson was guilty of the “act of obstructing legal
process or interfering with a peace officer” and used “force or violence or a threat of force
or violence.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subds. 1(2), 2(2). Second, on remand, the district
court determined that “the obstruction charge was not based on Robinson simply declining
the officers’ demand that he exit the car.” Based on the squad video, the district court found
that Robinson “physically resisted the officers’ efforts to get him out of the car when he
refused and ended up physically striking one of the officers in the process.”

5 Robinson also argues that caselaw on this issue “did not prevent Robinson from acting in
accordance with Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(4) (2020).” Under section 609.06,
subdivision 1(4), “any person in lawful possession of real or personal property” may use
“reasonable force” upon another person “in resisting a trespass upon or other unlawful
interference with such property.” Robinson did not make this argument in district court.
Thus, we decline to consider it on appeal. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn.
1996) (stating that appellate courts generally will not consider matters not argued to and
considered by the district court).
11
Berg informs our analysis of this factor. In Berg, law enforcement tried to serve an
arrest warrant on Berg at his parents’ house. Id. at 88. When Berg ran from the kitchen
toward a rear bedroom, two officers broke down the back door and chased Berg inside the
house to effect the arrest. Id. Berg was charged with one count of obstruction of legal
process and two counts of assault “for resisting and assaulting two police officers when
they tried to arrest him.” Id. at 87. After an omnibus hearing, the district court found that
the officers beat Berg “repeatedly on the head with a flashlight or nightstick” during the
arrest. Id. at 88. The district court concluded that “the actions of the police were illegal and
unconstitutional in two respects, namely, ‘forceable entry and gratuitous violence used
against [Berg],’ and that, consequently, the testimony of the police describing [Berg’s]
resistance would be suppressed.” Id. at 89.
The supreme court reversed and remanded for trial, concluding that evidence of
Berg resisting arrest could not be suppressed as fruit of the unlawful police entry. Id. at
89-92. In analyzing whether to apply the exclusionary rule to Berg’s intervening acts, the
supreme court focused on “whether the state is seeking to exploit the illegality of its agents
to gain some advantage.” Id. at 90. The supreme court determined that there was “no
exploitation” for two reasons: (1) “t he arrest did not lead to seizure of other evidence
relating to the offense for which [Berg was] arrested or for some other offense,” and (2) the
officers were not “deliberately provoking [Berg] into committing a new crime of resisting
arrest.” Id.
Like Berg, Robinson physically resisted illegal police conduct. But unlike the state
in Berg, the state here exploited the search of Robinson’s car to obtain incriminating
12
evidence—the pistol and marijuana. The state sought to use this evidence to prove the
marijuana-possession and firearm-possession charges, even though those charges were
ultimately dismissed.
Still, Robinson’s obstructive behavior arose after officers asked him to exit the car
and the search began. Cf. Engel, 18 N.W.3d at 551 (“Evidence that exists at the time of the
illegal seizure is generally fruit of the poisonous tree because there have been no
intervening acts of the defendant’s free will.” (emphasis added)). And law enforcement did
not provoke Robinson “into committing a new crime of” obstruction. Berg, 433 N.W.2d at
90.
The record shows that Robinson had many opportunities to comply with law
enforcement. Officers asked Robinson to exit the car for nearly 13 minutes. During the
stop, the second officer stated: “You’re forcing our hand to force you out of this car. I don’t
want to do that, that’s the last thing I want to do today.” The second officer then asked: “Is
there anything I can say or do to get you to voluntarily comply with what I’m asking you
to do?” Throughout the 13 minutes, Robinson refused to exit the car. When Robinson
struck the second officer’s hand—in an intervening act of his own free will— he crossed
the line and committed the new crime of obstruction. Thus, this factor weighs heavily
against suppression.
C. Whether Police Would Have Obtained the Evidence Without Illegal
Conduct

Robinson argues that it is “not likely that the evidence [of obstruction] would have
been obtained in the absence of the officers’ illegality.” He maintains that, “[i]f the police
13
had not expanded the scope of the traffic stop based on the smell of marijuana alone, the
obstruction would not have occurred.” The state concedes this point but argues that it does
not resolve the suppression issue. The state argues that the “‘but for’ causation of this factor
has not prevented” the admission of a defendant’s physical resistance in similar
circumstances.
We conclude that whether law enforcement would have obtained the evidence
proving Robinson’s obstruction without conducting an illegal search is one factor and not
dispositive. See Berg , 433 N.W.2d at 90 (“[T]he real basis for not extending the
exclusionary rule . . . is not a causation rationale, not a question of whether the defendant’s
resistance and the police officers’ unlawful conduct are inextricably interwoven, but
whether the state is seeking to exploit the illegality of its agents to gain some advantage.”
(quotation omitted)). But if law enforcement had not asked Robinson to exit the car so they
could perform an illegal search, Robinson likely would not have physically resisted a peace
officer. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of suppression.
D. Temporal Proximity Between the Illegal Search and the Evidence of
Obstruction

Finally, Robinson argues that the “causal chain between illegality and the evidence
supporting the obstruction charge is not so attenuated that it would not serve the purpose
of the exclusionary rule to exclude the evidence.” Robinson emphasizes that he “reacted
spontaneously within seconds after [the officer] reached inside the vehicle’s window.” The
state acknowledges temporal proximity between the illegal search and Robinson’s
obstruction of legal process, but counters that “[a]ll of the cases where the defendants
14
committed an unlawful act in response to a perceived unlawful police conduct were close
in time and interconnected with the police conduct.”
The record establishes temporal proximity between the illegal search of Robinson’s
car and evidence of his obstruction of legal process. Shortly after smelling marijuana, law
enforcement asked Robinson to exit the car for a vehicle search. About 12 minutes later,
after repeatedly asking Robinson to exit the car, the officer put his hand inside the
driver’s-side car window. Robinson immediately struck the officer’s hand. This is a brief
window of time between the illegal search and the resulting evidence of obstruction. See
Leonard, 943 N.W.2d at 162 (concluding that a two-hour gap between an illegal search
and the discovery of resulting evidence favored suppression); cf. Berg, 433 N.W.2d at 88
(reversing suppression order and noting that Berg allegedly obstructed and assaulted police
officers immediately after they illegally entered his parents’ home). This factor favors
suppression.
Evaluating all four Warndahl factors, we conclude that two favor denying
Robinson’s motion to suppress and two favor granting the motion to suppress. But this is
not a mathematical decision; we balance the four factors. We acknowledge that law
enforcement likely would not have obtained evidence of obstruction without the illegal
search of Robinson’s car and that the search was close in time to the resulting evidence.
Caselaw and our review of the record shows, however, that the police did not engage in
flagrant misconduct because Minnesota appellate case law at the time of the traffic stop
supported law enforcement’s search of Robinson’s car. And, most importantly, Robinson’s
decision to strike a police officer was an intervening criminal act of free will that purged
15
“the subsequent conduct from the taint of the unlawful seizure.” Engel, 18 N.W.3d at 550.
These last two factors weigh heavily in favor of denying the application of the exclusionary
rule here. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Robinson’s motion to suppress
evidence of and to dismiss the obstruction charge.
Affirmed.