In the Matter of the Teaching License of Raquel M. Andrade.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0301

In the Matter of the Teaching License of Raquel M. Andrade.

Filed December 15, 2025
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Minnesota Professional Educator
Licensing and Standards Board
File No. 412937

Raquel M. Andrade, Minneapolis, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jamal Zayed, Theresa Flahaven, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Maria Zaloker, Teacher Ethics Attorney, Professional Educator Licensing and Standards
Board, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Professional Educator Licensing and
Standards Board)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Respondent Minnesota Professional Educator Licensing and Standards Board (the
board) suspended self -represented relator Raquel M. Andrade’s teaching license for six
years following a contested-case hearing. On appeal, Andrade challenges both the
procedures used during the contested-case hearing and the board’s final decision. We
affirm.
2
FACTS
Andrade has a teaching license authorizing her to teach Spanish to students in
kindergarten through grade 12. Andrade worked at two schools, Elizabeth Hall Elementary
School and Beacon Academy.
Andrade began teaching at Elizabeth Hall Elementary School in fall 2018. In
October, a teacher reported that Andrade pulled a kindergartener’s ear. The school
administrators investigated the report and uncovered a total of three alleged ear-pulling
incidents involving Andrade and a kindergartner. The incidents were reported to the
Minnesota Department of Education and the board. Andrade was placed on administrative
leave with pay. In lieu of termination, Andrade resigned, and the board did not take an y
further action.
Andrade began teaching at Beacon Academy in fall 2021. In March 2023, Beacon
Academy received reports that Andrade had grabbed two fifth graders (student A and
student B) by their shoulders. Beacon Academy investigated the reports. The investigation
revealed that Andrade yelled at student A, “grabbed their sweater near the shoulder,” and
“pulled” the chair student A was sitting in from “under the table forcefully.” At the time,
student A had a broken collarbone and wore a sling. Regarding student B, multiple students
disclosed that Andrade yelled at student B and grabbed their shirt collar. As a result of the
investigation, Beacon Academy placed Andrade on administrative leave without pay for
two days. Beacon Academy reported the incidents to the Minnesota Department of
Education and the board. Following the period of administrative leave, Andrade returned
to her position.
3
In January 2024, the board’s ethics committee (the committee) initiated a contested-
case hearing before the Court of Administrative Hearings. 1 The scope of the hearing was
to determine whether Andrade’s actions in both 2018 and 2023 warranted discipline under
either the statutory grounds for suspending or revoking a license, see Minn. Stat.
§ 122A.20, subd. 1(a) (2024), or for violating the Code of Ethics for Minnesota Teachers
(the code), see Minn. R. 8710.2100, subp. 2 (2023). Specifically, the committee sought to
prove that Andrade’s actions constituted: (1) “immoral character or conduct,” Minn. Stat.
§ 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1); (2) “willful neglect of duty,” Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd.
1(a)(3); (3) failure to “make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions
harmful to health and safety” (duty to protect), Minn. R. 8710.2100, subp. 2(B); and
(4) failure to “take reasonable disciplinary action in exercising the authority to provide an
atmosphere conducive to learning” (duty to take reasonable disciplinary action), Minn. R.
8710.2100, subp. 2(D).
Following a prehearing conference, the administrative-law judge (ALJ) scheduled
the contested-case hearing for June 13 and 14, 2024. As the hearing neared, Andrade
requested a continuance due to health issues interfering with her ability to prepare. The
ALJ partially granted the request, moving the second day of the contested-case hearing to
October 4, 2024.

