A This Little Piggy Catering, Inc., Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0255

A This Little Piggy Catering, Inc.,
Respondent,

vs

Historic John P. Furber Farm L.L.C., et al.,
Appellants,

Loupat Corp., d/b/a Tinucci’s Restaurant, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed March 2, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, appeal dismissed in part, and remanded
Schmidt, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CV-22-195

Stephen A. Ling, Ariel K. Lierz, Haley A. Ekhaml, Spencer Fane LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

James Carson Whedbee Bock, JCWB ESQ., LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Ryan L. Kaess, Kaess Law, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant Historic John P. Furber Farm, LLC (Furber Farm), and appellant Ryan
Kaess—Furber Farm’s attorney—challenge the district court’s orders awarding attorney
fees and costs to respondent A This Little Piggy Catering, Inc. (Little Piggy) , due to
discovery violations. Dwayne and Angela Butts, the individuals that own Furber Farm and
GFY, LLC—the company that owns the real property on which Furber Farm operates—
also attempt to appeal the district court’s order piercing the corporate veil and holding the
Buttses individually liable for an attorney-fees-and-costs award.
Because the Buttses are not proper appellants, we decline to consider their
arguments. We also dismiss the appeal with respect to Furber Farm for a lack of standing.
We reverse the district court’s sanction award of $11,580.25 in attorney fees and costs
against Kaess because he did not receive notice that the award may be entered against him
personally. Finally, we affirm the district court’s order awarding $63,093.15 in attorney
fees and costs associated with Little Piggy’s motion for contempt.
FACTS
Little Piggy, a catering company, entered into a 15-year contract to be the exclusive
caterer for Furber Farm, a wedding-and-event venue company. Pursuant to a contract term
that allowed for early termination by written agreement of both parties, Furber Farm
attempted to terminate the contract three years into the 15-year term. Little Piggy refused.
The Buttses created a corporation—GFY — and Furber Farm then sold Furber
Farm’s real property to GFY. After discovering that Furber Farm had been using catering
3
services other than Little Piggy, Little Piggy sued Furber Farm and GFY. Furber Farm
denied liability and asserted counterclaims against Little Piggy.
Little Piggy served Furber Farm and GFY with interrogatories, requests for
production of documents, and requests for admissions. Neither Furber Farm nor GFY
responded. Three months after Little Piggy’s original discovery requests, Little Piggy sent
a letter to Kaess notifying him that if Furber Farm and GFY did not respond to the
discovery requests, Little Piggy would move to compel discovery. Furber Farm served
Little Piggy with answers to its interrogatories and requests for admissions. Little Piggy
sent Kaess another letter, alleging that Furber Farm’s answers were evasive,
nonresponsive, and not in good faith. Little Piggy stated that if Furber Farm did not amend
or supplement its answers by a given date, Little Piggy would move to compel discovery
and include a request for attorney fees and costs. Furber Farm did not respond.
Thirteen months after the original discovery requests were served, Little Piggy sent
a third letter to Kaess, which detailed Little Piggy’s discovery efforts and requested that
Furber Farm provide supplemental discovery responses. Little Piggy noted that it would
move to compel discovery and request attorney fees and costs if Furber Farm did not
respond or supplement its answers. Kaess wrote back:
Thank you for your letter . . . , it was nice to hear from you, I
assumed that your client had forgotten about this frivolous
litigation.

As to your question about discovery, now that I know your
client is still pursuing this matter, I will of course update the
initial discovery that was served on you.

4
After receiving no supplemental responses, Little Piggy moved to compel discovery
from Furber Farm and GFY and sought fees and costs associated with bringing the motion.
Furber Farm eventually provided amended answers to the first set of interrogatories and
responses to the requests for the production of documents. In support of its motion, Little
Piggy argued that Furber Farm’s supplemental answers “remain[ed] universally evasive or
incomplete” and that both Furber Farm and GFY “provide[d] no basis in law or in fact to
justify the substantial delay in answering basic discovery questions.” Furber Farm opposed
the motion, arguing that “Little Piggy failed to prosecute this case and now after months
of delay [is] demanding answers to questions that have already been asked and answered.”
After a hearing, the district court found that Furber Farm’s supplemental discovery
responses were “inadequate.” The district court granted Little Piggy’s motion and ordered
Furber Farm to provide supplemental answers by specific dates .1 The district court also
ordered Furber Farm and GFY to pay Little Piggy’s reasonable attorney fees and costs
associated with bringing the motion. Little Piggy filed an affidavit in support of the fees
and costs it sought from Furber Farm and GFY. The affidavit also noted—for the first
time—that Little Piggy also sought fees and costs from Kaess. Kaess was not served with
the affidavit for the fees sought against him in his personal capacity.
The district court entered judgment for Little Piggy’s attorney fees and costs and
ordered that Furber Farm, GFY, and Kaess be jointly and severally liable for the total
amount if it was not paid within 90 days. After the 90-day deadline had expired, Kaess

