State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0310

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Pierre Omar Combs,
Appellant.

Filed March 30, 2026
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-3789

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, N. Nate Summers, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for first-degree drug
possession and fourth -degree assault of a peace officer, appe llant argues there was
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed
2
the drugs found in the vehicle he was driving. Alternatively, appella nt argues the district
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial. Appellant raises
additional issues in his pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Pierre Omar Combs with one
count of first-degree possession of a controlled substance and two counts of fourth-degree
assault of a peace officer. See Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 2(a)(3) (2023 Supp.),
609.2231, subd. 1(c)(1) (2022). 1 The case proceeded to a jury trial during which the
following evidence was received.
On February 14, 2024, Minneapolis police officer J.S. was conducting surveillance
when he observed a white Jeep that appeared to resemble a vehicle that was the subject of
an ongoing investigation. The only occupant of the Jeep was the driver, who Officer J.S.
described as a heavy-set black male wearing green or teal clothing. As he followed the
Jeep, Officer J.S. learned that dispatch had just received a 911 call reporting that a driver
of a similar-looking Jeep had brandished a gun. The Jeep parked in an alley and the driver
got out and began to talk with two people standing nearby.
After additional officers arrived, law enforcement conducted a high-risk stop of the
Jeep’s driver, who was eventually identified as Combs. Combs had the key fob to the Jeep

1 The state also charged Combs with receiving stolen property. See Minn. Stat. § 609.53,
subd. 1 (2022). During trial, the district court granted Combs’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal on that charge.
3
in his pocket. As he was being escorted to a squad car, Combs attempted to break away
and he kicked Officer J.S. in the shin.
Officer J.S. ran the Jeep’s VIN through a police database and learned that it had
been reported stolen about a month earlier. When officers opened the driver-side door,
they immediately saw a “large bag with a white rock-like substance” inside the cupholder
in the driver’s side door pocket, an area that was “readily accessible” to the driver. Later
testing confirmed that the substance was 50.14 grams of a mixture containing fentanyl.
The fentanyl had an estimated street value of close to $4,000. According to a police
investigator, a person carrying this amount of fentanyl would “Carr[y] it very close to them,
if not on them.” During an inventory search of the Jeep, officers found two cell phones
belonging to Combs and a manila folder in the passenger-side visor containing Combs’s
personal documents.
When the officers discovered the fentanyl, Combs began hitting his head against the
inside of the squad car, yelling “I saw what they pulled out of that car,” and “It’s over. Kill
me now.” The officers removed Combs from the squad car for his safety and then called
an ambulance. Combs continued to shout that “it [was] over,” and kicked backwards
repeatedly, hitting one officer in the leg.2
As part of the investigation, a police investigator reviewed Combs’s Instagram
account and discovered a video of Combs in a vehicle that the investigator believed to be

2 In addition to hearing testimony, the jury watched body-worn camera footage of the
search of the Jeep and saw photos of the fentanyl and Combs’s personal items inside the
Jeep.
4
the Jeep. Combs was wearing a green jumpsuit similar to the one he was wearing on
February 14.
The jury found Combs guilty of all three counts. The district court adjudicated
Combs guilty on each count and imposed concurrent sentences of 144 months in prison for
first-degree possession of a controlled substance and 232 days in jail for each of the fourth-
degree assault convictions.
Combs appeals.
DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Combs
constructively possessed the fentanyl found in the Jeep.

