In Re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0215

In Re the Marriage of:

Douglas Paul Sundberg, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Morgan Alexandria Sundberg,
Respondent.

Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-22-710

Victoria M.B. Taylor, Shawn C. Reinke, Reinke Taylor, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Jennifer J. Grembowski, Rogness & Field, P.A., Oakdale, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In this marital-dissolution appeal, appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by (1) restricting his parenting time, (2) awarding respondent sole legal and sole
physical custody of their minor child, and (3) ordering him to complete domestic-violence
2
counseling. Because the district court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and
because we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Douglas Paul Sundberg (father) and respondent Morgan Alexandria
Sundberg (mother) were married in February 2017 and share one minor child, M.J.S.
Father also has one non-joint minor child, S.L.S., who lived with him full-time and visited
her biological mother every other weekend. Father co-parents M.J.S. and S.L.S. with
mother.
Father served four years in the United States Army from 1998 to 2002. While on
duty, father was struck by a drunk driver and broke his leg and hip; he was subsequently
put on medical leave and could not walk for nine months. Father testified that this incident
was the start of his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After he was discharged from
the Army, father worked in construction and beer distribution and, during this time, “drank
a lot.” Father later joined law enforcement as a road deputy and retired approximately
three years later because he was struggling at work and experienced sleeping difficulties.
Father explained that he had sleeping problems where he would wake up in different parts
of the house, covered in sweat, feeling scared, and hyperventilating. According to mother,
father “was beating her up in h[is] sleep,” but father had no recollection of doing it.
Father testified that medical marijuana helped his sleeping problems. He stated, “I
[smoke marijuana] so I can sleep, because otherwise I’m up all night, every night.” He
added that he smokes “mostly after the kids are in bed.” Father was allegedly prescribed
marijuana in pill form, but mother testified that he also used “street marijuana” he obtained
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from family friends. She described that when he used marijuana at night, he slept in the
morning while she got the kids up and ready for school. Mother testified that he had “big
bottles” of marijuana pills and that he “would take six up to umpteen times, four times a
day.” If he ran out, he called the Veterans Administration (VA) to get more. Mother
explained that “he was using them past the point of being high, you know, too high and
beyond.”
Father enrolled in treatment programs through the VA to address his PTSD and
substance abuse. Since then, father has been diagnosed with PTSD, major depressive
episodes, anxiety, and severe cannabis use disorder. Father’s sleeping problems are still
an ongoing issue, and he continues to work with his therapist and the VA.
Dissolution Proceedings
In May 2022, the parties filed a joint petition for dissolution of marriage. Two
months later, mother filed another petition for dissolution because of changed
circumstances surrounding the parties’ previously-agreed upon custody arrangement and
parenting-time schedule.
In August 2022, mother requested the district court to grant her sole legal and sole
physical custody of M.J.S. In her affidavit, mother expressed concern over M.J.S.’s safety
while in father’s care because of his “long history of mental health and chemical
dependency issues that . . . recently and significantly materaliz[ed] in harmful ways.”
About a year after they met, she described father as “more unpredictable and volatile as a
person,” resorting to “high conflict, which included significant blame, manipulation, anger,
outbursts, power, and control.” She also described his suicidal ideation, significant
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memory issues, addictions with gambling, alcohol, and marijuana, and being diagnosed
with PTSD. Father’s behavioral issues, according to mother, spilled into the dissolution
proceedings. For example, when S.L.S. asked father why mother left, he replied, “She
threw us out like garbage.”
The district court granted mother sole physical custody and maintained temporary
joint legal custody between the parties. The district court concluded that it was not in
M.J.S.’s best interests for the parents to have equal parenting time or for father’s parenting
time to be unsupervised. Additionally, the district court stated that it “would like to see
[father] be a more cooperative and dependable co-parent.” It ordered father to complete a
psychological evaluation within 30 days and to follow all recommendations from the
evaluation. Father completed the evaluation in January 2023 but did not list mother as a
collateral contact.
In January 2023, father underwent a psychological evaluation with his individual
therapist at the VA. Father had a second psychological evaluation with a different therapist
from the VA in March 2023. This therapist highlighted her concern relating to fa ther’s
“pattern of physically and verbally aggressive behavior.” The therapist recommended that
father begin an intensive outpatient treatment program as it related to depression and
trauma-related disorders. Father was specifically encouraged to participate in dialectical
behavioral therapy (DBT), which included weekly group and individual sessions.
However, father did not begin DBT programming until May 2024.