1 Furber Farm never provided the supplemental answers as ordered by the district court.
5
moved to “[d]ismiss and strike” the award of attorney fees and costs. But before the district
court ruled on Kaess’ motion, Little Piggy informed the district court that it had received
notice that Furber Farm and GFY declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy
proceedings resulted in an automatic stay that applied to Furber Farm and GFY. The
district court denied Kaess’ motion and —given Furber Farm and GFY’s insolvency and
Kaess’ joint-and-several liability—entered judgment against Kaess for $11,580.25.
Based on Furber Farm and GFY’s continued failure to provide discovery, Little
Piggy moved to hold Furber Farm, GFY, and Kaess in contempt. In its motion, Little Piggy
asked the district court to dismiss Furber Farm and GFY’s counterclaims with prejudice,
enter judgment on Little Piggy’s claims, pierce the corporate veil such that the Buttses
could be held personally liable for Furber Farm and GFY’s actions, and order sanctions
against Furber Farm, GFY, and Kaess in the form of attorney fees and costs.
At the contempt hearing, Furber Farm and GFY agreed to a default judgment but
opposed the request to pierce the corporate veil and the request for attorney fees and costs.
Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the district court dismissed Furber Farm and GFY’s
counterclaims against Little Piggy with prejudice and entered default judgment in favor of
Little Piggy. The district court also granted Little Piggy’s motion to pierce the corporate
veil and awarded attorney fees and costs as a sanction. In assessing attorney fees, the
district court ordered Kaess and the Buttses to pay Little Piggy $63,093.15 and found them
jointly and severally liable for the entire award.
Furber Farm and Kaess now appeal.
6
DECISION
I. The Buttses are not proper appellants as they failed to file a notice of appeal.

The brief submitted by Kaess and Furber Farm includes arguments on behalf of the
Buttses as individuals . The Buttses did not, however, file a separate notice of appeal.
Although “notices of appeal are to be liberally construed in favor of their sufficiency,”
Kelly v. Kelly, 371 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Minn. 1985), we will not construe a notice of appeal
so liberally as to include additional appellants not identified in it. See, e.g., Nash v. Allen,
392 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 22, 1986). The notice
of appeal filed by Furber Farm does not name or reference the Buttses. In addition,
although the Buttses are owners of GFY, which owns Furber Farm, the Buttses’ interests
as individuals—separate and apart from the legal entities— are not represented by Furber
Farm. Because the Buttses did not file a notice of appeal, they are not proper appellants.
We, therefore, do not consider their arguments. See id.
II. Furber Farm lacks standing because it is not an aggrieved party.

We next address whether Furber Farm has standing to challenge the awards of
attorney fees and costs on appeal, which is an issue that we review de novo.
Richards v. Reiter, 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2011). “To have standing to appeal, a
party must be aggrieved by the decision of a court from which the party appeals.”
Webster v. Hennepin County, 910 N.W.2d 420, 434 (Minn. 2018). A party is “aggrieved”
when its interests have been “injuriously affected by the underlying adjudication.”
Glaze v. State, 909 N.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Minn. 2018) (quotations omitted).
7
The district court never entered judgment against Furber Farm because the federal
bankruptcy court proceedings automatically stayed the state court proceedings.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018) (providing that the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically
stays all other proceedings against the debtor). As such, F urber Farm appropriately
concedes that it is not an aggrieved party. We agree. Because Furber Farm is not
aggrieved, it lacks standing to appeal. Webster, 910 N.W.2d at 434. Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal with respect to Furber Farm.
III. The district court abused its discretion when it entered the $11,580.25
judgment against Kaess for attorney fees and costs.

Kaess argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay Little
Piggy $11,580.25 in attorney fees and costs associated with Little Piggy’s motion to
compel discovery. Kaess first asserts that the district court abused its discretion because it
did not expressly find that he advised Furber Farm not to cooperate with discovery before
imposing sanctions. Kaess also asserts that the district court abused its discretion because
he received no notice that Little Piggy intended to seek fees and costs from him personally.
We review a district court’s discovery rulings, including sanctions orders, for an
abuse of discretion. Frontier Ins. Co. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 788 N.W.2d 917, 922
(Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2010). Kaess raises challenges to the
district court’s construction of a court rule, which is a legal question that we review
de novo. See In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 803 (Minn. App. 2007) . An error of law by
a district court constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.
8
A. Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01(d)(1) does not require an
express finding that an attorney advised the conduct that led to a motion
to compel disclosure or discovery.