1 Effective August 1, 2025, the legislature changed the name of the Office of
Administrative Hearings to the Court of Administrative Hearings. See 2025 Minn. Laws
ch. 39, art. 2, § 17, at 1219 (amending Minn. Stat. § 14.48, subd. 1 (2024)).
4
On the first day of the contested-case hearing in June, following arguments from
both parties, the ALJ admitted the committee’s eleven exhibits. The committee then called
four witnesses: student A, student B, an administrator from Elizabeth Hall Elementary
School, and an administrator from Beacon Academy. Andrade cross-examined each
witness, except the Elizabeth Hall Elementary School administrator. At the end of the first
day, Andrade requested that she be allowed to recall each witness during the second day of
the contested-case hearing. The ALJ expressed concerns a bout recalling student A and
student B but did not deny Andrade’s request.
On the second day of the hearing in October, Andrade sought to admit eight exhibits.
Following arguments from both parties, the ALJ did not admit four exhibits on the basis
that they were irrelevant and lacked foundation. Andrade then recalled the two
administrators, and she testified on her own behalf.
Following the contested-case hearing, the ALJ issued a report and recommendation
concluding the board proved that Andrade’s actions violated Minn. R. 8710.2100,
subp. 2(D), because she failed to perform her duty to take reasonable disciplinary action.
But the ALJ determined the committee failed to establish the other three alleged violations.
The parties filed exceptions to the ALJ’s report, and the board held a hearing in January
2024.
2 After the hearing, the board adopted the ALJ’s report, in part, but disagreed with
the ALJ’s determination that the committee failed to establish all four alleged violations.
Instead, the board determined that—in addition to her failure to perform the duty to take

2 Andrade did not attend the board hearing on January 17, 2025, after receiving notice on
December 18, 2024.
5
reasonable disciplinary action—Andrade’s conduct constituted “immoral conduct, ”
“willful neglect of duty,” and a failure to perform her duty to protect. The board disciplined
Andrade and suspended her license for six years.
Andrade appeals.
DECISION
Andrade raises several challenges to the board’s decision to suspend her license.
Before reaching her arguments, we review the applicable law.
To teach in a Minnesota public school, a person must hold a license. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 122A.15, subd. 1, 122A.16 (2024). The board has authority to discipline a licensed
teacher for five statutory reasons or for violating the code.3 Minn. Stat. § 122A.20,
subd. 1(a) (grounds for revocation, suspension, or denial); Minn. R. 8710.2100 (2023) (the
code); see also Minn. R. 8710.0800 (2023 ) (procedures for revocation or suspension of
licenses). License suspension is one form of discipline the board can impose. Minn. R.
8710.2100, subp. 5(D) (providing that license may be suspended for period of time
determined by board).
If the board receives a complaint and—following communication with the licensed
teacher and investigation—believes board action may be warranted, the board must
schedule a contested-case hearing under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act
(MAPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 14.001-.69 (2024). Minn. Stat. § 214.10, subd. 2 (2024).

3 A disciplinary action to enforce the code requires the board to comply with certain
procedures. See Minn. R. 8710.2100, subp. 3 (2023) (citing Minn. Stat. § 214.10, subds. 1-
3). The board followed those procedures in this case.
6
Following the contested-case hearing, an ALJ sends a report and recommendation to the
board. Minn. Stat. § 14.50. The board then issues a final decision regarding (1) whether
board action is appropriate, and if so, (2) the appropriate discipline, including suspension.
Minn. Stat. §§ 14.61-. 62; Minn. R. 8710.2100, subp. 5. Thereafter, a person who is
aggrieved by the board’s decision may seek judicial review. See Minn. Stat. § 14.63. We
review the board’s decision under Minn. Stat. § 14.69, which provides that we:
may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings; or [we] may reverse or modify the
decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have
been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences,
conclusion, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious.