Combs argues that his drug conviction should be reversed because the state’s
evidence fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the fentanyl in the
Jeep. Due process requires the state to prove every element of a charged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v. Merrill, 428 N.W.2d
361, 366 (Minn. 1988); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and “determine whether, given the facts in the record and the
legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude
that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Smith, 9 N.W.3d 543, 564-65
(Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
To convict Combs of first-degree controlled-substance crime, the state was required
to prove that he knowingly possessed over 25 grams of a mixture containing fentanyl.
5
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(3). “Possession may be proved through evidence of
actual or constructive possession.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017).
Actual possession is proved by showing an individual physically possessed an item. State
v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975). Constructive possession may be proved in
one of two ways: (1) by showing that “the police found the [contraband] in a place under
the defendant’s exclusive control to which other people normally did not have access” or
(2) by showing “that there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that[,] at
the time[,] the defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and control
over [the contraband].” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601; see also State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d
156, 160 (Minn. 2015) (referring to these as Florine’s first and second prong, respectively).
“Proximity is an important consideration in assessing constructive possession.” State v.
Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001).
Here, Combs was not in actual, physical possession of the fentanyl when police
found it in the Jeep. While the parties agree that, to establish the element of possession,
the state was required to prove that Combs was constructively possessing the fentanyl, they
disagree as to which Florine prong should control our analysis. The state urges us to apply
the first Florine prong, arguing that the Jeep was a place within Combs’s exclusive control
to which other people normally did not have access. Combs disagrees, contending that the
state had to prove constructive possession under the second Florine prong.3 We agree with
Combs that, because the Jeep was stolen and there is no evidence showing how long Combs

3 At trial, the state argued primarily that it had proven constructive possession under the
second Florine prong because Combs had “dominion and control” over the fentanyl.
6
had been driving it or whether Combs was the only person with access to it, the record does
not support a conclusion that the fentanyl was found in a place under his exclusive control.
Accordingly, the state was required to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable
doubt by showing that there is a strong probability, inferable from other evidence, that
Combs was consciously exercising dominion and control over the fentanyl at the time
police found it in the Jeep. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
When, as here, the state presents only circumstantial evidence to prove an element
of the offense, appellate courts apply a two-step analysis to evaluate the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence. State v. Ulrich, 3 N.W.3d 1, 11 (Minn. 2024). Under the first
step, we “‘winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact
in favor of the jury’s verdict,’ which results in ‘a subset of facts that constitute the
circumstances proved.’” State v. Firkus, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 517248, at *5
(Minn. Feb. 25, 2026) (quoting Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600). Identifying the circumstances
proved in this manner “protects the well-established legal principle that the jury is in a
unique position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before
it.” Id. at *6 (quotation omitted).
At the second step, reviewing courts consider “whether the reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as
discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. at *9 (citing Smith, 9
N.W.3d at 565). We independently review the reasonableness of inferences at this second
step, without deference to the fact-finder. Id. (citing State v. Isaac, 9 N.W.3d 812, 818
7
(Minn. 2024)). We will not reverse a conviction “based on mere conjecture.” Id. (quoting
State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 861 (Minn. 2008)). However, “[i]f the circumstances
proved when viewed as a whole, support a reasonable inference ‘that is inconsistent with
guilt, the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction and we must reverse.’” Id.
(quoting Isaac, 9 N.W.3d at 818).
Winnowing down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact
in favor of the jury’s verdict, see id. at *5, the relevant circumstances proved are as follows.
Combs was the driver and sole occupant of a stolen Jeep. Combs had the Jeep ’s key fob
in his pocket, and his personal effects, including a document and two cell phones, were in
the Jeep. A clear bag containing over 50 grams of fentanyl was “readily apparent” in the
driver’s side door pocket, an area that would have been easily accessible to the driver. The
fentanyl was worth roughly $4,000 and was in an quantity that a person would not typically
leave behind. When Combs saw police remove the bag of fentanyl from the Jeep , he
became physically violent and told police, “I saw what they pulled out of the car,” and “It’s
over. Kill me now.”
Having identified the circumstances proved, we now consider “whether the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a
whole and not as discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that [Combs] is
guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. at *11. We
conclude that the circumstances proved in this case—including that Combs was the driver
and sole occupant of the Jeep, the fentanyl was readily accessible in the driver’s side door
pocket, Combs’s personal documents and phones were in the Jeep, and Combs’s reaction
8
when the fentanyl was discovered—are consistent with the reasonable inference that
Combs was consciously exercising dominion and control over the fentanyl. See Smith, 619
N.W.2d at 770-71 (concluding that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove the
defendant’s constructive possession of a firearm in a rental car when defendant was the
sole occupant of the car and the firearm was located partially beneath his leg).
Relying on State v. Sam, Combs argues that his large stomach prevented him from
seeing the fentanyl and, as a result, there is a reasonable hypothesis that the fentanyl
belonged to the owner of the Jeep or to someone who was in the Jeep before Combs. 859
N.W.2d 825 (Minn. App. 2015). We reject Combs’s argument for two reasons. First, even
assuming that the size of Combs’s stomach is a circumstance proved, 4 it is not a
circumstance proved that Combs’s stomach obstructed his view of the fentanyl in its
readily-apparent location next to the driver’s seat. As we explained, we may not reverse a
conviction “based on mere conjecture.” Firkus, 2026 WL 517248, at *9 (quotation
omitted). Furthermore, when determining the reasonableness of inferences, we must
consider the circumstances proved not in isolation, but as a whole. Id. at *11. Combs’s
alternative hypothesis is not reasonable considering the circumstances proved as a whole,
which include Combs being the driver and sole occupant of the Jeep, the proximity of the
fentanyl to the driver’s seat, and his reaction upon law enforcement’s discovery of the
fentanyl.