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Neutral Custody Evaluation Report
In February 2023, the parties stipulated to appointing a neutral custody and
parenting time evaluator. The initial evaluation was completed in July 2023. The custody
evaluator interviewed mother, father, M.J.S., and S.L.S., and spoke with mother’s and
father’s individual therapists as well as staff from M.J.S.’s daycare. One of the daycare
providers explained that M.J.S. “had been exhibiting more aggressive behaviors towards
other children for the past two months.” The daycare provider also spoke of father
“removing [M.J.S.] from class and spending time with [him] in another part of the church,”
which was not typical at the daycare.
Mother told the evaluator that father’s symptoms of mental -health issues and
chemical dependency limited his ability to effectively parent M.J.S. The evaluator found
this was supported because M.J.S. attended all-day daycare despite father being
unemployed. The evaluator found that mother was M.J.S.’s primary parent, and her
“organization skills and task-oriented temperament” aided M.J.S.’s developmental, social,
and emotional needs. Father told the evaluator that “someone just needs to give [him] a
chance” to effectively parent M.J.S., but the evaluator found that he had “opportunities to
show a capacity for effective care through medical appointments and contact with
daycare,” but he has not taken advantage of those opportunities.
After discussing the statutory best-interest factors under Minnesota Statutes section
518.17, subdivision 1(a) (2024), the evaluator recommended that mother have sole legal
custody of M.J.S. and that the parties share joint physical custody of M.J.S. The evaluator
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did not recommend changing the parties’ parenting time as reflected in the district court’s
temporary order because of concerns with father’s mental health and chemical health.
Trial
The district court held the dissolution trial on March 19 and April 11, 2024. Trial
continued on August 21, 2024. Because of the significant lapse between the initial custody
evaluation report in July 2023 and the continuation of trial in August 2024, the district
court ordered another custody evaluation. The updated custody evaluation recommended
that mother have sole legal custody of M.J.S. and that both parties share physical custody.
The evaluator also recommended that father participate in DBT.
The district court heard testimony from mother, father, the custody evaluator, and
the director of M.J.S.’s daycare during the time of the incidents.
According to father, M.J.S. has been described as a “wild child.” Father testified
that M.J.S. wanted to be “rough and tough” and stated that he was getting into trouble at
school. At a parent-teacher conference, father learned that M.J.S. was unable to sit still,
distracted other students, and that he was “doing the class clown thing.” In a separate
conversation with M.J.S., father learned that M.J.S. “got in trouble at school for tackling
another boy.” One of M.J.S.’s schoolteachers believed it was AD HD and suggested that
he get tested for it. M.J.S. also struggled with sleep. Mother testified that he suffers from
night terrors, fears sleeping by himself, and that his sleep is “very dysregulated.” Because
of this, M.J.S. met with a sleep psychologist and completed a sleep consultation. Mother
stated that she and father disagree about son’s ADHD care, and that she does not believe
father has the ability to meet the child’s medical needs.
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At trial, mother testified to multiple instances of abuse from father. In October
2022, for example, father visited mother and M.J.S. at mother’s house. Mother explained
that father pulled up to her driveway and pulled out a long rifle from his trunk. Father held
up the rifle and pointed it down the street as if he were “checking the sights” before handing
the rifle to M.J.S. Mother testified that she be lieved she was going to die and that M.J.S.
was going to witness it. While father did not threaten her directly, mother was fearful
because of the history between the two of them. When asked what made her fearful, she
stated, “I mean, it’s our whole history. It’s our whole life. It’s this, like, escalating
behavior, and it starts with one thing, and it ends so differently.” She added, “T here has
just been so much unpredictability, so much instability, and his substance use that I had
learned about in 2022. I mean, it was so many things that made me think that this was it,
and I knew that [father] was mad.”
Mother described another incident that occurred at a supervised parenting time
exchange at father’s house in April 2023. In that instance, mother knocked on the door
and the parenting time supervisor opened the door. Mother was talking to the supervisor
while M.J.S. tied his shoes and S.L.S. was “just a couple steps behind,” when father
charged out of his bathroom and yelled at mother, “Get the f--k out of my house, you’re
not f--king welcome here.” After he went outside, the supervisor eventually yelled at father
to go back in the house. Mother was not sure what she did or how to stop it and described
this incident as “just so fast and scary.”
And in November 2019, while mother was sitting on the couch drinking hot coffee,
father threw a pillow at her coffee mug, causing the hot coffee to spill all over her. Mother
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testified, “I couldn’t believe my life, that this is where it was at. This was real, and part of
me thought he might really kill me someday. And if I leave my kid behind, kids, I need
someone to know my story.” Mother also testified that father kicked her dog on many
occasions and that he talked about “punting her.” Mother stated that “father would get
very mad if the dog would go to the edge of the yard or not listen” and that it was her fault
that she had a “sh-t dog.”
As it relates to taking care of M.J.S. and S.L.S., mother testified that “[t]hroughout
the whole marriage, [she] was getting both [M.J.S.] and [S.L.S.] to daycare and school.”
She explained that father slept in and had difficulty waking up; and when she and father
separated, he had a hard time getting S.L.S. to school or even getting her to the bus. She
added that father’s chemical use exacerbated these problems.
In December 2024, the district court entered its dissolution judgment and decree. In
applying the 12 best-interest factors, the district court found that ten weighed in favor of
granting mother sole legal and sole physical custody of M.J.S., and only two were neutral.
The court also found, in relevant part, that domestic abuse occurred between the parties ,
often in the presence of M.J.S., that father’s excessive cannabis use impacted his ability to
effectively parent M.J.S., that father had mental health issues that needed to be treated, and
that father was unable to meet M.J.S.’s emotional and developmental needs.
In limiting father’s parenting time, the district court granted him unsupervised
parenting time only during daytime hours, and to move to a “graduated schedule of
increased duration.” The district court provided a three-stage process for determining a
parenting schedule, with each stage lasting six months. If father successfully completed
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one year of DBT programming, adhered to the parenting schedule under all three phases,
abstained from mood- altering substances, and adhered to a drug-testing protocol, then
father could ask the district court to reconsider the parenting time to include overnights.
The district court also ordered father to enroll in domestic-abuse counseling.
Father appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting father’s parenting
time.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting him zero
percent parenting time with M.J.S. instead of a “graduating” schedule.
The district court has broad discretion in deciding parenting-time questions and will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75
(Minn. App. 2017). A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that
are unsupported by the record, misapplying the law, or resolving the question in a way
contrary to logic and the facts on record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn.
2022). A district court’s findings of fact underlying its parenting-time determination are
reviewed for clear error. Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009). We view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings and refrain from finding new facts,
reweighing facts, and reconciling conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 -22 (Minn. 2021). We additionally defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
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“In the absence of other evidence, there is a rebuttable presumption that a child must
receive a minimum of 25 percent of the parenting time with each parent.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 1(g) (2024); Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 690-91 (Minn. App.
2015), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015). Parenting-time awards below the 25-percent
threshold “can be justified by reasons related to the child’s best interests and considerations
of what is feasible given the circumstances of the parties.” Hagen v. Schirmers, 783
N.W.2d 212, 218 (Minn. App. 2010).
The parenting time statute also states:
If the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time with a
parent is likely to endanger the child’s physical, mental, or
emotional health or safety or impair the child’s emotional
development, the court shall restrict parenting time with that
parent as to time, place, duration, or supervision and may deny
parenting time entirely, as the circumstances warrant, and may
deny parenting time entirely.

Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(b) (2024).

This court has stated there is no statutory definition of what constitutes a
“restriction” of parenting time. Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 336 (Minn. App. 2014).
In Dahl v. Dahl , 765 N.W.2d 118, 124 (Minn. App. 2009), we held that “To determine
whether a reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification, the court
should consider the reasons for the changes as well as the amount of the reduction.” In
Suleski, we held that if a case involves a restriction, that restriction must arise solely from
the amount-of-the-reduction prong of the analysis, rather than the reason-for-the -change
prong, or from a combination of the two prongs. 855 N.W.2d at 336. Thus, Suleski
suggests that a restriction of parenting time is not just a limitation of parenting time, but
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limitation of parenting time that (a) arises from a parent’s willingness or ability to care for
a child, or (b) is otherwise disproportionate in amount given the other circumstances of the
case, or (c) a combination of the two. Alternatively stated, the reason a particular amount
of parenting time is awarded is critical to determining whether the parenting schedule is
restricted. Parenting-time awards below the 25-percent threshold “can be justified by
reasons related to the child’s best interests and considerations of what is feasible given the
circumstances of the parties.” Hagen, 783 N.W.2d at 218.
Here, the district court determined that the presumption favoring joint legal custody
was rebutted. As part of its analysis, the district court made detailed findings on each of
the statutory best-interest factors. It concluded that it was in M.J.S.’s best interests for
father to have unsupervised parenting time, but that it was not in M.J.S.’s best interests to
award father overnight parenting time. Particularly concerning to the district court was
father’s inability to care for M.J.S. overnight because father “ha[d] shown an inability to
meet [M.J.S.]’s needs in a consistent manner.”
Father contends that the record does not support the district courts determination to
limit his parenting time because there was no direct evidence that his cannabis use was an
issue and that the district court relied on his disability in awarding mother custody. 1 Each
will be addressed in turn.