The board’s decision “enjoy[s] a presumption of correctness,” and the person challenging
the board’s decision bears “the burden of proof.” See In re Excelsior Energy, Inc., 782
N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. App. 2010).
Here, broadly, Andrade challenges her suspension on five grounds: (1) the board
violated her right to procedural due process; (2) the board used an unlawful procedure when
it initiated a single contested-case hearing for both the 2018 and 2023 incidents; (3) the
board’s decision that her conduct warranted discipline was unsupported by substantial
evidence; (4) the board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious; and (5) the ALJ made
errors during the contested-case hearing. We address Andrade’s arguments in turn.
7
I.
Andrade first argues the board violated her right to procedural due process. See
Minn. Stat. § 14.69(a). Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the government
from denying “life, liberty, or property” absent due process of law. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. We review de novo whether an agency afforded
a party procedural due process. In re Minnikka Props., LLC, 834 N.W.2d 572, 580 (Minn.
App. 2013).
“We conduct a two-step analysis to determine whether the government has violated
an individual’s procedural due process rights.” Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d
627, 632 (Minn. 2012). First, we identify whether the board deprived Andrade of “a
protected life, liberty, or property interest.” Id. A teacher has a property interest in their
teaching license, see Falgren v. State, Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 908-09 (Minn.
1996), so we move to the second step.
Under the second step, we must determine whether the board employed
constitutionally sufficient procedures. Sawh , 823 N.W.2d at 632. Constitutionally
sufficient procedures include notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. To decide whether
a procedure meets this standard, we typically apply the factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
4 But Andrade does not analyze the Mathews factors or offer any

4 The Mathews factors require us to consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
8
other authority to support her claim that a contested-case hearing does not provide an
opportunity to be heard. See Poeschel v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 871 N.W.2d 39, 47 (Minn.
App. 2015) (“An assignment of error in a brief based on ‘mere assertion’ and not supported
by argument or authority is [forfeited] unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection.”). Further, a contested-case hearing under MAPA is the gold standard for
administrative proceedings in Minnesota, requiring a trial-style hearing process. Cf. GH
Holdings, LLC v. Minn. Dep’t of Com., 840 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating
procedures in contested-case hearing “are the incidents of a trial” (quotation omitted));
CUP Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 563 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding
due-process rights satisfied when relator received notice, a neutral ALJ, a trial-type
hearing, and an ALJ report based on record), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001) ; Haik v.
Pro. Educator Licensing & Standards Bd., No. A25-0368, 2025 WL 2754171, at *6-7
(Minn. App. Sept. 29, 2025) (explaining contested-case hearings provide procedural
protections by ensuring adequate notice, opportunity for discovery, and trial-like hearing
with opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses). 5 Thus, upon our
inspection, we conclude that Andrade received an opportunity to be heard.
For these reasons, Andrade has not met her burden to show the board violated her
right to procedural due process.

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335.
5 This opinion is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite nonprecedential
opinions as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
9
II.
Andrade next argues the board followed an unlawful procedure because it did not
comply with Minn. R. 1400.6350 (2023) when it “consolidated” the 2018 and 2023
incidents into one contested-case hearing. See Minn. Stat. § 14.69(c). Rule 1400.6350,
subpart 1, provides that two or more “contested cases” can be consolidated if they “present
substantially the same issues of fact and law, [where] a holding in one case would affect
the rights of parties in another case . . . save time and costs, and . . . not prejudice any
party.”
We are not persuaded that the board used an unlawful procedure. The rule does not
seem to apply because the committee initiated a single contested case based on the 2018
and 2023 incidents, rather than two separate contested cases requiring consolidation. See
Minn. R. 1400.6350, subp. 1. And Andrade does not provide any authority establishing
that it is unlawful for the committee to raise multiple incidents in a single contested- case
hearing. See Poeschel, 871 N.W.2d at 47 (“An assignment of error . . . based on ‘mere
assertion’ . . . is [forfeited] unless prejudicial error is obvious.”). Because prejudicial error
is not obvious upon mere inspection, we conclude Andrade did not meet her burden to
show the board followed an unlawful procedure.
III.
Andrade next asserts the board’s decision that her conduct warranted discipline is
unsupported by substantial evidence. See Minn. Stat. § 14.69(e). Substantial evidence is
“(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more
10
than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety.” In re Wazwaz, 943
N.W.2d 212, 216-17 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 30,
2020). “[A] substantial-evidence analysis requires us to ‘determine whether the agency
has adequately explained how it derived its conclusion and whether that conclusion is
reasonable on the basis of the record.’” In re NorthMet Project Permit to Mine Application,
959 N.W.2d 731, 749 (Minn. 2021) (quoting Minn. Power & Light Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 342 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn. 1983)).
As described above, the board has authority to discipline a licensed teacher for
violating the code. 6 Minn. R. 8710.0800, subp. 1; see also Minn. R. 8710.2100 , subp. 5.
The board found Andrade violated two code provisions: the duty to take reasonable
disciplinary action, Minn. R. 8710.2100, subp. 2(D), and the duty to protect, Minn.
R. 8710.2100, subp. 2(B). We address each alleged violation in turn.
Beginning with the duty to take reasonable disciplinary action, the code states that
“[a] teacher shall take reasonable disciplinary action in exercising the authority to provide
an atmosphere conducive to learning.” Minn. R. 8710.2100, subp. 2(D). Minnesota law
bars teachers from using corporal punishment to reform, or as a penalty for unacceptable
student conduct. Minn. Stat. § 121A.58, subd. 2 (2024). Corporal punishment includes