4 The state does not dispute that Combs’s physical stature is a circumstance proved.
9
Second, Sam is inapposite. In Sam, the defendant was convicted of possessing
methamphetamine found in the glove compartment of the vehicle he was driving. 859
N.W.2d at 829. The vehicle belonged to another individual. Id. at 828. We concluded
that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession because,
although the defendant was the driver, the methamphetamine was found in the glove
compartment and no “effects identifying the defendant were found near or on the [drugs].”
Id. at 835-36. Here, unlike Sam, Combs was the only person in the Jeep, the fentanyl was
in the driver’s side door, and Combs’s personal effects were in the Jeep.
We conclude that the circumstances proved are consistent with the rational
hypothesis that Combs constructively possess ed the fentanyl by consciously exercising
dominion and control over it and are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than
guilt. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Combs’s conviction for first-degree
controlled-substance possession.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Combs’s motion for
a mistrial.

In the alternative, Combs argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for a mistrial after a police officer testified to inadmissible evidence.
A mistrial should be granted only if “there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the trial would be different if the event that prompted the motion had not occurred.” State
v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). We review the denial
of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. Id. “A district court abuses its discretion
10
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
On the second day of trial, the state moved to introduce the 911 call that Officer J.S.
learned about as he was following the Jeep. The 911 caller reported that a man in a vehicle
matching the Jeep’s description had pointed a gun. Combs objected. The district court
ruled that the state could introduce evidence that “there was a 911 call reporting a gun and
a description of the car and that the description resembled the car that they were already
surveilling or following.” The district court denied the state’s request to introduce evidence
that the 911 caller reported that the person who pointed the gun was wearing clothes similar
to those Combs was wearing, reasoning that the evidence about the 911 call should be
limited to providing context for the manner in which the officers detained Combs. With
Combs’s agreement, the district court cautioned the jury that the 911 call was being offered
for the limited purpose of explaining why Officer J.S. conducted a high-risk stop of Combs
after Combs got out of the Jeep.
Despite the district court’s ruling, another officer, Officer A.D., testified that his
partner informed him that “there was a 911 call in downtown Minneapolis involving a
white Jeep SRT with dark window tint with a heavyset black male wearing all green. And
[the male] had pointed a gun.” Outside the presence of the jury, the district court discussed
Officer A.D.’s testimony about the 911 call with the parties. The district court explained
that it “didn’t interrupt at the time,” but that it would repeat its cautionary instruction to the
jury on the 911 call’s limited purpose.
11
Combs moved for a mistrial, arguing that Officer A.D.’s testimony went beyond
the court’s ruling and that the cautionary instruction was insufficient to mitigate the
prejudicial effect of the testimony. The district court denied the mistrial motion . The
district court determined that, while Officer A.D.’s testimony “specifically went beyond
what [it] had ordered,” there was no evidence the state failed to properly prepare its witness.
In addition, the district court reasoned that some of the challenged evidence came out
through defense counsel’s questioning of other witnesses, including when counsel asked a
witness about “Combs’ reaction upon hearing about the gun from the 911 call,” and
whether a witness “match[ed] the description of the person in the [911] call.” And the
district court noted that it had repeated its “very specific cautionary instruction” that “pretty
much directly addresses the potential prejudice.”
On appeal, Combs challenges the district court’s ruling as an abuse of discretion.
We agree that, as the district court found, evidence that the 911 caller reported that the
person who pointed a gun was “a heavyset black male wearing all green” should not have
been admitted because the district court ruled that evidence inadmissible. “But the fact
that the jury heard inadmissible testimony does not end our inquiry.” State v. Jaros, 932
N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. 2019). Rather, w e will not reverse a verdict unless Combs
establishes that there is a “reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict.” Id. (stating that “the burden rests on [appellant] to