1 Father frames this argument by noting that the record does not support the determination
that mother rebutted the parenting time presumption.
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A. Cannabis Use
The district court was concerned with father’s “practical ability” to parent M.J.S.
while in his care because of his cannabis use. While father claims there was no direct
evidence suggesting his cannabis use was an issue—aside from mother’s testimony—that
assertion is simply not true.
Father completed a psychological evaluation in January 2023, which revealed a
severe cannabis-use disorder that, according to the district court, impacted his ability to
parent M.J.S. The psychological evaluation focused on father’s “core issues” that were
responsible for the majority of his problems. One core issue in particular was father’s
“intermittently negative reinforcement cycle of avoiding his emotions . . . as well as
cognitive rumination.” The evaluator explained that father’s “avoidance” works in the
short term because “he gets to feel good when using cannabis and avoids uncomfortable
thoughts and feelings.” However, cannabis use is not a long-term solution because it
“prolong[s] the presence of those symptoms.” Notably, the updated custody evaluation
report did not recommend overnight visits because of father’s “continued use of medical
and recreational marijuana.” Despite evidence of his severe cannabis-use diagnosis and
that cannabis negatively reinforces his emotional avoidance problems, father appeared
reluctant to abstain from cannabis. And even if he abstained from cannabis, father refused
to submit to random drug testing to ensure his sobriety while caring for M.J.S.
The district court found that although father does not recognize cannabis use as a
problem, it nevertheless impairs father’s ability to “effectively parent [M.J.S.] at his current
young age on overnights if [father] is unable to get up in the morning to care for [him].”
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The district court found that this “endanger[ed] [M.J.S.] if left in the exclusive care of
[father] overnight.” The custody evaluator noted in his report that he “remain[ed]
concerned with [father’s] marijuana use,” stating that, “While this is prescribed treatment
and recreational use is legal, there is currently no means to verify sobriety during parenting
time.”
Mother testified that father’s cannabis use impacts his ability to provide safe care
for M.J.S. When father used cannabis, she described that he “wasn’t available at night,
because he was high.” And in the morning, father was “hungover, like, coming off of the
drug” and could not hear his alarms. On the other hand, if father did not use cannabis, he
would be up “almost all of the night, until 4:30 or 5:00 in the morning.” This presents a
concerning dilemma considering M.J.S. wakes up around 5:00 or 6:00 in the morning: if
father does not use cannabis at night, he is awake all night until 5:00 in the morning when
M.J.S. wakes up, but if he does use cannabis at night, then he sleeps through his alarms.
Father testified that he often stayed up until 5:00 in the morning whenever S.L.S. was in
his care and that he never had a problem getting her up for school. However, the record
supports the district court’s finding that S.L.S. had seven unverified absences from school
from times when S.L.S. was in fathers care.
There is substantial evidence in the record that supports the district court’s findings
that father’s cannabis use was problematic and impeded his ability to effectively parent
M.J.S.

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B. Mental-Health Disability
Father next argues that the district court limited his parenting time and custody
based on solely his disability and without any finding as to how it endangered M.J.S. He
cites to Schumm v. Schumm, 510 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. App. 1993), to argue that the
district court needed to “identify a cause and effect on the child as a result of a parent’s
disability.” Father’s assertion overlooks the district court’s other findings that father had
shown “an inability to meet [M.J.S.’s] needs in a consistent manner” and had “chemical
dependency issues” impacting his ability to care for M.J.S.
The district court found there was extensive testimony and evidence regarding
father’s history of mental- and chemical-health problems. The district court stated that
there was no evidence that father followed through with the recommendations from the
first psychological evaluation, and that he was reluctant to follow recommendations from
the other evaluations. And although father acknowledged his mental-health issues, the
district court found that he “delayed getting evaluations, providing reports, and starting
services.”
In July 2023, for example, the custody evaluator recommended that father
participate in a DBT group program for mental-health services. Despite this
recommendation, father did not follow through with DBT because he was concerned about
how effective the group would be if they learned he was a former police officer. The
custody evaluator discussed father’s concerns with his individual therapist, who believed
father’s concerns were not valid. And although father eventually began DBT
15
programming, that did not occur until well into dissolution proceedings in May 2024. And
in addressing father’s mental-health concerns, the custody evaluator also wrote:
While mental health struggles do not prevent effective
parenting, this evaluator is concerned with not only the amount
of services [father] has received with minimal positive impact,
but that [father] is also resistant to the recommendation of
reduced individual insight-oriented therapy and participation
in an adherent DBT skills group.