6 The board suspended Andrade’s license after determining her conduct violated the two
code provisions and constituted “immoral conduct” and “willful neglect of duty” under
Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a). We need not decide whether Andrade’s conduct also
constituted “immoral conduct” or “willful neglect of duty” because the board’s decision to
suspend Andrade for violating the code is supported by substantial evidence in the record,
there is nothing in the board’s decision that indicates the severity of the discipline imposed
depended on the number of violations, and Andrade does not challenge the severity of the
discipline.
11
“hitting or spanking a person with or without an object” or “unreasonable physical force
that causes bodily harm or substantial emotional harm.” Id., subd. 1. But teachers may
use “reasonable force” with a student “when it is necessary under the circumstances to
correct or restrain a student to prevent bodily harm or death to the student or to another.”
Minn. Stat. § 121A.582, subd. 1(a) (2024).
To support its conclusion that the committee met its burden to prove Andrade failed
to take reasonable disciplinary action, the board found that Andrade’s use of physical
discipline with the kindergartners, student A, and student B “constituted unlawful corporal
punishment.” The board further found that there was “no evidence in the record showing
that [Andrade] was faced with a student who presented a risk of harm” requiring the use of
physical force. The board determined that Andrade’s “use of corporal punishment inflicted
pain and fear in students, was not reasonable disciplinary action, and created an atmosphere
that was not conducive to learning.” T he board’s findings—that Andrade used physical
force against the students, that the use of physical force caused the students to feel fear,
and that the level of force was unreasonable under the circumstances —are well supported
by the testimonies of student A, student B, and the two administrators. Therefore, we
conclude the board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Moving to the duty to protect,
7 the code provides that “[a] teacher shall make
reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to health and safety.”