Kaess argues that the district court abused its discretion by sanctioning him without
making an express finding that Kaess advised Furber Farm not to cooperate with discovery.
Rule 37 authorizes a court to issue orders compelling discovery and to impose sanctions.
When a party moves to compel discovery and the district court grants the motion,
the court shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard,
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the
motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both
of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses
incurred in making the motion, including attorney fees[.]

Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(d)(1) (emphasis added).
We reject Kaess’ reading of the rule that the district court must—before imposing
sanctions against an attorney—make an express finding that the attorney advised the
conduct which necessitated the filing of a motion to compel. The plain language of the
rule requires no such finding, and Kaess cites no caselaw that imposes such a requirement.
We also note that there is ample support in the record that Kaess advised Furber
Farm about the conduct that led to Little Piggy’s motion to compel. Kaess represented
Furber Farm throughout these proceedings. Little Piggy served Furber Farm, through
Kaess, with interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for
admissions. Furber Farm did not respond. Little Piggy sent Kaess three letters requesting
that Furber Farm provide good-faith responses to Little Piggy’s discovery requests. Even
though Kaess responded to Little Piggy’s third letter, Furber Farm failed to supplement its
discovery responses, which forced Little Piggy to seek redress from the district court.
9
Thus, the record fully supports the district court’s decision to sanction Kaess as the
“attorney advising [the] conduct” that necessitated Little Piggy filing a motion to compel
against Furber Farm. Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(d)(1).
B. Because Kaess did not receive notice that Little Piggy sought attorney
fees from him personally, we reverse the district court’s order and
remand with instructions to vacate the $11,580.25 judgment.

Kaess also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it held him liable
for the $11,580.25 award because he did not receive notice that Little Piggy sought
sanctions against him personally.
Little Piggy’s notice of motion and motion to compel sought fees and costs against
Furber Farm and GFY. Those pleadings did not mention Kaess. In granting Little Piggy’s
motion to compel, the district court ordered that Furber Farm and GFY “shall be
responsible to pay [Little Piggy’s] reasonable attorney fees and costs associated with the
bringing of its present motion to comply.” The order did not mention Kaess. Little Piggy
then filed an affidavit detailing the amounts and, for the first time, noted its intent to seek
fees from Kaess. Kaess did not receive service of the affidavit seeking awards against him.
The district court later entered judgment for Little Piggy and ordered that Furber Farm,
GFY, and Kaess be jointly and severally liable for the total amount.
But before a district court can render sanctions under rule 37, the rule requires the
person from whom sanctions are sought to be afforded “an opportunity to be heard.” Minn.
R. Civ. P. 37.01(d)(1). Kaess was never provided with notice—through, for example, Little
Piggy’s notice of motion or motion—or given an opportunity to be heard about Little
Piggy’s intent to seek sanctions against Kaess.
10
Little Piggy argues that rule 37, itself, provided sufficient notice to Kaess because
the rule expressly authorizes sanctions against attorneys who advise parties to engage in
conduct prompting the filing of a motion to compel discovery. But the rule’s language
authorizing sanctions against attorneys does not alleviate Little Piggy of its duty to provide
notice to everyone from whom Little Piggy sought sanctions, so that they may have “an
opportunity to be heard.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(d)(1).
We conclude that Kaess was not provided an opportunity to be heard on whether he
should personally be sanctioned under rule 37.01(d)(1). Accordingly, we reverse and
remand with instructions to vacate the $11,580.25 judgment against him.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the $63,093.15
judgment against Kaess for attorney fees and costs.

Kaess contends that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered him to
pay $63,093.15 in attorney fees and costs associated with Little Piggy’s motion for
contempt,2 which—unlike the motion to compel—specifically named Kaess and, therefore,
put him on notice. We review sanctions orders for an abuse of discretion and the
underlying interpretation of a court rule de novo. Rollins, 738 N.W.2d at 803.
Kaess argues that the sanction order must be reversed based upon the five factors
for determining whether a court has abused its discretion in imposing discovery sanctions:
(1) [whether] the court set a date certain by which compliance
was required, (2) [whether] the court gave a warning of
potential sanctions for non-compliance, (3) [whether] the
failure to cooperate with discovery was an isolated event or
part of a pattern, (4) [whether] the failure to comply was willful

2 Kaess also argues that the district court needed to find that he advised Furber Farm’s
sanctionable conduct before imposing these sanctions. We rejected this argument above.
11
or without justification, and (5) [whether] the moving party has
demonstrated prejudice.

