State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0238

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Lynn Bethel,
Appellant.

Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-23-790

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dawn R. Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Sherburne County jury found Michael Lynn Bethel guilty of criminal sexual
conduct based on evidence that he sexually abused a grandchild of his wife when the
grandchild was between the ages of eight and sixteen. We conclude that the district court
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did not err by admitting evidence that Bethel previously had engaged in similar conduct
toward another girl. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2022, sixteen-year -old S.R. told a teacher that Bethel, who was
married to her grandmother, had repeatedly sexually abused her since she was eight years
old. The teacher notified S.R.’s parents, who spoke with S.R.’s grandmother and then
reported the matter to law enforcement, which conducted an investigation.
In June 2023, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Bethel with five counts
of criminal sexual conduct: one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2012); three counts of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct, in violation of Minn Stat. § 609.343 subds. 1(g) (201 8), 1(g) (2016), 1(h)(iii)
(2012); and one count of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn Stat.
§ 609.345, subd. 1a(f) (Supp. 2021). The state later amended the first-degree charge to
instead allege second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn Stat. § 609.343,
subd. 1(a) (2012).
In July 2023, the state gave notice of its intent to offer evidence that Bethel had
engaged in similar conduct on other occasions in the past. Specifically, the state sought to
introduce evidence that (1) in 1988, Bethel had engaged in criminal sexual conduct against
his daughters, who then were six and eight years old; (2) between 1994 and 1995, Bethel
had engaged in criminal sexual conduct against his then-girlfriend’s two daughters, who
then were six or seven years old; and (3) between 2010 and 2012, Bethel had engaged in
an uncharged act of criminal sexual conduct against S.R. when she was five years old.
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In April 2024, Bethel filed a motion in limine to exclude the state’s other-acts
evidence, also known as Spreigl evidence. See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn.
1965). Each party filed a memorandum of law. The state’s proffer was contained in its
memorandum, which summarized police reports and plea-hearing transcripts related to the
first and second categories of evidence described above and summarized S.R.’s anticipated
testimony related to the third category. The district court held a pre -trial conference in
May 2024 at which the parties presented arguments on the Spreigl issue, and the district
court took the matter under advisement.
In June 2024, approximately ten days before trial, the district court filed an order in
which it ruled that some of the state’s proffered Spreigl evidence is admissible and some
is not. Specifically, the district court ruled that the state could introduce evidence
concerning Bethel’s conduct toward his then-girlfriend’s two daughters in 1994 and 1995
(the second category of noticed Spreigl evidence described above) but that the state could
not introduce evidence concerning Bethel ’s conduct toward his daughters in 1988 or his
conduct toward S.R. between 2010 and 2012 (the first and third categories of evidence
described above).
The case was tried to a jury on three days. The state’s first witness was S.R., who
testified as follows. Bethel sexually abused her numerous times when she was between
the ages of eight and sixteen when she visited the home that Bethel shared with her
grandmother. Bethel often required her to accompany him on trips to the grocery store
under the pretext that he needed her help bagging groceries , but he parked his vehicle and
then rubbed S.R.’s vagina with his hand, under her clothing. Bethel took photographs of
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her vagina with his cellphone on some of those occasions. When she was eight years old
and playing videogames in the basement, Bethel placed her on his lap and rubbed her
vagina with his hand, under her clothing. When she was approximately 13 years old, Bethel
placed her hand on his groin area for approximately 30 seconds. When she was 14 years
old, Bethel touched her buttocks over her clothing while she was playing pool. When she
was 16 years old, Bethel squeezed her breasts over her clothing while she was looking at
social media on her cellphone.
The state introduced its Spreigl evidence through the testimony of one of his former
girlfriend’s two daughters, A.M.V., who testified as follows. A.M.V., her siblings, and her
mother previously lived with Bethel because A.M.V.’s mother and Bethel were in a
relationship. In 1995, when A.M.V. was six years old, Bethel sexually touched her on
multiple occasions. When her mother was away from home, Bethel often sexually touched
her legs, her buttocks, and her vagina. In one particular incident that occurred in the living
room, Bethel placed her on his lap and touched her vagina with his hands, under her clothes.
In another incident, Bethel took her to his bedroom, kissed her, asked her to touch his penis,
pushed her face against his penis, tried to force her to suck on his penis, and touched her
vagina with his hands.
Bethel did not testify. He called one witness, his wife, who testified that her
grandchildren, including S.R., often spent time at her house as children; that S.R. seemed
happy and well-adjusted whenever she visited; that she did not recall S.R. ever appearing
uncomfortable around Bethel; and that she did not recall S.R. ever being alone with Bethel
for an extended period of time.
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The jury found Bethel guilty of all five charges. With respect to the fourth and fifth
charges, the district court imposed two sentences of imprisonment for life with the
possibility of supervised release after 84 months and 150 months, respectively. The district
court did not adjudicate guilt on the first, second, and third charges. Bethel appeals.
DECISION
Bethel argues that the district court erred by ruling that the state could introduce the
Spreigl evidence that was provided by A.M.V.
“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith” though it may be admissible
“for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). In
Minnesota, evidence of “prior bad acts” is known as Spreigl evidence. State v. Washington,
693 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Minn. 2005). Such evidence generally is inadmissible unless
(a) the proffered evidence is relevant to an identified material
issue other than conduct conforming with a character trait;
(b) the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation in it by
a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing evidence;
and (c) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed
by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.

Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to
a district court’s admission of Spreigl evidence. State v. Smith, 9 N.W.3d 543, 561 (Minn.
2024).
In this case, the state offered its Spreigl evidence concerning A.M.V. for the purpose
of establishing Bethel’s intent, motive, knowledge, and a common scheme or plan. The
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district court stated in its order that the state may introduce Spreigl evidence concerning
A.M.V. for all of the purposes identified in its motion.
Bethel challenges the admission of the state’s Spreigl evidence in two ways. First,
he contends that the Spreigl evidence concerning A.M.V. is not relevant to a material issue
on the grounds that the purposes of intent, motive, and knowledge are inapplicable and that
the common-scheme-or-plan purpose is unavailable because the incidents A.M.V.
described in her testimony are not sufficiently similar to the incidents described by S.R. In
its responsive brief, the state does not address intent, motive, or knowledge but, rather,
seeks to uphold the district court’s ruling solely on the basis of common scheme or plan.
Accordingly, we confine our analysis to common scheme or plan. 1
The supreme court has recognized that Spreigl evidence may be relevant and
material in a case concerning criminal sexual conduct against a child on the ground that
such evidence may be used to “establish common scheme or plan, i.e., to establish that the
act occurred.” State v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Minn. 1993); see also State
v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 688 (Minn. 2006). But if Spreigl evidence is offered for that
purpose, “the misconduct must have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged
offense.” State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 346 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

1Bethel asserts that the state’s “real purpose” was not to prove a common scheme or
plan but to show that he was “opportunistic” because he committed multiple sexual assaults
whenever he was alone with a young girl. In support of this assertion, Bethel refers to part
of the prosecutor’s closing argument. But the argument referenced refers only to the
evidence provided by S.R. about the charged offenses in this case, not the Spreigl evidence
concerning A.M.V.
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In its written order, the district court acknowledged these legal principles and stated
that the incidents involving A.M.V. are “very similar” to the allegations in this case. The
district court identified several specific similarities between the proffered evidence
concerning A.M.V. and the allegations in this case, as follows:
(1) Mr. Bethel having the children sit on his lap
while he sexually assaults them, similar to count 1,

(2) Waiting for the adult female figure to be gone or
go shopping himself to isolate the child victim away from other
adult figures, similar to count 3,

(3) Digital penetration or rubbing over the vaginal
area in a number of the incidents, similar to counts 1 and 3,

(4) Having the child rub their body or hand over his
clothed penis in a number of the incidents, similar to count 2,

(5) Using the situation to force the child to remain in
a small space such as on a chair or in a bedroom while the
sexual assault occurs,

(6) Mr. Bethel begins to assault the child victims
when they reach age 5 or 6,

(7) Told both A.M.V. and Child A not to tell anyone
about the incidents.

Bethel challenges the district court’s reasoning by emphasizing that A.M.V.’s trial
testimony about the incident in the bedroom is unlike any incident about which S.R.
testified. If that were the extent of A.M.V.’s testimony, there may be a lack of marked
similarity. But A.M.V. also testified about other incidents, which are more similar to the
incidents about which S.R. testified. Bethel also focuses on relatively minor differences
between the 1994-1995 incidents and the allegations in this case, such as the specific body
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parts of the two girls that Bethel touched, the difference between the ages of six and eight,
and the rooms of the homes in which Bethel engaged in sexual conduct toward the two
girls. But “Spreigl evidence need not be identical in every way to the charged crime.”
State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 391 (Minn. 1998). The differences identified by Bethel
do not undermine the district court’s determination that the incidents involving A.M.V. are
markedly similar to the allegations in this case. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in making that determination.
Second, Bethel contends that the probative value of the state’s Spreigl evidence is
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. In determining whether the probative
value of other-acts evidence is outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, a district
court must “balance the relevance of the other offenses, the risk of the evidence being used
as propensity evidence, and the State’s need to strengthen weak or inadequate proof in the
case.” State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009).
In this case, the district court expressly considered this issue in depth in its written
order. The district court reasoned that excluding the proffered evidence from 1988 (the
first category of noticed Spreigl evidence described above), which was similar to the
evidence from the 1994-1995 time period (the second category), would alleviate the
potential for unfair prejudice. Similarly, the district court excluded the proffered Spreigl
evidence concerning S.R. (the third category) on the ground that it would increase the
probability of unfair prejudice. But the district court reasoned that A.M.V.’s testimony
about incidents that occurred during the 1994-1995 time period would “relate directly” to
whether the charged conduct occurred, would not persuade by illegitimate means, and
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would be accompanied by a cautionary instruction. Bethel asserts that the admitted Spreigl
evidence was “extremely prejudicial,” but his reasons for that characterization do not
indicate that the potential prejudice in this case is greater than typical in cases of this type.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by reasoning that the probative value of
the state’s admissible Spreigl evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice.
In sum, the district court did not err in its pre-trial ruling that the state’s Spreigl
evidence concerning sexual conduct by Bethel toward A.M.V. in 1994 and 1995 is
admissible for the purpose of proving a common scheme or plan.
Affirmed.