7 We note that the only reason the ALJ provided to support its decision that the committee
failed to establish a violation of the duty to protect was “it is not necessary or
appropriate . . . to stack multiple violations for the same conduct.”
12
Minn. R. 8710.2100, subp. 2(B). The board concluded that the committee met its burden
to show that Andrade did not comply with this provision when she used physical force to
discipline the two kindergartners, student A, and student B. To support its decision, the
board relied on its findings that Andrade (1) pulled on the kindergartners’ ears and
(2) yelled at student A and student B, grabbing one by the sweater near their broken
collarbone and the other by their shirt collar. These findings are amply supported by the
testimonies of student A, student B, and the two administrators. Therefore, we conclude
the board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
For these reasons, the board’s decision that Andrade’s actions warranted discipline
is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
IV.
Andrade also asserts the board’s decision to suspend her license was arbitrary and
capricious. See Minn. Stat. § 14.69(f). “An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if
it is an exercise of the agency’s will, rather than its judgment, or if the decision is based on
whim or is devoid of articulated reasons.” CUP Foods, 633 N.W.2d at 565. An agency
engages in arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking if it (1) relies “on factors not intended
by the legislature”; (2) entirely fails “to consider an important aspect of the problem”;
(3) offers “an explanation that runs counter to the evidence”; or (4) “the decision is so
implausible that it could not be explained as a difference in view or the result of the
agency’s expertise.” Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Minn. 2006).
13
Andrade argues the board’s decision is arbitrary and capricious because it
disregarded the evidence she presented regarding bias, improper motive, and fabrication of
the allegations. We are not persuaded. Andrade’s arguments go to the weight of the
evidence and the board’s credibility determinations. “We do not re-try the facts or make
credibility determinations” when reviewing an administrative decision. Excelsior Energy,
782 N.W.2d at 296. Accordingly, we conclude Andrade did not meet her burden to show
the board engaged in arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking.
V.
Finally, Andrade raises several challenges to the way the ALJ conducted the
contested-case hearing. She contests the ALJ’s decision to deny her continuance request
in part; certain evidentiary decisions; and the ALJ’s failure to properly accommodate
Andrade’s self-represented status.
Beginning with the continuance request, we review the ALJ’s decision to deny a
continuance for an abuse of discretion. See Torchwood Properties, LLC v. McKinnon, 784
N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn. App. 2010) (reviewing district court’s denial of continuance
motion). Under Minn. R. 1400.7500 (2023), an ALJ shall grant a continuance upon a
showing of “good cause.” To determine whether “good cause” exists, the ALJ must give
due regard to the requesting party’s ability to effectively proceed without a continuance.
Minn. R. 1400.7500. “[W]hen we evaluate the denial of a continuance motion, the critical
question is . . . whether the denial prejudiced the outcome . . . .” Torchwood, 784 N.W.2d
at 419.
14
We conclude the ALJ did not abuse their discretion when they partially denied the
continuance request. The record reveals that the ALJ weighed the interests of the
committee in presenting its case with Andrade’s ability to effectively proceed. By moving
the second day of the hearing out nearly four months, the ALJ provided Andrade ample
opportunity to prepare for the presentation of her evidence given her health concerns.
Accordingly, we conclude the ALJ’s decision did not prejudice the outcome of the case.
Next, Andrade challenges certain evidentiary decisions by the ALJ. We review
evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. See CUP Foods, 633 N.W.2d at 566
(applying abuse-of-discretion standard to review ALJ’s evidentiary ruling on motion to
strike).
Andrade first asserts the ALJ abused their discretion when they denied her the
opportunity to recall student A and student B. Andrade’s argument is not supported by the
record. Following the first hearing day, Andrade asked to recall the same four witnesses
on the second hearing day. Initially, the ALJ said no. But after some discussion, the ALJ
changed their mind and said, “if you do choose to call, I would ask that you please do not
call the students.” Yet the ALJ acknowledged that Andrade had the “right” to recall the
witnesses and stated that they did not know if they could stop Andrade if she chose to recall
them. Accordingly, the record does not reflect that the ALJ denied Andrade the right to
recall student A and student B.
Andrade argues second that the ALJ made biased decisions in the admission of the
exhibits. Specifically, she argues the ALJ applied different evidentiary standards because
they admitted all eleven of the committee’s exhibits but only four of her eight exhibits. We
15
are not persuaded. The record reflects that the ALJ made reasoned decisions when
evaluating the admissibility of the exhibits and, to the extent they disagreed with Andrade’s
positions, they explained their decisions within the confines of Minn. R. 1400.7300, subp. 1
(2023) (admissible evidence). We, therefore, conclude the ALJ did not abuse their
discretion in their evidentiary decisions regarding the exhibits.
Finally, Andrade argues the ALJ failed to properly consider Andrade’s self-
represented status. Andrade’s argument is belied by the record. The record shows the ALJ
took Andrade’s self-represented status into consideration. During the first hearing, the ALJ
stopped to ask if Andrade understood the rules of evidence, legal terminology , and the
process of witness examination. They even paused to remind Andrade that she was able
to ask a witness questions and asked if Andrade wanted an interpreter. The ALJ also
admitted some exhibits with questionable foundation and gave Andrade leeway in
questioning witnesses. Thus, the record does not indicate that the ALJ failed to take
Andrade’s self-represented status into consideration.
Affirmed.