Frontier, 788 N.W.2d at 923. Our analysis of each factor leads us to the conclusion that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Kaess.
Factor 1: the district court set a date certain by which compliance was required.
Kaess argues that the first factor weighs against sanctions because the court did not
order Furber Farm to comply with discovery by any particular date. Kaess’ argument has
no merit because the district court gave Furber Farm 30 days to supplement certain answers
to interrogatories and requests for admission and 45 days to produce certain documents.
3
Factor 2: the district court warned Kaess of potential sanctions for noncompliance.
Kaess argues that the second factor weighs against sanctions because the district
court gave no explicit warning. But we have afforded weight to implicit warnings. See,
e.g., id. at 923-25 (concluding “the lack of a prior explicit warning [was] not dispositive”
because the sanctioned party “had previously been given clear notice that its discovery
responses were insufficient and of the importance of completing adequate supplementation
in compliance with the discovery rules by [given] deadline[s]”). The district court did not
provide Kaess with explicit warnings of potential sanctions. But, as an officer of the court,
Kaess knew of the implicit consequences of being held in contempt for failing to comply
with the court’s ruling requiring compliance with discovery by certain dates.

3 Kaess argues that we should disregard these deadlines because Furber Farm notified Little
Piggy that it intended to agree to a default judgment. But Furber Farm stipulated to default
judgment 29 days after the court’s deadline expired. Furber Farm’s intent to agree to
default judgment at a later date did not relieve it of its obligation to comply with the order.
12
Factor 3: the failure to cooperate with discovery was part of a pattern.
Kaess contends that the district court “made no findings that there was any pattern
regarding a failure to provide discovery . . . [or] why Kaess is responsible for not providing
adequate discovery.” But the record shows that Furber Farm and GFY’s failure to
participate in discovery was the rule, not the exception.
The district court also made several findings that reflect a pattern of Furber Farm
and GFY—through Kaess—failing to participate in discovery. The court found that Kaess
“largely ignored” communications from Little Piggy to Kaess requesting that his clients
provide complete discovery responses. The district court further found that “Furber Farm
and GFY made modest attempts to respond to [Little Piggy’s] discovery requests” only
after being threatened with a motion to compel, but the court noted that those attempts were
“by-and-large inadequate.” The court also noted that Little Piggy’s discovery requests
“were generally material to the case, proportional, and not overly burdensome.” The
district court further found that Furber Farm and GFY:
• offered discovery responses that demonstrated an attempt “to shield
themselves from reasonable discovery”;

• provided discovery responses that were “not responsive”;

• “claimed not to understand questions not difficult to understand”;

• “claimed to lack knowledge of facts which any reasonable [d]efendant
in their position would have been aware”;

• “answered questions of their own making rather than the question put
to them”;

• failed to provide “[s]atisfactory explanations for” their
noncompliance;

13
• failed to provide the bases for denials to requests for admissions; and

• “deficient[ly]” produced documents because “[n]ot a single e- mail
between Furber Farm and any other admitted vendor was provided.”

These findings support the district court’s implicit determination that the pattern of failing
to cooperate with discovery occurred through Kaess.
Factor 4: the failure to comply was without justification.
Kaess argues that the district court made no finding as to why he, as opposed to
Furber Farm, is responsible for not providing adequate discovery. But this factor asks
whether the failures to comply were in good or bad faith, not who is most responsible. See,
e.g., Breza v. Schmitz, 248 N.W.2d 921, 922 (Minn. 1976). The district court’s finding that
the noncompliance was without justification is supported by the record.
Factor 5: Little Piggy demonstrated prejudice.
Kaess argues that Little Piggy was not prejudiced by the failure to respond to
discovery requests. Kaess asserts that Little Piggy “started a lawsuit to win a case” and it
“won the case,” which is the “exact opposite of prejudice.” But Furber Farm and GFY’s
uncooperativeness was not harmless. Little Piggy incurred significant expenses due to
Furber Farm and GFY’s failure to meaningfully participate in discovery.
In sum, all of the Frontier factors support the district court’s decision to hold Kaess
in contempt. The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $63,093.15 in fees and
costs associated with the motion for contempt and in entering judgment against Kaess.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, appeal dismissed in part, and remanded.