establish a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict had
the wrongfully admitted testimony not come in” (quotation omitted)). To determine
whether inadmissible testimony significantly impacted the verdict requiring a mistrial, “we
12
examine the entire record,” reviewing whether “the [s]tate presented other evidence on the
issue, as well as whether the district court issued cautionary instructions.” Id. at 474
(quotation omitted). We also consider whether the state relied on the challenged evidence
in its closing argument. Id.
Combs acknowledges that the state did not reference the inadmissible portion of
Officer A. D.’s testimony during its closing argument and that the district court gave a
cautionary instruction. But Combs asserts that the cautionary instruction was insufficient
to mitigate the prejudicial effect of Officer A.D.’s testimony. Analogizing to prior bad-
acts evidence, Combs asserts that because the testimony established that Combs “engaged
in egregious unlawful conduct by pointing a gun from a vehicle at another person,” the jury
must have believed that “he likely also engaged in unlawful conduct by possessing the
fentanyl.”
On this record, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny
Combs’s mistrial motion. See State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 819 (Minn. 2013)
(stating appellate courts review the denial of a mistrial motion for abuse of discretion
because “the district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any,
of an event occurring during the trial”). The district court instructed the jury multiple times
that evidence of the 911 call and its contents was to be used for the limited purpose of
providing context for Officer J.S.’s high-risk stop. We assume that the jury followed the
court’s instructions. See State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 578 (Minn. 2009). The
inadmissible testimony that the 911 caller described the driver as a “heavyset black male
wearing all green” was “isolated and brief ,” consisting of just two sentences in a trial
13
transcript that otherwise spans hundreds of pages. See Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d at 819
(concluding that a single inadmissible reference to prior bad-acts evidence over a four-day
trial did not warrant a mistrial). Further, as Combs acknowledges, the state did not
reference the contents of the 911 call during closing argument. See Jaros, 932 N.W.2d at
475 (concluding that the defendant did not meet his burden of establishing a reasonable
possibility that the inadmissible evidence significantly affected the verdict in part because
the state did not refer to the evidence during closing argument). And finally, the state’s
evidence was strong. See supra section I; see also Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d at 819 (assessing
the strength of the state’s evidence in concluding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial).
Combs therefore has not established that there is a reasonable probability that
Officer A.D.’s inadmissible testimony significantly affected the verdict. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Combs’s motion for a mistrial.
III. Combs’s pro se arguments do not merit reversal.
In a pro se supplemental brief, Combs argues that we must reverse his convictions
or grant a new trial because of Officer J.S.’s “false or misleading” testimony and the
“material inconsistencies” between Officer J.S.’s police report, body-camera footage, and
trial testimony.
The record shows that Officer J.S. testified that the department had a new handheld
camera that he was not entirely sure how to operate and that he believed it was recording
when he saw Combs exit the vehicle, as reflected in his report. He testified that when he
went to review the footage, it was not there. Officer J.S. speculated that the footage was
14
either reformatted by another officer before he had a chance to upload it, or that he failed
to properly record it due to his unfamiliarity with the camera.
We understand Combs’s challenge to be to the sufficiency of the evidence and, more
particularly, to Officer J.S.’s credibility. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
appellate courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263
(Minn. 2016); see also State v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 188 n.4 (Minn. 2022) (rejecting an
argument attacking a witness’s credibility as “unavailing” under this standard of review).
The jury viewed other body-camera footage, heard defense counsel cross-examine Officer
J.S. about the lack of footage and the alleged inconsistenci es between his written report
and his testimony, and ultimately found Combs guilty. We defer to the jury’s credibility
determinations and do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See State v. Olson, 982 N.W.2d
491, 495 (Minn. App. 2022).
Having carefully reviewed Combs’s pro se arguments, we conclude that none
provides a basis for relief on appeal.
Affirmed.