. . . .

Research shows that [father] will likely struggle with effective
parenting and that [M.J.S.] is at higher risk for difficulties at
school, as well as an increased likelihood for depression,
anxiety, and relationships later in life.

Other examples in the record show father did not follow through with treatment
recommendations. For example, when father entered treatment at the VA for his cannabis
use, mother testified that his attendance was not consistent and that he did not complete the
treatment program. And in his January 2023 psychological evaluation, father was
encouraged to complete “image reversal therapy” to work on his weekly nightmares and
“course of behavior therapy” for his sleeping problems. But father conceded at trial that
he presented no evidence that he ever followed through on those recommendations.
The district court was also concerned about father’s ability to parent M.J.S.
overnight because he showed “an inability to meet [M.J.S.’s] needs in a consistent
manner.” The custody evaluator reported in July 2023 that mother was the primary
caretaker for M.J.S. and kept father informed on medical appointments. However, the
custody evaluator noted that father “will most often not attend [these appointments], and
when he does attend, [father] will reportedly show up late.”
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To convince us otherwise, father argues that the district court “consistently adopted
[mother’s] speculative narrative and conclusions.” He adds that the court “ignored” his
testimony as it related to his medical history and care, as well as his psychological
evaluations. Father appears to ask us to reconsider or reweigh the evidence. However, we
defer to the district court’s credibility determinations and refrain from finding new facts,
reweighing facts, and reconciling conflicting evidence. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210;
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22 (quotations omitted).
The district court’s findings are supported by the record evidence, and its parenting-
time determination was not an abuse of discretion. The district court provided a detailed
analysis of the statutory best-interest factors that justified parenting time below the 25
percent presumption, and it allowed father to request that parenting time be changed upon
successful completion of the recommended treatment programs. See Hagen, 783 N.W.2d
at 218.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding wife sole legal and
sole physical custody.

The district court’s award to mother of sole legal custody and sole physical custody
is based, in part, on its ruling that father abused mother, and that this abuse is a sufficient
basis to rebut the presumption favoring joint legal custody. Father challenges the district
court’s ruling that he committed domestic abuse against mother. In custody disputes, the
best interests of the child is the “guiding principle” and serves as the court’s “paramount
commitment.” Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn. 2019) (quotations
omitted). In determining the best interests of the child, the district court “must make
17
detailed findings” on the 12 statutory best-interest factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b)(1). One of these factors is “whether domestic abuse . . . has occurred in the
parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship.” Id., subd. 1(a)(4). Minnesota
Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1(b)(9) (2024), provides, in relevant part:
The court shall use a rebuttable presumption that upon request
of either or both parties, joint legal custody is in the best
interests of the child. However, the court shall use a rebuttable
presumption that joint legal custody or joint physical custody
is not in the best interests of the child if domestic abuse, as
defined in section 518B.01, has occurred between the parents.
In determining whether the presumption is rebutted, the court
shall consider the nature and context of the domestic abuse and
the implications of the domestic abuse for parenting and for the
child's safety, well- being, and developmental needs.
(Emphasis added.).

The second sentence of subdivision 1(b)(9) thus rebuttably presumes that neither
joint legal, nor joint physical, custody is in the child’s best interests where domestic abuse
occurs between the parents. See Thornton, 933 N.W.2d at 791. “The presumption focuses
on the child’s needs and a custodial arrangement that is beneficial to the child, and not on
particular caregivers.” Id.
Under section 518B.01, subdivision 2(a) (2024), “domestic abuse” includes, in
relevant part, “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” or “the infliction of fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” if committed against a family or
household member of a family. “Domestic abuse” requires “either a showing of present
harm or an intention on the part of the actor to do present harm.” Aljubailah v. James, 903
N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. App. 2017).
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The district court found that mother credibly testified about father exhibiting a
“pattern of physical intimidation and verbal aggression towards her to exert power and
control over her.” The district court cited several instances of alleged domestic assault,
including father verbally mocking mother; throwing a pillow at mother causing her to spill
hot coffee over herself; stating to mother that she gave him “every cause in the world to be
violent”; physically abusing her dog; pulling a rifle from his trunk to show the minor child;
yelling at mother to “get the f--k out of his house” during a parenting time exchange in
front of the parenting time supervisor and S.L.S.; telling the therapist during the custody
evaluation that mother is the “kind of lady that gets the sh-t beat out of her”; and other
instances of verbal abuse. In one instance, the district court found that a “verbal
confrontation” resulted in M.J.S. “placing himself between the parties in order to try to
diffuse the situation and protect [mother] from [father’s] aggression.”
Here, the record supports the district court’s finding of domestic abuse because
father assaulted mother when he threw the pillow at her and caused the hot coffee to spill
over herself. Notably, a district court need only find one instance of domestic abuse. See
Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Minn. App. 2004) (affirming district court’s
single finding of domestic abuse). However, the district court’s findings of verbal
mocking, yelling profanities at mother, and grabbing the rifle from his trunk to show M.J.S.
do not amount to domestic abuse.
Father argues that, even assuming he engaged in domestic abuse against mother, the
district court erred in not articulating how such abuse impacted M.J.S. The record directly
undermines this argument. In analyzing the domestic -abuse best-interests factor, the
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district court expressed concern with M.J.S. “beginning to insert himself in altercations
between the parties to attempt to diffuse the situation.” This finding is also supported by
the evidence in the record. Mother arrived at a McDonald’s for a parenting-time exchange
and said to M.J.S., “ [T]ell your friends thank you.” Mother testified that father
“immediately lynched into me, and said, they’re not [your] friends. They have names.
You’re being disrespectful.” Mother told him to stop and, at some point, M.J.S. stood
between mother and father and said to father, “[Y]eah, mom is right, just stop.” The district
court did not clearly err.
Father lastly argues that the district court failed to make independent findings in a
“fair and neutral view of the evidence presented.” He adds that the court failed to consider
how the “circumstances of what was occurring and how [mother] had been alienating
[M.J.S.] from [him].” His argument is unavailing. The district court heard father’s
testimony and found him not credible. It found that his testimony was, at times, “self-
serving and contradictory,” and not credible considering the evidence presented. Simply
put, father disagrees with the district court’s credibility determinations and how it weighed
the evidence. But it is not our role to reweigh the evidence, find new facts, or make
credibility determinations. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22.
In sum, the record evidence supports the district court’s findings of fact.
Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in making those findings. Further, given
those findings, the district court’s custody award is contrary to neither logic nor the facts
found by the district court. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
mother sole legal and sole physical custody of the child. See Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506
20
(stating that a district court abuses its discretion if it mak es findings of fact that are
unsupported by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the question in a manner
contrary to logic and the facts).
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring father to complete
domestic-violence counseling.

A district court’s decision to order an abusing party to participate in a domestic-
abuse program is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(7)
(2024); Mechtel v. Mechtel, 528 N.W.2d 916, 920 (Minn. App. 1995) (“The Domestic
Abuse Act provides that the granting of relief is within the district court’s discretion.”);
Hall v. Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating section 518B.01,
subdivision 6(a) “specifically permits . . . ordering the abusing party to participate in
treatment or counseling services”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 1987).
To begin, Minnesota Statutes section 518B.01, subdivision 3 (2024), states that
“[a]n application for relief under this section may be filed in the court having jurisdiction
over dissolution actions . . . or in the county in which the alleged domestic abuse occurred.”
Subdivision 6(a)(7) provides that one form of relief is “order[ing] the abusing party to
participate in treatment or counseling services.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(7).
Notably, subdivision 6(a)(7) does not limit its relief to orders for protection.
Father argues that the district court erred by ordering him to complete domestic-
abuse counseling because its finding of domestic abuse was unsupported by the evidence.
But as discussed above, the record supports the district court’s findings of domestic abuse.
21
Accordingly, the district court’s order requiring father to complete domestic-abuse
counseling was not an abuse of discretion.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it restricted father’s
parenting time because there was evidence supporting its conclusion that father was unable
to meet the child’s needs in a consistent manner. In addition, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by finding that father domestically abused mother. Therefore, mother
rebutted the presumption favoring joint legal custody. Finally, the district court’s order
requiring father to complete domestic-violence counseling was not an abuse of discretion
because, as previously stated, there was evidence of father domestically abusing mother.
Affirmed.